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ABSTRACT PAGE 
Between the founding of the French post of Detroit in 1701 and the end of Pontiac's War in 1766, 
several native American peoples settled in distinct clusters around the French (and later British 
post) near current-day Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario. Focusing on the interactions 
among these communities, this dissertation makes two interrelated arguments. It first argues 
that, although these peoples had been challenged and changed by the forces of colonialism 
during the seventeenth century, they nonetheless emerged from that century as discrete ethnic, 
social, and political entities, rather than shattered or disintegrated refugees. A set of 
interconnected, mutually constituting, and consistent relationships between these separate and 
autonomous peoples, secondly, shaped affairs in the region just as much as the relationship 
between Europeans and native peoples. That colonial relationship, in fact, was embedded within 
and reciprocally tied to the web of relationships between native peoples. Only by understanding 
both exchanges between French and native peoples as well as modes of interaction between 
different indigenous peoples can scholars make sense of events at Detroit. 
To demonstrate both the survival of these native groups as discrete peoples and the 
consequences of that survival, each of the first four chapters explores one of the salient 
relationships between native peoples at Detroit, while the final charts how these relationships 
shaped one event, Pontiac's War. The first chapter charts the way in which the Huron man, 
Cheanonvouzon, sought to compensate for his peoples' weakness by forming a "southern 
alliance" with two powerful groups in the region, the Miamis and Five Nations, or Iroquois. The 
second chapter investigates how the closely related Anishinaabe peoples-the Ottawas, Ojibwas, 
and Potawatomis-cooperated to meet the challenge posed by the southern alliance. The 
emergence of these two rival blocs led to conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738, and 
the third chapter places that violence within a longer pattern of competition between these 
peoples. Chapter Four uses a controversy among the Hurons in the 17 40s and 1750s to 
understand the bonds which held that community together. Finally, the fifth chapter demonstrates 
how all of these patterns shaped one event, the Anglo-Indian conflict frequently called Pontiac's 
War, and situates that conflict within a local context. As scholars investigate how these 
relationships mutually constituted not only one another but also the colonial relationship, 
intercultural relations at Detroit, as well as the rest of the New World, become at once more 
complicated and more comprehensible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Same Body 
In a December 1701 conference, Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, 
commandant of a new post on the Detroit River, invited the Hurons to come live at 
Detroit. Settled alongside the other native nations that were sure to come, Cadillac 
assured the Hurons, they would find cheap trading goods and security from enemies such 
as the Dakotas. Cadillac further promised the Hurons that he would "embrace [them] and 
enclose you between [his] arms," and that they would form "the same body" with the 
French and other natives settled at the fort. 1 The following year he told the Miamis, 
through the Huron headman Cheanonvouzon, that "if they [the Miamis] come close to 
me, we will be the same body."2 
The analogy of a single, integrated body perfectly captured the sort of alliance 
that Cadillac and the French hoped to build among the peoples of the Great Lakes 
Region, or pays d'en haut.3 As the governor of New France, Hector de Calliere, had 
articulated it earlier that year, this alliance would unite all of France's allies in the region 
into a collective military and commercial entity-a "new nation." To ensure harmony 
1 
"je pourray vous embrasser et vous renfermer entre mes bras," "Conseil des Hurons tenu dans le fort du 
Detroit, le 4 Decembre 1701," in MDE 5:261. When the original French is supplied in the notes, the 
translation is that of the author. I have not corrected misspellings or inserted missing accent marks except 
when their absence makes the word unrecognizable. The translations are generally try to capture the sense 
of the quotation rather than a literal translation. 
2 
"Paroles de quatre Hurons ... ," 17 Feb. 1702, in ibid., 266. For other uses of this idiom, see Antoine 
Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac, capitaine en pied, ayant une 
compagnie de la Marine, en Canada, ci-devant Commandant de Missilimakinak et autres postes dans les 
pays eloignes, ou il a ete pendant trois annees," in ibid., 118; "Words of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the 
Savages Who Came down from the Upper Country, [1711], MPHSCR, 33:503. 
3 The French universally referred to the Great Lakes Region as the "pays d'en haut" or "upper country" to 
differentiate it from the St. Lawrence Valley-the "pays d'en bas" or "lower country." The pays d'en haut 
included a wide swath ofland reaching west from the St. Lawrence Valley to the Plains, even including, in 
some formulations, the Ohio River Valley and Illinois Country. 
1 
among these peoples, the governor of New France would mediate disputes among the 
nations and thus maintain peace among these people.4 As Calliere reminded to the 
Ottawas the following year, "if you have any quarrel between your people and theirs [the 
Iroquois'] do not Avenge it but Come here and inform me of it," so he could reconcile the 
two peoples."5 The French cast this alliance in familial terms: the nations of the region, 
"Onontio's children," would cooperate with one another and would acknowledge French 
mediation between them. 6 
Accepting Cadillac's promise and invitation, the Hurons and other groups who 
eventually settled at Detroit in the early eighteenth century-the Ottawas, the Ojibwas, 
and Potawatomis-certainly appeared to embrace this French vision of a unified regional 
alliance.7 They explicitly used the language of alliance. During the peace negotiations in 
August 1701, for example, the Ottawa leader Ontontagon, whom the French called Jean 
le Blanc, noted that, although they frequently disagreed, the Hurons and Ottawas 
"nevertheless form only one body together." Cheanonvouzon likewise noted that the 
4 Maxime Gohier describes "mediation" as the "French imperial policy" and lauds the "genius" of such 
diplomacy. Gohier is more comfortable describing the way that mediation was meant to work than 
assessing the extent to which it did work (Gohier, Onontio le mediateur: La gestion des conflits 
amerindiens en Nouvelle-France, 1603-1717 [Sillery: Septentrion, 2008], 23, 39). 
5 
"s'il arrivoit quelque desmele entre quelqu'uns de vos [les Outaouaois] gens et les leurs [les Iroquois] de 
n'en pas Vanger mais de Venir m'en donner avis affin que je accommode touts chose comme je l'ay 
preserver [?] dans cette paix" ("Parolles des outaotiaes arrivez a Montreal Le Cinq juillet 1702," in Moreau 
St.-Mery Collection, serie F3, Centre des archives d'outre mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, vol. 8, fol. 310. 
6 
"il vouloit etre le seul Arbitte de leurs differends ... qu'ils rernissent tous leurs interets entre ses mains," 
"Tous applaudirent avec de grandes acclamations, dont I' air retentit bien loin," Pierre-Fran~ois-Xavier 
Charlevoix, Histoire et description generale de la Nouvelle France, 6 vols (Paris: Didot, 1744), 3:415, 418. 
See also, Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal : French-native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth 
Century. trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (Ithaca: McGill-Queens University Press), 2001; White, 
The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 142; Havard, Empire et metissages: Indiens et Franr;ais dans le pays 
d'en haut, 1660-1715 (Quebec: Septentrion and Presses de l'Universite Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 215. 
7 I use "Detroit" to designate the settlement during the French regime, from 1701 until1760, and "Detroit" 
to refer to the post and region in the British period (after 1760). 
2 
Hurons and the Miamis shared "one Body," and the Miami leader Chichikatalo 
confirmed that his people had "the same will as the Huron[s'] with whom we make only 
one body." Fifty years later, the native peoples living at Detroit used nearly identical 
terms to describe their alliance with one another, claiming to have "the same Heart, and 
the same Body."8 In 1760, the Hurons once again proclaimed, now to the British troops 
who had just taken possession of Detroit, that "All the Indians in this Country are Allies 
to each other and as one People" and "form one heart and one body together."9 
These proclamations of unity were more than simply words. On a daily basis, the 
peoples of Detroit lived in close proximity, traded with one another and with French 
merchants, competed in lacrosse and footraces with one another, and, in some cases loved 
and married one another. They sometimes appealed to the French to help them settle 
disputes and to keep the peace as well. These peoples also formed a powerful military 
coalition which had warred with the Iroquois in the seventeenth century and fought 
against the Catawbas, Foxes, Chickasaws, British, and other common enemies during the 
eighteenth. This cooperation suggests that the peoples of the region had indeed formed a 
single, integrated body under the auspices of Onontio. As one prominent historian of the 
region phrases it, the nations had joined a "collective identity." The peoples of Detroit 
cooperated so closely that they appeared to form a single "Indian community at Detroit," 
8 
"vous ne faites plus qu'un meme Cceur, et qu'un meme Corps," "Conseil des hurons en presence des 
outaotiais, et pouteouatarnis [et Sauteux] et reponse, Mai 1753, in CAOM, C11A, vol. 99, fol. 76v. 
9 George Croghan, "Journal," 1760-1761, in Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels: Travel to the 
Interior of North America, 1748-!856, 32 vols (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1904-1907) 1:118; "Minutes of 
the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson Bart with the Indians on his Way to, and at the Detroit in 1761," in 
WSJ, 2:497. 
3 
Figure 1: Detail from Antoine Laumet 
de Lamothe Cadillac, "Carte du 
Detroit," 1702. Service historique de Ia 
Marine, Chateau de Vincennes, France). 
Tlus map shows the ongmal three native 
settlements closest to Fort Pontchartram m 
therr ongmal configuration From top to 
bottom, they are the Ottawa settlement, the 
short-hved Loup, or Molucan, commumty, 
and, below Fort Pontchartram, the Huron 
village 
and easily mteracted "across boundaries that were too often and too casually described as 
tnbal."10 
Yet a 1702 map of DetrOit presents a different perspective of that alliance (see 
figure 1). Drawn by Cadillac, the map shows that each of the groups then settled at 
Detroit-the French, Hurons, Ottawas, and Mohicans (Loups)-had Its own separate 
village, walled off from their neighbors. Far from forming one cozy commumty or an 
integrated "body," DetrOit consisted of a collectiOn of distinct ethnic enclaves positioned 
miles apart from one another. 11 Cadillac mdicated that each of these native commumties 
erected defensive palisades around their villages. Such walls served not only to defend 
these nations from external enemies, particularly the Iroquois Confederacy, or Five 
Nations with whom they had recently made a tentative and fragile peace, but as physical 
mamfestat10ns of the psychological distance which separated these communities from 
10 Jon Parmenter, "Pontiac's War Forgmg New Lmks m the Anglo-Iroqums Covenant Cham, 1758-1766," 
Ethnohzstory 44 4 (Fall, 1997), 633, Gregory Dowd, War under Heaven Pontzac, the lndzan Natwns, & 
the Brztzsh Empzre (Baltimore Johns Hopkins Umversity Press, 2002), 62 
11 Cadillac au rmmstre, 25 sept 1702, mMPHSCR, 33 137-38 
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one another. 12 These representations suggest that, contrary to what the French wanted to 
believe or the natives were willing to say, the peoples of the pays d' en haut had not 
abandoned their discrete identities to embrace a single, common identity or form the 
"same body." Indeed the peoples of Detroit demonstrated repeatedly in the coming 
decades that, although willing to cooperate with one another, they continued to be 
separate peoples with separate agendas and goals. Indeed, as the Jesuit polymath Pierre-
Fran<;ois-Xavier Charlevoix observed, the pays d'en haut was home to a melange of 
peoples. At "first glance," he admitted in 1721, "there is much resemblance in the 
character of the wit, morals, and customs of the savages of Canada." Yet his extensive 
research and his own observations in the region convinced him that these apparent 
similarities obscured a more profound "diversity" that separated the nations. 13 To the 
consternation of Cadillac, his successors, and countless other colonial officials, the native 
peoples never formed a single body under French supervision. "Onontio's children" 
refused to melt into a common, undifferentiated whole. 
t 
This dissertation takes its cue from Lamothe Cadillac's 1702 map, rather than his 
1701 rhetoric. Focusing on the native peoples who settled at Detroit between the 
establishment of the French post there in 1701 and the conclusion of the Anglo-Indian 
conflict called Pontiac's War in 1766, I make two interrelated claims. First, I argue that 
12 William Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance" (PhD. diss. Dept. of History, 
University of Toronto, 1995), 248. 
13 
"Il est vrai que malgre cette diversite, qui ne se remarque pas du premier coup d'reil, il y a bien de la 
ressemblance dans la caractere d' esprit, les mreurs, & les cofitumes de to us les Sauvages du Canada." 
Pierre-Fran9ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un Voyage, ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 2 vols (Montreal: Les 
Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744], 1994), 1:452. 
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although the peoples who settled at Detroit faced considerable disruptions in the 
seventeenth century they nonetheless survived as discrete and autonomous groups. 
During the seventeenth century these peoples had encountered new diseases which 
ravaged some communities, encountered a wide range of new technology and new ideas, 
and engaged in a series of devastating wars with the Five Nations Iroquois. Some, 
especially the Hurons and Kiskakon Ottawas, had been forced to flee their homes when 
the Iroquois defeated them in the 1640s and again when the Dakotas did so in the 1660s. 
Yet the peoples of the region adapted to these changes and survived the seventeenth 
century as independent and autonomous social, political, and cultural entities. The pays 
d' en haut, therefore, was peopled by a host of discrete native peoples. 
In arguing that these peoples identified themselves as distinct and autonomous, I 
do not mean to suggest that these identities operated as static, abstracted self-definitions 
like "citizenship." Rather than a fixed, self-conscious explanation of what it meant to be 
"Huron," or "Potawatomi," I understand identity to be a dynamic mode of acting which 
reflected loyalty to and membership in an exclusive and distinct community of fictively 
and literally related people (by which I mean a circumscribed and politically unified, 
though not necessarily centralized, entity). Thus identity was a way of living, not a mode 
of thinking. Native people demonstrated this identity, for example, when leaders sought 
to accomplish the best interest of their communities, when warriors fought to defend one 
another, and when they made alliances with other nations. Moreover, this identity could 
change over time as circumstances required. What persisted through these changes, 
however, was a consistent tendency to act in ways that affirmed membership in a larger 
6 
community. 
My second argument flows from the first. If the peoples of Detroit did not form 
"one body," and instead acted as coherent and discrete peoples, then scholars must pay 
attention not only to how Europeans interacted with native peoples, but with how native 
peoples acted with one another. Specifically, I argue that a set of interconnected, 
mutually constituting, and consistent relationships between the native people at Detroit 
shaped affairs in the region just as much as the relationship between the French and 
native peoples did. That colonial relationship, in fact, was embedded within and 
reciprocally tied to the web of relationships between native peoples. Only by 
understanding both exchanges between French and native peoples as well as modes of 
interaction between different indigenous peoples can we make sense of events at Detroit. 
Intercultural relations at Detroit, in other words, did not constitute a two-way dialogue 
·between the French and the natives, but a multi-sided conversation among many groups 
including the French. As scholars eavesdrop on this conversation, and fully listen to each 
of the participants, the cultural encounter becomes at once more complicated and more 
comprehensible. 
Home to many native groups living in such intimate proximity, Detroit offers the 
ideal laboratory for eavesdropping on this conversation. 14 From the beginning, the post 
attracted a large and diverse population of natives. The settled native population, 
consisting of a variety of cultural groups, generally did not dip much below 2,000 and 
approached 2,500 at times. In addition to the permanently settled groups-the Hurons, 
14 Following the contemporary French usage, I define Detroit expansively to include not only the location 
of the modem-day city, but also the entire "strait" from Lake Huron to Lake Erie. 
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Ottawas, Mahicans, Ojibwas, and later Potawatomies-a number of others frequented the 
post to trade, carry out diplomacy, and rest during long journeys. A constant stream of 
Miamis, Iroquois, Foxes, lllinois, and other groups spent time at the post. These natives 
found at Detroit a cosmopolis of sorts, a mixture of tongues, cultures, dress, and religious 
beliefs. These differences led to myriad encounters and exchanges, ranging from the 
prosaic to the profound. Here, more than in the rest of the pays d' en haut, and indeed 
more than most of eastern North America, natives of different groups encountered one 
another on a daily basis, playing, trading, loving, and living in a dynamic new world. 15 
To demonstrate both the survival of these native groups as discrete peoples and 
the consequences of that survival, each of the first four chapters explores one of the 
salient relationships between native peoples at Detroit, and the final chapter charts how 
these relationships shaped one event, Pontiac's War. Together, these chapters form a 
single narrative arc. Focusing on roughly the first decade of settlement at Detroit, the 
first chapter explains how Cheanonvouzon, sought to compensate for his peoples' 
numerical weakness and diplomatic isolation by forming a "southern alliance" with two 
powerful groups in the region, the Miamis and Five Nations, or Iroquois. The second 
chapter investigates how the closely related Anishinaabe peoples-the Ottawas, Ojibwas, 
and Potawatomis-cooperated to meet the challenge posed by the southern alliance. The 
15 Until recently Detroit has received little scholarly attention. Older narrative histories such as George 
Pare (The Catholic Church in Detroit, 1951) and Clarence M. Burton ("Cadillac's Village," 1896) focused 
on the French community, referring to natives only incidentally. In recent years, however, a number of 
scholars have begun investigating the post more fully. These have focused more on Europeans in the 
region, with the exception of Karen Marrero, who is interested in metissage among European and native 
peoples. Lina Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit, 1701-1765," (PhD. diss., Dept. of History, 
Universite Laval, 2002);Catherine Cangany, "Frontier Seaport: Detroit's Transformation into an Atlantic 
Entrepot, 1701-1837 ," (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, University of Michigan, 2009); Guillaume Teasdale, 
"The French of Orchard Country : Territory, Landscape, and Ethnicity in the Detroit River Region, 1680s-
1810s," (PhD. diss., Dept. ofHistory, York University, 2011). 
8 
emergence of two rival blocs led to conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738, 
and the third chapter places that violence within a longer pattern of competition between 
these peoples. Chapter Four uses a controversy within the Huron community, prompted 
by violence between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738, to understand the bonds which 
held that community together. Finally, the fifth chapter demonstrates how all of these 
patterns shaped one event, the Anglo-Indian conflict frequently called Pontiac's War, and 
situates that conflict within a local context. 
Although I have attempted to understand and analyze the dynamics of these 
relationships separately, they were clearly interwoven and mutually contingent. The 
Hurons' close association with the Iroquois and Miamis in the early eighteenth century, 
for example, had much to do with the Hurons' resentment of the Ottawas, their close 
neighbors and allies. And this Huron resentment came, in large part, from the Ottawas' 
dominance in the region, which itself derived from the Ottawas' connections to other 
Anishinaabe people in the region. It is therefore difficult to tell one story without telling 
all the stories, and to define where one ends and another begins. I have nonetheless 
sought to reduce repetition as much as possible and to supply only as much information 
as necessary to explain the current relationship while including cross-references to other 
chapters. 
t 
My work participates in an ongoing reappraisal of intercultural interaction in the 
pays d'en haut. For nearly three decades, that literature has been dominated by the 
perspective offered by Richard White in his brilliant and magisterial The Middle Ground. 
9 
In that book, White suggests that the forces unleashed by the colonial encounter-
disease, more frequent and more deadly warfare, dislocation, and dependence upon 
European goods-proved too powerful for native societies to handle. Overwhelmed by 
these challenges, native societies splintered into feeble fragments. In order to survive, 
these shards gathered themselves to form new mosaics, heterogeneous new constellations 
that could cope with the forces of colonialism. In New France, colonial officials 
fashioned these scattered remnants into a new political and cultural configuration-a 
"common identity." As White phrases it, "[w]ar, famine, and disease, ... had been the 
executioners of the older, familiar world of the Algonquians, ... [and] the gruesome 
midwives attending the birth of the new world of the pays d' en haut." In a sense, they 
became French Indians or "Algonquians," dependent upon Onontio for support, for 
guidance, and, crucially, for mediation and crisis-management. Only Onontio's careful 
mediation of disputes kept the alliance from crumbling. Under the governor's watchful 
eye, his brood fused into one more-or-less integrated collective. Dependent upon the 
French, these peoples embraced Onontio's interests as their own. In order to serve their 
mutual interests, they created an accommodative "middle ground" in which they created 
compromise through "creative misunderstandings."16 
As the number of studies citing "the middle ground" suggests, White's thesis 
looms large in the historiography both of the Great Lakes Region and of North American 
more generally. 17 White so thoroughly defined the region, in fact, that even many of his 
16 Richard White, The Middle Ground, xi. ix, 2, 16, 33, 142. 
17 See, for example, Charles Weeks, Paths to a Middle Ground: The Diplomacy of Natchez, Boukfouka, 
Nogales, and San Fernando de las Barrancas, 1791-1795 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
10 
critics accept his basic conceptual framework. Gilles Havard, for example, argues that 
White misapprehended the meaning of the "middle ground." What appeared to be 
accommodative practices based on mutual regard, Havard argues, were actually infused 
with French imperial ambitions. Through "mixing," the French hoped ultimately to 
establish their suzerainty in the region, and to accomplish "colonization without a 
population." Disagree though he might about White's description of the European-Indian 
interaction, however, Havard nonetheless accepts that the cultural encounter was a two-
sided affair, an "entre-deux dynamique." He echoes White, concluding that the French 
formed a "new nation" in the pays d' en haut, and arguing that they "conferred a common 
identity to their Amerindian allies."18 
My work, however, diverges from White in two critical respects-one 
methodological and the other philosophical-and thereby participates in larger debates 
about intercultural interaction in the Great Lakes Region and beyond. First, while White 
attempted to survey a large geographical region over a long span, my work focuses 
specifically on one small, albeit important, corner of that region. Surveying a region that 
stretched from the outskirts of Montreal to the Great Plains and from the seventeenth 
century until the War of 1812, White offers an abstracted aerial view of the Great Lakes 
Region. At such a remove, the texture of social relations and lines between peoples 
become blurry. From this perspective, the peoples of the region did in fact look as 
though they formed a grand alliance which, except for a few exceptions, functioned as a 
"common identity." Conflict and tension among natives likewise appear only 
2005); Kathleen Du Val, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
18 Havard, Empire et metissages, 44, 205. 
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occasionally as aberrations to the overall pattern. When scholars narrow that perspective, 
however, and study specific people, groups, places, or events, the social landscape of the 
region changes profoundly. Distinct peoples with their own goals and identities emerge 
from the undifferentiated "Algonquian" masses. Quarrels which otherwise seem 
innocuous and exceptional begin to demonstrate larger patterns and dynamics between 
peoples. When meticulously tracked on a local level, the behavior of local communities 
demonstrates a consistency over time and patterns of interactions between these peoples 
become clear. The Hurons acted in a certain way over time, for example, and they 
interacted with the Ottawas according to a consistent logic during that time. This 
behavior and consistency suggest that these peoples acted as separate communities over 
the longue duree. When viewed microscopically at Detroit, in other words, the Great 
Lakes Region begins to look significantly different than it did to White. 
In focusing specifically on Detroit to understand the larger dynamics of the 
region, I follow other researchers who have explored specific periods, incidents, peoples, 
or places, and developed a very different view of the region from White's. Specifically, 
these works have questioned the degree to which the Iroquois Wars "shattered" the 
people of the region, and, consequently the extent to which these people acted like 
"Algonquians" beholden to the French. William Newbigging, for instance, focuses 
specifically on one people, the Ottawas. Intensively reconstructing Ottawa diplomatic 
affairs during the French period, Newbigging points out that, far from being shattered, the 
Ottawas survived the Iroquois Wars of the seventeenth century largely intact. He further 
argues that the Ottawas did not ally themselves with the French because they were a 
12 
shattered people in need of a French father, as White suggests, but because they were a 
healthy people who saw an alliance with the French as an opportunity to advance their 
own interests and consolidate their influence among other native nations. As Newbigging 
suggests, the pays d' en haut is better understood not by viewing the whole region 
abstractly, but by understanding "individual nations ... one community at a time."19 
Focusing on one culture group in a part of the pays d' en haut, Heidi Bohak:er likewise 
contends that the Anishinaabe people identified themselves not as "Algonquians," but as 
members of kinship groupings, or "nindoodemag. "20 Referring specifically to White, 
George Ironstack, who focuses on the Miami settlement of Pickiwillany, points out that 
the "lack of localized studies" of the region has led to "the construction of overly broad 
generalizations that fail to take into account the diversity that existed ... among the 
indigenous peoples of the pays d'en haut.'m This attention to local history reflects a 
larger trend in the literature of native American history.22 
Although scholars have increasingly questioned White's argument that the 
peoples of the pays d'en haut formed a regional "identity" based on their alliance with the 
French, they have disagreed about how identity actually functioned in the region. While 
some argue that the various "nations" or "tribal" groups that the French described 
maintained separate identities, others reject such designations as imperial impositions on 
19 Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 2, 27, 248-29, 410. 
20 Heidi Bohaker, Nindoodemag: The Significance of the Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern 
Great Lakes Region 1600-1701," WMQ, 36:1 (Jan. 2006), 29, 46; Bohaker, "Nindoodemag: Anishinaabe 
Identities in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1900 (PhD. diss., Dept. of History, University of 
Toronto, 2006), 40-41. 
21 George Ironstack, "From the Ashes: One Story of the Village of Pinkwi Mihtohseeniaki"( M.A. thesis, 
Dept. of History, Miami University, 2006), 5. 
22 Joshua Piker articulates the need for community studies of native American peoples (Okfuskee: A Creek 
Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-6. 
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peoples that would not have identified themselves as "Ottawas" or "Ojibwas."23 These 
names, they argue, imply fixity of membership and political organization alien to the 
peoples of the pays d' en haut. Such scholars are certainly correct to suggest that these 
peoples did not operate like "nations" or "tribes" as we understand those terms. Yet their 
lived experience suggests that these designations meant something, even if they do not 
mean everything that contemporary or modem observers might assume they do. If these 
"national" or "tribal" categories meant nothing, why did different natives choose to live 
in different villages which included people of multiple lineages? Why did they speak as 
one people at councils? How could they even consider going to war with one another, if 
there was not some meaning to these "national" designations? As a Huron word list from 
around 1747 attests, even native peoples classified their neighbors by these supposedly 
artificial "national" names.24 
If I have adopted a different approach from White's, I have also asked different 
questions of my sources. White, and other scholars of his historiographic moment, asked 
a new and important question: how did native people interact with European newcomers 
23 Claiming that the "differences between these nations are vital," Newbigging suggests that "individual 
nations must be studied one community at a time." Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa 
Alliance," 2, 27, 248-29, 410. Michael Witgen, in contrast, suggests that the Anishinaabeg were "shape-
shifters" who easily and fluidly exchanged identities as the situation required. "The Rituals of Possession: 
Native Identity and the Invention of Empire in Seventeenth-Century Western North America," 
Ethnohistory, 54:4 (Fall 2007): 667. Heidi Bohaker likewise rejects the "names and categories imposed by 
outsiders," and instead argues that Anishinaabeg (the plural of Anishinaabe) identified themselves 
primarily through their patrilineal nindoodemag, or totemic clan designation. Nindoodemag: The 
Significance of the Algonquian Kinship Networks," 29, 46; Bohaker, "Nindoodemag: Anishinaabe 
Identities." 
24 Potier left two different versions of a Huron dictionary recording the Hurons' names for their neighbors. 
In both cases the Hurons provided separate and corporate names for each of these people, although they did 
provide different names for the Ottawas living at Detroit and those at Saginaw. To be sure, Potier's 
questions might have shaped the Hurons' responses, but this evidence nonetheless suggests that the Hurons 
categorized their neighbors the same way the French did. Pierre Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte 
I, 230, Texte II, 263. 
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to shape the Great Lakes Region? The answers to this question greatly illuminated not 
only native American history but early American history more generally. For the first 
time, scholars really understood the role played by native agents in the new world. Yet 
the question itself dictates the answer. By its very terms it assumes the locus of those 
interactions to be between Europeans and native people. I have asked, instead, a more 
basic question: which relationships shaped the Great Lakes Region? By searching for 
patterns of interaction not only between Europeans and native peoples but among native 
peoples themselves, I found that the interaction between Europeans and natives, 
accommodative or otherwise, did not dictate events in the pays d' en haut. Instead, a 
whole set of longstanding and dynamic relationships among native peoples shaped the 
social reality of the region, some of which had precious little to do with the French or 
British. The colonial relationship, though certainly consequential, was also embedded in 
a larger matrix of relationships. Those relationships both molded and circumscribed the 
colonial relationship, and were in tum molded and circumscribed by it. Scholars cannot 
therefore understand the colonial relationship, abstracted from those other entangled 
relationships. 
This study therefore belongs to a longer tradition which has appreciated the 
importance of understanding interactions among native peoples. Many of these 
historians, tellingly, wrote before the publication of The Middle Ground in 1991. In 
1983, for example, Michael McConnell argues that native peoples of the Great Lakes and 
Ohio Valley did not act as "cultural monoliths" following the fall of New France, but as 
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distinct and heterogeneous peoples?5 In his dissertation, Peter MacLeod also denied that 
"European-Amerindian relations were the most important phenomena in the west," and 
argues that native groups were connected in "network[s] of relationships" with other 
native groups?6 More recently, Brett Rushforth has observed that the Ottawas and other 
groups demanded that the French wage war against other purported "Algonquians," like 
the Foxes. Such behavior, Rushforth suggests, renders White's "binary" representation 
of "Euro-Americans on one side, Indians on the other" unconvincing.27 Historians of 
other regions, especially those focusing on Iroquoia, have also explored interactions 
among native peoples as well.28 Together these works suggest the complexity of 
intercultural interaction in the new world. 
t 
I use both an ethnohistorical and a microhistorical approach to understand 
interactions among native peoples at Detroit. It is based on a close reading of French-
produced documents, such as official and ecclesiastical correspondence, maps, notarial 
records, and native-language lexicons. Although such documents are clearly filtered and 
shaped by the prejudices of their authors, they nonetheless offer a wealth of useful 
25 Michael N. McConnell, "The Search for Security: Indian-English Relations in the Trans-Appalachian 
Region, 1758-1763." (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, College of William & Mary, 1983), viii. 
26 Peter MacLeod. "Une conspiration generate: The Exercise of Power by the Amerindians during the War 
of Austrian Secession." (Ph.D. diss. Dept. of History. University of Ottawa, 1992), 183. 
27 Rushforth, "Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance," WMQ, 36:1 (Jan. 2006), 58, 59, 62-
63, 79; "Savage bonds : Indian slavery and alliance in New France" (PhD. Diss, Dept. of History, 
University of California, Davis, 2003); Rushforth, "A Little Flesh We Offer You": The Origins of Indian 
Slavery in New France." WMQ, 60:4 (Oct. 2003): 777-808. 
28 See, for example, Daniel Richter and James Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and 
their Neighbors in Indian North America (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987); Jon Parmenter, 
The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 20 10); 
Gregory Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1992). 
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information about the peoples of Detroit. No matter how ethnocentric they may have 
been, French officials, priests, and traders had a vested interest in understanding how 
conceptions of membership and loyalty worked in their communities. They lived with 
native people every day and their livelihoods and sometimes their lives depended upon an 
accurate understanding of the political and social structures of natives. In fact, some had 
even married native women and others were the offspring of such marriages. These 
people, therefore, understood native peoples and societies deeply, despite their 
ethnocentric baggage. More importantly, French and metis correspondents left a clear 
record of how native people behaved in certain contexts and how they reacted to crisis. 
Piecing together these patterns of behavior, scholars can uncover the goals, attitudes, and 
perspectives of these peoples, even if French writers sometimes misapprehended them or 
misrepresented them. 
I have also adjusted for the distortions presented in the documents by measuring 
them against other epistemological tools. Anthropological evidence from sites in Ontario 
and Michigan, for example, allows us to contextualize native behavior and motivations in 
ways that contemporary French people could not. Such data, for example, suggest that 
significant cultural differences might have led to conflict between the Hurons and 
Ottawas. I also compensate for the lack of archaeological data with a thorough 
investigation of Detroit cartography. Maps reveal the spatial relationships between native 
villages and hence testify to the social and political proximity between native groups. 
Besides geography, maps often communicate a wealth of useful ethnographic detail-
from the layout of the natives' forts to the size of the populations. Finally, I have 
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addressed these biases and prejudices by reading the documents closely and by 
comparing them with other accounts of similar events. Although two colonial officials 
might represent events very differently, their conflicting accounts give important clues. 
For example, the rancorous disputes between Cadillac and the Jesuits or the marquis de 
Vaudreuil (or for that matter anybody who crossed Cadillac) reveal important facts about 
the Huron leader Cheanonvouzon and the role that Mississauga-Miami animosity played 
in the Miami-Ottawa conflict of 1706. 
t 
Beginning in the 1690s, several French officials, led by Cadillac, had advocated 
the establishment of a French trading post along the waterways that connected Lakes Erie 
and Huron. As Cadillac articulated the plan, the post would be the site both of an 
intensive European agricultural outpost and a large native American settlement, 
composed of native peoples from throughout the region whom the French invited to 
relocate there. 29 Such an establishment, Cadillac argued, would address two pressing 
concerns that New France confronted at the tum of the eighteenth century. Cadillac and 
others promised, first, that the post would blunt Anglo-American commercial incursions 
into the Great Lakes. 30 Engaged in fierce competition with the English for control of 
North America, French officials sought to dominate the sometimes lucrative beaver-fur 
29 Cadillac seems to have been most concerned about securing his own financial welfare by monopolizing 
trade in the region and creating a feudal seigneury, or perhaps even fiefdom, in the region. "Necessity of a 
Post at Detroit," [n.d.], in MPHSCR, 33:42-43; Cadillac, "Detroit Is Founded," in ibid., 97-100. 
30 
"Extrait d'une lettre du marquis de Denonville au Ministre," 8 May 1686, in MDE, 5 :14-17; "Extrait 
d'un memoire du sieur Charron pour le Canada, ibid.," 135-36; "Envoi du Memoire de Lamothe Cadillac 
sur la Fondation d'un Poste au Detroit," in ibid., 136-37 ; "Extrait du memoire du Roi au sieur chevalier de 
Callieres, Gouverneur, et au sieur de Champigny, Intendant de la Nouvelle France," 27 May 1699, in ibid., 
137-53. 
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trade in the Great Lakes Region.31 In the 1680s and 1690s, British and Dutch traders 
operating out of the post of Albany in New York had, in fact, sent large trading convoys 
into Lakes Erie and Huron-an area that the French claimed as part of New France-and 
traded with peoples whom the French considered their allies. 32 These incursions worried 
French officials not only because they threatened the fur trade, the basis of the colonial 
economy, but also because they fretted that, if the English established trading relations 
with the peoples of the region, the French would lose their native allies. As the French 
understood acutely, the natives of the region would happily form commercial and 
military alliances with the English intruders if English traders provided them with better 
and cheaper goods. If such incursions continued unchecked, they worried, England (and 
later Great Britain) might establish a beachhead in the Great Lakes. 
Cadillac also claimed that this settlement would maintain the newly established 
peace reached with the Five Nations, or Iroquois Confederacy, New France, and the 
natives of the pays d' en haut, and would keep the Iroquois in check. 33 Since the 1630s, 
New France and its native allies throughout the Great Lakes had intermittently been at a 
war with the powerful Iroquois, who were allied with the English. These conflicts had 
taken a considerable toll on the French and their allies. In 1649, the Iroquois had finally 
31 A glut in the supply of beaver pelts had triggered a sharp drop in the price of beaver furs, leading the 
French to abandon the posts they had established in the area. Eccles, The French in North America, 1500-
1783 (Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969) 108-115 atllO. 
32 
"Governor Dongan' s Report on the State of the Province, including his Answers to certain Charges 
against him, 1686", in John Romeyn Brodhead, trans, and E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents relative to the 
Colonial History of the State of New-York (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1854), 3:395; 
"Information furnished by Nanning Harmentse and others," 7 Sept. 1687, in ibid., 3:436; "Expedition of M. 
de Denonville against the Senecas," Oct. 1687, in ibid., 9:363; Newbigging, "The French-Ottawa 
Alliance," 201. See also David Armour, The Merchants of Albany, New York, 1686-1760 (New York: 
Garland Pub., 1986). 
33 
"Lamothe Cadillac Rapporte les Debats qui Ont Eu Lieu a propos de Son Projet Dans 1' Assemblee 
Ordonnee par le Roi et dans Sa Conference avec M. Callieres. 11 Combat les Objections." [n.d.], in MDE, 
5:160-61. 
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defeated New France's chief native allies, the confederated Huron nations settled to the 
east and south of Lake Huron, and forced the Hurons to flee the region. Iroquois armies 
had also threatened French settlements in the St. Lawrence Valley and even the Ojibwas 
and Ottawas as far away as Michilimackinac on the straits between the Upper and Lower 
Peninsulas of modern-day Michigan. 34 In the last years of the seventeenth century, 
however, the Iroquois, French, and peoples of the pays d'en haut had decided, for various 
reasons, to make peace. They therefore began a process of negotiations which 
culminated in the Great Peace of Montreal in August 1701. In this treaty, the parties 
agreed to mutual non-aggression and vowed that, if troubles did arise, the parties would 
seek mediation from the French governor-whom they called Onontio. 35 Situated to the 
west of the Iroquois homeland and in the midst of France's allies in the west, Detroit 
promised to maintain this fragile new peace by intimidating the Iroquois and projecting 
French military power and diplomatic might into the region. Accordingly, the French 
gave Cadillac orders to establish a post between Lakes Erie and Huron and dispatched 
him along with one hundred French soldiers and civilians in the summer of 1701. 
Arriving on 24 July, before the final settlement of the peace treaty in August, the 
French began building a fort and Cadillac issued invitations to the peoples of the region 
to settle at the new post.36 Several groups accepted the captain's promise to form a 
34 For general works on the Iroquois Wars, see Daniel Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples 
ofthe Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1992); Jose Brandiio, "Your fyre shall bum no more:" Iroquois Policy toward New France and its 
Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the 
Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 20 10), esp. chap. 3. 
35 Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal ; Gohier, Onontio le mediateur. 
36 Chev. De Calliere and M. de Champigny, Quebec, toM. de laM., Versailles, 5 Oct. 1701, in MPHSCR, 
33 :110; Brian Dunnigan, Frontier Metropolis: Picturing Early Detroit, 1701-1838 (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2001), 18-21. 
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single, integrated body and soon formed a native cosmopolis at Detroit. Their 
interactions would reshape the region in profound ways. 
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PROLOGUE 
Exploring the Detroit River with Father Charlevoix, ca. 1721 
When the Jesuit Pierre-Fran<;ois-Xavier Charlevoix and his escorts left Lake Erie 
to ascend the Detroit River on 5 June 1721, they entered a profoundly native social space 
(see figure 4).37 As the canoes made their way up the river, the missionary marveled, as 
did many visitors to the region, at the beauty of the marshes, meadows, and "orchards" of 
wild fruit trees lining the river in their full spring splendor. He found the region "the 
most beautiful place in Canada. "38 Yet Charlevoix, one of the first historians of New 
France and a learned ethnographer, found the human inhabitants even more interesting. 
As they neared the French stockade, Fort Pontchartrain, Charlevoix and his escorts saw 
the first evidence of the posts' human inhabitants. Using Charlevoix's description of his 
journey up the river as a guide, this prologue surveys the physical and social geography 
of Detroit in 1721. 
Ascending the river, Charlevoix first encountered the palisaded Huron village on 
the left-hand or eastern side of river 650 yards from the French fort, as well as the 
immaculate fields of com, beans, squash, and even French peas and wheat which 
surrounded the fort. 39 Prior to the Great Peace of Montreal, the Hurons had lived at two 
37 David M. Hayne, "Pierre-Fran9ois-Xavier de Charlevoix," in DCB, 1741-1770 (Volume III). 
38 Pierre-Fran9ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un Voyage. ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 2 vols. (Montreal: Les 
Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744], 1994), 1:535-48. 
39 [Sabrevois], "Memoire on the Indians between Lake Erie and the Mississippi," 1718, WHC, Vol. 16:368; 
Charlevoix, Journal, 1:542-43. 
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(Left) Figure 2: Detail, 
[Henri-Louis Boishebert], 
"Carte du Detroit et Partie 
du Lac Erie, et du Lac Ste. 
Claire," 1731, Centre des 
archives de'outre mer, 
Aix-en-Province, France. 
(Below) Figure 3: The Major 
Peoples and Places of the Pays 
d'en haut, 1701-1766. 
Figure 4: Boishebert, Carte du detroit Erie remontent jusqu'au Lac 
Huron, 1731. Service historique de Ia Marine, Chateau de Vincennes, 
France. 
... ,. ·' ~:. /· h ~.-. ' 
locations, one on the St. Joseph River southeast of Lake Michigan, and the other at 
Michilimackinac, at the southern tip of Michigan's Upper Peninsula. Responding to 
French invitations, they had arrived at Detroit by 1704.40 As Charlevoix, who wrote a 
history of New France, knew, these people were the remnants of a once impressive native 
political entity, the Hurons Confederacy. The Hurons, and the related northern Iroquoian 
40 
"Memorandum ofM. de la Mothe Cadillac Concerning the Establishment of Detroit," 19 Nov. 1704, in 
MPHSCR, 33:235. 
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Figure 5: Population of Natives Permanently Settled at Detroit, 1703-1761 
Year Wendat Odawa Pottawatomie Others Total 
1703a 
--
-- -- -- 2000 
1707 ° 
-- -- -- --
1200 
1710- 240<1 800 -- 800 1840 
1718e 400 400 720 -- 1520 
1721 r 480 520 600 400 2000 
1729g 800 1800n 600 3200 
17301 600 120<Y 600 -- 2400 
1737K 1000 560 600 -- 2160 
1761 1 800 880 640 800 3120m 
a Source: Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 1704, inMPHSCR, 33:205. 
b Source: Cadillac au ministre, 10, 15 Sept., 1 Oct. 1707, in ibid., 340. 
c Sources: The estimate ofWendats comes from an official report issued in 1710, while the 
estimates of the Ottawas and others comes from a 1711 map. Antoine Denys Raudot, and 
Antoine Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle (annees 1709 et 171 0), ed. 
Camille de Rochemonteix (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, editeurs, 1904), 131. Jean-Baptiste de 
Couagne, "Carte du Canada sur un tres grand nombre de memoires des plus recents ... " [1711], 
photostatic reproduction, in the Louis C. Karpinski Map Collection, Map Photo France ASH 
124-1-2, Newberry Library, Chicago. 
ct Note: All estimates, except those in bold font, are projections based on the number of 
"warriors." The French almost universally gave their estimates in terms of effective warriors, or 
"men at arms" rather than of the entire population. I follow Franvois Clairambault d' Aigremont's 
ratio of one warrior to four members of the general population. Clairambault au ministre, 14 
Nov. 1708, inMPHSCR, 33:436; Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 1704, in ibid., 205. 
e Source: Jacques-Charles de Sabrevois, "Memoire de Sabrevois sur diverses tribus de 
l'Ouest,"1718, in DRCHNY, 9:888. 
f Source: Vaudreuil and Begon au Conseil de Marine, 4 Nov. 1721, inMPHSCR, 33:680-81. 
g Source: Noyan, «Project pour s'opposer a l'agrandissement des anglois en Canada Et pour Le 
Bien de la Colonie Francoise» in C11A, vol. 51, fol. 465v, 467v. 
h Note: This number, based on an estimate of 450 men, seems high, given that the number is 150 
fewer the next year. 
'Source: Noyan au ministre, inMPHSCR, 34 :76. 
J Note: This number includes some Mississagues who apparently settled with them. 
k Source: Hocquart, "Detail de toute la colonie," 1737, in AN, serie C11A, 67 :103v-104. 
1 Source: Minutes of the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson Bart with the Indians on his Way to, 
and at the Detroit in 1761, in WJP, 3:501. 
m Note: This is the first estimate provided by the British and suggests a fifty percent increase 
among the peoples of Detroit, which is unlikely. The discrepancy-especially as regards the 
Ojibwas-probably suggests that the British counted not only the Ojibwas living at on Lake St. 
Clair, but in southern Ontario and perhaps at Saginaw in this number. 
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peoples, the Tionontates, or Petun peoples, and Neutrals, had been situated in the region 
immediately to the east and south of Lake Huron. In 1649, the Hurons, who were allied 
to the French, finally succumbed to the onslaught ofthe Dutch-allied Iroquois 
Confederacy, or Five Nations, and abandoned the region. In the ensuing diaspora, some 
Hurons fled east and formed a community near Quebec. Others fled west, finding shelter 
with their allies in the region, particularly the Ottawas, first at Michilimackinac on the 
Mackinaw Straits, then at Chequamegon Bay. By the time they returned to 
Michilimackinac in the 1670s, these Huron refugees had formed a new composite group, 
referred to usually as the Hurons, and sometimes as the Tionontates and, later, 
"Wyandots."41 Buffeted by disease, war, and dislocation, these people numbered around 
500 people in 1721 (see figure 5).42 
The next group that Charlevoix encountered where the last to have arrived at 
Detroit. Potawatomi settlers had only moved to Detroit around 1711 and 1 712, perhaps 
in response to the growing hostility between the Foxes of Green Bay near their settlement 
on the St. Joseph River. At the time Charlevoix encountered them, the Potawatomis still 
lived in a temporary camp adjacent to the French fort, although they later formed separate 
villages further south on the eastern shore of the river, a little over a mile from the French 
41 The Detroit "Hurons" were composed of remnants of the Huron Confederacy and the Tionnontates, or 
"Petuns," French for tobacco, a crop which they grew in great quantities. Although later evidence suggests 
that the group called themselves "Wendats"-the autonymn of the Huron Confederacy-! follow the more 
familiar and accessible French usage of"Huron," which referred to their distinctive hair-style. 
"Tionontate" here denotes that nation before the fall ofHuronia. See Trigger, Children of Aataentsic: A 
History of the Huron People to 1660. 2 vols (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 824-25; 
Charles Garrad and Conrad E. Heidenreich, "Khionontateronon (Petun)," in Bruce Trigger, The Northeast, 
vol. 15 of HNAI, 394-97; James A. Clifton, Hurons of the West: Migrations and Adaptations of the 
Ontario Iroquoians, 165 0-1704 (Research Report, Canadian Ethnology Service, Ottawa, National Museum 
of Man, 1977). For names, see "Donation des Hurons au Pere Potier," 22 Dec. 1780, in Ernest J. 
Lajeunesse, ed., Windsor Border Region (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1960), 281. 
42 Gilles Havard, Empire et metissages: Indiens et Fran9ais dans le Pays d 'en Haut, 1660-1715 (Sillery 
(Quebec): Septentrion, 2003), 134. 
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fort. 43 Had he arrived in February, and not June, Charlevoix might have noticed, as 
another observers a few years before, that the Potawatomis wore heavy bison-skin cloaks 
in cold weather. Their attire attests to the Potawatomis' geographic ties to the west. 
With settlements not only at Detroit but also on the St. Joseph River and Green Bay, the 
Potawatomis had access to bison hides coming from the tall grass prairies of Illinois and 
Wisconsin.44 The Potawatomis living at Detroit maintained close ties to other 
Potawatomi communities, particularly the one at St. Joseph, as a series of exchanges 
between the communities in 1763 demonstrates. In June, according to British reports, a 
group ofPotawatomis settled at Detroit visited their "Relations" at St. Joseph and invited 
them to attack the British garrison at the post.45 The St. Joseph contingent complied and 
soon came "to join the Potawatomis of Detroit" in their siege of the British fort. 46 When 
the Detroit Potawatomis decided to abandon the siege in July, they pledged that they 
would work to convince "the rest of their Nation at St. Josephs" to do so as we11. 47 After 
Potawatomis from St. Joseph killed British people in 1764, moreover, Detroit 
Potawatomi leaders interceded to resolve the crisis.48 Not only did the two groups of 
Potawatomis easily move back and forth, they continued to constitute a single, coherent 
43 For their original position, see [Fram;ois La Forest], Memoir on Detroit, 1 Oct. 1714; [Sabrevois], 
Memoir on the Indians between Lake Erie and the Mississippi, l7l8m in DRCHNY, 9:887. For their later 
village site, see [Noyan] State of Canada in 1730, in MPHSCR, 34:76; ("The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 
1755-57," ed. Beverley Bond, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 13 (1926-1927): 58-81 at 75-76. 
44 James A Clifton, A Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965 
(Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977); R. David Edmunds, The Potawatomis: Keepers of the 
Fire (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978). 
45 
"A Court ofEnquiery held by Order of Major Henry Gladwin to Enquire into the Manner of the taking of 
the Forts Sandusky, St. Joseph, Miamis & Presquill," 6 July 1763, in CCCOP, 425 
46 [Robert Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," in Milton Quaife, ed., The Siege of Detroit in 1763: 
The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy and John Rutherford's Narrative of a Captivity (Chicago, 1958), 130. 
47 [Jehu Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," in Diary of the Siege of Detroit, ed. Franklin Hough (Albany, 
NY: J. Munsell, 1865), 42. 
48 ibid., 114; Indian Proceedings, 26 Jan. 1765, WJP, 11:547-50. 
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political community which conferred on matters of importance. The Detroit Potawatomis 
saw the St. Joseph Potawatomis, not as a separate entity, but as the "rest of their Nation." 
The combined populations at Detroit (ca. 600) and the St. Joseph River (400) represented 
a powerful people stretched over a considerable territory.49 
Located near where Lake St. Clair drains into the Detroit River, the French 
stockade stood adjacent to the Potawatomi camp-Potawatomi structures incorporated 
the walls of the French fort. Fort Pontchartrain, named after minister of the marine 
Jerome Phelypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain, the senior French official overseeing 
colonial affairs, housed all of the posts' French population. This population, which 
numbered fewer than two hundred French people following a period of official neglect 
and indifferent administration, consisted mainly of people involved in the fur trade and a 
few lackluster French Marines. After tracing the occupations of the habitants, Lina 
Gouger notes the "essentially commercial nature" of Detroit during the French period. 5° 
The colonial official, Fran<;ois Clariambault d' Aigremont, sent to evaluate the state of the 
post in 1708, counted only sixty heads ofhousehold, the majority of which engaged in 
trade and neglected to grow crops. 51 
Looking across the river from Fort Pontchartrain, Charlevoix could see the 
Ottawa village perched on the western shore, where the Ottawas had resettled after 
having abandoned their former village on the eastern shore in the aftermath of a conflict 
49 
"Enumeration of the Indian Tribes connected with the Government of Canada, 1736" in DRCHNY, 
9:1056. 
50 Lina Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit, 170 1-1765" (PhD. diss., Dept. of History, 
Universite Laval, 2002), 53, 87-93. 
51 
"Letter from Sr. d' Aigremont Denouncing Cadillac Methods," 14 Nov. 1708, in MPHSCR, 33:425-26. 
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with the Miamis and Hurons. 52 The Ottawas at Detroit belonged to a powerful native 
alliance of four constituent nations: the Kiskakons (les Queues coupees), Sinagos, 
Kamigas (la Nation du Sable), and Nassaukuetons (la Nation de laFourche). Although 
these groups retained separate identities, they also identified themselves as part of the 
larger group. As Cadillac put it, the four nations were "well united together, living in 
good intelligence."53 In addition to speaking the same language, they lived together in 
the same the villages at Chequamegon Bay, Michilimackinac, and Detroit. 54 According 
to the Ottawa speaker Kiscouaky, Kiskakons, Sinagos, and the Kamigas had settled at 
Detroit by 1703, presumably in the single village indicated on French maps of the area. 55 
Later evidence indicates that both Kiskakon and Sinago contingents remained at the post 
(see figure 6). 56 They also frequently spoke through one "Ottawa" spokesman rather than 
through different representatives for each nation. 57 The Ottawas relied upon their 
52 Charlevoix, Journal, 1 :536-37. 
53 
"Ces quatre nations sont alliees et bien unies ensemble, vivant en bonne intelligence entre elles et ne 
parlent aujourd'huy qu'une mesme langue," "Relation de Lamothe Cadillac," in MDE, 5:80. 
54 Claude Allouez, "Voiage du P. Allouez," Tire de la Relation de la N1e France de 1662 et 1667, Delisle 
Sketches, Newberry Library, Chicago, AN 158-1-58 ; JR, 51:20 (Fran9ois Le Mercier); "Paroles de 
Miscouaky Frere de jean leblanc Chef outaoiias du detroit a Vaudreuil," 26 Sept. 1706, in MPHSCR, 
33:228 
55 [Henri-Louis Boishebert], "Carte du Detroit et Partie duLac Erie, et duLac Ste. Claire," 1731, 
MapPhoto France MC no. 545, Newberry Library, Chicago. 
56 Cadillac to the Minister, 31 Aug. 1703, inMPHSCR, 33:163; Speech ofMiscouaky, 26 Sept. 1706, in 
ibid., 288; "Enumeration of the Indian Tribes connected with the Government of Canada," 1736, 
DRCHNY, 9:1053, 1058; "Memoire des ouvrages quej'ai faits par ordre de M. de Noyelles, commandant au 
Detroit, par Pierre Belle Perche", armurier, COAM, CllA, 74: 136-37; "Estate des Despenses faites par 
Moi Capitaine au fort PonChartrain du Detroit," 1738-1740, 20 June 1740, COAM, Cl1A, vol. 74, fol. 
136; "Operations of the French in New England and New-York," 1745, 1746, DRCHNY, 10:34; Ottawa at 
Montreal, 16 June 1742, WHC, 17:372, "Other Western Indians at Montreal," July 14, 1742, in ibid., 387; 
"Extrait de la depense qui a ete faite dans les magasins du roi a Montreal (fournitures distribuees)," 1746, 
COAM, CllA, vol. 86, fol. 178v). 
57 Conference of Indian Envoys with Governor de Vaudreuil, 27 Sept. 1703, WHC, 16:227; Speech of 
Miscouaky, Chief of the Outaouais to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, 26 Sept. 1706, in MPHSCR, 33:288, 04; 
"Paroles des Outaouais ... " 18 June 1707, in ibid., 319. 
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Figure 6: [Henri-Louis Boishebert], "Plan du Village Des Sauvages Outaouas du 
Detroit," 1732. Bibliotheque nationale de France, Paris. 
Tlus plan of the Ottawa village portrays a bifurcated layout, which may mdicate that the 
Kiskakons and Smagos observed residential segregatiOn 
superior numbers and settlement at strategic locations in the region to deploy what 
William Newbigging calls the "gateway strategy." The four constituent Ottawa nations 
controlled the crucial entry points into western Lake Huron and thus into Lakes Superior 
and Michigan-Manitoulin Island, Michilimackianc, and Detroit. Using the waterways 
that connected them, they easily and frequently moved between these settlements to 
trade, visit kin, and confer on strategic and diplomatic issues that affected them all. So 
positioned, they thereby mediated commerce within the region, supplied the French with 
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many of their furs, and exerted a powerful influence over their neighbors. 58 Numbering 
some 520 people and around 700 more at Michilimackinac and 320 at Saginaw Bay, the 
Ottawas served as the "elder brothers" of the peoples of Detroit (see figure 5). 59 
After remaining at Detroit for three weeks, Father Charlevoix and his company 
moved up the strait late in the evening of June 24 and soon reached the Ojibwa on 
Walpole Island near where the St. Clair River flows into Lake St. Clair. Although the 
settlement was much farther from Fort Pontchartrain than the Huron and Ottawa 
villages-some 36 miles and a half-day's journey by canoe-the French nonetheless 
reckoned the Ojibwa settlement part of Detroit. As the baron de Longueuil, commandant 
at Detroit, put it when he addressed the Ojibwas in 1744, although they were "far from 
me .. .I know that your Heart has never been Separate" from the French. 60 This settlement 
included a number of different Ojibwa groups who had "united and incorporated with one 
another" in a single village: the Mississaugas (who came from the river of that name 
which flows into Lake Huron from the north), the Sauteur (those originally from the Sault 
Ste.-Marie) and the Amicoues.61 Like the Ottawas and Potawatomis, the Ojibwas were 
also connected to other communities spread throughout the region, including at Sault-
Ste.-Marie, Saginaw Bay, Toronto, and Detroit. Although they lived in more dispersed 
settlements and had less cohesion or centralization than the Ottawa nations enjoyed, these 
peoples nonetheless frequently cooperated with other Ojibawas and traveled between 
58 Newbigging, "History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," viii, 87. 
59 These numbers are based on a 1736 census of the warriors in the region. "Enumeration of the Indian 
Tribes connected with the Govermnent of Canada, 1736" in DRCHNY, 9:1053, 1058. 
60 
"tous e1oigne de moy avec tu sois, je s<;ai que ton Cceur ne s'en estjamais Separe," Conseil tenu par Mr 
de Longueiiil Commandant pour Le Roy au Detroit, aux 4. nations de Son Paste, au Sujet dela declaration 
de laguerre contre L'anglais, 1744, CAOM, C11A, vol. 18 :134-35. 
61 Report ofDetroit in 1703,31 Aug. 1703, inMPHSCR, 162. 
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settlements throughout the region. In particular, the Ojibwas settled around the northern 
end of Lake St. Clair around Walpole Island, usually identified as Mississaugas but 
occasionally as Sauteux, maintained connections with the Mississaugas living near 
Toronto and elsewhere along the northern shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario.62 
Mississaugas traveling from Lake St. Clair could ascend the Thames river which the 
French, portage to the Grand and continue down to the vicinity ofToronto.63 This 
geographic arrangement allowed the Mississaugas to carry goods easily between Niagara 
and Detroit, including British trade goods and rum. By 1718, some 240 to 320 Ojibwa 
peoples lived at the settlement and a French census-taker counted some 400 on the island 
in 1737 (see figure 5). 
During his three week stay at Detroit, Charlevoix carefully observed and 
described the natives he met there. For example, he watched the natives of Detroit play a 
dice game, which he called the "Dish game, or jacks." Charlevoix noted that that 
"sometimes one Village ... play[ ed] against another." In these cases, each village chose a 
champion who played in the name of the entire community, which eagerly cheered on its 
representative. To ensure their victory, each village "invoke[d] its spirit [Genie]."64 
Charlevoix's observations tell us a great deal about the peoples that he encountered at 
Detroit. These peoples interacted as friendly neighbors, but as distinct communities who 
62 Cadillac to the minister, 31 Aug. 1703, inMPHSCR, 33:162; LeroyEid, "Ojibwa-Iroquois War: The 
War the Five Nations Did Not Win," Ethnohistory 26:4 (Autumn, 1979): 297-324; Neal Ferris, The 
Archaeology of Native-Live Colonialism: Challenging History in the Great Lakes (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 2009), chap. 3. 
63 The Mississaugas could also use the Thames and Grand River portages to gain access to Lake Huron. 
Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery, Journal de la Campagne que le sr de Lery, 1749, RAQ, 7:335,339-
40. 
64 Charlevoix, Journal, 1:544-45. 
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competed with one another and venerated separate gods. The interactions between this 
distinct peoples form the content of the next five chapters. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Lyons and Foxes: Cheanonvouzon and the Southern Alliance 
"[The Hurons] were formerly the most powerful, strongest, and numerous nation, but the 
Iroquois destroyed it and chased it from its lands, so that it is at present reduced to a very 
small number, and ... their sword is cut too short ... "1 
Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, ca. 1694 
"all the Savages [of Detroit] are guided exclusively by the sentiment of the Hurons."2 
Pierre-Jacques de Payan de Noyan, 1730 
By all accounts, the Hurons should have been decimated by the time they limped 
to Detr<?it in 1701. The northern Iroquoian peoples who made up the composite Huron 
community-the constituent nations of the Huron Confederacy as well as the 
Tionnontates and Neutrals-had borne the brunt of colonialism in the seventeenth 
century. Because they had closer contacts with French missionaries and fur traders than 
other nations in the region, they suffered more acutely from the epidemic diseases 
brought by the Frenchmen. Experiencing "catastrophic depopulation," northern 
Iroquoian peoples lost nearly two thirds of their population between 1634 and 1640.3 
Situated close to the Iroquois Confederacy, they also suffered disproportionately during 
the wars, not only from deaths but also from captive raiding.4 Pressure from the Iroquois 
1 
"C'estoit autrefois la nation la plus puissante, la plus forte et mesme la plus nombreuse, mais !'Iroquois, 
I' a destruite et I' a chassee de ses terres, en sorte qu'elle est a present reduite a un fort petit nombre, et il est 
bon pour nous qu'elle le soit ainsi, car ce sont des hommes malins, intrigans, malintentionnez et capables 
de grandes entreprises, mais par bonheur leur epee est tro courte," Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, 
"Relation du Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac," MDE, 5 :80. 
2 
"tousles Sauvages qui ne Se conduissent que par l'Esprit du huron," Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et de 
Chavoy, "Memoire," [1730], COAM, CllA, vol. 52, fol. 279v. 
3 Gary Warrick, A Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 222-36 at 245. 
4 Jose Brandao, "Your fyre shall bum no more:" Iroquois Policy toward New France and its Native Allies 
to 1701. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 
1534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), esp. chap. 3; Garry Warrick, A 
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had finally forced these peoples to flee the region and begin a long sojourn throughout 
the Great Lakes Region, where they encountered still more trouble with the Sioux. This 
demographic decline and dislocation severely weakened the Hurons. Unlike the Ottawas 
who had extensive ties to communities in Saginaw Bay, Michilimackinac, and elsewhere, 
they lacked the kinds of regional connections which would allow them to command much 
respect in the region. With an earthiness which did nothing to endear himself to his 
Jesuit rivals, Cadillac noted that the Hurons' "sword" had been cut "too short" to wield 
much influence. The once powerful "lyons" were now mew ling kittens.5 Father Pierre-
Franc;ois-Xavier Charlevoix, a Jesuit missionary and historian who visited Detroit in 
1721, marveled that the Hurons, once the "most numerous" nation in the pays d'en haut, 
had "almost entirely disappeared in a few years."6 
Despite the brutal battering they had received, however, the Hurons emerged from 
the seventeenth century not only as a proud and autonomous people, but as a powerful 
force in regional diplomacy. Forming a new social and political fabric and replicating 
cultural practices based on historical precedents, the new Huron community zealously 
maintained the borders of its community and chose a separate path from their close 
neighbors and allies, the Ottawas. In 1708 Cadillac proclaimed the Hurons the "elder 
brother" among the nations at Detroit."7 Charlevoix found that the Ottawas, 
Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
240. 
5
"Relations de Memoire de Lamothe Cadillac," [ca. 1696], MDE, 5:80. 
6 
"On a vfi avec etonnement une Nation des plus nombreuses, & des plus guerrieres de ce Continent, & la 
plus estimee de touts pour sa sagesse & pour son esprit disparoitre presque entirement en assez peu 
d'annees," Pierre-Franc;:ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d"un Voyage, ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 2 vols 
(Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744], 1994), 1:457. 
7 
"il est vrai qu'autrefois L'outauois etoit mon fils aisne; mais puis qu'il a leve son feu d'ici, ... , il sera 
avenir mon enfans cadets, et vous hurons rentez vous aujourd'huy que par6tre obeissance, nous avez pris 
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Potawatomis, and Ojibwas accorded the Hurons "the honor of speaking for all" the 
natives at Detroit. 8 Recognizing the Hurons importance in 1728, the Marquis de 
Beauharnois, newly appointed as the governor of New France, acceded to the Hurons' 
demands that he relieve Alphonse de Tonty, the commandant at Detroit, because the 
Hurons' "resentment was to be feared."9 In 1730, Capt. Pierre-Jacques de Payan de 
Noyan noted that "All the Savages" of Detroit "are guided exclusively by the sentiments 
of the Hurons."10 He confirmed this observation a decade later when, as commandant of 
Detroit, he declared that the Hurons were "a nation [which was] not to be neglected."11 
Noting that the Hurons were "restless" in 1754, the French officer and cartographer, 
Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery, hyperbolically observed that if the Hurons decided 
they wanted to, they and their allies could "force the English of Virginia, Carolina and 
Georgia to abandon this country and take refuge in Europe."12 In 1779 an Anglo-
American colonel informed George Washington that the Hurons "are respected by the 
dans mon C~ur et dans mes bien fait Le place de votre aisne," "Proces-verbaux des conseils tenus a 
Detroit," Aug. 1707, CAOM, CllA, vol. 26, fol. 123v. 
8 
"l'honneur de parler pour tous est ordinairement defere aux Hurons [Wendats], quand il s'en trouve dans 
un Conseil." Charlevoix, Journal, 1:539. 
9 
"la necessite de conserver une nations dont le ressentment estoit a craindre," Beauharnois au ministre, 27 
Sept. 1727, COAM, CllA, vol. 49, fols. 109-112v at llOv. 
10 
"tousles Sauvages qui ne Se conduissent que par !'Esprit du huron," Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et 
de Chavoy, "Memoire," [1730], COAM, C11A, vol. 52, fol. 279v. 
11 
"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR, 34:201. Other officials agreed that the 
"Although the hurons are not numerous, it nonetheless would appear important to conserve them" 
("Quoique les hurons ne soient pas bien nobreux, il paroit neanmoins interessant de les Conserver,)." 
"Resume de depeches du Canada concernant les Indiens," CAOM, CllA, 80:361; "Memoire concernant 
diverses nations indiennes," 1742, ibid., 77:390 ; "Resume de lettres du Canada avec commentaies des 
autorites metropolitaines," 1740, ibid., 74:232-36v. 
12 
"ils forceront les Anglais de la Virginie, Caroline et de la Georgie d'abandonrier cette countree et de se 
refugier en Europe," Joseph-Gaaspard de Chaussegros de Lery, "Journal de Joseph-Gaspard de 
Chaussegros de Lery, Lieutenant des Troupes, 1754-1755," in RAQ, 8 :410. 
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western Indian nations as much as the six nations [Iroquois] are by the Northern."13 
Although they never commanded more than a couple hundred warriors, the Hurons 
nonetheless commanded fear and deference among their neighbors. 
The Hurons were ultimately able to exercise an influence so disproportionate to 
their numbers by creating a network of allies and situating themselves in a new 
diplomatic configuration. In particular the Huron leader Cheanonvouzon, the purported 
"chief of all his tribe" following the death of Kondiaronk in 1701, formed three alliances 
which this chapter examines separately. 14 They first exploited their cultural and kinship 
ties with the Five Nation Iroquois (especially the Senecas) to create an alliance which 
both guaranteed them military backing and access to the Iroquois' British allies. At the 
same time, they formed a new relationship with the Miamis, a group of people living 
south and southwest of Lake Michigan, to strike against the Hurons' Ottawa rivals. 
Finally, based on these two relationships, the Hurons forged a tripartite "southern 
alliance" which involved both the Iroquois and Miami. While the first two alliances 
compensated for the Hurons' comparative weakness and allowed them to act with an 
13 Col. Daniel Brodhead to Gen. George Washingtonh, 6 May 1779, Louise Kellogg, The Frontier Advance 
on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779. Collections of the Wisconsin Historical Society, Vol. 21. Draper Series, 
vol. 2. (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1916), 311. 
14 Cheanonvouzon, who was forty-five when he died in 1707, was already a senior elder and led the Huron 
contingent then living at the Miami settlement on the St. Joseph River. "Paroles de quatre Hurons," MDE, 
5:266. Cadillac au ministre, 31 Aug. 1703, MPHSCR, 33:165-66; "Bapteme de Louis-Antoine 
Cheanonvouzon," Registre paroisse de Detroit, 1:19, 26. After the death of Kondiaronk, whom the French 
called the "first mover" among the Hurons and even Ottawas, in 1701, Cheanonvouzon apparently became 
the most powerful Huron leader until his death in 1707 (Kondiaronk "etoit le premier mobile de sa Nation 
& de tousles Outaouaks"). Claude-Charles Bacqueville de Potherie, Histoire de !'Amerique, 4 vols 
(Paris: Jean-Luc Nion ... et Franc;ois Didot, 1722), 4:222-23; J.J. Marest to Cadillac, 23 July 1702, 
MPHSCR, 33:127; Charlevoix, Histoire, 14, 145-48. According to the 1694 Dictionnaire de L'Academie 
fram;;aise, a "premier mobile," or "first mover," was a someone who initiated affairs and offered an 
example for others to follow ("premier mobile, Un homme qui donne le bransle, le mouvement a une 
affaire, a une compagnie"; "Donner le bransle, pour dire, Commencer une affaire, & par son exemple 
obliger les autres a suivre.Jl a donne un grand bransle a cette affaire"). Dictionnaire de L'Academie 
fram;;aise, 1st. ed. (Paris: J.B. Coignard, 1694), 98, 126. 
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autonomy they would not have otherwise enjoyed, the third allowed the Hurons to 
operate as a regional leader. In short, these alliances allowed the Hurons to envision a 
world in which they regained a measure of the prestige they had enjoyed before the fall of 
Huronia. Commenting on the Hurons' use of diplomacy and alliances to compensate for 
their small numbers, Cadillac proclaimed that the erstwhile "lyons" had now become 
wily "foxes" who exerted a soft power in order to refashion the region in ways which 
would have otherwise been impossible. 15 
That the Hurons both survived the beating they endured in the seventeenth 
century as a discrete community and charted their own course in the new world suggests 
that they were not orphaned refugees but an integrated and coherent community. 
Disease, defeat, and dislocation had all taken their toll on the Hurons and had broken the 
political and economic structures of the various northern Iroquoian peoples. Yet these 
peoples quickly assembled the pieces of the old polities into a new configuration and 
created a new community. Creating a new configuration based on distinctively Iroquoian 
cultural traditions-an exogamous clan system, an Iroquoian language, surplus or market 
farming-and complemented with new additions, such as French technology and 
15 
"Relation de Lamothe Cadillac," [ca. 1694], MDE, 5 :81; According to the first edition (1694) of the 
Dictionnaire de L'Academie franc;aise, a fox was a "stinking, malign, and crafty beast, which lives by 
plunder" ("Beste puante, maligne & rusee, qui vit de rapine"). The proverb "to sew the skin of a fox to 
that of lion," further, meant "to add ruse, finesse, to force" ("On dit prov. & fig. Coudre la peau du renard 
a celle du lion, pour dire, Adjouster la ruse, la finesse, ala force"). Dictionnaire de L 'Academie franc;aise, 
1st ed., 393. Jesuit Jean de Quens used the same language to describe the Algonkians, who faced 
circumstances similar to the Hurons. "It [the Algonkian nation] knew well that it was not equal in number 
[to the Iroquois] and that, having lost the skin of the Lyon, they were very well served by that of the Fox" 
("11 s~auoit bien qu'il n'estoit pas egal en nombre, & que la peau de Lyon luy manquant, ils, s'estoit fort 
bien serui de celle du Renard.") JR, 42 :230. 
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Catholicism, a new Huron entity emerged from the ashes of Huronia. 16 This Huron 
community continued to refashion itself long after their arrival at Detroit, but nonetheless 
remained an integrated and coherent whole. 
That these reconstituted Hurons successfully fought to insure their autonomy from 
both the Ottawas and the French largely through their connections to the Iroquois and 
Miamis, furthermore, demonstrates how relationships between native peoples shaped the 
region. Without their connections to the militarily powerful Iroquois and Miamis, 
Cheanonvouzon and his people could not have dreamed of achieving the kind of 
autonomy they wanted. Their neighbors and allies, the Ottawas living at Detroit used 
their superior numbers and connections with peoples throughout the region to project 
their power over the Hurons. Only by establishing connections to the militarily powerful 
Miamis and Iroquois and establishing an alternative to the powerful Anishinaabe alliance, 
could the Huron escape the Ottawas' domination. 
I. The Huron Fox: Cheanonvouzon's Vision 
16 Conrad Heidenreich, Huronia: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, !600-!650 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971); Susan Branstner, "Decision-Making Processes in a Culture 
Contact Context: The Case of the Tionontate Huron of the Upper Great Lakes" (Ph.D diss., Dept. of 
Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1991); Jules M. Boucher, "The Legacy of louskeha and 
Tawiscaron: The Western Wendat People to 1701." M.A. Thesis (Department of History, University of 
Kansas, 2001); Campeau, Appendice 1: Les Hurons de Detroit, in La mission des jesuites chez les Hurons, 
1634-1650 (Montreal: Editions Bellarrnin, 1987), 361-67; Bruce Trigger, Children of Aataentsic: A 
History of the Huron People to 1660. 2 vols. (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 824-25; 
Charles Garrad and Conrad E. Heidenreich, "Khionontateronon (Petun)," in Bruce Trigger, The Northeast, 
vol. 15, HNAI; James A. Clifton, Hurons of the West: Migrations and Adaptations of the Ontario 
1roquoians, 1650-1704 (Research Report, Canadian Ethnology Service, Ottawa, National Museum of Man, 
1977). 
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The Hurons who limped to Detroit in the early eighteenth century were a pale 
shadow of their former glory. The Huron nations, Tionnontates, and Neutrals had 
dominated western Lake Huron commercially and militarily. Reaching for familiar 
language to describe the Hurons he met in Huronia in the 1630s, Recollect brother 
Gabriel Sagard likened the Wendats to the "nobility," compared to the humble Ottawa, 
"bourgeois"17 Yet since 1649 they had been defeated both by the Iroquois and by Dakota 
Sioux, whom they deemed cultural inferiors, in the 1660s.18 Dislocation, warfare, and 
disease, moreover, had taken a considerable toll on the Hurons. While the Hurons and 
Tionnontates numbered as many as 30,000 at the dawn of the seventeenth century, the 
portion of those survivors who arrived at Detroit in the seventeenth century number under 
five hundred. 19 They were so diminished, in fact, that they had to rely on their allies, the 
French and the Ottawas, for protection. As the French trader Nicolas Perrot maintained, 
if the French "had not protected [the Hurons, they] would no longer exist," and the 
Ottawa leader, Ontontagan claimed to have saved the Hurons more than once. 20 In such 
reduced circumstances, the Hurons simply could not shape the world as freely as their 
ancestors had. 
17 Gabriel Sagard, Legrand voyage du pays des Hurons situe en /'Amerique (Paris: Denys Moreau, 1632), 
184. 
18 Perrot, Memoire, 86-90, 101. 
19 Archaeologist Gary Warrick estimates that in 1615 some 21,600 Wendats-Hurons lived in about twelve 
villages, while 6,500 Tionnontate-Petuns occupied at least seven more villages. Each ofthese villages 
probably housed 1000 denizens, considerably larger than the villages at Michilimackinac and Detroit. 
Many of the remnant Hurons moved closer to Quebec and settled at Lorette and other settlements, while 
others had been absorbed into the Iroquois Confederacy. Warrick, A Population History of the Huron-
Petun, A.D. 500-1650 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 218-20, 245; Anon., "Memoir on 
the Indians between Lake Erie and the Mississippi,"1718, NYCD, 9:8880. 
20 
"if I had not protected you, you would no longer exist" ("Et si je ne te protegois, tu ne serois plus," 
Nicolas Perrot, Memoire sur les moeurs, coustumes, et religion des sauvages de !'Amerique Septentrionale, 
ed. J. Tailhan (Leipzig: A Franck, 1864), 155; "Paroles des Outaouais .... " 18 June 1707, MPHSCR, 
33:323). 
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Judging from his actions, the Huron headman, Cheanonvouzon, known as 
Michipichy to the Ottawas and Quarante Sols to the French appearantly understood the 
root cause of his people's weakness in the late seventeenth century. 21 His people were 
weak not simply because they had lost so many of their people or because the Ottawas 
outnumbered them, but also because they had been plucked from the geographic and 
diplomatic context in which they had long operated. Forced to flee from Huronia east of 
Lake Huron, they abandoned the alliances, patterns of exchange, and networks of power 
which had defined them before 1649. During their long sojourn through the Great Lakes 
wilderness, the Huron refugees had been a strange people in a strange land. They had 
been tom from the set of geopolitical relationships which they had enjoyed in the Huron 
homeland and now lived among people whom they did not know and did not trust. This 
vulnerability placed them at the mercy of both the French and Ottawas, who did have 
connections throughout the region, especially with other Anihishnaabe peoples like the 
Ojibwas and Potawatomis. The price of survival had been a surrender of autonomy and 
influence. 
21 Domique de La Marche, the Recollect priest serving at Detroit baptized "Louis Antoine Cheanonvouzon, 
du nornrne Quarante Sous Chef des Hurons" on 27 April 1707 and the man died soon thereafter ("Bapeme 
de Louis-Antoine Cheanonvouzon," RPD, 1:19, 26). They also rendered his name "Saint-Cholian," in 1701 
("Conseil des Hurons tenu dans le fort du Detroit," 4 Dec. 1701, MDE, 5:259; Joseph Marest to Cadillac, 
12 May 1703, MPHSCR, 33: 160). The French called him "Quarante So us" or "Sol," or "forty cents," 
probably a reference to what the French perceived as the man's avarice. The Ottawas called the man 
"Michipichy," mostly likely in reference to the fierce "underwater panther" said to live in the depths of 
Lake Huron. The Ottawas feared this creature, just as they feared the mecurial Huron leader. Perrot, 
Memoire, 121; Louis Armand de Lorn d' Arce, Baron de Lahontan, New Voyages to North-America 
(Chicago: A.C. McClurg, [1703] 1905), 232-33; Richard Rhodes. Eastern Ojibwa-Chippewa-Ottawa 
Dictionary, (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1993), 253; Claude Allouez, in Franc;ois le Mercier, Relation, 
1668, in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed. The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations 
of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791, 73 vols (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers, 1896-
1901), 50:286, 288. Hereafter "JR." Rasles a son frere, 12 Oct. 1723, in JR 67 :158; Harry Kelsey, 
"Michipichy (Quarante Sols)," in DCB, vol. 3. 
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Cheanonvouzon and his people sought to do three things to reclaim Huron 
autonomy. First they must compensate for his lack of military might in comparison to his 
neighbors. Outnumbered and dependent upon the Ottawas for military protection, the 
Hurons knew that they could not assert their independence or act with freedom as long as 
the Ottawas and their allies could field more warriors. Alliances with powerful groups, 
however, would not only help the Hurons defend themselves in case of conflict, but 
would also serve as a deterrent in ordinary times. Second, the Hurons sought to situate 
themselves in a commercial network which would give them access to goods and elevate 
their status in the region. The Tionnontates and Hurons had long been commercial 
intermediaries who traded with northern Algonquian peoples and the Iroquois before 
1649, and Cheanonvouzon understood the connection between commercial and political 
power.22 Finally Cheanonvouzon knew that if the Hurons hoped to act as independent 
players in the region, they would have to operate independently from their longtime allies 
and rivals, the Ottawas. The Ottawas, whose constituent nations had settlements 
throughout the region and who had connections to Potawatomi and Ojibwa communities, 
had dominated the Hurons since the fall of Huronia in 1649. The Hurons could not hope 
to operate independently as long as the Ottawas held them in "a sort of slavery.'m 
To an extent, the Hurons addressed this problem by courting the French. Arriving 
at Montreal for the peace negotiations in August 1701, Cheanonvouzon told Calliere that 
it gave him a "particular joy to come hear his word" and assured the governor of "the zeal 
22 Newbigging, "The French-Ottawa Alliance," 44. 
23 Les Hurons "n'ont quite ce poste que par I' aversion naturelle qu'ils ont pour les [Odawas], et que ceux cy 
les tenoient dans une espece d'esclauvage," Aigremont au ministre, 14 Nov. 1708, CAOM, C11A, vol. 29, 
fol. 69; Raudot and Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle, 131. 
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he [Cheanonvouzon] had to please him."24 He was so eager to see a peace concluded 
between the Iroquois and the nations of the pays d' en haut that he had lent canoes to his 
allies, the St. Joseph Miamis, so they could come to Montreal and participate in the talks. 
A grateful Calliere thanked Cheanonvouzon for the "good sentiments that he has come to 
convey to the French Nation." The aid he had provided to the Miamis, furthermore, was 
a sure "proof of the attachment" that the Huron had to French "interests."25 That summer 
at Montreal he promised Gov. Calliere that he would work to move his people to the new 
post of Detroit. At Cadillac's request, Cheanonvouzon worked to convince his own 
people and the Miamis to come settle at Detroit in 1701 and 1702.26 He even 
collaborated with the commandant, who served as his godfather when he was baptized in 
1707, against Cadillac's rival, the governor of New France, Philippe Rigaud, the marquis 
de V audreuil, in 1704. 
Yet Cheanonvouzon quickly realized that his alliance with the French and 
participation in the French-led alliance would not guarantee him the autonomy he wanted 
or help him subvert the Ottawas. He in fact grumbled that "the French were preventing 
24 Cheanonvouzon a dit "qu'il etoit fait un joye particuliere d'aller ecouter sa parole," "le zele qu'il avoit eu 
de lui plaire." Claude-Charles Bacqueville de Potherie, Histoire de !'Amerique, 4:222-23. 
25 
"On remercia Quarante-sols des bons sentimens qu'il venoit de temoigner ala Nation Franc;:oise," "les 
secours qu'il avoit donne aux Miamis, etoient une preuve de l'attachement qu'il avoit a nos interets," in 
ibid., 226. Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal, The Great Peace of Montreal : French-native Diplomacy 
in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott. (Ithaca: McGill-Queens University 
Press, 2001). App. 2, 207-08. 
26 
"Paroles de quatre hommes," 17 Feb. 1702, MDE, 5:266-67; "Paroles de Michipichy," in ibid., 271; 
"Conseil tenu dans le fort du Detroit," 27 Jan. 1702, in ibid., 282; Cadillac to the Minister, 31 Aug. 1703, 
MPHSCR, 33:443; Aigremont to the Minister, 11 Nov. 1708, in ibid., 442; "Conseil tenu par les Hurons, 
dans lequel se trouvoient les Outaouas," 12 June 1703, MDE, 5:292-93; "Conseil des Hurons tenu dans le 
fort Detroit," 4 Dec. 1701, in ibid., 260; "Paroles des Hurons," 14 July 1703, COAM, CllA, vol. 21, fol. 
74-75v. "Paroles de Miscouaky [Ottawa] ... a Monsieur le marquis de Vaureuil," 26. Sept. 1706, 
MPHSCR, 33:288. 
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him from revenging himself' on the Odawas.27 Accordingly he sought to address all of 
these problems by crafting a series of alliances with peoples in the Great Lakes Region. 
Building on an ancient cultural affinity and the effective demographic blending of the 
two peoples during the seventeenth century, Cheanonvouzon continued Huron attempts 
to maintain an exclusive and powerful alliance with the Five Nations of the Iroquois 
Confederacy. Alliance with the Iroquois not only served as a deterrent against external 
attack from other nations, but also ensured access to the British, with whom the Iroquois 
were bound in the celebrated Covenant Chain. In addition to this Iroquois alliance, 
Cheanonvouzon also slowly forged an alliance with the Miamis, a group living along the 
St. Joseph River southeast of Lake Michigan. Like the Iroquois alliance, this relationship 
provided military protection for the Hurons and helped them compensate for their relative 
weakness. In 1706 Cheanonvouzon, well aware of the hostility between the Ottawas and 
Miamis, engineered a conflict between the two nations in hopes of escaping Ottawa 
domination. Finally, Cheanonvouzon sought to create a larger regional alliance-a 
southern alliance-which included both the Miamis and Iroquois. This coalition allowed 
the Hurons to do more than separate relationships with those peoples. By mediating trade 
and diplomacy between the Iroquois and Miamis, the Hurons claimed for themselves a 
place of influence and prestige for themselves which would have otherwise been 
impossible. This southern alliance likewise challenged the grip of the Anishinaabe 
people on the region. Through skillful diplomacy, Cheanonvouzon built a series of 
alliances which situated the Hurons in a region-wide commercial and diplomatic context 
27 Lamothe au gouverneur, 17 Feb., 1702, MDE, 5:266; Jean Mermet a Cadillac, 19 April1702, MPHSCR, 
33:118-119. 
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and helped them regain some of their erstwhile influence. Cheanonvouzon and the 
Hurons pursued these three separate alliances simultaneously. In order to examine the 
particular dynamics of each of the alliances, I deal with them separately meaning that 
there is chronological overlap in the three sections. 
II. "Flesh and Blood": The Iroquois and the Hurons 
In March 1758, during the height of the Seven Years' War, the Huron man, 
Theata, traveled to Seneca territory to recount the proceedings of a recent council 
between Fran~ois Marie Picote, sieur de Belestre, the commandant of Fort Pontchartrain 
and the peoples of Detroit. According to Theata, Belestre had invited the nations to 
attack the Six Nations in order to secure territorial rights to the Ohio Valley. When some 
of the nations agreed to the attack, the Huron leader named Sastaretsy reacted angrily.28 
Grabbing the belt that Belestre had presented, he chastised his neighbors for so easily 
betraying the Iroquois. The Huron leader rhetorically asked how "I, whom am Flesh and 
Blood of the Six Nations and in whose Towns Number of our Friends & Children are 
living and settled, declare War against them." He then reminded his neighbors that they 
too were allied with the Six Nations and implored them to reject the "French Hatchet."29 
Sastaretsy's angry reaction to Belestre's invitation reveals not only the long-term 
and exclusive affinity between the Hurons and Iroquois, but also indicates the key to that 
relationship: the cultural kinship and intermarriage of the two peoples. This relationship, 
28 Sastaresty, the hereditary title for the leader of the Huron Deer clan, passed from maternal uncle to 
nephew [Pierre Potier, "Recensement des villages hurons," 1747, in Robert Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre 
Potier (Ottawa: Les Presses de l'Universite d'Ottawa, 1996), 226-27; Cadillac, "Relation du Sr. De 
Lamothe," [1718], MDE, 5:119; Pierre-Franc;ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un Voyage, 1:451]. 
29 
"Message of a Seneca to Sir William Johnson," in WJP, 2:793-96. 
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which had begun in the late seventeenth century, allowed the Hurons to claim an 
unprecedented power in the region. The Hurons' relationship with the Iroquois allowed 
them to accomplish two specific goals. First, the alliance with the most powerful people 
in the region discouraged any potential enemies from menacing the Hurons. Living in 
western New York and numbering some 6,400 individuals, the Iroquois Confederacy was 
the most powerful native group in northeastern North America.30 No nation in the region 
wanted to resume the warfare which had broiled the region during the late seventeenth 
century. At the same time, their alliance with the Iroquois also allowed the Hurons 
access to the Iroquois' allies, the British. The British entrepot of Albany, after all, was 
situated in the midst of Iroquois country, and no one could reach the post without the 
Iroquois' blessing. 
In spite of the fierce conflict between the Hurons and Iroquois in the seventeenth 
century, the two peoples formed an unusually close alliance in the last decades of the 
seventeenth century. That alliance was premised upon a shared cultural kinship and a 
practice of intermarriage which reached back hundreds of years. Both the Hurons and the 
Iroquois claimed a kinship with an ancestral group of St. Lawrence Iroquoian peoples 
who had inhabited the lower reaches of that river, and whom Jacques Cartier had 
encountered in the 1530s. Following Cartier's last visit these Iroquoians dispersed; while 
some moved west into southern Ontario and formed the Wendat nations, others traveled 
south and became the Mohawks, Cayugas, Onondagas, Senecas, and Oneidas-the 
constituent nations of the latter-day Iroquois League.31 Descendant from the same the 
30 Parmenter, The Woods' Edge, Appendix 2, 291. 
31 Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, 60 (quotation), 69, 80-81 
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ancestral groups, these people shared many cultural and linguistic traditions as well as a 
sense of cultural kinship and a sense of common kinship. As a French official later 
observed, the Hurons' "language and customs" had a strong resemblance to those of the 
Iroquois, and the two groups therefore shared a "great affinity."32 
This shared mythic heritage, and the very real cultural and linguistic affinities it 
bequeathed, led to an impressive cultural and biological convergence between the Hurons 
and Iroquois in the mid-1600s. When epidemics reduced the populations of both the 
Hurons and the Iroquois, these peoples sought to compensate for their losses by raiding 
other Iroquoian peoples and forcibly assimilating captives into their communities. 
Because of the shared sense of Iroquoian heritage and cultural similarities, both the 
Iroquois and the Hurons preferred to capture and incorporate other Iroquoian peoples. 
Indeed Jon Parmenter argues that the Iroquoian attacks on the various northern Iroquoian 
peoples, including the peoples who later became Wendats, reflected, not a particularly 
hatred for the Hurons, as the Jesuits believed, but a preference for Iroquoian captives. 
These Huron captives, or "Iroquois by affection," represented a sizeable minority among 
the Iroquois population. 33 Indeed Cheanonvouzon hi~self may have been born as an 
Iroquois. 34 An adopted Huron leader who had become an Iroquois war leader 
32 
"les hurons dont la langue et les mreurs ont un grand rapport avec les leurs et avec lesquels ils ont de 
grands afinitees," Aigremont au ministre, 14 Nov. 1708, in C11A, 29 :45-45v. 
33 Parmenter refers to the conflict as a "civil war" given the numbers of Iroquois and Hurons on both side of 
the conflict. Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, 72; Boucher, "The Legacy of Iouskeha and Tawiscaron," 
151-52. 
34 Giles Havard suggests that Cheanonvouzon might have been a native Iroquois who had been adopted by 
the Hurons, and the man's dealings with the Iroquois support this possibility. But the evidence for this, as 
Havard observes, is ambiguous. Cheanonvouzon's position in the Huron community, moreover, suggests 
that, even if he had been born an Iroquois, he had earnestly and thoroughly embraced his new community. 
In 1702, a Seneca chief accused him of plotting against the Iroquois, suggesting that he saw himself as a 
Huron, not an Iroquois. "Narrative of the most Remarkable Occurences in Canada," 1695, NYCD 9:606; 
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encapsulated the ambiguous blending of Iroquois and Huron identity. Addressing a 
Huron audience as "My brothers," he proclaimed that "I have not changed my soul by 
changing my country; & my blood has not become Iroquois, although I have lived among 
them. My heart is completely Huron, as is my language."35 In a very real sense, these 
peoples were a hybrid Iroquoian people. 
Even after the peace of 1701 ended the captive-raiding between the Hurons and 
Iroquois nations, these peoples continued to marry and have children together. Although 
they are incomplete and only include those children presented for baptism, the surviving 
baptismal records bespeak a pattern of conception, and probably marriage, between the 
Hurons and the Iroquois. In May 1707, for instance, the Huron woman Marie Timengure 
had a child with TBrakBinnen, a Seneca man. In the next six decades, Hurons from 
Detroit and Iroquois parents from the St. Lawrence Valley and Iroquoia conceived eight 
more children which appeared in the existing baptismal records.36 Father Pierre Potier's 
census of the Huron communities at the Bois Blanc mission and Sandusky taken around 
1746 further bears out these patterns of intermarriage and cohabitation. In his manuscript 
he identified twenty-three individuals by a designation other than Huron. Of these the 
majority, fifteen, were either Foxes or Flatheads who had either been captives or slaves 
Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal, App. 2, 207; "Conseil tenu dans le fort de Detroit par les Iroquois, 
Outaouais, Hurons, Nepissingues et Mississagues," 4 May 1702, MDE, 5:277. 
35 
"Mes freres, dit-il aux Huron, ie n'ay point change d'ame pour auoir change de pa1s: & mon sang n'est 
pas deuenu Iroquois, quoy que i'habite parmy eux. Mon cceur est tout Huron, atuant que rna langue," JR 
42 :56; Richard White, "'Although I Am Not Entirely Dead. I Have Left a Second of Myself: 
Constructing Self and Persons on the Middle Ground of Early America," in Through a Glass Darkly: 
Reflections on a Personal Identity in Early America, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika 
Teute (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 406. 
36 The Hurons did have children with four Abenakis before 1765. They also had seven or eight children 
with a French parent. The records also include evidence for two Church-sanctioned marriages between the 
French and the Hurons. They also had children with adopted Foxes and Chickasaws. 
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adopted into Huron families. 37 Potier identified one "Loup," or Delaware, and one 
Abenaki, presumably a Christian convert from Kanahsatake.38 The other six individuals 
identified were Iroquois, three of which were specified as Senecas and three simply as 
"Iroquois." Two of these Iroquois individuals were women and the rest were men.39 Of 
the eight non-Huron individuals who had come to live with the Hurons willingly 
(compared to those captured in slave raids), the vast majority were therefore Iroquois. 
And this number excludes those Hurons of both Iroquois and Huron descent whom Potier 
identified as Huron instead of Iroquois and, of course, those Huron who had gone to live 
in Iroquois villages. As in the baptismal records, no Ottawas, Potawatomis, or Ojibwas 
appear in Potier's census. 
To put these numbers into context, existing parish records suggest that priests at 
Detroit only baptized three children with a Huron and Ottawa parent between 1735 and 
1764. There are no recorded incidents of a Huron parent having a child with a 
Potawatomi or Ojibwa between 1704 and the death of the last Jesuit missionary, Pierre 
Potier, in 1781. The paucity of such children is telling. Although the Hurons lived less 
than a mile from the Ottawas and Potawatomis at Detroit and less than a day from the 
Ojibwa village, the existing baptismal and marriage registers indicate that the Hurons 
rarely ever married these peoples. The Hurons were much more likely to marry their 
37 The inclusion of these Algonquian-speaking people is instructive. While the existing records indicate 
that they seldom married or lived with their Algonquian neighbors, they did live with and sometimes 
married captive Algonquian-speaking Chickasaws and Foxes and the Siouan Flathead!Catawbas. This 
might indicate that they regarded these people as culturally Huron following their adoption into Huron 
families. Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, ed., Les ecrits de Pierre Potier,, 241-43, 
245,247,249-50,253,255. 
38 Ibid., 242, 246. 
39 Ibid., 242, 243, 253, 257, 258. 
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Iroquoian cousins than the Algonquian-speaking peoples who lived nearest them.40 As in 
the baptismal records, no Ottawas, Potawatomis, or Ojibwas appear in Potier's census. 
These numbers confirm indications that Hurons had intermarried with Algonquian-
speakers during the seventeenth century, and suggest a clear distinction between 
Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples.41 
Iroquois people married to or living with Hurons at Detroit or settlements like 
Sandusky surfaced frequently in official correspondence over the years. In 1709, for 
example, a "Sinneke Indian who livd at TjuhhSagrondie [Detroit]" had married a woman 
living at the post, possibly a Huron.42 An anonymous French chronicler noted that a 
Seneca man, whom he called "the great Sononton," lived at the primarily Huron 
settlement of Sandusky in 1745.43 This is likely TaBita, a Seneca man whom Potier listed 
in his census.44 In the early 1750s the British captive James Smith noted that his adopted 
Kahawake Iroquois brother had a Huron wife and he belonged to what ethnohistorian 
Eminie Wheeler-Voegler called "a mixed Caughnawaga Mohawk-Wyandot 
40 The Hurons did have children with four Abenakis before 1765. Huron parents also conceived seven or 
eight children with a French parent who were baptized, and the existing records include two Church-
sanctioned marriages between the French and the Huron celebrants. They also had children with adopted 
Foxes and Chickasaws. 
41 Boucher, who suggests that the Hurons "incorporated people of non-Iroquoian ethnic identiy," admits 
that there is "[m]eager documentary evidence" for this supposition. Apart from a couple of ambiguous 
early seventeenth-century references, Boucher only offers Richard White's generalization about the 
frequency of such unions in the region. Boucher, "The Legacy of Iouskeha and Tawiscaron," 201-202. 
Gregory Dowd also states, without evidence, that "villagers intermarried frequently across boundaries that 
were too often and too casually described as tribal" and that "Algonquian-speaking Ottawas, Miamis, 
Potawatomis, and Ojibwas thought little of intermarrying with one another or even with Iroquoian-speaking 
Wyandots." Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 62. 
42 
"Examination of Atheroghkoes an onnondage Indian," 17 July 1710, in Lawrence Leder, ed., Livingston 
Indian Records (Gettysburg, PA: The Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1956), 210. 
43 
"Anonymous Diary of a Trip from Detroit to the Ohio River," 22 May- 24 August 1745, Archives of the 
Seminary of Quebec, ASQ V-V 17:1 (Translation), Papiers Contrecoeur, pp.1-10. Translation provided by 
the Glenn Black Laboratory of Archaeology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. 
44 Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte I, in Toupin, Les Ecrits de Pierre Potier, 225. 
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assemblage."45 When Smith and his Kahnawake family arrived at Detroit to buy 
supplies, naturally, they stayed at the Huron village.46 In 1760 George Croghan spoke to 
a "Six Nation Indian, who has lived .... amongst the Wyandotts" at Detroit for fourteen 
years.47 
The Hurons themselves testified to their practice of intermarrying with the 
Iroquois. In 1747, for example, the Hurons noted that because the "greater part of their 
village were children" of the Six Nations, they were no longer truly Hurons but actually 
Iroquois.48 As we have seen, Sastaresty likewise claimed to be "Flesh and Blood of the 
Six Nations" and added that many of the Hurons' "Children" lived in the villages of the 
Six Nations in 1758.49 Two years later Huron representatives used the same phrase in a 
conference with British and Iroquois representatives. 5° These fragmented references hint 
at a larger pattern of cohabitation and sexual intimacy between these two peoples, 
especially given the frequency of intermarriage and captive adoption between the peoples 
in the seventeenth century. 
45 
"An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Colonel James Smith ... during 
His Captivity with the Indians, in the Years, 1755, '56, '57, '58, and '59," in Samuel G. Drake. Ed. Indian 
Captivities, or Life in the Wigwam, (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby and Miller, 1852), 190, 225, 255; Erminie 
Wheeler-Voegelin. Indians of Northwest Ohio: An Ethnohistorical Report on the Wyandot, Potawatomi, 
Ottawa, and Chippewa or Northeast Ohio. (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1974), 32. 
46 Smith, "An Account," in Drake, Indian Captivies, 218, 225. 
47 George Croghan, "George Croghan's Journal April3, 1759 to April [30], 1763," ed. Nicolas B. 
Wainwright, Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 71:4 (Oct. 1947): 370-71. 
48 The Iroquois League added a sixth member, the Tuscaroras, in the 1720s, making them the Six Nations. 
Les Hurons "ne se regardoient plus Comme hurons attendu leur petit nombre, mais comrne yroquois, 
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et Hocquart), 1747-1748, COAM, CllA, vol. 87, fo1.186. 
49 The term "Flesh and blood" may have been an idiom, rather than a literal indication of genetic relation, 
the equivalent ofthe phrase which the French rendered as having the "meme corps." Yet Sastaretsy's 
clarification that Huron "Children" lived among the Iroquois suggests that he meant that they had 
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This intermarriage facilitated constant communication and travelling between the 
Huron settlement at Detroit and the various Iroquois outposts in Iroquoia, in the St. 
Lawrence Valley, and after the 1730s, in the Ohio Valley. Indeed the Iroquois seemed to 
be omnipresent in the Huron village at Detroit. 51 Cadillac claimed that thirty Iroquois 
families had settled at the Huron village at Detroit in 1704. To be sure, Cadillac serially 
exaggerated the number of natives settled at Detroit, and the commandant presented the 
claim in an attempt to demonstrate the Iroquois' acquiescence to the French settlement at 
Detroit. Yet other evidence validates his claim. The Ottawas testified that some 
Kahnawake Iroquois had been present in the Huron fort in the summer of 1706, for 
example. 52 Fran<;ois La Forest, commandant of Detroit in 1711, referred to the 
"Iroquois ... established at detroit."53 In 1728, a Mohawk even threatened the British that 
if they continued to encroach on their lands the Iroquois would move "to 
Tughsaghronide," or Detroit, and other places, suggesting the ties between the Iroquois 
and Hurons. 54 Potier listed "La Cabane des Iroquois" in his 1746 census, and indicated 
that the "old Iroquois woman" Therese headed the household. Since two of the 
inhabitants of the longhouse were "at the sault"-Sault-Saint-Louis, or Kahnawake-
these Iroquois were likely from the St. Lawrence Valley settlements.55 In 1747, the 
51 The presence of Iroquois people at Detroit, both from the St. Lawrence settlements and from Iroquoia 
itself, lend credence to Jon Parmenter's argument that the Iroquois formed settlements outside of Iroquoia 
in order to project Iroquois power and to gather information. Detroit probably served as a node in the 
greater Iroquoian world in the same way that St. Lawrence Valley settlements did or that the Ohio River 
Valley settlements later would. Jon Parmenter, "At the Wood's Edge: Iroquois Foreign Relations, 1727-
1768" (Ph.D. diss. Dept. of History, University of Michigan, 1999). 
52 Marest to Vaudreuil, 14 Aug. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:269. 
53 La Forest au ministre, 1711, COAM, C11A, vol. 120, fol. 125. 
54
"Minutes of the Albany Commissioners for Indian Affairs," 1728, cited in Parmenter, "The Edge of the 
Woods," 61. 
55 Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte I, in Toupin, Les Ecrits de Pierre Potier, 200, 205, 211. 
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marquis of Vaudreuil-Cavagnal, the governor of Louisiana and Canadian-born son of a 
long-serving governor of New France, accused the "Jroquois of detroit" of acting as 
messengers for the British. 56 
The appearance of Iroquois children in the Detroit parish register also suggests 
that some Iroquois people either lived at Detroit or at least visited there frequently. In 
addition to the nine children of Huron and Iroquois parents baptized at Detroit, parish 
priests and the Jesuit missionaries recorded the births of nine children with at least one 
Iroquois parent, but no Huron parent, between 1707 and 1765, as well as the deaths of 
three Iroquois people, the majority of which came from the Huron mission. 57 These 
visitors included not only Iroquois from the St. Lawrence Valley, but also Cayugas, 
Senecas, and Mohawks, as well as many "Iroquois" from unidentified nations. While 
these numbers are by no means overwhelming, they do give a sense of the 
communication and interchange between the Hurons and Iroquois. That pregnant women 
and small children traveled from Iroquois villages in the St. Lawrence Valley and 
Iroquoia to the Huron village of Detroit suggests an intimacy and frequency of contact 
between the two peoples. 
The cultural and physical intimacy between the Hurons and Iroquois led to an 
enduring diplomatic alliance between the two nations beginning in the final two decades 
of the seventeenth century.58 Not only did the mingling of the Huron and Iroquois 
56 Pierre Fran<;:ois de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil-Cavagnal, au ministre, 22 March 1747, COAM, C13A, 
vol. 31, fol. 42. 
57 All of these children were born either to two Iroquois parents or an Iroquois and a French parent. 
Registre paroisse de Detroit, 1:19, 67, 132, 240; Toupin, "Introduction au registre de la mission huronne," 
in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 793; Potier, "Registre Mortuaire," in ibid., 922-23, 925. 
58 Boucher argues that the Turtle segment or hontaXen (see chapter four) made overtures to the Iroquois in 
order to "counterbalance" the influence of the newly-ascendant Deer segment, which supported a French 
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populations create a shared sense of trust and common culture, but it also created a large 
cadre of Huron-born Iroquois and Iroquois-born Hurons who served as intermediaries 
and facilitated the diplomacy between the two peoples. These diplomats thus began 
negotiating a separate peace to end the disruptive beaver wars. As early as 1679, the 
Senecas informed the Indian Commissioners at Albany that they had reached a separate 
peace with the "Dionondadaagas"-or Hurons. 59 Three years later, after the Hurons 
visited the Seneca territory, the Ottawas complained that the Hurons had "an 
understanding" with the Iroquois and they had frequent clandestine meetings with them. 60 
By the end of the decade, the Hurons had sent envoys to the Iroquois and apparently 
concluded a peace with the Hurons.61 In 1689, the fur trader Nicolas Perrot concluded 
that the Hurons and Iroquois were, despite appearances to the contrary "at peace." The 
French interpreter and trader claimed that the Hurons only pretended to fight against the 
Five Nations because the French and Ottawas compelled them to do so.62 Eventually 
they dropped their pretenses. In 1695, Cadillac, then commandant ofMichillimackinac, 
complained that, no matter how much he cajoled them, the Hurons would not raise 
alliance instead of an Iroquois one. Although the Deer leader, Sastaresty, did appear to be more disposed to 
the French and other Huron leaders like Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon supported an Iroquois/British 
alliance, we have no clue about the ethnic identity of these later leaders. To posit this conflict between 
Iroquois- and French-aligned factions as one revolving around phrartry-identification is unsupported. 
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59 
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raiding parties against the Iroquois. One Huron leader, called Le Baron by the French, 
rebuffed French demands to attack the Iroquois, claiming that the Christian God had 
forbidden him to do so. 63 While some Hurons, led by the headman Kondiaronk, finally 
relented and sent a war party against the Iroquois, Le Baron, Cheanonvouzon and others 
moved to the Miami settlement on the St. Joseph River in order, Perrot opined, to 
abscond to the "Irroquois."64 
By the time the peoples of the Great Lakes met with Calliere in 1701, then, the 
Iroquois and Hurons had translated their cultural and biological union into a diplomatic 
one. Indeed their cultural and diplomatic bonds were so strong that the Iroquois 
frequently invited the Hurons to relocate in Iroquoia and the Hurons, or at least some of 
them, often seemed disposed to do so. Around the tum of the eighteenth century, for 
example, Iroquois people from the St. Lawrence communities of Kahnawake and 
Kanehstake asked the Hurons to move to their settlements near Montreal.65 When 
Huron-Ottawa tensions rose in 1705, for example, the Hurons wanted to move to Seneca 
territory and, anticipating fear from the Ottawas and others, asked the Senecas to send 
three hundred warriors to Detroit to help them leave.66 In August of the following year, 
after the Hurons and Ottawas had fought openly at Detroit, the Michilimackinac Ottawas 
fretted that the Hurons would flee to the Iroquois and implored Gov. Vaudreuil to prevent 
63 
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65 In 1742, the Hurons recalled that these nations had come to them before they left Michilimackinac, but 
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them from doing so. 67 The governor shared the Ottawas fears and worked hard to prevent 
"too close a connection between the Miamis, Hurons, and Iroquois."68 On his tour 
through the pays d' en haut the following year, Fran<;;ois Clairambault d' Aigremont once 
again learned that the Hurons "may settle with the Iroquois." Indeed the officials' 
sources told him that the Hurons would have done so already if the Senecas had 
permitted them to establish their own village in Seneca territory and retain their 
autonomy, rather than merge with the Iroquois and lose their distinct identity.69 In the 
1715, the Hurons still "irritated" by the Ottawas and desperately alarmed by the Fox 
incursions in the neighborhood of Detroit, again considered an Iroquois invitation to 
settle with them. 70 Although the Hurons never moved to Iroquoia, the Iroquois' frequent 
invitation for them to do so, the Hurons' serious contemplation of these offers, and the 
continual French fear that the Hurons would do so all attest to the strong cultural and 
political alliance which had bound the Iroquois and Huron together. As late as 1726, the 
Senecas identified Detroit as the "place where the Tienonadies [Hurons] now live."71 
The remark suggested that the Senecas associated Detroit, not with the more numerous or 
powerful Ottawas living at the place, but the Senecas' cultural and linguistic cousins and 
commercial partners, the Hurons. 
Their ties to the Iroquois, the most powerful and well-connected people in the 
region, allowed the Hurons to act with a freedom of movement and autonomy that they 
67 Father Marest to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, 14 Aug. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:269. 
68 Vaudreuil au ministre, 24 July 1707, in ibid., 330; Vaudreuil au ministre, 4 Nov. 1706, NYCD, 9:780 
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had lacked for the past fifty years. Since the fall of Huronia and during their long sojourn 
through the Great Lakes wilderness, the Hurons had been a strange people in a strange 
land. They had been tom from the set of geopolitical relationships which they had 
enjoyed in the Huron homeland and now lived among people whom they did not know 
and did not trust. This vulnerability placed them at the mercy of the Ottawas, who did 
have connections throughout the region. By forming alliances with the Iroquois, 
however, the Hurons had created a place for themselves in the pays d' en haut. They were 
no longer wanderers who lacked ties to their neighbors and depended upon the Ottawas. 
They had situated themselves as part of a larger social and diplomatic reality. On its 
most practical level these connections guaranteed protection for the Hurons: few nations 
would risk a fight with the Iroquois by attacking the Hurons. Having finally made peace 
with the Iroquois in 1701, the people of the region had little interest in renewing the 
conflict that had consumed much of the seventeenth century. In the aftermath of Huron-
Ottawa violence in 1706 and 1738, for example, the Ottawas implored the Iroquois to 
"take no part" in their quarrel with the Hurons. 72 
Their relationship with the Iroquois, furthermore, allowed the Hurons 
unprecedented access to the Iroquois' English allies, and, in tum, access to British goods. 
The Iroquois, who had joined the English colony of New York in the Covenant Chain, 
introduced the Hurons to their allies and mediated between the two peoples. 
Cheanonvouzon admitted to Gov. Vaudreuil that the Mohawk messengers "have come on 
72 
"Les Outa8ais [Odawas] ont donne trois branches de Porcelaine aux cinq Nations Iroquoises pour les 
Inviter de ne prendre aucun party," Beauharnois au ministre, 6 Oct. 1738, COAM, C11A, vol. 69, 128v; 
Marest to Vaudreuil, 14 Aug. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:269. 
57 
the part of the English to invite the Hurons to Orange."73 According to rumors, in fact, 
Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon had been plotting since the late seventeenth century to 
defect from the French alliance altogether and move to Niagara, or some other location 
where they could trade openly with the British.74 To that end, he had sent representatives 
to Albany along with Miami leaders to "see if goods be cheaper here than elsewhere."75 
Having succeeded in doing so, the Miamis and Hurons apparently tried to return to 
Albany in 1705.76 Twelve Huron and Miami representatives returned to Albany in 1708 
in order to "Trade & Traffick" with the British.77 In that year a French official 
complained that the Hurons "constantly pass through their [Iroquois] districts to take their 
beaver-skins to the English."78 Their relationship with the English not only gave the 
Hurons access to coveted goods like Caribbean rum and scarlet woolens, which the 
French could or would not supply, but it also enhanced the Hurons' status in the region.79 
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The Hurons quickly situated themselves as intermediaries between their Iroquois and 
British allies and the peoples of the pays d' en haut. As had their middlemen status before 
the fall of Huronia, this commercial position conferred political power on the Hurons. 
Indeed in 1687 the Marquis de Denonville, the governor of New France, speculated that 
the Hurons wanted to make peace with the Iroquois and English because they hoped to 
become "master of the entire trade of the other Far Nations."80 
III. "One Mind": The Hurons and Miamis 
The Iroquois alliance allowed the Hurons to operate without fear of serious 
reprisals from any regional rivals and to position themselves as commercial middlemen. 
Yet for the Hurons to act with the kind of autonomy and power they desired, 
Cheanonvouzon recognized that he would have to assert Huron independence from their 
closest ally and most determined rival in the region, the Ottawas. Constituted of four 
nations who had settlements throughout the region and allied to the other Anishinaabe 
peoples-the Potawatomis and Ojibwas-the Ottawas had lorded over Huron affairs 
since the Hurons first fled Huronia and took refuge at the Ottawa communities on 
Manitoulin Island and Michilimackinac. To revenge himself on the Ottawas and declare 
Huron autonomy from them, Cheanonvouzon relied on another alliance with a regional 
power, the Miamis. Adeptly reading the geopolitical situation at Detroit and marshalling 
his considerable diplomatic skills, the Huron leader orchestrated a conflict between the 
Miamis and Ottawas in 1706. In so doing, Cheanonvouzon, leader of a small and much-
reduced band, used his diplomatic skills to shake the pays d' en haut. 
80 Gov. Denonville to the Minister, 1687, NYCD, 9:325. 
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As the third chapter explores in greater detail, relations between the Hurons and 
Ottawas, two longtime allies, had deteriorated badly by 1701. At the 1701 peace talks 
with the Iroquois, for example, Cheanvouzon and the Ottawa leader Ontontagon, also 
known as Jean leBlanc, clashed. When Ontontagon claimed to speak for both the 
Ottawas and the Hurons, a "scandalized" Cheanonvouzon asked the Ottawa leader how 
he dared speak "for all the Nations, without having asked for the Hurons' particular 
advice," and demanded to know why Ontontagon was "meddling" in Huron affairs. 81 
Ontontagon's brazen pretentions to authority over the Hurons nettled Cheanonvouzon, 
who envisioned a future of Huron ascendency. This event convinced him, if he was not 
already convinced, to strike against the Ottawas. In 1702, Father Jean Mermet, 
missionary to the Miamis, warned that Huron resentments against the Ottawas would 
"explode one day" very soon, and Gov. Vaudreuil confirmed that the Hurons were "only 
waiting for an opportunity to avenge themselves" on the Ottawas. 82 
Knowing that the Hurons could never take on the Ottawas by themselves, 
Cheanonvouzon reached out to the Miamis for help in striking the Ottawas. He 
apparently tried first with the Iroquois in 1702. Speading an apparently spurious rumor 
that an Iroquois man had killed an Ottawa, he sought to reawaken the war which the two 
nations had so recently ended. When the Iroquois refused to participate and sharply 
reproached Cheanonvouzon for trying to "disrupt the land," Cheanonvouzon turned 
81 
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instead to his close allies, the Miamis, for help in humbling the Ottawas and exerting 
Huron influence in 1706.83 The Miamis provided the perfect partners, not only because 
they had quarreled with the Ottawas in previous years, but because the Huron and 
Miamis had already formed a close alliance in the previous decade. The Miamis, settled 
at the St. Joseph River in southwestern Michigan in the early 1700s but later moving into 
the Maumee and Wabash watersheds, consisted of around 2,000 in 1736.84 While the 
Hurons did not share the same cultural bonds that they did with the Iroquois, 
Cheanonvouzon nonetheless crafted powerful personal and diplomatic ties to the 
Miamis.85 As early as 1682 the Hurons, Miamis, and Kiskakon Ottawas concluded a 
defensive alliance, announcing that they had formed "one body and one spirit."86 When 
the Iroquois threatened the Miamis in 1695, Cadillac reminded the Hurons of this alliance 
and implored the Hurons to protect their long-time "friend and ally."87 
The decision of a group of Hurons, led by Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon, to move 
from Michilimackinac to the Miami settlement on the St. Joseph River in southeastern 
Lake Michigan in the early 1690s both testifies to the importance of these bonds and 
strengthened those same connections. Although a rival Huron leader, Kondiaronk, or Le 
Rat, accused these Hurons of moving to the Miami settlement in order to betray them to 
83 
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the Iroquois and then "promenade in their prairies," Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon likely 
moved to the Miami settlement in order to collaborate more closely with the Miamis and 
Iroquois, and to escape the oppressive thumb of the Ottawas at Michilimackinac.88 
Accordingly, between three and six extended Huron households, or about half of the 
nation, settled with the Miamis.89 These "Hurons of saint Joseph," traveled with the 
Miamis to Montreal in the summer of 1701, and Cheanonvouzon even provided canoes 
for the Miamis' voyage.90 During the negotiations with the French and Iroquois 
Cheanonvouzon even spoke for the Miamis "with whom we make only one Body." The 
Miami leader Chichikatalo agreed that their two nations constituted only "one body," and 
added that they had the "same will as the Hurons"91 
When Cheanonvouzon decided to accept Callere's offer and move to Detroit, he 
sought to convince the Miamis to do so as well. Holding a council with the Miamis and 
the Hurons who remained at the settlement in October 1701, he extended an invitation 
from Cadillac to establish a village near the newly erected Fort Pontchartrain.92 In doing 
so, he used evocative language to suggest the intimacy between the Miamis and Hurons. 
He suggested, for instance, that the Miamis and Hurons join "the two villages together" at 
Detroit, and repeated Cadillac's promise that the Hurons and Miamis would "be one 
88 
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body" with each other and with the French. 93 Despite Jesuit opposition, Cheanonvouzon 
convinced all of his people and some of the Miamis to settle at Detroit. By autumn of 
1702, the Miami headman, Miamensa, and several Miami families lived with the Hurons 
in a fort constructed less than half a mile from the French fort. 94 This cohabitation was 
remarkable. Not even the culturally similar Anishinaabeg peoples-the Ottawas, 
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis-shared villages at Detroit.95 
Even among the Hurons, Cheanonvouzon appeared to have especially close ties to 
the Miamis. Cadillac, in 1702, and the Ottawas, in 1706, had enlisted the man to carry 
messages to the Miamis, and the Miamis trusted him to carry their case to Iroquois and 
other groups. When the Senecas failed to return Miami captives as they had promised 
Calliere, for example, Cheanonvouzon chastised the Iroquois nation.96 Even more 
tellingly, one of Cheanonvouzon's daughters married a Miami man. Such intermarriage 
is perhaps the greatest symbol of Huron and Miami intimacy.97 Although the Hurons 
often married the culturally and linguistically similar Iroquois, they rarely married 
Algonquian-speaking peoples, perhaps because they considered them culturally inferior. 
That they would marry the Miamis, then, suggests an unusually powerful alliance. 
93 Cheanonvouzon apparently held at least two such councils, one in the autumn of 1701 and another in 
February of 1702. "Paroles de quatre hommes," 17 Feb. 1702, MDE, 5:266- 67; "Paroles de Michipichy," 
in ibid., 271. 
94 
"Conseil tenu avec les Miamis dans le fort du Detroit," 27 Jun. 1702, in ibid., 282; Cadillac au ministre, 
31 Aug. 1703, MPHSCR, 33:442 ; Aigremont au ministre, 11 Nov. 1708, in ibid., 442. 
95 [Anon.], "Memoir on the Indians between Lake Erie and the Mississippi," 1718, WHC, 16:268-70. 
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4 May 1702, in Margry, Decouvertes, 5:279. 
97 Cornbury reported that "Tehonwahonkarachqua, a Twichtwigh [Miami] son in law of ye Principal 
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"Conference of Lord Combury with the Indians," 20 July 1702, NYCD, 4:979. Another, much later, 
example, indicates that the Miamis and Hurons might have intermarried frequently. Pierre sens8anne, the 
son of a latter-day Sasteretsy, married a Miami woman. Toupin, "Introduction," Les ecrits de Pierre 
Potier, 41. Yet unions between Miami and Huron parents do not regularly appear in the baptismal registers 
of Detroit. 
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Cheanonvouzon's daughter and his Miami son-in-law had symbolically become one 
flesh, just as their nations had. 
By 1702, the Miamis and Hurons had forged a powerful alliance.98 At the peace 
talks in Montreal in 1701 the Hurons claimed that the two nations had "formed only one 
body," and the Miamis insisted that they had the "same will as the Hurons."99 The 
following year a Huron leader told the governor of New York that the "greatest part of ye 
Twichtwighs [Miamis] are removed and come to live" at Detroit and that the "said two 
nations are united." 10° Cheanonvouzon likewise told Vaudreuil that the two nations were 
"united together" and shared a common "head by the union that is between us."101 This 
relationship continued long after Cheanonvouzon' s death in 1707. In 1713, the Miamis 
sent the Hurons to talk to Gov. Vaudreuil in their name. 102 The Miamis partcipated in the 
anti-French movement led by Huron dissident Nicolas Oronotny in the 1740s (see 
Chapter Four). 103 In 1759, the Hurons and Miamis gave a joint response at a conference 
with British representatives, the Delawares, and the Shawnees, suggesting that they 
maintained their close connection. 104 Twenty years later a Huron leader claimed to speak 
in the "name of the Wyandotts [Hurons] & Miamis."105 To be sure the relationship was 
not without its problems-the Miamis resented the Hurons' reconciliation with their 
98 Havard, Empire et metissages: lndiens et Fram;ais dans le pays d'e haut, 1660-1715 (Quebec: 
Septentrion and Presses de l'Universite Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 223. 
99 Les "Miamis avec qui nous [the Hurons] ne faisons qu'un Corps," "nous [les Miamis] n'avons cependent 
qu'une meme volonte avec les Hurons" (Potherie, Histoire de !'Amerique, 4:213-14). 
100 
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mutual foes, the Flatheads, in 1729, for example. 106 Yet they nonetheless cooperated 
closely during the eighteenth century. 
When Cheanonvouzon began looking for a partner to help humble the Ottawas in 
1706, he settled on the Miamis. Not only were the Miamis closely aligned with the 
Hurons, they, too, had recently had trouble with the Ottawas and the Ottawas' close 
allies. In early 1704 some Weas, a group allied to the Miamis, attacked Detroit and killed 
two Hurons, a Potawatomi and an Ottawa man. 107 Sometime around then, they also 
attacked the Mississaugas, an Ojibwa group closely allied with the Ottawas. 108 To 
prevent war between the Ottawas and Miamis and Weas, the French sought to mediate 
the disputes. Cadillac demanded that the Weas come to Detroit to atone and they 
apparently did so before August 1704, meeting with the acting commandant, Tonty. 109 
Noting that the attacks had been a "mistake," Vaudreuil encouraged the offended parties 
to put the unpleasantness behind them. In so doing, the governor concluded, the French 
had successfully "set matters right." 110 
Yet Cheanonvouzon, closely allied with the Miamis and familiar with the 
Ottawas, knew that the groups had not forgotten their anger as easily as the French 
imagined. The Huron leader may well have attended an 8 March conference in which the 
106 Beauharnois au ministre, 21 July 1729, CAOM, CllA, vol. 51, fol. 127. 
107 Aigremont identified these attackers not as Weas, but as Miamis. He also notes that there had already 
been some conflict between the Ottawas and Miamis. Aigremont au ministre, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 
33:, 431). Vaudreuil noted that the Miamis had twice attacked the Miamis. "Paroles des Outaouais ... ," 
20 June 1707, in ibid., 320; "Conference," 21 June 1704, in Livingston Indian Records, 197-98. See also 
"Paroles des Hurons, Outaouais et Miamis de Detroit aux Tsonnontouans," 30-31 July 1704, in ibid., 190-
91; "Paroles de Vaudreuil aux Indiens (Hurons) de Detroit," 7 Aug. 1704, in ibid., 193; Vaudreuil au 
ministre, 16 Sept. 1704, NYCD, 9:760; Cadillac au ministre, 14 Nov. 1704, MPHSCR, 33:232-3. 
108 
"Paroles adressees a Vaudreuil par des chefs outaouais de Michillimakinac," 1 Aug. 1706, in ibid., 261. 
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Kamiga Ottawa leader Mekoua, known to the French as Le Pesant, or "the Heavy One," 
railed against both the French and the Miamis. Meeting with Ensign Etienne Bourgmont, 
the acting commandant in Cadillac's absence, Mekoua noted that the Weas had "killed 
us" and that the Miamis had attacked "our Comrades the Missisaguez," but that the 
French had done nothing to resolve the solution and had implored the Ottawas not to 
retaliate against the Miamis. Instead Onontio had only put him off, telling him "to wait, 
and that he Wished to be master of That affair. " 111 Later that month, Mekoua told 
Bourgmont that the "Missaguez Are angry ... that the Miamis killed two of their men last 
year, and want. .. to go kill them."u 2 The Mississaugas, in fact, nearly did so and only 
relented when the Ottawas and Hurons convinced them to do so. 113 Frustrated and 
embarrassed, Mekoua worried that, if the Ottawas allowed any more murders to go 
unrevenged, his neighbors would "no longer esteem us, and will look on us as 
women."
114 The Ottawas, therefore, were primed for confrontation. Ottawa informants 
told the sieur d' Aigremont in 1708, the Miamis had never made reparation for their 
attacks and directly connected later violence to these on-going disputes. 115 
Reading the conditions adeptly, Cheanonvouzon saw his chance to finally revenge 
himself on the Ottawas. In such combustible conditions, he only needed to provide a 
spark to ignite the war he wanted with the Ottawas. Those Ottawas unwittingly gave him 
111 
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an opportunity to do just that in 1706. Sometime in late spring or early summer, the 
Ottawas had organized a raid against the Dakotas and, at the Sieur de Bourgmont' s 
urging, invited the Miamis to come along. Because of his close ties to the Miamis, the 
Ottawas sent Cheanonvouzon to both the Miamis at Detroit as well as the Weas on the 
Wabash to deliver the invitation. When he arrived, however, he apparently told the 
Miamis and Weas that the raid on the Dakotas was merely a ruse. The Ottawas, 
Cheanonvouzon warned them, planned to betray the Miamis. 116 He suggested instead 
that they wait until the Ottawas warriors left and then attack the undefended Ottawa fort. 
The Miamis agreed. All the parts were in place. 117 
Unfortunately for Cheanonvouzon and his Miami allies, however, secrets were 
hard to keep at Detroit. According to later Ottawa testimony, a Potawatomi who lived 
with the Miamis told the Ottawas about the plot. The Ottawas, who had already left 
Detroit for the Dakota territory, stopped to confer. Two Ottawa brothers, Miskoaky and 
Ontantagan, later told Vaudreuil that they had urged the warriors not to attack the Miamis 
until they had consulted with the French. Mekoua, still angry with the Miamis because of 
the uncovered deaths, however, prevailed over them and the party returned to Detroit to 
116 The Ottawas who spoke with Aigremont suggested that Ensign Bourgmont had encouraged 
Cheanonvouzon to act as he had, although Miscouaky' s and Ontontagan' s accounts mention nothing about 
this. In fact, this narrative generally suggests that Bourgmont had a larger role in the actions than the other 
two. The Ottawas to whom Aigremont spoke interpreted Bourgmont's apparently gruff attitude toward 
them as indication of hostility and inferred that he had cooperated with Cheanonvouzon to precipitate the 
conflict. The other accounts scarcely mention Bourgmont and portray him more as inexperienced than 
scheming (ibid., 432-33). Cadillac, seeing conspiracy everywhere alleged that Vaudreuil had ordered Jean 
leBlanc to carry out the attack. "Words of the Outavois on the 18th of June with the Answers with 
Lamothe Cadillac's marginal comments," MPHSCR, 33:319-22; [Ruette d'Auteuil?] "Memoire de l'etat 
present en Canada," 1712, CAOM, CllA vol. 32, fol. 270. 
117 
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attack the Miamis preemptively sometime in early June.118 Just as the group returned to 
the fort, they encountered a delegation of Miami leaders walking to the French fort for a 
feast, perhaps in preparation for the attack. The Ottawa column split, allowing the 
Miamis to pass between them. Then Mekoua gave a signal and the warriors, after an 
initial hesitation, attacked the Miami leaders, killing or capturing all but one. The 
warriors then rushed to attack the Miami encampment, situated to the north of Fort 
Pontchartrain. Luckily for the Miamis, they saw the Ottawas advancing and scurried into 
the safety of the French fort. Ontontagan struggled to restrain the warriors, urging them 
to douse the arrows they had already lit to set the French fort on fire, but could not keep 
them from killing a French soldier and a Recollect priest, who, by unlucky circumstance, 
were outside of the fort. 119 
Cheanonvouzon had been discovered before he could execute his plan, but he 
nonetheless succeeded in kindling a war between his allies, the Miamis, and his enemies, 
the Ottawas. Nor was he content to stop there. Following the initial attack, the headman 
frequently visited the Ottawas, who were apparently ignorant ofCheanonvouzon's 
involvement in the contemplated attack. He convinced the Ottawas to attend a feast with 
the Miamis in order to reconcile their differences. On the appointed day, the Hurons laid 
118 The timing of this conflict is difficult to reconstruct. The Ottawas appear to have Detroit by 2 July, 
when the Miamis, Hurons, and Weas held a council with Ensign Bourgmont to inform him that they 
planned to attack the Ottawas at Michilimackinac, where they had taken refuge. "Conseil Tenu au fort 
Pontchartrain le deuxe juillet 1706," CAOM, F3, vol. 2, fols. 232v-25. Bourgmont also indicated that the 
siege had lasted two months, meaning that the initial attack must have happened two months before the 2 
July, sometime in early May. "Resume d'une lettre de Bourgmond avec commentaries," 27 Aug. 1706, in 
CAOM, C11A, vol. 24, fol. 207v. Vaudreuil knew about the attack before 27 June, when he mentioned it 
in a letter to Cadillac, and this would have been long enough for the information to have traveled from 
Detroit to Montreal. Cadillac's to Vaudreuil, 27 Aug. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:272). Father Marest reported 
that the Ottawas had returned to Michilimackinac from Detroit in early August (Father Marest to the 
Marquis de Vaudreuil, 14 Aug. 1706, in ibid., 263-69. 
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out a spread of maize on a large cloth in a clearing and invited the Ottawas to partake. 
The Ottawas, however, became suspicious when they saw movement in the trees 
surrounding the field. When they investigated, the Ottawas found Miami warriors ready 
to spring on the Ottawas as soon as they entered the clearing. The Ottawas rushed back 
to their village, where they found Miami warriors preparing to attack and destroy the 
undefended fort. Reaching the safety of their palisades, the Ottawas immediately fired 
upon the Miamis. Huron warriors soon joined the Miamis besieging the Ottawa fort. 
They reportedly insulted the Ottawa warriors, calling them "women" and cowards. 
Finally, the Hurons could revenge themselves on the Ottawas, and even claim that they 
were acting in French interest while doing so. 120 
Even then, however, Cheanonvouzon continued to exacerbate matters. Earlier 
that summer, some Ottawa warriors had joined a Huron party headed to attack the 
Catawbas of the Carolina Piedmont. The group returned just as hostilities broke out 
between the Ottawas and Miamis, and the Hurons detained their erstwhile comrades in 
the Huron fort. In a clear sign of the Hurons' enmity, they tortured the Ottawa warriors 
and killed at least one. Now, Cheanonvouzon offered to return the remaining Ottawa 
warriors to their people in exchange for some Miami captives. The Hurons and Ottawas 
gathered outside of the French fort to exchange prisoners. Just as Cheanonvouzon 
offered his hand to Ontontagan, however, some Huron sharpshooters shot at the Ottawa 
leader. Barely escaping with his life, Ontontagan seemed truly hurt by the Huron's 
betrayal. After "having been our friends so long," he told Vaudreuil, the Hurons "have 
120 
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basely betrayed us."121 After two months, Ontontagan and the Ottawas decided that they 
were no longer safe at Detroit, escaped the post and joined the Michillimackinac Ottawas 
in late July or early August. 122 
Following the Ottawas' departure, Bourgmont struggled to keep the Miamis and 
Hurons from immediately counterattacking the Ottawas at Michilimackinac. Meeting 
with the officer in early July, the Hurons, speaking for the others, bluntly declared "We 
Came to tell you that we Want to Avenge to Strike that outaotias have made in this land" 
and that they would "not listen to you." They only relented when Bourgmont pointed out 
that the natives had little ammunition and that, if they attacked Michilimackinac, they ran 
the risk of killing the French people at the fort. 123 The next month the Hurons repeated to 
Cadillac, who had finally returned to Detroit, that they would "never hear a word of any 
arrangement with the [Ottawas]; on this point we do not listen to the Governor, nor to 
you either," hardly the words of obedient children. Promising that he would personally 
lead the campaign to annihilate the Ottawas if they failed to make amends for their 
attack, Cadillac barely managed to restrain them. 124 The commandant also sent a cadet, 
Pierre Boucher de Boucherville, Cheanonvouzon, and the Detroit Miami leader, 
Pakoumakotia, to allay the Miamis and Weas during the winter of 1706-1707.125 
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Although Cadillac succeeded in temporarily restraining the Hurons and Miamis, 
the Ottawas' behavior put the French in a delicate situation. They could not allow the 
death of French people, and especially a priest, to go unanswered. Such would be an 
invitation to further attacks and would ruin French credibility in the region. They also 
had to find a solution that would satisfy the Miamis and Hurons. 126 Those groups, after 
all, claimed to be defending themselves and the French by fighting the Ottawas. More 
threatening, the Hurons and Miamis had developed close bonds to the Iroquois and, if the 
French failed to punish the Ottawas, those groups might ally with the Five Nations. 127 If 
they feared alienating the Hurons, the French were terrified of estranging the Ottawas. 
The Ottawa nation was not only the largest and most powerful in the region but also 
claimed close relations to the other Anishinabeeg groups, the Ojibwas and Potawatomis, 
as well as a host of smaller Algonquian groups. A wrong move could have triggered a 
regional war between a Huron, Miami, and Iroquois bloc, on the one hand, and the 
Ottawas and their allies on the other. 128 
Taking all of these concerns into consideration, Cadillac charted a cautious 
strategy. 129 To allay the Hurons and Miamis, who still wanted revenge for what had 
happened, he would demand that the Ottawas tum over one scapegoat, whom would bear 
126 Cadillac mused that "if I make peace with the one set, I shall very likely have war with the other," but 
nonetheless believed he could resolve the conflict. Cadillac a Vaudreuil, 27 Aug. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:281. 
127 The Iroquois seemed to confirm these affairs when the asked Vaudreuil to allow them to punish the 
Ottawas. "Paroles des Sonnontuans," 4th Sept. 1706, in ibid., 286 ; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 4 Nov. 1706, 
NYCD, 9 :780-81, and MPHSCR, 33:313; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 24 July 1707, in ibid., 330. 
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the responsibility for the entire affair, for execution. 130 To avoid alienating the Ottawas, 
he demanded that they tum over Mekoua, then promptly let the Ottawa man escape. 131 
Far from placating all the parties, however, Cadillac's design only fanned the fire. The 
Miamis, Hurons, and Iroquois, apparently infuriated by the commandant's indulgence 
toward Mekoua, demanded justice, and even contemplated assassinating Cadillac 
himself. Some Miamis took justice into their own hands in April, attacking Detroit and 
killing some French people, and, intriguingly, some cows, which they may have seen as 
symbols of the French presence. Another group attacked the Ottawas wintering at 
Saginaw. When the Miamis failed to make amends, Cadillac organized an abortive and 
mismanaged campaign against the offenders. 132 Cadillac's gambit was not a subtle use of 
"creative misunderstandings" but an ill-informed and disastrously managed attempt to 
mediate between people who knew their business much better than the commandant or 
governor. 133 Ultimately, the Hurons, Miamis, and Ottawas resolved their problems 
themselves, although animosities lingered long after 1706. Animosity still lingered 
130 
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between the groups in 1718, when Alphonse de Tonty, now commandant of the post, 
suggested that Hurons were once again trying to trigger a war between the Miamis and 
Ottawas. 134 
The chroniclers of the 1706 conflict locate Cheanonvouzon squarely at the root of 
the crisis. Granted, these accounts favor the Ottawas' versions of these events. Since the 
French officer commandanding at the time left no official report of the events, we only 
have the testimony of the Ottawa brothers Ontontagan and Miscouak:y to Vaudreuil in 
1706 and 1707 and the statements of five Ottawas to the sieur d' Aigremont in 1708.135 
These Ottawas, having just killed a Recollect priest, had reason to deflect the blame and 
therefore may have overemphasized Cheanonvouzon' role in the events. Still, their 
accusations ring true. All the accounts agree upon Cheanonvouzon's involvement in the 
affair and offer a consistent version of events. V audreuil noted, moreover, that a French 
person who had been at Detroit during the conflict had corroborated the Ottawas' 
story. 136 No one, not even Cadillac, bothered to deny Cheanonvouzon's involvement in 
the affair, either. The allegations of Cheanonvouzon also make sense, given what we 
know about the man. Cheanonvouzon, after all, had been openly denouncing the Ottawas 
since he arrived at Detroit, and he had close ties with the Miamis. Nor would this be the 
first time that he had used such trickery and diplomacy to advance his group's interest. 
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Cheanonvouzon, then, finally had his revenge on the Ottawas, thanks in part to 
Mekoua' s rashness. He had not only successfully arranged a conflict between the 
Miamis and Ottawas, but had, by Ontantagan's count, betrayed the Ottawas four times. 
Cheanonvouzon, to be sure, had not "destroyed" the Ottawas-far from it. 137 Although 
the group lost between twenty-six and thirty warriors, they soon returned to Detroit, 
albeit on the opposite shore of the river. 138 But he had revenged himself upon the 
Ottawas. According to Father Marest, this had been his goal all along. Moreover, 
Cheanonvouzon apparently succeeded in lowering the Ottawas' standing with the French, 
while elevating the Hurons' status. In the peace talks of 1707, Cadillac praised the 
Hurons for their support and defense of the French during the previous year. Although 
the commandant had heretofore counted the Ottawas as his "elder son," that group's 
rebellion had cost them his esteem. Henceforth, the Hurons would be Cadillac's "elder 
brother in my heart."139 The leader of a small, embattled group had used diplomacy and 
trickery to reshape the political landscape at Detroit. 
IV. "too close a connection": The Southern Alliance 
Both his connections with the Miamis and the Iroquois had allowed 
Cheanonvouzon to assert Huron autonomy in the region. In order consolidate their 
independence from the Ottawas, he sought to create a larger alliance that incorporated 
137 Perrot, 145; Vaudreuil to the Minsiter, 24 July 1707, MPHSCR, 33:328. 
138 
"Paroles de Miscouak:y ... ," 26 Sept. 1706, in ibid., 293; "Paroles des Outaouais," 18 June 1707, in ibid., 
33:323; "Paroles des Outaouais ... ," 24 Sept. 1707, in ibid., 347; The Ottawas asked for their old lands 
back, but these had been granted to French colonists. Cadillac therefore granted them land across the river. 
Map of Detroit, 1711, reprinted in Brian L. Dunnigan, Frontier Metropolis: Picturing Early Detroit, 1701-
1838. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2001). 
139 
"Paroles de Lamothe Cadillac aux chefs outaouais," 6 Aug. 1707, MPHSCR, 33:334. 
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both the Miamis and Iroquois. Although he had not yet been born when the Hurons 
abandoned Huronia in 1649, Cheanonvouzon surely had been raised on stories of the 
ancient glory of the northern Iroquoian peoples. Those people had been powerful in part 
because they served as commercial mediators between the Iroquois nations and the 
Algonquin-speaking people to the west and north. 140 Well aware of the connections 
between commercial clout and polticial influence, Cheanonvouzon envisioned a new 
world in which the Hurons would serve as mediators in an expansive alliance which 
included both his Iroquois and Miami allies. By mediating interactions between their two 
allies and by channeling goods from the Iroquois and British to the Miamis, the Hurons 
positioned themselves at the center of an important strategic and commercial network. 
Observing these movements, Gov. Vaudreuil publically fretted that "everything was to be 
feared from too close a connection between the Miamis and Hurons and the Iroquois." 141 
Since this alliance involved the Miamis and Iroquois living to the south of Detroit, I refer 
to this coalition as the "southern alliance," in comparison to the northward-facing alliance 
of Anishinaabe people addressed in the following chapter. 
Cheanonvouzon seems to have conceived of this southern alliance before he 
moved to Detroit in 1701. He laid out his scheme to the Miamis in early 1702, when he 
visited the St. Joseph settlement purportedly to invite the Miamis to settle at Detroit. 142 
According to Jean Mermet, the Jesuit missionary stationed at Miamis' St. Joseph 
140 Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 824-35. 
141 
"il y avoit tous a Craindre d'une trop grande liason du rniarnis et du hurons avec L'lroquois." Vaudreuil 
au rninistre, 24 July 1707, CAOM, C11A, vol. 26, fol. 58v. 
142 
"Paroles de quatre Hurons, deputes aM. de Lamothe par Michipichy, leur grand chef, que les Fran~ois 
ont nomme Quarante-Sols." 17 Feb., 1702, MDE, 5 :266-8; "Paroles de Michipichy," 27 Feb., ibid., 5:271-
3; Jean Mermet a Cadillac, 19 avril 1702, ibid., 219-22. 
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settlement, Cheanonvouzon suggested that the Hurons and Miamis move to a location 
sixty to ninety miles away from the new post in the Maumee River watershed, in hopes of 
concluding an "alliance ... with the English," the foes of New France. The Iroquois, after 
all, purportedly planned to establish a trading post on the Maumee River, and 
Cheanonvouzon wanted move to the region so he could have "his choice of the English 
or the French for trade." Mermet also spoke of the Huron's "resentments" against the 
Ottawas and feared they would soon lead to violence between the nations. 143 From 
Michilimackinac, Father Joseph Marest repeated his brother Mermet's warnings. He 
understood that Iroquois, the Mahicans (Loups), and the Detroit Hurons, particularly 
Cheanonvouzon, planned "to establish at Ouabache [Wabash] an English post." 144 
As articulated to the Miamis, Cheanonvouzon's plan to move to the Maumee 
portage contained the four crucial elements of Cheanonvouzon's plan for the southern 
alliance. First he would use his connections to the Iroquois to facilitate a closer 
relationship between his people and the English and Dutch traders settled at Albany, in 
the colony of New York. Having done so, he would then implicate the Miamis into this 
alliance and convince them to take their furs to Albany instead of Montreal. To facilitate 
the trade between the Hurons, Miamis, Iroquois, and British, he would convince the 
Miamis to move with the Hurons to some place far from French supervision and closer to 
the English, where they could trade with either the French or English as they saw fit. 
Finally, and emphatically, the plot excluded the Ottawas from this arrangement, and 
sought to shut them out from this commercial network altogether. The Ottawas were 
143 
"I' alliance qu'il medite avec 1' Anglois," "Quarante-Sols aura la choix des Anglois ou des Fraw;:ais pour 
la traite," Mermet a Cadillac, 19 April 1702, in ibid., 220. 
144 Jospeh Marest a Cadillac, 30May 1702, in ibid., 227-28. 
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conspiculously absent at this meeting, as they were from subsequent meetings between 
the Hurons and Miamis. 
Although some Miamis opposed the plan and leaked it to Mermet, others 
apparently supported his proposal. 145 Accordingly, joint Miami-Huron delegations made 
two critical embassies in the spring of 1702, one to the Seneca village of Sonnontuan and 
the other to the English entrepot of Albany, where they met with the governor of New 
York. First a delegation of twenty-four Miamis and Hurons on their way to the trading 
fair in Montreal visited the Seneca village of Sonnontuan in the spring. Noting that the 
two nations had now "concludd a firm Peace"-referring to the Great Peace of 170 1-the 
delegates invited the Senecas to come to Detroit, where both nations now lived, to 
exchange captives as per the terms of the Great Peace. 146 The delegates hoped thereby to 
finalize the emerging alliance between them and the Senecas as well as "all i five 
nations ... as also i Governour of New York." But they also sought to ensure that this 
alliance excluded their Ottawa rivals. They warned the Senecas that although the 
Ottawas had made peace in 1701, the Senecas must not "trust too much to i 
Dowaganhaes [the Ottawas and probably other Anishinaabe peoples] for they are a 
brutish People." Moreover, they asked them not to blame the Hurons and Miamis if "any 
of your men happen to be killed" by the Ottawas. The implication here was clear: the 
untrustworthy Ottawas might very well break the terms of the Great Peace. 
Cheanonvouzon therefore sought to consolidate the ties between the Miamis, Hurons, and 
145 Father Marest prematurely pronounced that this intervention had "caused his design to fail" (Marest a 
Cadillac, 23 July 1702, in ibid., 243). 
146 The Iroquois satisfied this request in May. "Conference of Lord Cornbury with the Indians," 20 July 
1702, NYCD, 4: 989; "Conseil tenu dans le fort du Detroit entre les Iroquois, Outaouas, Hurons, Nepissings 
et Mississaguez," 4 May 1702, MDE, 5:275-80. 
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Iroquois, while also sowing doubt and distrust between the Iroquois and the Ottawas. 147 
Symbolizing this tripartite union, a joint party of Miamis, Iroquois, and Hurons left to 
attack the Dakotas. 148 
Shortly after the Miamis and Hurons met with the Senecas, Cheanonvouzon and 
the Miamis sent five delegates to Albany in the summer of 1702. Here, they met with 
Lord Cornbury. The delegates told Cornbury that the "Sachims" of the Detroit Hurons 
and Miamis had sent them to Albany to trade and "to see if goods be cheaper here than 
elsewhere." For "where we find goods cheapest," they promised, "thither we will bend 
our course." Esctatic about the prospect of wooing important allies from the French 
rivals, Lord Cornbury, the governor of New York, assured his guests that "ye Goods are 
farr cheaper here than at Canada." The Hurons and Miamis were, of course, welcome to 
visit Albany whenever they liked, but Cornbury could more easily supply them if "you 
would come and live nearer us," away from French intervention. Then, the governor 
assured them, they would have little need to go to Montreal. The governor finally 
presented them a wampum belt which showed the Hurons, Iroquois, and governor of 
New York linked hand-in-hand. 149 The Hurons carefully curated this belt for at least 
another fifty years, when they presented it to British officials. 150 
147 Indeed earlier that year "Huron chiefs," presumably including Cheanonvouzon, had floated rumors that 
the Iroquois had killed an Ottawa man in an apparent attempt to spark conflict between the Iroquois and 
Ottawas. Ibid., 275-77 at 276; "Paroles de Alleouoye, Huron envoye par les Outaouas aM. de Lamothe," 
in ibid., 368-71. 
148 
"Parolles des outauotiaes arrivez a Montreal Le Cinq juillet 1702," CAOM, F3, vol. 8, fol. 311; 
"Parolles des kiskakons Saquis poux et puantes descendus a Montrealle 23 juillet 1702," in ibid., 312v. 
149 
"Conference of Lord Corn bury with the Indians," 10 July 1702, NYCD, 4:979-81; M de Callieres to the 
Minister, 4 Nov. 1702, MPHSCR, 33:158. 
150 George Croghan, "Journal," in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 5:351. 
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These two meetings provided the groundwork for an emerging tripartite alliance 
between the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois. At Sonnontuan, the Hurons had explicitly 
articulated an alliance of the southern nations which explicitly excluded the Ottawas. At 
Albany, Huron and Miami deputies reiterated that proposal and sought to establish an 
exclusive relationship with the English, although the Iroquois were not "privy to this 
Conference." These negotiations led directly to the formation of a commercial and 
strategic alliance between the conferees. In fact, that year some Hurons and Iroquois had 
joined a Miami war party against the Dakotas. 151 The Hurons visited the Seneca 
settlement of Sonnontuan in 1703, as they had in 1702, and discussed the message of a 
belt the Senecas had given them. 152 The Miamis and Hurons apparently tried to return to 
Albany in 1705.153 Twelve Huron and Miami representatives returned to Albany in 1708 
in order to "Trade & Traffick" with the British.154 Satisfied with the prices they found at 
Albany, the representatives agreed to return the following spring. The six people of the 
"Farr Nations" who arrived at Albany the following June, therefore, may well have been 
Hurons and Miamis. 155 In addition to visiting Albany directly, the Hurons also traded 
with their Iroquois partners at the Iroquois entrepots in Lake Ontario, Niagara and 
151 
"Parolles de kiskakons Sakis poux et puants dessendus a Montreal," 23 July 1702, CAOM, F3, vol 8, 
fol. 312v. 
152 
"Conseil tenu dans le fort Pontchartrain par les Hurons," 3 June 1703, MDE, 5:290-1. 
153 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 44-45. The Commissioners of trade reported that the French had dissuaded 
some unspecified Detroit natives from visiting Albany in 1705. Since the Ottawas and Senecas were 
currently on bad terms after an Ottawa attack in 1704, the would-be traders were probably the Miamis and 
Hurons. Moreover, Vaudreuil noted in the same year that the Hurons were considering moving to Seneca 
country and had communicated with them. Vaudreuil au ministre, 5 May 1705, CAOM, CllA, vol. 22, fol. 
23lv. 
154 Wraxall identifies these, not as Hurons and Miamis, but as "far or Western Indians settled about Lake 
Erie or Tughsackrondie." The following month, however, Combury clarified that these visitors were 
"Twigtwicks and Dionondadees," or Miamis and Hurons. Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 56; "Lord Combury to 
Lords of Trade," 20 Aug. 1708, NYCD, 5:65. 
155 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 50. 
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Cataroquoi (Fort Frontenac). The Iroquois also visited their Huron allies at Detroit 
regularly, bringing with them British goods to exchange for Great Lakes peltry. By 1706, 
the Iroquois had already begun bringing British goods to Detroit. Cadillac complained 
that a Seneca man named Pimabauso frequently brought English rum to his relations at 
Detroit.156 
Concerned about losing trading partners and military allies to their British rivals, 
the French testified to this emerging alliance. Even before their second visit to Albany, 
Vaudreuil had fretted in 1706 that the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois might "be united" 
and that the English and Dutch merchants at Albany would "profit from this 
opportunity."157 He fretted that "everything was to be feared from too close a connection 
between the Miamis and Hurons and the Iroquois."158 Fran~ois Clairambault 
d' Aigremont, a French official and Vaudreuil's protege, witnessed this nascent trade 
first-hand in 1708. After his inspection tour of the western forts, Aigremont noted that 
the Hurons and Iroquois enjoyed "close relations" because of the "great resemblance" in 
the two groups' language and culture. 159 This intimacy allowed the Hurons to 
"constantly pass through their [Iroquois] districts to take their beaver-skins to the 
English." Aigremont elsewhere noted that, if the nations currently settled at 
Michilimackinac moved to Detroit, the beaver pelts "would almost all go to the English 
by the agency of the Iroquois, the Hurons, and even many other savages who have gone 
that way." To make matters worse, the Hurons had proctored an alliance between the 
156 Cadillac to Vaudreuil, 27 Aug. 1706, MPHSCR, 34: 278. 
157 Vaudreuil to the Minister, 4 Nov. 1706, NYCD, 9:979. 
158 Vaudreuil to the Minister, 24 juillet 1707, MPHSCR, 33:330. 
159 Jon Parmenter also argues that the Iroquois nations and other northern Iroquoian peoples maintained an 
important alliance in the eighteenth century ("At the Woods' Edge"). 
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Miamis and Iroquois, creating a massive and potentially threatening alliance of southern 
nations. While Aigremont certainly exaggerated the frequency with which the Hurons 
visited Albany, his observations do attest to a growing trade network which, if 
unchecked, could seriously threaten French trade in the region. In fact, he noted that 
nearly all the goods at Detroit came from the English and that most of the furs coming 
from Detroit found their way to Albany, not Montreal. 160 
In 1711 Fran9ois La Forest, formed y the third in command at the post and now its 
commandant, likewise pointed to the Hurons' centrality in linking the Miamis to the 
Iroquois and thus the British. La Forest lamented that the Miamis and lllinois, who 
lacked the boat-handling abilities of the Ottawas and others, seldom made the arduous 
trip to Montreal to trade. Instead, those peoples preferred to "to trade their pelts with the 
Iroquois, hurons and missaguez [Mississaugas] established at detroit who then carry them 
to the English."161 Just as Aigremont had, then, La Forest testified to a powerful trading 
alliance which united the Iroquois and British with the Miamis and even lllinois, through 
Huron mediators strategically located at Detroit. In his formulation, the Hurons acted as 
agents or middlemen, mediating trade between the Iroquoian allies and other nations who 
came to Detroit to trade for British goods, much as their ancestors had mediated trade 
between Iroquoian and Algonquian groups before the fall of Huronia. Obtaining British 
goods either by trading with the British themselves or with the Iroquois, the Hurons then 
trafficked these goods to other nations in the pays d' en haut. 
160 Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 9:426, 431, 441, 450. 
161 La Forest au ministre, 1711, CAOM, C11A, vol. 120, fol. 125. 
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An incident in 1711 further speaks to this Huron-Iroquois-Miami nexus and 
suggests the centrality of the Hurons to that alliance. In the summer of 1711, Vaudreuil 
received reports that the British planned to invade Canada and called upon the nations 
d' en haut to assemble in Montrea1. 162 Most of the nations answered the call-including 
the Hurons, Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Foxes of Detroit. Yet when the governor asked the 
nations to declare war against the British, the delegates hesitated. According to 
V audreuil, the people of the pays d' en haut had "long fluttered between the Desire to 
declare themselves [against the British]" and the fear that by doing so they would close 
"the path going to the English." Only when twenty Hurons "began to sing [the war song] 
and to take the hatchet" did the other nations follow suit. 163 The other nations' reaction 
to the Hurons' behavior is suggestive, if ambiguous. The Hurons' show of bravery might 
have shamed their neighbors into declaring war against the British; if the Hurons, 
numerically reduced as they were, agreed to fight, then the Ottawas and other nations 
might have felt obliged as well. Yet Aigremont' s and La Forest's testimony suggests 
another alternative. If the nations d' en haut, like the Miamis, lllinois, and Ottawas, saw 
the Hurons as uniquely attached to the British and Iroquois, then the Hurons' reaction to 
Vaudreuil's invitation would be especially meaningful. As crucial mediators between 
Albany and Detroit, the Hurons' position mattered profoundly, and therefore the others 
deferred to them. At the very least, the other nations might have looked to the Hurons to 
decide whether war with the British would, indeed, close the path to Albany as they 
162 
"Memoire de Vaudreuil pour servir d'instruction a ceux qu'il envoie chez les nations des pays d'en haut," 
10 March 1711, MPHSCR, 33:497-502; "Words of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Savages ... " [1711], in 
ibid., 503-506. 
163 Vaudreuil au rninistre, 25 Oct. 1711, CAOM, C11A, vol. 32, fols. 51-52v. 
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feared. If so, the incident demonstrates that Cheanonvouzon's design had worked exactly 
to plan; by forging ties with the Iroquois and British, the Hurons had improved their 
status in the pays d' en haut. 
Even though Cheaunonvouzon died in 1707, the alliance which he had proctored 
had outlived him. The Hurons and Iroquois continued to nurture their friendship and to 
keep their competitors-especially the Ottawas-away from the Iroquois. Although the 
southern alliance seems to have diminished, especially after the establishment of the 
British trading post at Oswego in the 1720s, echoes of the southern alliance continued to 
reverberate for years afterward. In 1758, as we have seen, the French commandant 
invited the peoples of Detroit to attack the Iroquois. When several nations, including the 
Miamis, accepted the war belt and agreed to strike the Iroquois, the latest Huron elder to 
bear the title of Sastaresty angrily erupted at their "Conduct & Readiness to take up the 
French Hatchet." After refusing to accept the hatchet, he pointedly "kicked" the 
wampum belt "toward where the Twightwees sat, & desired they wou'd speak their 
Sentient." Following a "short pause" the Miamis acknowledged that the Iroquois were 
"their old Friends and Allies" and therefore "kicked" the belt toward the Illinois leaders 
who had come. The episode demonstrates the lingering connections between the three 
nations. Sastaresty acknowledged his ties to his "Flesh and Blood" Iroquois kin, and the 
Miamis conceded that they had enjoyed a long relationship with their "old Friends." 
More importantly, Sastaresty had reprised Cheanonvouzon's role as a mediator between 
his Miami and Iroquois allies. Even if the alliance no longer operated as it had, its 
remnants were still plain to be seen fifty years after Cheanonvouzon's death. 
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Conclusion 
As the 1711 and 17 58 incidents testify, the southern alliance had allowed the 
Hurons to exercise an influence far beyond their numbers. In each incident, the Hurons' 
neighbors looked to them, and some even deferred to their judgement, before deciding 
how to proceed in regard to the Iroquois and British. As Payen de Noyan witnessed in 
1721, "All the Savages [of Detroit] are guided exclusively by the feelings of the 
Hurons."164 The Marquis de Beauharnois, governor of New France, explicitly drew the 
connection between the Huron-Iroquois alliance and Huron influence in the region. 
Noting the necessary to accommodate a recent conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas, 
the governor observed that "the hurons are allied with all the 5 Nations Iroquois" and 
worried that the Hurons and Iroquois might combine against the Ottawas. In a very 
explicit way, the Hurons had translated their relationship with regional allies into 
influence among their neighbors. They were able to do so because Cheanonvouzon had 
inserted himself into a regional network and a diplomatic reality. He had used diplomacy 
to compensate for the Hurons' weakness. No longer able to act as "lyons" who 
intimidated their neighbors through the threat of force, the Hurons acted like "foxes" that 
used diplomacy to compensate for the weakness and to project their influence in the 
region. 
The Hurons' maneuvering after their arrival at Detroit defied all odds. That 
activity not only demonstrates that the Hurons remained a profoundly and defiantly 
distinct people, but also that relations between peoples like the Hurons, Miamis, and 
164 Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et de Chavoy, "Memoire," [1730], MPHSCR, 34:76. 
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Iroquois, shaped the region as much as the accommodative "middle ground" where 
French and native peoples negotiated. By all objective accounts, the Huron community 
should have been shattered and should have clung to the French and other allies in order 
to survive. Yet Cheanonvouzon's dogged pursuit of autonomy from the Ottawas 
suggests that no matter how badly the Hurons had been battered since the epidemics and 
wars of the seventeenth century, the Huron community nonetheless remained distinct and 
separate from their neighbors in the region. Cheanonvouzon and his people were not 
orphaned refugees who needed Onontio to solve their problems, but wily and resourceful 
survivors who sought to retain their separate existence. Moreover, Cheanonvouzon was a 
Huron leader seeking to advance the ends of his own nation, even when that meant 
flouting his French or Ottawa allies. In fact, when Vaudreuil appeared ready to 
undermine Detroit in 1704, Cheanonvouzon brazenly declared Onontio to be a "liar" and 
refused to "listen any longer to his word."165 He clearly perceived himself to be a child 
of Aatentsic-the ancient mother of the Hurons-rather than of Onontio. Nor was he 
alone. Mekoua also railed against the French for deferring their vengeance on the nations 
which had attacked and killed his people.166 
Both the Hurons' survival as a discrete entity and their later ascendency as a 
regional power were premised upon a set of relationships which were only partially 
connected to the French and which often undermined French interests. In fact, the 
Hurons' alliances, and the activity it enabled, threatened to undermine New France 
165 
"Nous voyons bien que le Gouverneur est un manteur, ne nous tenan[t]s pas ce qu'il nous a prornis 
puisqu'il nous a menty. Nous luy mentirons ainsy et nous n'ecouterons plus sa parolle," "Conseil tenu au 
fort Pontchartrain dans le Detroit du lac Erie le 8e juin 1704," COAM, F3, vol. 2, fol. 301 v. 
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"Conseil Tenu au fort Pontchartrain le deuxe juillet 1706," in ibid., fols. 232v-25 
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constantly. Although Cheanonvouzon worked to attract nations to Detroit when it suited 
him, his extracurricular activities proved much less conducive to Onontio's interest. His 
plotting against the Ottawas, for instance, threatened to ignite a regional war between the 
two nations which would have drawn the French into an unwinnable war. The intensity 
of the Huron-Ottawa rivalry continually overwhelmed French attempts to mediate it, and 
the two nations only came to terms when they saw fit to do so. By openly courting the 
British, furthermore, Cheanonvouzon threatened to send furs to France's imperial rivals, 
the English in Albany. Onontio continually demonstrated his inability to "arrange 
affairs" in the region. Cheanonvouzon, on the other hand, used his alliances with the 
Iroquois and Miamis to establish Huron ascendency, humble his Ottawa rivals, and shape 
Detroit along Huron lines. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"The Ottawawa Confederation": 
The Anishinaabeg during the Pax Vulpinae 
In late June 1717, a small Ottawa party left Detroit, ostensibly to attack the 
Flatheads, their perennial enemies. Instead of attacking the Flatheads, however, they 
headed for the Miami settlement on the Maumee River and murdered a Miami woman, 
her Iroquois husband, and two of the couple's children. The murders threatened to engulf 
the pays d'en haut in war. In one fell swoop, the Ottawas had offended the Iroquois and 
the Miamis, two of the most powerful nations in the pays d'en haut. Noting that the 
Ottawas had already attacked them several times, the Miamis were disinclined to "listen 
to talk of peace."1 By August, they had reportedly mobilized a large war party against 
the Ottawas. Watching the crisis unfold, the Hurons, rivals of the Ottawas and friends of 
the Miamis, silently hoped that a "war would be ignited" between the two nations, just as 
they had a decade earlier, and tried to prevent delegates from visiting the Miamis. The 
events so roiled affairs at Detroit that the nations settled at the post dared not to descend 
to Montreal to attend peace talks with the Foxes that summer. 2 
Arriving in early July, Alphonse de Tonty, the new commandant at Detroit, 
desperately worked to prevent further bloodshed. He dispatched envoys to Saginaw Bay 
to apprehend the murderers and to invite the Miamis to come reconcile with the Ottawas. 
When a Miami delegation finally arrived in September, Tonty convoked an assembly 
1 
"La plus grande partye du village [des Miamis] ne voulant pas Entendre parler de Paix, et disant Pour 
raison qu'on [les Outaouais] les avoit tuez tant de fois," Vaudreuil au conseil, 30 Oct. 1718, CAOM, 
C11A, vol. 39, fol. 151; Vaudreuil au conseil, 30 Oct. 1718, Ibid., 149-56v. 
2 Vaudreuil to the Council of the Marine, 12 Oct. 1717, MPHSCR, 33:551; Vaudreuil au conseil, 30 Oct. 
1718, CAOM, C11A, 39:149-56v; Alphonse de Tonty, "Estat de La Depense qui a este faitte pour 
accommoder L'affaire des Outa8as de Saguinan qui avoient tuez les Myamis," 15 Sept. 1718, Ibid., 30-31v. 
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with the Miamis and Ottawas, as well as the Potawatomis, Hurons, and Ojibwas at the 
fort. He then ordered musketeers to escort the perpetrators before the council. Speaking 
to the council, he dramatically offered to surrender the Ottawa men to the Miamis, but 
implored them to be merciful toward them. The Ottawas likewise apologized for the 
indiscretion of the reckless "young men" and presented the Miamis gifts to "cover" their 
dead symbolically. Despite the Hurons' opposition to the terms of reconciliation, the 
Miamis reluctantly accepted the peace and surrendered the murderers to Tonty's care. If 
the Ottawas attacked again, however, they promised swift retribution, regardless of 
Tonty' s intervention. Having kept the peace, Tonty convinced the assembled nations to 
sign a peace treaty. 3 
The Ottawas never really explained why they had attacked the Miamis and 
suggested that the crime was simply the work of uncontrollable "young men," the 
ubiquitous excuse for bad behavior. Yet the identity of the victims and the timing of the 
attack suggest a more serious and intentional motive. The warriors had not attacked just 
any Miami family; they had targeted a mixed Iroquois-Miami household living near the 
Miami settlement. The Ottawas had long been concerned about the growing commercial 
and diplomatic intimacy between the Miamis, Iroquois, and Hurons. The Ottawas, the 
most powerful and well-connected nation in the region, worried that this emerging 
alliance might diminish Ottawa influence and commercial clout. They had repeatedly 
and unsuccessfully tried to disrupt this alliance and to forge their own partnership with 
the Iroquois. When they failed to do so once again in the spring of 1717, their frustration 
3 Ibid. 
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became deadly. They struck out at the unfortunate mixed family, the physical and 
biological manifestation of this alliance. 
The murders therefore constituted a skirmish between two rival blocs within the 
French-allied coalition: the southern alliance described in the preceding chapter and an 
alliance between the culturally and politically connected peoples of the Anishinaabe 
culture group-called Anishinaabeg in the plural-the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and 
Potawatomis, a group whom the British later referred to as the "Ottawawa 
Confederacy."4 Fearing that the southern alliance would successfully challenge Ottawa 
and Anishinaabe interests in the region and reorient the region toward the south and away 
from the core Anishinaabe settlements, the Ottawas and their allies sought to disrupt that 
coalition (see figure 7). 
Gov. Vaudreuil observed this emerging rivalry in 1706 when he fretted that "if the 
Hurons, the Miamis and the Iroquois be united, they will accomplish the destruction of 
the Outtaouois."5 Thirty years later Vaudreuil's successor, the Marquis de Beauharnois, 
observed the same rivalry. Emphasizing the importance of reconciling the Hurons and 
Ottawas, who had recently clashed again, he noted that the affair "is very delicate the 
hurons being allied with the 5 Nations Iroquois, and the Outaotiais with all of those in the 
pills d'en haut," meaning chiefly the Anishinaabe peoples.6 At the same time, the 
intendant, Gilles Hocquart confirmed that the Hurons were allied "to all the Iroquois"-
indicating both those in the St. Lawrence Valley settlements and those living in 
4 Sir William Johnson to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, 6 Oct. 1763, in WJP, 10:866 
5 Vaudreuil to the Minister, 4 July 1706, NYCD, 9:780 
6 
"cette affaire qui est tres delicat les hurons etant alliez avec les 5 Nations Iroquois, et les Outaotiais avec 
tous celles des paYs d'en haut," "Resume des lettres de Beauharnois," Jan. 1739, COAM, C11A, vol. 72, 
fol. 393v. 
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Miamis, Detroit Hurons, and 
Iroquois 
Figure 7: The Southern and Anishinaabe Alliances, ca.1700 The map shows the two competing 
spheres of influence within the pays d'en haut. One, dominated by the Ottawas, centered on 
Michilimackinac. The other, a southern alliance forged by the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois, linked 
Albany to Detroit and points west. 
Iroquoia-and the Ottawas of Detroit were allied to the "Savages of the same name" 
living elsewhere and the "Sauteur of Michilimackinac"-an Ojibwa community.7 These 
two blocs had been quarrelling ever since the Hurons moved to Detroit and begun 
negotiating with the Iroquois and Miamis and continued to do so long after 1717. At a 
council with the British commandant of Detroit, Henry Hamilton in 1779, an Ottawas 
orator spoke for "the Outawaas, Chippeweys and Poutwuattamies," while a Huron leader 
7 
"Ces deux Nations sont alliees, La premiere a tousles Iroquois, et les 8ta8acs le sont aux Sauvages du 
meme nom, et aux Sauteur de Michilimakinac," Hocquart au ministre, 22 Oct. 1738, in ibid., vol. 70, fol. 
116. 
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spoke in the "name of the Wyandotts [Hurons] & Miamis." Even at this late date, these 
two peoples acted as separate entities. 8 
Such commercial squabbles and fights over influence between these two blocs 
would not be surprising had they not come when they did, amidst a series of conflicts 
against the Foxes, also known as the Outagamis or Mesquakies. By all accounts, the era 
should have been one of harmony between the peoples of Detroit and in many respects it 
was. Engaged in a common effort against a common foe-the Foxes and their allies-
the Ottawas, Hurons, Miamis, and other nations overlooked their differences and 
cooperated as they had not since the Iroquois wars. In the midst of these conflicts, these 
nations enjoyed an era of cooperation-a Pax Vulpinae, or Fox Peace. Indeed, the 
previous year those nations had issued a severe blow to the Foxes and the groups had 
promised to come to Montreal that very summer to conclude a treaty with the Foxes. Yet 
if the Fox threat drew them together, the 1717 murders remind us that other forces 
continued to separate them. 
This chapter therefore charts the curious paradox between the harmony, 
engendered by both the Fox threat and the subsequent wars, and the sometimes violent 
competition between the peoples allied against the Foxes. The first section recounts how 
the common threat posed by the Foxes and their allies galvanized the peoples of Detroit 
to form a powerful military alliance against the Foxes in 1711 and 1712. This threat, and 
the anti-Fox campaigns that followed, provided these peoples with common ground from 
1711 until the 1730s. Yet, as the remainder of the chapter shows, this temporary 
cooperation neither melted the boundaries separating the different members of the 
8 
"Council held at Detroit," June 1779, MPHSCR, 9:449. 
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alliance nor implied a greater political fusion. In particular, the Anishinaabeg saw the 
rise of the Huron-led southern alliance as a threat to their traditional dominance of the 
region. Exploring the dynamic of the Anishinaabe alliance-the so called "Three 
Fires"-the second section sketches out the ways in which the Anishinaabe communities 
used their cultural and familial ties to control the pays d'en haut. Finally, the third 
section describes the ways in which the Anishinaabe challenged the southern alliance, 
first by seeking to disrupt Iroquois-Huron relations, and then by trying to supersede that 
relationship. This rivalry led, in 1717, to the doorstep of the unfortunate Miami-Iroquois 
family. 
This juxtaposition between peace and conflict, between cooperation and 
competition, reveals the durability and stubborn independence of the peoples living in the 
pays d'en haut. The Fox threat, like the Iroquois threat the previous century, could have 
spurred these communities to forget their past difficulties and to remain in harmony. The 
common endeavor in the following years could have suppressed the struggles for 
influence in the region. Instead the two rival blocs continued to spar and compete even 
as they faced challenges from a mutual enemy. Such competition reveals not only the 
depth of the antipathy between different groups, but also the natives' loyalty and 
commitment to their own nations' well-being. Happy to cooperate when conditions 
called for such cooperation, these groups nonetheless maintained their sense of 
separateness and never heeded French calls to live in harmony and to fuse into one cozy 
family. Not even an external threat could completely overcome the friction between the 
peoples of the pays d' en haut. 
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I. Pax Vulpinae 
Beginning in 1710, the nations of the pays d' en haut, although fractured and wary 
after the conflicts of the previous decade, coalesced in an alliance against their longtime 
foes, the Foxes, Sauks, and Mascoutins. To be sure, these nations had long shared 
common enemies, like the Sioux in the north and the Flatheads in the south. Yet none of 
them posed the threat that the Foxes did in 1711 and 1712. In those years, the Foxes and 
their allies, who had sometimes clashed with other nations, adopted an especially 
aggressive and menacing stance. Moving eastward from Green Bay, bands of Foxes and 
their allies settled at Detroit, the Saint Joseph River and elsewhere. At the same time, 
they collaborated, or at least appeared to collaborate, with the Five Nations Iroquois-the 
all-purpose bogeymen of the region-against the peoples of the pays d'en haut. 
Threatened by an external enemy who posed a real and imminent danger to their common 
interests, most of the peoples of the pays d' en haut banded together to attack the Foxes in 
the winter and spring of 1712. Once the nations had allied, the continuing menace 
presented by the Foxes worked to unify the people of the region. The common endeavor 
against a common foe moreover counteracted their tendency toward distrust and gave 
them a shared project and common ground. This collective fear, shared suffering, and a 
common enemy created conditional harmony, a flawed and fragile Pax Vulipinae, which 
extended from 1712 until the 1730s. 
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By 1712, relations among those nations d'en haut certainly needed some repair.9 
Speaking to an assembly of nations in Montreal late in 1711, Governor Vaudreuil 
acknowledged that the previous decade had been one of discord and conflict among his 
allies in the pays d'en haut. In a palpably weary tone, Vaudreuil recounted "how much 
trouble and care I have taken ... to keep you at peace and in union with one another" and 
noted that their "dissensions" had deeply troubled him. 10 Despite the high hopes and 
lofty promises of 1701, the peoples had spent the subsequent decade squabbling. The 
Ottawas had attacked the Iroquois just three years after the conference, casting doubt on 
the durability of the peace. More troubling, the Miami raids on the Ojibwas and Ottawas 
in 1704 and 1705 triggered the confrontation at Detroit in 1706. That violence threatened 
to permanently poison relations among Ontonio's children and to split the pays d'en haut 
into two blocs-one dominated by the Miamis and Hurons and the other by the Ottawas 
and their Anishinaabeg allies. Lamothe Cadillac's pardon ofMekoua had then triggered 
retaliation from the Miamis and a French-led retaliatory campaign in 1708. Since then 
the Miamis and Ottawas had observed a tentative cease-fire without fully reconciling. II 
The Ottawas' allies and Miamis' erstwhile targets, the Mississaugas, an Ojibwa group, 
had attacked a group of Miamis on their way to the 1711 conference. Before dismissing 
9 Following contemporary usage, I use the term "nations d'en haut" to refer to the nations living in the pays 
d'en haut. 
10 
"Words ofthe Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Savages who Came down from the Upper Country." [1711], 
MPHSCR, 33:503. 
11 The acting commandant of Detroit, Charles Regnault, Sieur du Dubuisson, attested to that enduring 
animosity in 1712 and the Miamis objected in 1717 that the Ottawas had attacked them "so many times" 
("tant de fois)." Sieur du Dubuisson to Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR 33:550; Vaudreuil au conseil, 
30 Oct. 1718, CAOM, CllA, vol. 39, fol. 151v. 
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Figure 8: Detail of De 
Couagne, " Carte du 
Canada," 1711. 
Bibliotheque nationale de 
France, Paris. 
The Foxes and Mascoutins 
settled south of the Huron 
fort (see "Fort des renards") 
and immediately began 
positioning themselves as key 
players in the French alliance. 
his allies to return home, Vaudreuil once more enjoined his children "to reunite your 
minds and to induce you to live together as brothers."12 
Most of these nations did in fact reunite their minds in the autumn and winter of 
1712, but this unity had more to do with the threat of a Fox incursion than acquiescence 
to Onontio's pleas. At the invitation of Lamothe Cadillac, two bands of Foxes, as well 
as many closely allied Mascoutins and Kickapoos-some seven or eight hundred souls all 
told-had moved eastward in 1710 (see figure 8). 13 While some of these settled near the 
home quickly, establishing a camp in the shadow of Fort Pontchartrain and-to ingratiate 
themselves to their French neighbors-presenting many of their children for baptism by 
the post's Recollect missionary. 14 
12 Vaudreuil to the Minister, [1711], MPHSCR, 33:503. 
13 [Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery], "Memoire, 1712, "in Legislature de Quebec, Collection de manuscrits 
contenant lettres, memoires, et autres documents hzstoriques relatifs a Ia Nouvelle-France, recueillis aux 
Archives de Ia Province de Quebec, ou copies a l'etranger. 4 vols. (Quebec: Cote etC., 1883), 1:623. 
14 Dubuisson to Vaudreuil, 15 June, 1712, MPHSCR, 33:537. Father Cherubin de Nian, the Seminarian 
missiOnary to DetrOit, baptized a staggering forty-six children listed as either "Renard," "8tagames," or 
"8'tames" between 13 Nov. 1709 and the beginning of the Fox Wars in June 1712. No existing records 
indicate that Foxes had been baptized at Detroit prior to 1709. Cherubin de Nian, "Seconde Livre des 
Baptemes du Sauvages," Registre de paroisse, DetrOit, 1703-1800,96-130. 
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The Foxes' arrival at Detroit troubled many of the peoples the region, especially 
the Ojibwas and illinois, who had been fighting with the Foxes for decades. This conflict 
only intensified when the Fox settled in the midst of their Ottawa, Huron, and 
Potawatomi enemies at Detroit. 15 The Foxes, already on bad terms with their long-time 
enemies, the Ojibwas of Sault-Ste.-Marie, with whom they had been fighting since at 
least 1708, defiantly "menaced" the Saginaw Ottawas. 16 At the same time they moved 
eastward in 1710 and 1711, the Foxes also provoked conflicts with the illinois. 17 In 1711 
the Foxes attacked some Miamis at Detroit, killing two of that nation-a Wea and 
Piankshaw .18 Moreover, the Kickapoos, close allies of the Foxes, and, to the minds of the 
nations' d'en haut, inseparable from them, attacked the Miamis as well in the spring of 
1711. 19 In addition to insulting the Hurons at Detroit in 1711, the Foxes reportedly 
planned to ambush both the Hurons and Miamis, on their return trip from Montreal to 
Detroit.20 Although the Foxes did not succeed in this attack, a Kickapoo leader settled on 
the Maumee River, whom the Hurons regarded as "really an Outagami," captured and 
15 Dubuisson to Vaudreuil, 15 June 1715, MPHSCR, 33:537. 
16 William Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance" (PhD. diss. Dept. of History, 
University of Toronto, 1995), 304-308. The Miami attacks on the Ojibwas had likewise angered the 
Ottawas in 1704 and 1705, and the Ottawas had promised to revenge their Ojibwa "comrades" for the 
indignity. "Consei1 tenu au fort Pontchartrain le 8. March 1706," CAOM, F3, vol. 2, fol. 320v ; "Parolles 
de Makisabe chefP8t8atarnis du 17 aout 1712," CAOM, C11A, 33:88. 
17 
"Words of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Savages ... " [1711], MPHSCR, 33: 505-506; "Reply to 
Cadillac's Claim," 17 July 1711, in Ibid, 515-16. 
18 
"Words of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Savages ... " [1711], in ibid., 504-505; Dubuisson to 
Vaudreuil, 15 June 1715, in Ibid., 539. 
19 
"Parolles de Makisabe chef P8t8atarnis le 8. March 1706," CAOM, C11A, vol. 33, fols. 85v-86. 
20 
"Parolles de [Vaudreuil] en reponce de celles que luy ont dit K8tasiliboe, 8ilamek, et monet chefs 8ta8as, 
Pot8atarnis et Sakis du 28° julliet 1712," ibid., 81-81 v.; "Words of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the 
Savages ... ," [1711], MPHSCR, 33:506. The following year, several leaders thanked Dubuisson for 
"saving" them from the Foxes, perhaps referring to his role in preventing the attack. Dubuisson to 
Vaudreuil, in Ibid., 541. 
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killed a Huron man and two of his Iroquois companions the following winter.21 Finally, 
the Foxes attacked the Potawatomi settlement at Fort St. Joseph in the autumn or winter 
of 1712.22 Surveying the damage brought by the Foxes in late 1711, Vaudreuil enjoined 
the Foxes and Mascoutins to return to Green Bay, lest they "draw down upon 
[themselves] all the tribes in the land."23 
If the Foxes' and Mascoutins' arrival at the post and subsequent aggression were 
not alarming enough, the nations d'en haut thought they discerned even more sinister 
motives in those nations' behavior. Piecing together scraps of information and rumors, 
the nations d'en haut concluded that the Foxes' aggression was part of a larger 
conspiracy, hatched with the Iroquois and the British, to destroy Detroit and the nations 
d' en haut entirely. 
First, the Iroquois and British had been acting more aggressively in recent years. 
Early in 1710, representatives had complained both to the English and the French that the 
"Wagenhaes"-the Iroquois name for the Ottawas-had frequently murdered their 
people and that the Five Nations were "determined to take Revenge" against them?4 
Some Senecas and Onondagas confirmed this to Vaudreuil in 1710, complaining that the 
Ottawas had repeatedly attacked them since 1701 and that they would no longer defer 
21 Ibid., 550-51. Dubuisson later noted that the Hurons were especailly resentful of the Foxes and would 
not accept an accommodation with them ("Resume des letters de Vaudreuil au rninistre, "Nov. 1712 [5 
May 1713], CAOM, CllA, vol. 123, fol. 19v). 
22 
"Parolles de Makisabe chef P8t8atarnis du 17 aout 1712," in Ibid., 33:85-85v. 
23 
"Words ofVaudreuil to the Savages ... ," [1711], MPHSCR, 33:505-506. 
24 Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs, ed. Charles Mcilwain (New York: Benjamin Blorn, 
[1915] 1968), 80-84. 
97 
their vengeance. 25 In the summer of 1712 the Senecas reported that the Onondaga 
headman, Teganissorens, had spent the previous winter plotting an attack on Detroit and 
had invited the other four nations to join him.26 Moreover, Vaudreuillearned of an 
anticipated British invasion of New France in 1711 and had called all the nations d'en 
haut to protect Montreal from invasion, which added to the sense of alarm and gave 
credence to the rumor that the Foxes were in league with the British?7 
These rumors of Iroquois and British aggression coincided with evidence of 
collusion between the Fox and their allies and the Iroquois and British. The Foxes and 
Mascoutins had visited the Iroquois in 1710 and "renewed their alliance" and the Iroquois 
had placed the nation "under their protection."28 In fact, Vaudreuil feared that they 
would fuse into "one body with the Iroquois."29 In seeming confirmation of this new, 
troublesome alliance, a band of Foxes abruptly abandoned Detroit in the spring of 1712 
and took refuge among the Five Nations.30 This alliance, moreover, extended to the 
Iroquois' partners, the British. In 1712 Claude Dubuisson, acting commandant at Detroit, 
claimed that the Foxes had accepted "many presents and belts from the English."31 An 
25 The Iroquois were also at odds with the Potawatomis who had recently attacked them. "Paroles des 
Tsonnontuans et Onontagues ... et Reponse de Vaudreuil," 8 Aug. 1710, CAOM, CllA, vol. 31, fols. 99-
100v. 
26 Vaudreuil au ministre, 6 Nov. 1712, Ibid,, 33:57-58; "Resume des lettres de Vaudreuil au ministre," in 
Ibid., vol. 123, fols.24-28. 
27 
"Memorandum to Serve as Instructions from the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Officers and Voyageurs 
Despatched to Bring Down to Montreal the Savages of the Upper Country,", 10 March 1711, MPHSCR, 
33:497. 
28 According to Louis-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire, the French officer stationed at Niagara, the Foxes and 
Mascoutins had visited the Iroquois around 1710. Les Foxes et Mascoutins "avoient este renouveller 
alliance avec Eux [les Iroquois] et Se mettre sous leur protection." Vaudreuil au ministre, 6 Nov. 1712, 
CAOM, C11A, fol. 32, fol. 54v. 
29 Vaudreuil au ministre, 8 Nov. 1711, Ibid., fols. 72v-73. 
30 Vaudreuil au ministre, 6 Nov. 1711, in Ibid., fol. 54v. 
31 Dubuisson toVaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:537. 
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official in New York confirmed in 1715 that the Foxes had "made an Alliance with this 
Gvt" several years earlier. 32 
Aware of the intensified British and Iroquois aggression toward New France and 
its allies and the rumored dealings between the Iroquois, British, and Foxes, many 
observers reasonably interpreted the Foxes' aggression in 1711 as definitive proof of a 
conspiracy. Specifically, they feared that the Foxes and Mascoutins, on orders from 
Albany, would attack Detroit in 1712 and immediately flee to the Iroquois, who would 
shelter them from any recriminations. Thereafter, the Five Nations and Foxes would 
scour the pays d' en haut. Dubuisson articulated this theory in his report in the spring 
1712. Citing the testimony of a Fox defector, the officer claimed that the Foxes had 
received orders from the British "to destroy the post ... and then certain tribes allied to 
us."
33 More importantly, native observers also believed that the Foxes had colluded with 
the British to attack Detroit. In the spring of 1712 an lllinois leader told the Foxes that, 
despite their subterfuge, he knew about "the messages that [they had] received from the 
English to slaughter our father and the children here"-the nations of Detroit. The 
Potawatomi elder Makasabe likewise chastised the Foxes for betraying their French 
father for a British one and for countenancing the Protestant "enemy of prayer."34 
According to Joseph Marest, the Jesuit missionary at Michilimackinac, the Ottawas had 
attacked the Mascoutins "so as not to be attacked by them first," suggesting that they 
32 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 115. 
33 Dubuisson toVaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:537-38; This may well be Joseph Nimenso, a Fox 
man who presented his daughter to be baptized on 22 March, 1711. Cherubin de Nian, "Seconde Livre des 
Baptemes du Sauvages," RPD, Ill. 
34 Dubuisson to Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:542-45. 
99 
believed the rumors about a coordinated assault on Detroit and the nations d'en haut.35 
Whether the Foxes truly had conspired with the British-something they apparently 
claimed during the siege-the nations d'en haut clearly believed that they had and the 
"f" d h 36 prospect tern 1e t em. 
By creating a common threat-specifically one that involved the powerful 
Iroquois-the Foxes had curiously and unintentionally given those nations common 
ground (their resentment and fear of the Foxes) and a common cause (the ultimate 
destruction of the Foxes). The emergence of a threatening external enemy quickly 
eclipsed the conflict that had separated the nations d'en haut in the previous decade. If 
the Foxes really planned to sack Detroit then unite with the Iroquois, all of the nations 
d' en haut would suffer the consequences. The suspected involvement of the British and 
Five Nations was critical because it made what would have otherwise been a serious 
threat a potentially devastating one. Facing this common threat, moreover, these nations 
remembered the ties which had long bound them. They recalled their shared struggle 
against the Five Nations during the seventeenth century. Accordingly, the Fox threat 
propelled the nations d' en haut into a harmony not seen since the seventeenth century. 
35 Marest to Vaudreuil, 21 June 1712, in Ibid., 555; As late as 1714, the Ottawas still feared that the Foxes 
and Iroquois might cooperate. Learning that the Foxes, Mascoutins , and Kickapoos had visited the 
Senecas, Ottawa delegates visited Sonnontuan and demanded to know the meaning of the meeting. 
"Paroles des deputes tsonnontouans," 25 Sept. 1714, CAOM, C11A, vol.34, fol. 297. 
36 Dubuisson clearly presented this position in his letter to Vaudreuil after the violence of 1712, arguing 
that the Foxes were poised to attack Detroit in June 1712, and that the violence barely prevented this. Yet 
Dubuisson, having been unable to prevent the violence or control the allies, had a vested interest in 
presenting the conflict as inevitable and as justified. Accordingly, the attack was a preemptive strike 
against a treacherous foe. Other evidence argues against such a conspiracy. The British, in fact, had 
discouraged the Five Nations from attacking the nations d'en haut and described their current conflict with 
the French-Queen Anne's War-as a fight between "Christians." Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 84. Iroquois 
warriors even participated in the siege and showed no effort to help the Foxes after their defeat. Dubuisson 
to Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:551. Yet the reality of the threat mattered less than the 
perception of the threat. 
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Ironically, the Foxes had done in a few short months what French officials had been 
trying to do for years-they unified the peoples of the pays d' en haut. 
While the nations d'en haut certainly worried about an alliance between the 
Foxes, Iroquois, and British, they may also worried that the Foxes and other nations at 
Green Bay threatened their position within the pays d' en haut. French traders had been 
travelling to Green Bay more frequently, and the eastward migration of the Foxes, 
Kickapoos, and Mascoutins might have triggered worries, especially among the Ottawas, 
that the Foxes would displace them as crucial traders in the alliance. The Ottawas, 
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis certainly had no interest in seeing their longtime enemies 
settled and trading with their French partners. They accordingly sought to impose their 
"vision of a more limited alliance" that excluded the Foxes. 37 
Capitalizing on the almost universal ill-will toward the Foxes and their allies and 
hoping to prevent a Fox attack, the peoples d'en haut built a formidable anti-Fox 
coalition during the autumn and winter of 1711-1712 and resolved to attack the Foxes 
and Mascoutins at Detroit in the spring of 1712. As Dubuisson noted, the war against the 
Foxes had been "well planned during all the autumn and winter, with all the tribes and 
presents given."38 According to the St. Joseph Potawatomi war leader, Makisabe, 
Sagima, the Saginaw Ottawa headman coordinated the affair, inviting first the 
Potawatomis, and then the lllinois to join the coalition. By late spring the coalition 
included "almost all the other nations," such as the Hurons and Miamis as well, in 
37 Brett Rushforth, "Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance," WMQ, 63:1 (Jan. 2006): 58-60 at 
60. 
38 Dubuisson to Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:540; [Lery], "Memoire," 1712, in Legislature de 
Quebec, Collection de manuscrits. 1:623. 
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addition to nations as distant as the Osage of the Missouri River Valley.39 Together these 
peoples aimed to "Entirely destroy" the Foxes and their friends. 40 
The new coalition wasted little time implementing its strategy. Claiming to act, 
not just for themselves but for "all the upper nations," the Potawatomis and Ottawas 
combined to attack some Mascoutins who were wintering near Saginaw.41 Proceeding to 
Detroit, the Ottawas and Potawatomis joined with Illinois, Miamis, Huron, Osage, and 
Sauk warriors to attack a party of Foxes and Mascoutins encamped at the fort. 
Numbering some six hundred and perhaps as many as nine hundred warriors, the allies 
arrived at Detroit in May 1712.42 Taking up positions both in the fort and around the Fox 
and Mascoutin camp, the allies besieged the shabby enclosure for nineteen days. 
Although the Foxes finally managed to escape the siege on a dark night, the hapless 
refugees only made it a few miles north of Fort Pontchartrain before a combined force of 
Ottawas, Hurons, Potawatomis, and Misssissaugas reached them and easily defeated the 
weary refugees. According to Dubuisson, the allies killed all the men and enslaved the 
women and children.43 Demonstrating the depth of their hatred toward the Foxes, the 
Hurons murdered their captives rather than retain them as slaves.44 
39 
"Car le nomme Saguina ayant trouve Le Secret pendant l'hiver de Se joindre aux P8t8atarnis pour faire la 
guerre Ensemble aux Mask8tins et aux 8tagarnis ... ayant Encor trouve Le Secret de mettre dans ses interest 
[interet] presque toutes les autres nations." Vaudreuil au rninistre, 6 Nov. 1712, CAOM, C11A, vol.32, fol. 
51v. 
40 
"pour detuire Entieremens L8tagarnis et Le Mask8tins." in Ibid., fols. 86-87v at 87v. 
41 Ibid., 87v-90v; "Resume des lettres de Vaudreuil au rninistre," Nov. 1712 [May 1713], in ibid., vol. 123, 
fols. 19-20v. 
42 Dubuisson and Makisabe put the number at six hundred, while another French official, who was not 
present at the siege, claimed that there were nine hundred warriors. Dubuisson a Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, 
MPHSCR, 33:539; [Lery], "Memoire," 1712, in Legislature de Quebec, Collection de manuscrits. 1:623. 
43 Father Nian christened a nine-year-old Fox slave, a boy belonging to the Ottawa interpreter and trader, 
Pierre Chene La Butte, on 16 July 1712, shortly after the siege. Nian, "Seconde Livre," RPD, 132. 
44 Dubuisson a Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:537-52. 
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Dubuisson noted that the attack on the Foxes had immediately improved relations 
among the nations d' en haut. During the siege, the allies had coexisted and cooperated 
"in peace, union, and good understanding" in the cramped French fort and had 
cooperated to defeat a common foe. In the warm afterglow of their victory, furthermore, 
the nations seemed poised to forget their ancient troubles altogether. Dubuisson asserted 
that this "general assembly of all the tribes" had "put them all at peace with one another, 
and has renewed their former alliance. "45 The Potawatomis, impressed with the bravery 
and sacrifice of some St. Lawrence Iroquois, reconciled with their erstwhile enemies.46 
Dubuisson also took credit for making a "firm peace" between the Miamis and the 
Ottawas. The two nations-estranged since the violent encounter in 1706-finally 
created "a strong alliance with one another." Dubuisson even hoped that the lllinois and 
Miamis might finally reconcile. 47 Violence had begotten harmony. 
If the threat of a Fox attack in the winter of 1711-1712 had bridged the rifts 
opened by the violence of 1706, the subsequent violence, lasting intermittently for the 
following two decades, cemented that alliance. Within weeks of the siege, a Kickapoo 
delegation arrived at Detroit to address the nations settled there. The Hurons and 
Ottawas, seeking vengeance for an attack on the Hurons the previous winter and 
45 Ibid., 541. 
46 Dubuisson refers to "about twenty-five Iroquois in this fight, who had joined the Hurons from the foot of 
the lake," probably the mission, or Canadian, Iroquois for the Lac de Deux Montagnes mission. "Paroles 
des Tsonnontouans et Onontagues venus a Montreal avec Longueuil et Joncaire," 8 Aug. 1710, CAOM, 
C11A, vol. 31, fol. 100. Furthermore, Father Cherubin de Nian baptized a Cayuga Iroquois baby in June of 
that year, strongly implying that Iroquois warriors-and even their wives-had been present at the fight. 
"Seconde Livre des Baptemes du Sauvages," RPD, 132. 
47 Dubuisson a Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:550-51. The Miamis and Illinois did eventually 
reach an accommodation. Vaudreuil and Michel Begon de Picardiere to the Minister, 20 Sept. 1714, in 
WHC, 16:303-304. 
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regarding the Kickapoos as virtual Foxes, intercepted and slaughtered them.48 Learning 
of the siege later that summer, the Mascoutins and Kickapoos from the Green Bay 
settlements mobilized war parties to Detroit and elsewhere, scattering the allies, "who 
dared not hold at their approach."49 Rather than directly attacking the fort, these parties 
lurked in the outskirts of the post, ambushing hapless victims and occasionally 
skirmishing with the peoples of the post. Hostilities resumed in the summer of 1713. A 
Fox party led by the ominously named Le Tonnerre-or The Thunderer-launched a raid 
on Detroit early that year. The Hurons intercepted the party on the lie aux Dindes-a 
small island in the Detroit River about six miles from Fort Pontchartrain still known as 
Turkey Island-and killed the chief and two other Foxes. 5° Later that summer, a 
Kickapoo warrior killed a Huron on the outskirts of Detroit. By the end of the year, war 
parties had killed five Hurons and three French people in the vicinity of Detroit. 51 The 
Foxes returned in the spring of 1714, sending "several small parties toward Detroit." In 
September of that year, Vaudreuil reported that these parties had killed thirteen people 
around the post.52 Between the autumn of 1714 and the summer of 1715 alone, the Foxes 
had made five raids around Detroit. 53 
48 Dubuisson a Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:550-51; Marest a Vaudreuil, 2 July 1712, in Ibid., 
559. 
49 [Lery ], "Memo ire," 1712, in Legislature de Quebec, Collection de manuscrits. 1:625. 
50 Vaudreuil to the Minsiter, 6 Sept. 1712, MPHSCR, 33:561; "Paroles des Hurons descendus du fort 
Pontchartrain du Detroit a Vaudreuil, "7 Nov. 1713, CAOM, C11A, vol. 34, fol. 66; Jacques-Charles de 
Sabrevois, "Memoire of Sabrevois on the Tribes of the West," 1718, NYCD, 9:886. 
51 
"Reponse ofe Mr Le marquis de Vaudreuil to the hurons," 7 Nov. 1713, in Ibid., 89; Vaudreuil au 
ministre, 14 Nov. 1713, CAOM, CllA, vol. 34, fols. 49v, 51v. 
52 
"Les Renards ont aussy envoye plusieurs petit partis vers le detroit, et depuis ce printem[p]s ils ont pris 
ou Tue treize personnes, et ont perdu onze," (Vaudreuil au ministre, 16 Sept. 1714, Ibid., fols. 283-384). 
53 In an impassioned plea for help, Sasteretsy noted that his people had suffered five attacks at Detroit since 
he had returned from visiting Montreal the previous autumn. "Parolles que les hurons ont prie Mr. 
Dubuison d'ecriver a Mr. Le gouverneur general a qui elle L'addresse dittes devant Orangesse chef des 
p8te8atemis," CAOM, serie CllE, vol. 22, fols. 62-62v. Charles Le Moyne de Longueuil, a lieutenant in 
104 
These attacks inflicted a crippling psychological blow far beyond what the death 
toll would suggest. Carrying on a guerrilla war and randomly attacking anyone who 
strayed too far from their forts, the Foxes traumatized the peoples of Detroit. The 
Hurons, who seemed to bear the brunt of these attacks, complained in 1713 that the Fox 
incursions forced them to remain close to Fort Pontchartrain for "fear of having their 
heads broken every time" they ventured too far from it. 54 Commandant La Forest 
reported in October of the following year that Hurons and Ottawas remained sequestered 
in their forts and that the frequent "alarms" of imminent attack disturbed the peace at the 
place and that the Ottawas, Hurons, and Potawatomis remained confined to their forts. 55 
The Governor of Montreal, Claude de Ramezay, likewise noticed that the peoples of 
Detroit did not go hunting "on account of their well-grounded fear that the Reynards will 
destroy them all, one after the other."56 As one clearly rattled Huron headman lamented, 
the Foxes were killing them "one by one. "57 
The continued Fox incursions only bound the peoples of Detroit closer. At the 
very least, the continual threat of Fox or Kickapoo incursions dampened the rivalry which 
had sometimes separated these nations. The nations of Detroit had enemies aplenty and 
therefore saw no reason to alienate their allies and neighbors. Yet the conflict did more 
than simply reduce quarrels among the peoples of Detroit. The violence provided a 
shared experience of suffering and psychological torment, which encouraged the Miamis, 
the French Marines, saw evidence of a Fox war party headed toward Detroit in the summer of 1715. 
"Copie d'une lettre par Charles LeMoyne de Longueuil (D' Adoucourt) a son pere, Charles LeMoyne de 
Longueuil, Baron de Longueuil," 22 Aug. 1715, CAOM, CllA, vol. 35, fol. 57v. 
54 Vaudreuil and Begon to the Minsiter, 15 Nov., 1713, in WHC, 16:298. 
55 [La Forest], Memoire sur le Detroit, 1 Oct. 1714, NYCD, 9:866. 
56 Claude de Ramezay to the Minister, 18 Sept., 1714, in WHC, 16:301. 
57 
"Paroles que les Hurons ont prie M. Dubuisson d'envoyer aM. le gouverneur general," [1715], CAOM, 
C11E, vol. 22, fol. 62. 
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Ottawas, Hurons, Ojibwas, and others to put aside their differences and to see each other 
as allies rather than rivals. More importantly, the continual violence-and the 
vulnerability it engendered-bred a deepening animosity toward the Foxes and their 
allies. Constantly alert for potential attacks and confined to their forts, the peoples of 
Detroit felt vulnerable and increasingly resented their Fox tormentors. Indeed their 
resentment of the Foxes ripened into a genocidal hated of the Foxes and anyone who 
dared side with them. 58 As their hatred of the Foxes grew, their resentment of one 
another abated. The animosity toward the Foxes drew attention away from their old 
grievances and rivalries and pulled them into ever greater harmony. 
United in their hatred of the Foxes, the nations d' en haut once again joined forces 
to destroy their common enemies. In 1713, eight hundred Ottawa, Huron, and Miami 
warriors amassed to launch a raid against the Foxes and apparently inflicted a blow on 
them. 59 In 1715, the French and their allies launched a formal campaign against the 
Foxes, supported by several hundred French coureurs de bois. When an outbreak of 
measles in the pays d'en haut and a poor harvest derailed the campaign, the nations d'en 
haut took their own initiative.60 The Hurons and Detroit Potawatomis, joined by a 
58 A growing chorus of native leaders called for the "entire destruction" of the Foxes and their allies. 
Mak:isabe confessed that he hoped to "entirely destroy" the nations ("d[e]tuire Enti[e]remen[t]s L8tagarnis 
et Le Mask8tins"). "Parolles de Mak:isabe chef P8t8atarnis du 17 aout 1712," CAOM, C11A, vol. 33, fol. 
87v. For similar statements, see Marest a Vaudreuil, 19 June 1713, in Ibid., vol. 34, fol. 80; "Responses de 
Vaudreuil au paroles du Brochet, de Saguima et de Miscouaky," 28 Aug. 1713, in ibid., 34:73v; Dubuisson 
a Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:540; Vaudreuil au rninistre, 6 Sept. 1712, in i"bid., 559-60; 
[Lery], "Memoire, " 1712, in Legislature de Quebec, Collection de manuscrits. 1 :625. 
59 Claude Michel Begon, "Reestablishment ofMichilimackinac,",20 Sept., 1713, in WHC, 16:296; 
Ramezay to the Minister, 18 Sept. 1714, in ibid., 300; Council of the Marine, "Plans for Settling 
Difficulites with Fox Indians," 28 March 1716, in ibid., 339. 
60 Vaudreuil and Begon to the Minister, 20 Sept. 1714, in WHC, 16:303-306); Ramezay, "Reponces aux 
parole des hurons adressez a Mr. Le marquis de Vaudreuil par Mr. Dubuisson a Mr. de Ramezay," [1715], 
CAOM, C11E, vol. 22, fols. 62-62v; Ramezay, "Response aux parolle d'onangesse chef des p8te8atarnis," 
[1715], in Ibid., fols. 64-64v; Copie de la lettre de D' Adoucourt a Longueuil, 22 Aug. 1715, CAOM, 
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contingent of Canadian Iroquois warriors and a few French soldiers, traveled to the 
lllinois village of Kaskaskia, where they invited the lllinois to attack a nearby Mascoutin 
and Kickapoo camp. In late November of that year, the combined force attacked the 
village and killed or captured 150 men and uncounted women and children.61 Buoyed by 
this success, the French launched another campaign in the summer of 1716. The 
combined force defeated a Fox settlement near Green Bay and imposed rigorous 
conditions on them.62 
Although the decisive victory in 1716 quieted the Foxes' aggressive stance, the 
nations of Detroit remained wary and distrustful of the Green Bay nations. In August 
1720, Alphonse de Tonty, now commandant at Detroit, reported that the Detroit 
Potawatomis had agreed to attack the Foxes and that he thought the Miamis, lllinois, and 
other nations would join them.63 When Vaudreuil invited these nations to attack and 
"destroy" the Foxes the following year, the Hurons, Ottawas, and Potawatomis agreed 
that such a war was necessary.64 Tonty reported in 1722 that the peoples of Detroit 
intended to attack the Foxes in the spring of the following year and in fact the Saginaw 
Ottawas did make a raid in 1723.65 In 1728, the Ottawas, Potawatomis, Hurons and other 
CllA, vol. 35, fols. 56-60v; Ramezay et Begon au ministre, 13 Sept. 1715, in ibid., vol. 34, fols. 5-8v; 
Louvigny au ministre, 3 Oct. 1715, in ibid.,fols. 220-23v. 
61 Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 Oct. 1716, MPHSCR, 33:576-77. 
62 Ibid., 577-79; Louvigny to the Council of the Marine, 13 Oct. 1716, in WHC, 5:78-80; Vaudreuil to the 
Council of the Marine, 30 Oct. 1716, in ibid., 80-81; Vaudreuil to the Council of the Marine, 30 Oct. 1730, 
ibid., 16:377-78. 
63 Vaudreuil to the Council of the Marine, 22 Oct. 1720, in ibid., 393. 
64 Pierre-Franc;ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un voyage fait par ordre du roi dans !'Amerique 
Septentrionale adresse a Madame la Duchesse de Lesdiguieres (Paris: Chez Rollin Fils, 1744), 383. 
65 After the Ottawas' raid, the nations of Detroit apparently backed away from their plans to attack the 
Foxes. In the summer of 1723 they told Foxes that they planned only to remain on their mats. According 
to Vaudreuil, the allies feared that the Foxes would attack Detroit in retribution for the Saginaw Ottawas' 
attack, suggesting that they still feared the Fox and their allies. Tonty a Ramezay, (10 March 1723), 
MPHSCR, 33:710; Vaudreuil au ministre, 2 Oct. 1723, in WHC, 16:528-30. 
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nations joined a French expedition commanded by Lignery against the Foxes and 
participated in other attacks on the Foxes and their allies in subsequent years.66 
The net effect of these conflicts, then, was a period of sustained cooperation and 
relative harmony among the peoples of Detroit that lasted from 1712 until the early 
1730s. During these years, the quarrels of the proceeding decades abated. The nations of 
Detroit seemed to forget, or at least subordinated, their old animosities. Hatred of the 
Foxes washed clean the blood spilled in 1706 and following years. Groups which had 
previously promised the destruction of their neighbors now sent their young men in 
common raiding parties against the Foxes, their allies, and Onontio's enemies to the 
south. In the face of intimidating and foreign enemies, the nations reaffirmed their old 
friendships. As Ramezay noted in the aftermath of the 1716 Fox defeat, the Ottawas and 
other nations d' en haut had been "peaceably disposed" and· "their relations with each 
other have been amicable."67 
Within months of Ramezay' s observation, however, the Ottawas had killed the 
Iroquois-Miami family. Even while conflict with the Foxes healed the wounds opened in 
1706 and drew the nations of Detroit in closer harmony, other forces continued to reopen 
them. Amidst this Pax Vulpinae, the nations of Detroit and their neighbors in the region 
66 Louis Crespel, ed., Voiages du R.P. Emmanuel Crespel dans le Canada et son naufrage en revenant en 
France (Frankfurt, 1752), 5; Constant le Marchand de Lignery to Fran<;ois de Beauharnois de La Boische, 
Marquis de Beauharnois, 30 Aug. 1728, in WHC, 17:31; Jean Baptiste de St. Ours, sieur Deschallions to 
Beauharnois, 22 Aug. 1728, MPHSCR, 34:69; Le president du conseil de marine au Pere Duparc, 2 May 
1729, CAOM, serie B, 53:541; Nicolas Joseph des Noyelles to Beauharnois, [1731], MPHSCR, 34: 122-28; 
Beauharnois and Hocquart to the Minister, 1 Oct. 1732, in ibid., 97-100; Louis Henri Deschamps, sieur de 
Boishebert to Beauharnois, 2 Nov. 1732, in ibid., 104-105. These renewed hostilities with the Foxes 
merged with new conflicts against the Chickasaws. Deschaillons a Beauharnois, 22 Aug. 1728, in ibid., 69; 
Beauharnois et Hocquart au ministre, 1 Oct. 1732, in Ibid., 100; Beauharnois to the Minister, 30 May 1733, 
WHC, 17:181-82; Beauharnois to the Minister, 24 July 1733, MPHSCR, 34:108-109. 
67 
"Indian Affairs in the West," 6 Jan., 1717, in WHC, 345. 
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continued to wage a desperate contest to establish commercial and strategic prominence 
begun in the previous decade. Each nation tried, with whatever resources they could 
muster, to shape the region in their interests, often at the expense of their neighbors. 
II. The Iroquois of the North: The Anishinaabe Alliance 
The violence on the Maumee in 1717 was part of an Anishinaabe response to 
what they perceived to be a serious challenge to their long-held dominance in the region: 
the southern alliance. Connected by ties of real and fictive kinship and united by a 
common language and culture, the Anishinaabe peoples-the various Ottawa, Ojibwa, 
and Potawatomi communities that lived throughout the region-formed a powerful 
commercial and diplomatic network which had allowed them to dominate the region 
since at least the fall of Huronia. As one historian has put it, the Anishinaabe were the 
"dominant people" in the region during the eighteenth century.68 Yet the emergence of 
the southern alliance had threatened to undermine Ottawa commercial and diplomatic 
dominance in the region by creating a rival network which explicitly excluded the 
Ottawas and their Anishinaabe partners. If successful, the Miami-Iroquois-Huron 
configuration could provide a serious military and commercial threat to the 
Anishinaabe. 69 In response to this threat, the Anishinaabe mounted a coordinated effort 
to maintain control of the region. This section explores how the Anishinaabe, united by 
68 Peter MacLeod, "The Anishinabeg Point of View: The History of the Great Lakes Region to 1800 in 
Nineteenth-Century Mississauga, Odawa, and Ojibwa Historiography," Canadian Historical Review 73 
(1992): 209. 
69 As the Ottawas understood well, this alliance could defeat them militarily as well. Vaudreuil explicitly 
worried that a coalition of the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois, could destroy the Ottawas. Vaudreuil to the 
Minister, 4 Nov. 1706, NYCD, 9:780. 
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culture and ties of real and fictive kinship, cooperated to dominate the pays d' en haut. 
The following section narrates their joint response to the threat raised by the southern 
alliance between 1704 and 1717. 
Shortly before the fall of New France in 1760, an anonymous British official 
compiled a rough census of the peoples occupying the pays d' en haut. Referring to the 
"Ottawas, Chepaways [Ojibwas], Putuvatimies [Potawatomis], Melkomineys, or 
Shockeys," he suggested that the "Nations are in confederacy somewhat like the Six 
Nations" Iroquois.70 While the analogy exaggerates the formality of the Anishinaabe 
alliance-or "Ottawa Confederacy" as other British officials sometimes called it-the 
official nonetheless recognized that the Anishinaabe people had formed a powerful 
strategic and commercial alliance.71 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
Anishinaabe peoples had formed a loose coalition of culturally similar, interrelated, and 
diplomatically allied peoples which their descents would later call the "Three Fires."72 
This Anishinaabe network allowed goods, information, and people to flow easily 
throughout the region from Anishinaabe settlements at Sault Ste. Marie, Manitoulin 
Island, Michilimackinac, Saginaw Bay, the St. Joseph River, Green Bay, and Detroit. 
The "Three Fires" also formed an intimidating military alliance which worked together to 
70 
"Accounts of the Western Indians," in SThe Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet., ed. Sylvester Stevens and 
Donald Kent, Northwestern Pennsylvania Historical Series (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical 
Commission, 1942-1943), Series 21655:86. 
71 
"Minutes of the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson Bart with the Indians on his Way to, and at the 
Detroit in 1761," in WJP, 2:487,490, 494; Johnson to Amherst, 6 Oct. 1763, in WJP, 10:866; 
"Enumeration of Indians within the Northern Department," 18 Nov. 1763, NYCD, 7:583. 
72 Peter MacLeod. "Une conspiration generale: The Exercise of Power by the Amerindians during the War 
of Austrian Secession" (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, University of Ottawa, 1992), 6-10, 18-20; Donald 
Fixico, "The Alliance of the Three Fires in Trade and War, 1630-1812," Michigan Historical Review, 20:2 
(Fall1994):1-25; Newbigging, "The French-Ottawa Alliance," 337-47; Havard, Empire et metissages, 206-
209. 
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fight external threats, such as the Dakotas, Iroquois, Foxes, and, in the eighteenth 
century, the southern alliance. This section argues that the Anishinaabe alliance was built 
on a common Anishinaabe cultural tradition, nourished and sustained through 
intermarriage between peoples and frequent travel between villages, and expressed in 
strategic cooperation and trade. This cooperation allowed the Anishinaabe people to 
dominate affairs in the pays d' en haut. 
As it had for the Hurons and Iroquois, a common cultural tradition served as the 
basis for the relationship between the Anishinaabe peoples. Nineteenth century accounts 
even suggest that, by that time at least, the Anishinaabe peoples claimed a common 
ancestral people. Just as they did among the Iroquois in the seventeenth century, this 
shared mythic past created a sense of exclusive kinship and familiarity.73 The 
Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and Ottawas moreover spoke very similar Algonquian dialects, 
which both facilitated communication between them and confirmed their sense of 
commonality.74 James Smith, a British colonist captured by Kahnawake Iroquois, 
pronounced the Ottawa and Ojibwa dialects "nearly the same."75 Indeed, the languages 
73 James Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1695 
(Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 32-35; Newbigging, "The French-Ottawa Alliance," 343-
44; Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2010), 81. 
74 The Ottawa language is in fact a dialect of eastern Ojibwa. Although previously classified as an Ojibwa 
dialect, Potawatorni is now recognized as a distinct language. Still it "shows many parallels" with Ojibwa 
and Ottawa. James Clifton, "Potawatorni," in Trigger, The Northwest, vol. 15, HNAI, 725. 
75 
"An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Colonel James Smith ... during 
His Captivity with the Indians, in the Years, 1755, '56, '57, '58, and '59," in Samuel G. Drake. Ed. Indian 
Captivities, or Life in the Wigwam (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby and Miller, 1852), 213; Memoire de Sabrevois, 
1718, COAM, CllA, 39:358. 
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were closely related enough that the French Crown only maintained one Algonquian-
aki . h 76 spe ng mterpreter at t e post. 
In addition to language, the Anishinaabe peoples shared other cultural traditions. 
In 1718 Jacques Charles Sabrevois, Sieur de Bleury, the commandant at Detroit, asserted 
that the Mississauga Ojibwas' "manners are the same" as the Ottawas.77 The Ottawas, 
Potawatomis, and Ojibwas were so similar, in fact, that Charles Stuart, an Anglo-
American colonist taken to Detroit by his Huron captors, could not differentiate between 
the Anishinaabeg he met at the post. Stuart berated Lewis Evans's influential "General 
map of the middle British colonies in America," for listing the "Poutewatamis," 
"Outawas," and "Sississogaes [Mississaugas]" separately.78 These were not distinct 
nations, Stuart insisted, but only "different Names given to the Same Nation." He 
likewise referred to the Potawatomi village at Detroit as "an Outotoway Town."79 Given 
the close proximity in language and culture, Stuart confused the different peoples and 
called them all "Outotoway." As they had among the Hurons and Iroquois, these 
common bonds of culture facilitated, although they did not dictate, diplomatic 
cooperation between these peoples. 
If this common cultural tradition served as a basis for cooperation, the exogamous 
marriage between different Anishinaabe peoples facilitated cooperation between these 
peoples. When the Shawnees and Delawares threatened the Potawatomis in 1771, for 
76 
"Reply of the Governor-General to the Memorial Presented by Monsieur de la Mothe Cadillac on the 
31st of March, 1706," MPHSCR, 33:256. 
77 Memoire de Sabrevois, 1718, CAOM, CllA, vol. 39, fol. 358. 
78 Lewis Evans, "A General Map of the Middle British Colonies, in America," 1755, Newberry Library, 
ChicagoMap4F3 790. 
79 
"The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-57 ,"in Beverley W. Bond, Jr., ed., Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review vol. 13 (1926-1927): 75-76, 80. 
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example, the Potawatomis gave the Ottawas a wampum belt asking for safe harbor for 
their women and children. As the Potawatomi put it, the Ottawas and Ojibwas were "all 
Relations, being intermarry' d with one another."80 Such unions, of course, created 
diplomatic and personal bonds between the peoples, and created webs of loyalty and 
kinship which enhanced the connections between peoples. Their relations were never 
distant strategic alliances between peoples, but real, affective bonds connecting peoples. 81 
These connections of loyalty and marriage, then, knit the Anishinaabe peoples 
together into a regional alliance. In many important respects, the Anishinaabe alliance 
resembled Jon Parmenter's description of the Iroquois League in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Like the Iroquois League, the Anishinaabe recognized a common 
culture, perhaps one derived from a common ancestor, and spoke mutually 
comprehensible languages. Exogamous marriage between individuals from different 
communities, moreover, fostered loyalty and kinship networks that extended past the 
village and wove the villages together. These connections created what Parmenter, 
referring to the Iroquois communities, calls a "geography of solidarity" which connected 
Anishinaabe across a wide swath of the Great Lakes. 82 Anishinaabe people easily moved 
through an Anishinaabe social world which stretched from Sault Ste.-Marie and other 
Ojibwa settlements in Lake Superior, down to Saginaw Bay, Detroit, Toronto, and west 
to the St. Joseph River and Green Bay. These connections allowed goods and 
80 George Turnbull to Thomas Gage, 29 May 1771, in WJP, 8:116-18. 
81 Donald Fixico emphasizes the "socio-kinship nature" of the Three Fires ("The Alliance of the Three 
Fires in Trade and War, 1630-1812," 2, 10). 
82 In addition to resembling Parmenter's description of the Iroquois, the Anishinaabe enjoyed a 
predominance in the Great Lakes not unlike that achieved by the Comanche, although neither can 
realistically be called an "empire." Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, xi; Pekka, Hamaliiinen, The 
Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
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information to pass quickly through the region, and allowed the peoples to pursue 
commercial and military strategies in their common interest. Anishinaabe leaders 
constantly met together to discuss joint issues, and Anishinaabe warriors left Detroit in 
joint war parties destined for the Flatheads, Foxes, or other enemies. The Ottawas, for 
example, helped the Sauteur Ojibwas fight the Dakotas in the early eighteenth century 
and sought to revenge the Miami attack on their Mississauga Ojibwa "comrades" in 
1706.83 Capable of fielding a joint army of nearly twelve hundred warriors by the 1750, 
the Anishinaabe alliance could easily face any challenge to its authority. 84 By these 
means, the Anishinaabe established a powerful grip on the region, one that they were 
loath to surrender the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois. 
Yet to say that the Anishinaabe cooperated and frequently intermarried is not to 
suggest that the nations abandoned their separate identities in favor of a pan-Anishinaabe 
one, any more than the Senecas or Mohawks jettisoned their autonomy by joining the 
Iroquois Confederacy. Indeed the Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and Ottawas maintained 
separate villages at Detroit, indicating a spatial and psychological boundary between the 
peoples. These villages squared off against one another on the lacrosse field; as 
Sabrevois observed they "play village against village, the [Potawatomi] against the 
[Ottawas] or the Hurons."85 While it might be facile to liken such competition to an 
inter-city rivalry between two sports teams, the practice does suggest that Anishinaabe 
attributed meaning to the differences separating them. 
83 
"Conseil tenu au fort Pontchartrain le 8 March 1706," CAOM, F3, vol. 2, fol. 320v. 
84 MacLeod estimates that there were "460 Odawas, 480 Ojibwas, and 220 Potawatornis" warriors 
(MacLeod, "Une conspiration generale," 7). 
85 
"il jeux vilage contre vilage; les poux contre les outaouac ou les hurons," "Memoire de Sabrevois," 1718, 
COAM, C11A, vol. 38, fol. 356v. 
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More seriously, two eerily similar Ottawa attacks on the Potawatomis at St. 
Joseph separated by twenty years reveal much about relations among Anishinaabe 
communities. In 1734 a Saginaw Ottawa party encountered and murdered two 
Potawatomi men and a woman, and, as the commandant at St. Joseph reported, the 
Potawatomis were "determined to Avenge their deaths on the OutaBacs."86 Twenty years 
later, after another Ottawa party killed a Potawatomi man and woman, the French learned 
that the Ottawas and Ojibwas from Saginaw were planning "to make war on the 
Potawatomis of the St. Joseph River."87 That such conflict between Anishinaabe peoples 
was rare and easily resolved without bloodshed tells us much about the relationship 
among those groups. That it could happen at all tells us more. The Anishinaabe, bound 
by close cultural and kinship ties, coordinated their movements and deployed a 
geographic strategy which ensured Anishinaabe dominance in the pays d' en haut and 
influence far beyond. Yet, as the Ottawas' willingness to attack the Potawatomis 
demonstrates, these separate Anishinaabe peoples continued to act with a great deal of 
autonomy. This, then, was the central dynamic of the Anishinaabe alliance-no matter 
how much they cooperated or how often they married one another, they continued to 
view each other as closely related, but ultimately different peoples. 
86 
"les Poutoliatamis sont determines aVenger leur morts sur les Outa8acs du Saguinan," Beauharnois au 
ministre, 11 Oct. 1734, COAM, C11A, vol. 61, fols. 314v-315; "Entierement racomodee ," Beauharnois au 
ministre, 15 Oct. 1736, in ibid., vol. 65, 135; "Memoire des frais que moy le Verchere Commandant a 
Missilimakina ait fait en mil Sept Cens trente,"1730, in ibid., vol. 76, fol. 240; Newbigging, "The French-
Ottawa Alliance," 342-43. 
87 Joseph-Gaspar Chaussegros de Ury, "Journal," 1754-1755, RAPQ, 8:406-407, 414. 
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III. The Anishinaabe Response 
Their alliance had allowed the Anishinaabe people to dominate affairs in the 
Great Lakes Region, yet the Huron-Iroquois-Miami configuration threat posed a serious 
challenge to that dominance. That alliance had, after all, explicitly excluded the Ottawas 
and their Anishinaabe partners. Cheanonvouzon had snubbed his Ottawa rivals in 1702 
and 1708 by visiting Albany with the Miamis, and actively sought to distance the 
Ottawas from the Iroquois and their British partners. 88 Cheanonvouzon had positioned 
the southern alliance as an explicit rival to the Anishinaabe. 
Not only would an alliance of Miamis, Iroquois, and Hurons rival the military 
might of the Anishinaabe, it would also threaten their commercial monopoly on the 
region. Since the fall of Huronia, the Ottawas had worked carefully to dominate the trade 
of the region. In addition to strengthening ties with the Anishinaabe neighbors, many 
Ottawas had married into French mercantile families, who recognized the Ottawas' 
connections. 89 They therefore stood to lose much from the southern alliance. If 
successful, the Miami-Iroquois-Huron configuration promised to reorient the political 
landscape of the pays d' en haut away from Michilimackinac and from Anishinaabe 
hegemony toward the south.90 Detroit-positioned much closer to the entrep6ts of Fort 
St. Joseph, home of the Miamis and Potawatomis, as well as the Iroquois trading posts in 
Lake Ontario, and Albany itself-would slowly displace or at least compete with 
88 
"Conference of Lord Cornbury with the Indians, Albany," 20 July 1702, NYCD, 4:981. 
89 Newbigging argues against the portrayal of the Ottawas as the commercial "middlemen" of the pays d' en 
haut. Newbigging "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance." 3-8. 
90 As the Ottawas understood well, this alliance could defeat them militarily as well. Vaudreuil explicitly 
worried that a coalition of the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois, could destroy the Ottawas. Vaudreuil to the 
Minister, 4 Nov. 1706, NYCD, 9:780. 
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Michilimackinac (see figure 7). In turn, the Miamis and Hurons would no longer play 
second fiddle to the Ottawas. To be sure, the competing alliance would never displace 
the Ottawas entirely; the French demanded the high-quality furs only found in northern 
climes. Yet the Miami and Huron ascendency would erode the Ottawas' profound 
influence in the region. 
In order to undermine the southern alliance, the Anishinaabeg, led by the Ottawas, 
pursued an evolving geopolitical strategy. The Ottawas first sought, through diplomatic 
maneuvering, to disrupt the alliance by fostering animosity between the Hurons and 
Senecas in 1704. When this failed, the Ottawas hoped that they might subvert the 
relationship by forging their own ties with the Senecas, as well as with the other four 
Iroquois nations and the British in 1708. Blunted by a continuing hostility between 
Ottawas and Senecas, the Ottawas finally sought to circumvent the southern alliance 
altogether. Calling upon their Anishinaabe allies, a group of Ojibwas whom they called 
the Mississaugas, for help, they tried to establish their own relationship with the British 
and hence mitigate the influence of the Hurons and Miamis. The Mississaugas, who 
maintained villages both at Detroit and near the Iroquois outposts on Lake Ontario, 
seemed perfectly poised to help their Ottawa allies form their own trading alliance with 
the British. After this attempt, too, failed, the Ottawas took their revenge on the hapless 
Iroquois and Miami couple in 1717. The Ottawas' unwillingness to acquiesce their 
control over the region to their Huron and Miami neighbors, the lengths to which they 
were prepared to blunt those nations' influence, and especially their willingness to attack 
their erstwhile partners in 1717, shows the level of animosity which separated the peoples 
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of the pays d' en haut. The Ottawas seemed willing to sacrifice solidarity in the face of 
the Fox threat if it meant retaining their dominance of the region. 
The Ottawas first tried to disrupt the southern alliance. They first struck in 1704. 
Distressed by the Huron-Miami trip to Albany two years earlier, they hoped to poison the 
nascent relationship. Accordingly, some Ottawas from Michilimackinac and Detroit 
accompanied the Hurons and Miamis to Seneca territory in August, where they offered 
condolences for recent Wea attacks on the Iroquois.91 Once they arrived in Iroquoia, 
however, the Ottawa warriors abruptly attacked the Senecas and Onondagas "without 
giving any reason for doing so" and took six Iroquois prisoners.92 They took these 
captives first to Detroit, where they ostentatiously paraded them for all the nations to see 
and then distributed the prisoners to their allies.93 The Ottawas apparently hoped that the 
Iroquois would blame the Hurons and Miamis for the attack and judge them guilty by 
association with the Ottawas. According to Lamothe Cadillac, the Ottawas even planted 
a distinctive Huron club on a slain Iroquois warrior.94 Once the Five Nations realized the 
Hurons' apparent betrayal, the Ottawas surmised, the emerging alliance would collapse.95 
At the same time, the Ottawa leader identified only as Tyhadagro, sent a representative to 
Albany, escorted Mohawks, to meet with the English and Dutch traders and find a "good 
91 
"Paroles des Hurons, Outaouais et Miamis de Detroit aux Tsonnontouans," 30-31 July 1704, MPHSCR, 
33:190-91. 
92 
"Parolles des Sauvages Sonnontou8ans a Monsieur le Gouverneur general et les reponses," 12 Sept. 
1704, in CAOM, F3, vol. 2, fols. 315-216; "Parolles de la grande terre Chef Onontague a Monsieur le 
Gouverneur general du 18e octobre 1704, et les reponses," 18 Oct. 1704, in ibid., fols. 317-17v. The 
Ottawas later claimed that they had carried out the attack because the Iroquois had failed to return Ottawa 
captives, as they had promised to do in the Great Peace of 1701. "Reponses de Monsieur le Gouverneur 
general [aux Iroquois]," 15 Aug. 1705, CAOM, CllA, vol. 22, fols. 276v-77. 
93 Vaudreuil to the Minister, 4 Nov. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:301-302. 
94 
"Memoir of Lamothe Cadillac," 19 Nov. 1704, in Ibid., 235. For the Iroquois use of distinctive clubs to 
communicate messages, see Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, xl, 243. 
95 Newbigging presents this reading of the attack ("History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 267 -69). 
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Market" for the furs. 96 By simultaneously courting the English and Iroquois and framing 
the Hurons, the Ottawas hoped to disrupt the southern alliance and forge their own 
connections to the Iroquois and English. 
Far from sundering the Hurons and Miamis from the Iroquois, however, the 
Ottawas' 1704 attack only provoked the Iroquois wrath against the Ottawas. The 
Iroquois blamed the Ottawas, and not the Hurons, for their perfidy and for breaking the 
terms of the Great Peace. 97 Traveling to Montreal in the fall of that year, the Senecas and 
Onondagas denounced the Ottawas' aggression and only grudgingly agreed to defer their 
revenge. 98 That winter the Senecas caught and killed an Ottawa warrior whom they 
found lurking near Cataroquoi.99 In late May 1706, the Senecas informed colonial 
officials in Albany that some of the "farr Indians [e.g. the Ottawas] have taken up the 
hatchet against the 5 Nations" and that the confederacy planned to meet in Onondaga to 
discuss the situation. 100 Afraid of the resumption of war with the Iroquois, Vaudreuil 
sought to reconcile the Ottawas and Iroquois. He convinced the Ottawas to "replace" the 
96 
"Propositions made by three Mohogs and Some River Indians and Waganher [Ottawa] Come from 
Tiogsagrondie [Detroit]," 20 June 1704, in Lawrence Leder, ed., The Livingston Records, 1666-1723 
(Gettysburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1956), 196-97. 
97 Newbigging claims that the Ottawas' stratagem succeeded in alienating the Hurons and Iroquois. Yet the 
Iroquois neither blamed the Hurons for the strike nor explicitly implicated them in the attack when 
speaking to the French. Instead, they specifically and exclusively blamed the "outa8as." Indeed, the 
following year, an Iroquois messenger reported that the Hurons were considering moving to Iroquois 
territory, suggesting that the two nations were not at odds. The Iroquois cooperation with the Hurons in 
1706 and their conference in 1708 demonstrate further that the alliance remained quite intact. (Les 
Outaouais "ayant frapez sur Nous, sans leur en avoir donne aucun sujet). "Parolles des Sauvages 
Sonnontou8ans a Monsieur le Gouverneur general du 12e Sept. 1704", CAOM, F3, vol. 2, fols. 315-315v; 
"Parolles de la grande terre Chef Onontague a Monsieur le Gouverneur general du 18e octobre 1704," in 
ibid., fols. 317-17v. 
98 Ibid. 
99 
"Parolles des Iroquois a Monsr le gouverneur generalle 4e aoust 1705," CAOM, C11A, vol. 22, fol. 
276v; "Parolles des Iroquois a Monsieur le Gouverneur general du 16e aoust 1705," in ibid.,fol. 268v. 
100 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 43. 
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dead Iroquois warriors with captives, which they did in the summer of 1706.101 Yet the 
Ottawa attack on Detroit that summer shattered the fragile peace. 102 The Senecas visited 
V audreuil in August and demanded justice for their offended Miami and Huron allies. 
Huffing that it was the Ottawas' "usual manner" to attack without reason, the Five 
Nations bluntly informed Vaudreuil that they planned to attack the Ottawas and that they 
would not be dissuaded. 103 A delegation of Senecas also traveled to Detroit, where they 
joined with the Hurons and Miamis in demanding vengeance. Assembled together at 
Detroit, the Huron, Miami, and Seneca allies agreed that "We will not have peace [with 
the Ottawas]; that must not be spoken of."104 When Lamothe Cadillac pardoned Mekoua 
the following year, the Iroquois apparently conspired with the Miamis and Hurons to 
attack the Ottawas and to murder Lamothe Cadillac. 105 
Having catastrophically failed to estrange the Iroquois from the Miamis and the 
Hurons, the Ottawas revisited their strategy. Their efforts to estrange the Miamis and 
Hurons from the Iroquois had only strengthened that southern bond. The Ottawas 
101 The Ottawas insisted upon calling the Iroquois, their younger brothers ["cadets"], suggesting a rivalry 
for status within the French alliance and the Ottawa conceit that they remained closest to Onontio's heart. 
"Parolles du Pesant a Monsieur le Gouverneur generalle 4e aoust 1705," CAOM, CllA, vol. 22, fols. 257-
59; "Parolles des Iroquois a Monsr le gouverneur generalle 4e aoust 1705," in ibid., fols. 276-77v; 
"Parolles des Iroquois a Monsieur le Gouverneur general du 16e aoust 1705," in ibid., fols. 269-
70; "Parolles des outauois de Michilimak:ina a Monsieur le Gouverneur general du 22e. aoust 1705," in 
ibid., fols. 260-61 v; "Parolles de Monsr. le gouverneur aux Iroquois, [22 Aug. 1705]," in ibid., fols. 272-
72v; "Parolles des outauois aux Iroquois du 23e aoust 1705," in ibid., fols. 255-55v; "Parrolles adressees a 
monsieur le marquis de Vaudreuil par Onaskin Chef des outaouas," 1 Aug. 1705, in ibid., fols. 238-42. 
102 The Senecas might have actually helped plan the attack. The Ottawas claimed that a Seneca woman had 
warned them of an imminent Miami and Huron attack in the spring of 1706, suggesting that the Senecas 
had at least been aware of Cheanonvouzon's plot. Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 
33:434. 
103 
"Words of the Sonnontuans with the replies of the Marquis de Vaudreuil," Aug. 1705, in ibid., 285-88. 
104 Cadillac to Vaudreuil, 27 Aug. 1706, in ibid., 280-81. 
105 The missionary, Jean Marest, repeated a rumor that the Miamis had given the Iroquois presents inviting 
them to attack the Ottawas and this alliance had made the Miamis "bold." Lord Cornbury confirmed that 
the Miamis and Hurons met with the Iroquois and British in Albany in 1708. Marest to Vaudreuil, 4 June 
1708, in ibid., 385; Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, in ibid., 33:436; Lord Cornbury to the Board 
of Trade, 20 Aug. 1705, NYCD, 5:65. 
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decided that, if they could not destroy that alliance, perhaps they could supersede it by 
creating their own, separate relationship with the Iroquois and British. Beginning in 
1708, they tried to forge their own relationship with the Iroquois, concluding a peace with 
the Five Nations and visiting Albany in 1711. Despite their best efforts and constant 
French hand-wringing about the possibility of an Ottawa-Iroquois trade, lingering 
animosity between the Ottawas and the Iroquois frustrated Ottawa attempts to establish a 
relationship with the Iroquois and British like that enjoyed by the Hurons and Miamis. 106 
In hopes of forming their own separate peace with the Five Nations, the Ottawas 
sent messengers to the Senecas in August 1708 and asked them to clear the "Path that 
was formerly opened to them down to Albany" through Seneca country. 107 The 
following year the Ottawas and Senecas agreed to purge "all past evil thoughts" and to 
unite in a "fast & everlasting peace." In 1710, the Ottawas ratified this peace with the 
Senecas and with the other four Iroquois nations assembled at Onondaga and proceeded 
to Albany where they met with British officials and merchants. The Ottawas promised to 
visit Albany again the following year, which they might have done. 108 
The "everlasting Peace" lasted scarcely the year. Despite their diplomatic 
overtures to the Ottawas, many Iroquois still had substantial misgivings about their new 
106 French officials often invoked the threat of an Ottawa-Iroquois-British trade in order to justify their pet 
projects, such as the reinstatement of the licensing, or conge, system or war against the Foxes. For their 
part, the Ottawas used the threat of trade with the Iroquois to manipulate the French. Yet these very 
warnings suggest that the Ottawas had not yet formed such alliances, even if they threatened or wanted to 
do so. The potential for such commerce-not its actual denouement-bothered the French. Nor would the 
Ottawas' threats to trade with the British mean much if they already did so frequently. Aigremont to the 
Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 33:402-403; Claude Michel Begon to the Minister, 20 Sept. 1713, in 
WHC, 16:297; Ramezay and Begon to the Minister, 12 Nov. 1714, MPHSCR, 33:572; "Paroles des chefs 
outaouais Saguima et Miscouaky a Vaudreuil," 26 Aug. 1713, CAOM, CllA, vol. 34, fols. 70v-71. 
107 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 59. 
108 Ibid., 70-76. Unidentified natives from Detroit visited Albany in July 1711 (ibid., 90). The Potawatorni 
leader, Mikisabe, alluded to the Ottawas' trade with the British in 1712 . "Paroles de Makisabi, chef 
poteouatarni, au Vaudreuil," CAOM, CllA, vol. 33, fol. 89. 
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allies. The Ottawas had, after all, attacked the Iroquois at Cataroquoi without cause and 
had subsequently attacked the Miamis and Hurons. As the Iroquois bitterly observed, the 
untrustworthy Ottawas did not customarily speak from the "bottom of their hearts," but 
from other, less pleasant, quarters. 109 Aware of this lingering animosity, indeed, British 
officials prohibited the Iroquois from drinking rum at the 1710 conference, lest they 
attack the Ottawa delegates in a drunken rage. 110 In August 1710, a scant two months 
after the peace negotiations at Onondaga, Seneca and Onondaga representatives 
complained to Vaudreuil about the Ottawas. The Ottawas had attacked them several 
times since the Great Peace in 1701, including the unprovoked attack in 1704 and the 
1706 conflict. Until now, the Iroquois had followed Vaudreuil' s will and postponed their 
vengeance, but now they demanded justice. The Great Peace had declared, after all, that 
if any nation attack another and fail to make amends, then the others would unite to 
punish the offenders. 111 
In January 1711, representatives of all Five Nations told the Albany 
Commissioners much the same thing. The Ottawas had "at several Times murdered 
sundry of their People_ & offered them repeated Insults." They had decided, accordingly, 
to "take Revenge" against the Ottawas. 112 Regardless of French and British opposition, 
the Iroquois proceeded with their preparations. Either that year or the following, the 
Senecas reportedly invited the Weas to join an Iroquois attack on Detroit and explicitly 
109 
"il [l'Outaouais] parle du fond du Cceur, et non pas du bout des leurs, comme il a coutume de faire," 
"Parolles des outauois aux Iroquois du 23e aoust 1705 et Reponces des Iroquois," CAOM, C11A, vol. 22, 
fol. 255. 
no Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 71. 
m "Paroles des Tsonnontuans et Onontagues ... et Reponse de Vaudreuil," 8 Aug. 1710, CAOM, C11A, 
vol. 31, fols. 100-100v. 
112 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 80. 
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warned them not to tell the French or the Hurons about the plans. 113 In the summer of 
1712, rumor had it that the Five Nations, led by the Onondaga leader Teganissorens, 
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Although the Iroquois' plans never came to fruition, thanks to intervention from 
the French, British, and ultimately the Senecas, the threat of war nonetheless slammed 
shut the symbolic path that the Ottawas and the Iroquois had opened between them. The 
following year, Paul Marest, the Jesuit missionary at Michillimackinac, reported that the 
Ottawas were "menaced" by the Iroquois and therefore dared not attack the Foxes. 115 
And, of course, the Ottawas suspected Iroquois and British collaboration with the Foxes. 
In 1714, a Detroit Ottawa delegation confronted the Senecas and demanded to know why 
a group of Foxes, Mascoutins, and Kickapoos had visited Seneca early that year, 
suggesting they still suspected collusion between the Iroquois and the Green Bay 
nations. 116 The mutual suspicion guaranteed, at least for the short term, that the Hurons 
and Miamis would continue to enjoy access to the Iroquois and the British, and that the 
Ottawas would not. The Ottawas had b~en on the verge of superseding the southern 
alliance, but their long and problematic history with the Five Nations ultimately scuttled 
their detente. No matter how much the French might fear it, the Ottawa-Iroquois alliance 
remained incomplete. 
113 Vaudreuil au ministre, 17 Sept. 1712, CAOM, CllA, vol. 34, fol. 281. 
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"Resume des lettres de Vaudreuil au ministre," Nov. 1712 [May 1713], in ibid., vol. 123, fols. 24-28. 
m "Copie d'une lettre du missionaire Joseph-Jacques Marest a Vaudreuil," 19 June 1713, in ibid., vol. 34, 
fol. 81v. 
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6 The Senecas confirmed that the Foxes, Mascoutins, and Kickapoos had indeed visited them and invited 
them to attack the Illinois. The Senecas told the Ottawas that they had declined the offer and later offered 
Vaudreuil some "medicine" to purge the differences between them and the Ottawas. "Parolle des deputes 
sononta8ans [Senecas] qui ont voulu parler a Montrealle 25e Sept. 1714," Ibid., vol. 34, fols. 297 -97v; 
"Reponce de Mr. de Longueuil aux Sononto8ans [Senecas] de la part de Monsieur De Ramezay du 30e Sept. 
1714," in ibid, fols. 298-98v; Ramezay and Begon to the Minister, 23 Oct. 1712, in WHC, 16:310. 
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Early in 1710, representatives had complained both to the English and the French 
that the "Wagenhaes"-the Iroquois name for the Ottawas-had frequently murdered 
their people and that the Five Nations were "determined to take Revenge" against 
them. 117 Some Senecas and Onondagas confirmed this to Vaudreuil in 1710, 
complaining that the Ottawas had repeatedly attacked them since 1701 and that they 
would no longer defer their vengeance. They also reported trouble with the Potawatomis, 
the Ottawas' Anishinaabe allies. 118 In the summer of 1712 the Senecas reported that the 
Onondaga headman, Teganissorens, had spent the previous winter plotting an attack on 
Detroit and had invited the other four nations to join him. 119 Moreover, Vaudreuil 
learned of an anticipated British invasion of New France in 1711 and had called all the 
nations d'en haut to protect Montreal from invasion, which added to the sense of alarm 
and gave credence to the rumor that the Foxes were in league with the British.120 
The Ottawas had thus tried in 1704 to alienate the Iroquois and Hurons and in 
1711 to forge their own alliance with the Five Nations and failed on both accounts. Now, 
they and the Potawatomis looked to their old friends and fellow Anishinaabe people, the 
Mississaugas, for help. Since the tum of the century, the Mississaugas, who had 
established villages at Detroit as well as the Iroquois entrep6ts of Niagara and 
117 Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs, 80-84. 
118 The Iroquois were also at odds with the Potawatomis who had recently attacked them. "Paroles des 
Tsonnontuans et Onontagues ... et Reponse de Vaudreuil," 8 Aug. 1710, CAOM, C11A, vol. 31, fols. 99-
100v. 
119 Vaudreuil au ministre, 6 Nov. 1712, in ibid., vol. 33, fols. 57-58; "Resume des lettres de Vaudreuil au 
ministre," in ibid., vol. 123, fols. 24-28. 
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Cataroquoi, had developed powerful economic ties with the Iroquois and the British. 121 
The Ottawas therefore hoped that their old allies might help them finally make a 
meaningful and sustained partnership with the Iroquois and, in the process, disrupt the 
southern alliance. Although the Mississaugas enthusiastically cooperated and the 
Ottawas nearly reached Albany in 1717, however, their attempts failed yet again, thanks 
to an unfortunate twist of fate. This latest disappointment apparently motivated the 
Ottawa warriors to attack and kill the Iroquois/Miami family later that summer. 
In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the Mississaugas deployed a 
sophisticated geographic and commercial strategy. By maintaining villages both on Lake 
Ontario and at Detroit, they insinuated themselves as crucial intermediaries in the region. 
They began by establishing settlements near the Iroquois on Lake 9ntario. Having 
fought viciously to expel the Iroquois from the northern shore of the lake during the 
seventeenth century, the Mississauags settled at the key Iroquois trading posts in the pays 
d'en haut-Cataroquoi (the site of the French post, Fort Frontenac), at the eastern 
entrance to Lake Ontario, and Niagara, at the western terminus of the lake-as well as 
smaller settlements (see figure 9). 122 Having settled at Niagara and Cataroquoi, the 
Mississaugas established another settlement near Detroit, just north of Lake St. Clair, 
121 Richard Haan. "The Covenant Chain: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Niagara Frontier, 1697-1730," (PhD. 
diss., Dept. of History, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1976). 
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pontchartrain ce 26 mars 1706," in ibid., F3, vol. 2, fol. 323. 
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with other Ojibwa groups in the early eighteenth century. 123 From Lake St. Clair, the 
Mississaugas could easily and quickly ascend the river which the French referred to as 
the Duluth, portage to the Grand (Thames) River, and continue down to the vicinity of 
Toronto. 124 
With villages both at Detroit and on Lake Ontario, the Mississaugas positioned 
themselves as essential couriers carrying furs from the Upper Great Lakes to Albany and 
British products (especially Caribbean rum) to Detroit. Not only did they trade with the 
Iroquois who lived in Lake Ontario, but, more troubling to the French, the Mississaugas 
actually went to Albany itself, where they traded their furs for British goods and 
particularly Caribbean rum. The Commissioners of Trade in Albany reported that the 
headman Kaqucka and four others of the "Mesasaga Nation" had arrived in May 1709. 
Kaqucka framed his visit as a business trip, telling the Commissioners of Indian Affairs 
that he was seeking "the best Markett" for his furs. He promised that, if the rates at 
Figure 9: Major 
settlements in Lakes 
Ontario and Erie. 
The Mississaugas 
occupied the crucial 
entrances to Lake 
Ontario, Niagara in 
the west and 
Cataroquoi, site of 
Fort Frontenac, in the 
east. 
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Albany pleased him, more of his people would return there. When the delegation left two 
weeks later, the commissioners gave the Mississaugas a wampum belt "to come to 
Albany & Trade."125 
The Mississaugas, in tum, traded British goods to their neighbors at Detroit. As 
early as 1708, Joncaire, a French officer stationed at Niagara, complained that the 
Mississaugas of Detroit frequently brought their pelts to the Iroquois, who proceeded to 
trade these to the Albany merchants. 126 That the Detroit Mississaugas-those from Lake 
St. Clair-regularly traded in Lake Ontario suggests that the Mississaugas settled at 
Detroit cooperated with those living at Niagara and Cataroquoi to shuttle goods between 
Detroit and Albany. The Albany Commissioners confirmed in 1711 that the 
Mississaugas "from the Country about Tuchsakrondie," or Detroit, came to Albany to 
trade. 127 That year Commandant La Forest identified the Mississaugas, along with the 
Hurons and Iroquois, as purveyors of British goods at Detroit. 128 In 1714 Vaudreuil and 
Intendant Michel Begon de la Picardiere claimed that the Mississaugas, unable to obtain 
French brandy, had traded all their beaver pelts to the British for rum. 129 The following 
year, Claude de Ramezay, governor of Montreal and acting governor-general, 
complained that Mississaugas and Amikwas-another Ojibwa people-traded with the 
125 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 66-67. 
126 Aigremont au ministre, 14 Nov. 1708, CAOM, C11A, vol. 29, fol. 31v. 
127 The British only identified these visitors as "Farr Indians from the Country about Tuchsakrondie." They 
indicated, however, that the nation had been to Detroit two years beforehand and that they brought back a 
belt that they had been given at that time. Since the Mississaugas had visited in 1709 and had been given a 
belt, which had belonged to Montour, these "farr Indians" were probably the Detroit Mississaugas. 
Moreover, Vaudreuil noted that the Mississaugas had attacked the Miamis that year as they returned from 
Albany, confirming that they visited the British post that year. Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 87; "Words of the 
Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Savages ... " [1711], MPHSCR, 33:503. 
128 La Forest au ministre, 1711, CAOM, CllA, vol. 120, fol. 125. 
129 Vaudreuil et Begon, au ministre 20 Sept., 1714, in ibid., vol. 34, fol. 235v. 
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Iroquois when they ventured into Lake Erie to hunt. When Ramezay confronted them 
about trading with the British, the Mississaugas remained defiant. They told him that 
they preferred trading with the French at Frontenac to trading with the British, but that 
the British offered them better rates and, significantly, provided them with sufficient 
liquor. 130 Three years later, the commandant of Detroit, reported that the Mississauga 
man, Itacougik, had brought some of this liquor to his neighbors at the post. 131 
Calling upon their Anishinaabe allies, the Ottawas hoped to turn the 
Mississaugas' position and relationship with the Iroquois to their advantage. The 
Ottawas living at Michilimackinac and Manitoulin Island had long lived near and traded 
with the Mississaugas living northwest of Lake Huron and the Sauteurs, Ojibwas living at 
Sault Ste. Marie on Lake Superior. The groups continued that alliance at Detroit, both 
establishing villages near the post. The Ottawas acknowledged their close association 
with the Mississaugas in 1706 when they complained of the Miami attacks on their 
Ojibwa "comrades" in 1704 and 1705. 132 After the 1706 clash, the Mississaugas aided 
the bloodied Ottawa refugees and considered counterattacking the Miamis and Hurons. 133 
The Ottawas' aggressive stance toward the Foxes had also been premised on that nation's 
conflict with the Ojibwas. 134 
Shortly after the Ottawa-Iroquois truce collapsed, then, the Ottawas and 
Mississaugas collaborated to open a trading network with the Iroquois and the British. 
The Mississaugas, at the prompting of the British, had actually been endeavoring to do 
130 Ramezay et Begon au ministre, 7 Nov. 1715, Ibid., vol. 35, fol. 27v-28v. 
131 Sabrevois to Vaudreuil, 8 April 1718, MPHSCR, 33:582-83. 
132 
"Conseil tenu au fort pontchartain 9e. mars" 1706, CAOM, F3, vol. 2, vol. 320-20v. 
133 Lamothe Cadillac a Vaudreuil, 27 Aug. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:279. 
134 Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 304-308. 
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this for some time. Hoping to establish themselves as intermediaries between the 
Iroquois and the Ottawas, the Mississaugas had frequently invited the Ottawas to trade 
with the British and Iroquois. As early as 1711, they gave the Ottawas four belts on 
behalf of the British, inviting them to trade with the Iroquois and British.135 Three years 
later, Ramezay alleged that the British had sent messages and gifts to the Ottawas 
through their "emissary," a Mississauga man named Itacougik. 136 The British had even 
floated the idea of establishing a trading post at the Mississauga settlement on Lake 
Ontario in order to trade more directly with the Ottawas and other Anishinaabeg. 137 
Itacougik returned to Detroit again in 1716 with a shipment of rum and a message for the 
Ottawas and Potawatomis living at the post. Distributing some wampum belts, the 
Mississauga go-between told his Anishinaabe cousins that they were "very foolish to 
adhere to the French, that they rob them." The British, in contrast, offered cheap trade 
goods, would accept all of their furs, and would grant them liquor in abundance. The 
Mississaugas' invitation found a willing reception. 
The Ottawas had tried and failed to establish a relationship with the Iroquois for 
years. The Mississuagas now offered them an opportunity to finally succeed. Holding 
secret councils during the autumn and winter of 1716 and 1717, the Ottawas and 
Potawatomis decided to try yet again to establish a relationship with the Iroquois. In 
order to accomplish their goals, the Ottawas had turned to their longtime allies and 
Anishinaabe cousins. Moreover, they involved the third member of the triple alliance, 
135 Ramezay au ministre, 1 Nov. 1711, CAOM, CllA, vol. 32, fol. llOv. 
136 Ramezay and Begon to the Minister, 12 Nov. 1714, MPHSCR, 33:572; Ramezay to the Minister, 16 
Sept. 1715, in WHC, 16:320-21. 
137 Ramezay au ministre, 28 Oct 1715, CAOM, CllA, vol. 35, fol. 91 v. 
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the Potawatomis, but not the Hurons, in the project. 138 In doing so, the Ottawas explicitly 
acknowledged the ties which connected the Anishinaabe peoples and the growing gulf 
between the Anishinaabe and the Hurons, who had tried to and partially succeeded in 
establishing a rival alliance. 
Yet this attempt, like the previous ones, was ill-fated. A convoy of seventeen 
Detroit and Saginaw Ottawa and Potawatomi canoes left Detroit in the spring of 1717 
headed for Albany. Serendipitously for the French, the would-be traders made it no 
further than Lake Ontario, where they met Alphonse de Tonty, the new commandant of 
Detroit, on his way to assume command of the post. Alarmed that the Ottawas and 
Potawatomis might take their furs to Albany, the officer held a series of councils. He 
offered sixty blankets at the bargain price of five beaver pelts per blanket-the price they 
fetched at Albany-and other presents to dissuade the Ottawas and Potawatomis from 
continuing to New York. At length, the convoy agreed and some returned to Detroit with 
the commandant while others continued to Montreal to do more trading and to speak with 
the governor. 139 
Once again the Ottawas had tried to establish their own ties with the Iroquois and 
British and once again their attempts had failed miserably. They would have to continue 
trading with Mississauga and Iroquois middlemen for British goods and liquor. More 
importantly, they had failed to split or outmaneuver the southern alliance. The Miamis 
and Hurons maintained good relations with the Iroquois and continued to trade with 
138 Sabrevois a Vaudreuil, 8 April1717, MPHSCR, 33:582-83. 
139 
"Paroles des Outaouais et des Poteouatamis arrives de Detroit a Montreal, en route pour aller faire la 
traite a Orange, et reponses de M. de Vaudreuil," 24 June 1717, CAOM, CllA, vol. 38, fol. 172-75; 
Vaudreuil to the Council of the Marine, 12 Oct 1717, MPHSCR, 33:490-92. 
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them. This latest failure clearly incensed the Ottawas. They had tried several times to 
gain access to the British but such an alliance remained out of their reach, hampered by 
poor relations with the Iroquois and by determined French opposition. The Ottawas 
could only sit by quietly while the Hurons and Miamis progressively reoriented the 
region toward the Iroquois and Albany. The Ottawas feared that they would lose their 
coveted dominance in the region. 
If the Ottawas repeatedly failed to cultivate ties to the Iroquois and the British, the 
Miamis had no such problem. 140 After the Hurons proctored an alliance between the 
Iroquois and Miamis, the Miamis and Iroquois had formed an important commercial 
partnership. In 1707, in fact, the St. Joseph River Miamis moved closer to the Iroquois, 
establishing a village at the portage of the Maumee River. 141 Uneasy about the Miamis' 
physical and diplomatic proximity to the Iroquois, the Mississaugas attacked some 
Miamis in 1711, as the Mississaugas returned from trading with the British. 142 This 
rivalry actually may explain the Miami attacks on the Mississaugas going back to 1704. 
Noting that the Miamis had "long wished" to trade with the British, Gov. Vaudreuil sent 
Franc;ois-Marie Bissot de Vinsenne (Vincennes) in 1711 to prevent them from doing so. 
Three years later, Dubuisson, still commanding at Detroit, again sent a Huron delegation 
to the Miamis to prevent them from concluding an "alliance that they would like to make 
140 MacLeod, "Une conspiration generate," 33. 
141 Cadillac invited them to move to this place, which brought them closer to Detroit than they were at the 
St. Joseph River settlement. The new settlement was twelve leagues (around twenty-six miles) from Fort 
Pontchartrain. "Resume of Letters from Lamothe Cadillac with commentaries, 10, 15 Sept., 1 Oct. 1707," 
MPHSCR, 33:338; "Parolles de M' de la Motte queM' de Boucherville fait dire au miarnis en general," 24 
Nov. 1705, CAOM, C11A, vol. 24, fols. 365-66. The Weas also moved to Ouiatenon, a settlement on the 
Wabash near present-day West Lafayette, Indiana. 
142 
"Words ofthe Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Savages ... " [1711], MPHSCR, 33:503-504. The resentment 
continued after 1711. The Mississaugas refused to make peace with the Miamis in the aftermath of the 
1712 siege. Dubuisson to Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:551. 
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with the English and the Savages, their friends." 143 Despite these precautions, however, 
the French could not prevent the Miamis and Iroquois from forming an alliance or from 
trading together. Senecas allegedly met with the Weas and Miamis in 1713 and invited 
them to attack Detroit with them. 144 In 1715, the Miamis, as well as the Weas and 
illinois, reportedly met with traders from North Carolina. 145 The following year, just 
months before the Ottawa warriors attacked and killed the Miami-Iroquois family, the 
Iroquois had secretly sent the Miamis and Weas wampum belts inviting them to trade at a 
new post on the Wabash River. 146 These embassies eventually bore fruit for the Iroquois 
and British. In 1717, Tonty reported that "an Iroquois man and a miami man" had 
brought 200 pots of rum to Detroit "from the English," suggesting the maturation of a 
powerful Miami-Iroquois alliance. 147 In 1719, moreover, Iroquois ambassadors escorted 
between eight and ten Miami canoes to Albany, and Vaudreuil conceded that the Miamis 
were "very much under the influence of the English and Iroquois."148 By 1721, 
Vaudreuil averred that the Iroquois traveled to the Maumee settlement "almost every 
year" to trade and to invite them to go to Albany and to new British trading posts in the 
Ohio V alley. 149 
143
" I' alliance qu'ils Vouloient faire avec les anglois et les Sauvages leurs amis," "Deliberation du conseil," 
9 April1717, CAOM, CllA, vol. 123, fol. 272 -272v. 
144 
"Paroles des Hurons descendus du fort Pontchartrain du Detroit a Vaudreuil," 7 Nov. 1713, in ibid., vol. 
34, fol. 66-66v. 
145 Ramezay au conseil, 28 Oct. 1715, in ibid., vol. 35, fol. 90v. 
146 
"Indian Affairs in the West," 6 Jan. 1717, in WHC, 16:345. 
147 
"Deliberation du Conseil de Marine sur une lettre de Vaudreuil et Begon datee du 20 octobre 1717 ," 7 
Dec. 1717, CAOM, CllA, vol. 37, fol. 379v. 
148 Vaudreuil to the Council of Marine, 22 Sept. 1720, in WHC 16:394; Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 122. 
149 
"Proceedings of Council regarding letter (dated Oct. 6, 1721) of Governor Vaudreuil," 2 Dec. 1721, in 
WHC, 16:399. 
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The Miamis' reported discussions with the Iroquois and British in 1716 coincided 
with the Ottawas' latest failure to reach Albany themselves. This unhappy concurrence 
meant disaster for the hapless Iroquois-Miami family. The family, after all, represented 
the kind of relationship that the Ottawas had long coveted and repeatedly failed to 
create-a commercial alliance with the Iroquois and thereby with the British. Not only 
did the warriors resent the Miamis' success in trading with the Iroquois and British, but 
they also feared what that relationship might ultimately mean for their position in the 
pays d' en haut. The warriors might have hoped that the attack would have strained 
relations between the Iroquois and Miamis, disrupting their intimacy. Iroquois custom 
may have held the Miamis liable for the death, since it occurred at their village. 150 More 
likely, however, the Ottawas acted as they did simply out of anger. They had launched 
their attack, after all, right after the botched attempt to reach Albany earlier that summer. 
The murder-rather than enslavement-of the couples' children also bespeaks an 
irrational rage directed at their parents' nations and the political and sexual intimacy that 
produced them. No matter how much fear and hatred of the Foxes pulled the nations 
together, their competition for ascendency in the pays d'en haut pushed the Miamis, 
Ottawas, and other nations apart. 
Conclusion 
150 In 1681 an Illinois warrior had murdered a Seneca headman in the Kiskakon Ottawa village at 
Michilimackinac in the presence of the Hurons. According to missionaries, Iroquois custom held both the 
Kiskakous and Hurons culpable for the attack, since they did not immediately kill the Iroquois perpetrator. 
The same might have applied to the Miamis, who were present at the death of the Iroquois man. Jacques 
Chesneau de la Doussiniere et d' Ambault, "M. du Duchesneau to the Minister concerning the Indian 
nations," 13 Nov. 1681, NYCD, 9:163-65; "Extracts of the Advice Given at the Conference held with the 
Reverend Jesuit Fathers on the Subject of News from the Iroquois," 23 March 1681; in Ibid., 171. 
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Although the Miamis, Ottawas, and Hurons made a "good peace" in September 
1717, the nations did not thereby stop competing for commercial or political ascendency. 
Indeed, events in the pays d' en haut made the British and Iroquois even more attractive. 
The peoples of Detroit found the prices there poor and the conduct of the commandants 
disrespectful. During his tenure as commandant, Jacques-Charles de Sabrevois, Sieur de 
Bleurry, had disregarded commercial and diplomatic protocol by refusing to treat the 
local headmen to feasts. 151 Tonty proved little better than his predecessor. 152 The Hurons 
later confided that they could no longer abide Tonty and demanded that the new 
governor, the Marquis de Beauharnois, relieve the man of his command. 153 Both 
Sabrevois and Tonty, furthermore, had restricted the natives' access to French brandy. 154 
Impelled by these forces, the Ottawas, now more determined than ever, finally 
"broke thro" the French obstacles and reached Albany in the early 1720s. The Albany 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs reported that sixteen "Ottowawa Indians" reached the 
post in 1722.155 In 1723, a much larger convoy of eighty Ottawa, Potawatomi, and even 
Huron traders, along with their wives and children, finally arrived in Albany. Speaking 
for the convoy, Sagima told the British that the inability of the French to provide 
adequate goods prompted him to come to Albany. If the British would give them "goods 
cheape," the Ottawas would forsake their French allies and even consider joining the 
vaunted Covenant Chain. The British happily consented and sent them back to Detroit 
151 Paroles des outa8as du saguinan, et des poute8atarnis, [1717], CAOM, C11A, vol. 38, fols. 172-75. 
152 Sabrevois to Cadillac, [ca. 1718], MPHSCR, 33:694. 
153 
"Ordonnance du gouverneur Beauharnois accedant a la demande des Hurons de retablir la liberte du 
commerce a Detroit," 21 Aug. 1727, CAOM, C11A, vol. 48, fol. 122; "Paroles des Hurons de Detroit," 9 
Aug. 1727, in Ibid., vol. 34, fols. 49-51. 
154 Louvigny au conseil, 15 Oct. 1720, Ibid., vol. 41, vols. 238-240; Vaudreuil et Begon au conseil, 26 Oct. 
1720, in ibid.,vol. 41, fol. 19v; Charlevoix, Journal, 381-82. 
155 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 136, 140. 
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laden with twenty-six gallons of rum among other goods. 156 After the 1724 assembly, the 
Ottawas returned to Albany. During a trip to Iroquois country in 1725, Charles le Moyne 
de Longueil, a French captain, counted a hundred canoes of various nations, including the 
Ottawas and Mississaugas, either destined for or returning from trading with the 
British.157 Vaudreuil owned that the Ottawas appeared to be "as much in the interest of 
the English and Iroquois as they appear to be in ours."158 After 1727, the Ottawas also 
frequently traded with the British at the new trading post south of Lake Ontario, 
Oswego. 159 At long last the Ottawas had forged a commercial relationship with the 
Iroquois and the British. They could, with little French interference, trade for scarlet 
woolens, rum, and other necessities. In some measure, the Ottawas had circumvented the 
southern alliance. Yet if the Ottawas had finally gained access to the British, they had 
not dismantled the Huron-Miami-Iroquois alliance that had long troubled them. 
Although some Hurons had accompanied Sagima' s delegation in 1723, the Hurons 
arrived again the following two years without the Ottawas. 160 The Hurons and Iroquois 
continued to collaborate through the next four decades. 
156 Gov. Burnett (New York) to Lords of Trade, 25 June 1723, NYCD 5:684; "Conference between the 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs and some Western Tribes," 29 May 1723, in Ibid., 693-97; Cadwallader 
Colden, "Account of the Trade of New-Yorlc," in Ibid., 5:687; Burnett to Lords of Trade, 9 August 1724, in 
Ibid., 5:709-10. 
157 Lettre de Longueuil et Begon au rninistre, 31 Oct. 1725, CAOM, C11A, vol. 47, fols. 136-26v. 
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qu'ils paroissent estre dans les noistres," Vaudreuil au rninistre, 22 May 1725, in ibid.,vol. 47, fol. 167v. 
159 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 197; The British Superintendent for Indian Affairs, Sir William Johnson, noted 
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William Johnson, "A Review of the progressive State of the Trade, Politics and proceedings of the Indians 
in the Northern district," NYCD, 7:957. The Hurons told an English captive that they could reach the post 
in ten days. "An Account of the Captivity of Charles Stuart," 1757, Beverley W. Bond, ed., in Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 13 (1936), 75. For more on the establishment of Oswego, see Parmenter, "The 
Edge of the Woods," 43. 
160 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 152, 159. 
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This narrative of competition and strife, in the midst of a period of common 
alarm, provides insight into the political and cultural tapestry of the pays d'en haut. 
Since the seventeenth century, tremendous pressures had threatened to obliterate the 
distinct ethnic communities in the region and to refashion them into one large French-
allied polity. In many respects they appeared to have done so. They had cooperated 
during the long struggle against the Five Nations throughout the latter half of the 
seventeenth century. When those struggles ended in 1701, these peoples pledged to 
subordinate their individual interests to the interests of the whole, to bring their disputes 
to Onontio to mediate, and to remain in harmony. In subsequent years they (sometimes) 
heeded these requests, seeking out the governor's guidance to resolve their quarrels. 
Moreover, they addressed each other as "brothers" and often professed to share a "single 
body." In many ways, they seem to have substituted their individual identities for a 
larger regional "French" one. 
In 1717, however, the nations d' en haut did not act like "French" Indians, but as 
members of individual communities pursuing distinct and explicitly incompatible goals. 
Even in the face of a determined external threat, they responded, not by collapsing into an 
undifferentiated mass, or by abandoning their ethnic distinction, or even by suppressing 
their animosity for one another any longer than absolutely necessary. Instead they 
continued to vie for advantage even when that competition might threaten their collective 
safety against a common foe. That they did so suggests that they continued to define 
themselves as members of separate and competing ethnic groups. This recognition goes a 
long way to explaining the communities' behavior. Seeing themselves as members of 
136 
distinct nations, they sought to advance themselves at the expense of the others, by force 
if necessary, and only cooperated with their neighbors when it suited them. Their 
identities as members of distinct communities fundamentally ordered how they interacted 
with each other and with the French. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"Inseparable Companions" and Irreconcilable Enemies: 
The Huron and Ottawas 
The Detroit Hurons were terrified. Huddling behind their hastily-repaired 
palisade in 1738, they listened as the Ottawas, their neighbors and erstwhile allies, 
insulted and threatened them. And, when the Hurons ventured from their walls, the 
Ottawas made good on their bloody promises. As the elder Hurons trembling within their 
enclosure knew well, the current conflict with the Ottawas was but the most recent in a 
long and complicated relationship between the groups. That relationship had long 
oscillated between heart-felt affection and alliance and equally genuine disdain and 
conflict. In 1738 the pendulum swung decidedly toward animosity, threatening to rend 
the alliance permanently and to destroy the fragile French-led native alliance in the pays 
d 'en haut. The longtime allies-once identified as "inseparable companions"-had 
become, in short order, irreconcilable enemies. 1 Even these groups, arguably the two 
most important allies in the French alliance, remained so fundamentally distinct, that they 
nearly came to war in 1738. 
As near as the Marquis de Beauhamois, governor of New France, could tell, the 
most recent trouble between the Hurons and Ottawas had begun sometime in the spring 
of 1738. The Hurons settled near the French post of Detroit had called a conference with 
the other native groups settled at the post, the Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and Ottawas, to 
I Les Ottawas etaient" Compagnons inseparables des Hurons, depuis que les Iroquois [Haudenosaunee] ont 
oblige les uns & les autres, a abandonner leur Pays." Pierre-Fran9ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un 
Voyage, 2 ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 2 vols. (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744], 
1994), 1:547. 
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announce that they had made peace with the Flatheads and to invite their neighbors to do 
the same. For years the Hurons had joined their allies in attacking the Flatheads, the 
Iroquois' name for several southeastern nations.2 Now the Hurons cautioned their 
neighbors that, if they continued attacking the Flatheads, the Hurons would send couriers 
to warn their newfound friends. The Ottawas scoffed at the Hurons' suggestion. Did the 
Hurons not remember that the Flatheads had tortured and killed Ottawa warriors and that 
no one less than the Governor of New France had "given this Nation to be devoured by 
all the others"?3 
The Ottawas and other Detroit groups soon gave the Hurons an opportunity to 
prove their loyalty to the Flatheads. In the summer of 1738 they organized a party of 
seventeen warriors to attack the southern nation. True to their word, the Hurons 
dispatched two parties to warn their southern allies and the Flatheads thus easily routed 
the Detroit natives, killing all but three of the invaders. If the loss of fourteen warriors 
was troubling, the news that the survivors brought was even more so; the Ottawa men had 
seen familiar faces among their attackers. Not only had the Hurons warned the Flatheads 
of the imminent attack, they had fought alongside them. The Hurons, the Ottawas' 
2 The French tended to use the term "Tete-Plate," or Flathead, casually and promiscuously. Following the 
Iroquois, the French referred to several southeastern groups, including the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and 
Choctaws, as well as to a specific group bearing that name, as "Tetes-Plates." Daniel Richter concludes 
that the "Tetes-Plates" were probably the Catawbas of the Carolina Piedmont. The group with whom the 
Hurons allied, however, seems more numerous than the Catawbas-it consisted of at least ten villages-
and thus probably included both the Catawbas and other allied nations. See Anon., "Denombrement des 
nations sauvages qui ont rapport au gouvernement du Canada," in COAM, C11A, vol. 66 fol. 254v ; 
Guillaume De L'Isle, "Carte du Canada et du Mississippi," 1702, photostatic reproduction, Louis C. 
Karpinski Map Collection, Box 1, Fol. 2, Aff. Etrangers, Newberry Library, Chicago; Richter, "War and 
Culture: The Iroquois Experience," WMQ, 40:4 (Oct., 1983): 557; Beauharnois au ministre, 6 Oct. 1739, in 
CAOM, serie C11E, vol. 16, fols. 224, 227. 
3 
"Notre Pere Onnontio a donne cette Nation [a] manger [a] toutes les autres," Charles de Beauharnois de la 
Boische, Marquis de Beauharnois, au ministre, 6 Oct. 1738, in CAOM, CllA, vol. 69, fols. 125-126v. 
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neighbors and close allies for centuries, had, as the Ottawas complained, spilled the 
"blood of their brothers."4 
The fallout was swift. The Ottawas angrily confronted their neighbors, calling 
them "dogs" who were "capable of killing ... your brothers."5 Terrified, the Hurons took 
refuge in their fortified village, scrambling to repair breaches in the walls and abandoning 
their fields to the crows and weeds.6 That fall, the Hurons retreated to Sandusky, on the 
southern shore of Lake Erie, where they hoped to find some peace. 7 Although some 
Hurons returned to Detroit the following summer, the situation there remained tense. As 
late as the summer of 1740, some Ottawas warriors, who were destroying a Huron field, 
shot at a Huron women and, with "knife in hand," chased two Huron children. 8 Despite 
Governor Beauharnois' efforts to mend the rift, the Hurons ultimately decided that they 
could have no peace as long as they were "within sight of the [Ottawas]" and other 
groups. They implored the governor to grant them leave to join their fellow Hurons near 
Quebec, where they could be safe from their enemies. When Beauhamois dithered, the 
Hurons finally decided to leave Detroit and settle on Bois Blanc Island, south of Detroit, 
where they hoped to be safe from the Ottawas' wrath. 9 
4 
"le sang de leurs freres, L'outa8ais [Ottawas]," in ibid., 126v-130v at 127v: "Resume de lettres de 
Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie," 17 Sept. 1741, in ibid., vol. 75, fol. 130-137v. 
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"vous Etes des chiens non seulement vous Etes Capables de ttier vos freres, mais Encore Votre Pere," 
Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1738, in ibid., vol. 69, fol. 127v. 
6 Ibid., fol. 128. 
7 Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1739, in CAOM, C11E, vol. 16, fol. 224; Roland-Michel Barrin de la 
Galissoniere, Marquis de Galissoniere et Gilles Hocquart, "Journal concernant 'ce qui s'est passe 
d'interessant dans la colonie ... ,"' 7 Oct. 1747, NYCD, 10:114. 
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"le couteau ala main," Armand de la Richardie a Beauharnois, 26 Aug. 1740, in CAOM, CllA, vol. 75, 
fols. l36v-137 
9 Les Hurons cherchaient "un lieu de Surete, n'en trouvant autant dans cet Endroit, ala vtie des les outatiacs 
et saulteurs," Ibid.; La Richardie to Jean-Baptiste de Saint-Pe, 26 Aug. 1740, MPHSCR, 34 :172. 
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The rift demonstrated a profound ambivalence of Huron-Ottawa relations. By 
1738, the Hurons and Ottawas, especially the Kiskakons, had long been trading partners 
and close neighbors. The Hurons and the neighboring Tionnontates, had lived to the east 
of Lake Huron, while the Kiskakon Ottawas settled nearby on the Bruce Peninsula. 
Living in such close proximity, the Ottawas traded furs, meat, and other goods for the 
Hurons' and Tionnontates grain and produce. 10 Moreover, the Tionnontates welcomed 
Ottawa hunters to winter near their villages. When the Iroquois finally defeated the 
Hurons in 1649 some of the Hurons thus sought refuge with the Ottawas on Manitoulin 
Island and at Michilimackinac. Eventually these Hurons and some of the Ottawas moved 
to Chequamegon Bay in Lake Superior, where they settled in a single village, and, in the 
1670s, to Michilimackinac.u On the northern shore of the Mackinaw Strait, the Hurons 
and Ottawas built their villages next to one another, separated only by a single palisade of 
stakes. 12 
Thus, the groups had lived in intimate proximity for more than three decades by 
the early eighteenth century when they moved again, this time to a new French post 
established on the strait connecting Lakes Erie and Huron. Arriving at the post in the 
early eighteenth century, the Hurons and Ottawas continued their close relationship, born 
10 Bruce Trigger, Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660. 2 vols (Montreal: 
MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 62-65. 
11 Garrad and Heidenreich, "Khionontateronon (Petun)," in HNAI, 15:394-97; Johanna E. Feest and 
Christian F. Feest, "Ottawa," in Ibid, 772-86. The Jesuit missions of St. Ignace (Huron) and St. Fran~ois de 
Borgia (Ottawa) sat on the northern shore of the Straits of Mackinac, which became an important strategic 
and commercial center. Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac," MDE, 5:75-76. According to 
Margry, this manuscript was dated 1718 in another hand than Cadillac's. The description of 
Michilimackinac and the reference to Cadillac as commandant of Michilimackinac, however, suggests that 
the document dates to the captain's tenure at that post, from 1694-1698. 
12 Louis Armand de Lorn d'Arce, Baron de Lahontan, New Voyages to North-America (London, 1703 ; 
reprint, Chicago: A.C. McClurg, 1905), 143, 147. 
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of centuries of interaction in the Georgian Bay region and decades of cohabitation at 
Chequamegon Bay and Michilimackinac. 13 These long-time allies continued to interact 
as they long had, sending their young men on raids against common enemies, hunting 
game in the winter, playing lacrosse when there was no more work to be done, and, on 
occasion, as all neighbors, quarrelling and fighting. They were, by French observers' 
reckoning, "allies," "friends," even "brothers."14 
At the same time, however, a persistent undercurrent of hostility permeated the 
Hurons' and Ottawas' relationship. Nicolas Perrot, an explorer, interpreter, and fur trader 
well-versed in native affairs, reported what had become general knowledge by 1689; "the 
Hurons [Hurons] have always sought to destroy the nations" of the pays d'en haut, and 
especially the Ottawas. 15 The Hurons themselves even testified to this animosity, 
warning the Iroquois in 1702 "not to trust the [Ottawas] for they are a brutish People."16 
Around the same time, the mission Indians of the Sault-Saint-Louis and Lac des Deux 
Montagnes noted that the Hurons had settled among "nations who do not love you."17 In 
13 William Newbigging contends that both some Hurons and some Ottawas had moved to the area as early 
as the 1690s and discounts Cadillac's claims that the groups came to settle there in the early eighteenth 
century ("The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance" (PhD. diss. Dept. of History, University of Toronto, 
1995)," 226). 
14 
"Speech ofMiscouaky ... ," 26 Sept. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:291; "Words of the Outaouais of 
Michillimackinac to Vaudreuil," 18-20 June 1707, in ibid., 323. 
15 
"On S9ait bien que les Hurons ont toujours cherche a detruire les nations d'en haut." Nicolas Perrot, 
Memoire sur les moeurs, coustumes, et religion des sauvages de !'Amerique Septentrionale, ed. J. Tailhan 
(Leipzig: A. Franck, 1864), 145. 
16 The Hurons, speaking to the British in Albany in 1702, referred to the Ottawas as "Dowaganhaes," the 
Iroquois name for that group. Lord Corn bury to the Board of Trade, 20 July 1702, NYCD, 4:989. 
17 
"vous etes au-milieu d'une multitude de nations qui ne vous aiment point, et dont vous ignores les 
mreurs." In 1742, the Hurons recalled that these nations had come to them before they left 
Michilimackinac, but after the Marquis de Vaudreuil had become governor, meaning the exchange came in 
the first years of the eighteenth century. At the same conference, the Hurons noted that Vaudreuil had long 
ago invited them to leave "the Nations who hate" them and come live near him ("M. de Vaudreiiil nous 
Exhorta dans ce tem[p]s, [a] quitter au plust6t des Nations qui nos haYssoient, et qu'il nous dit, .. retires vous 
aupres de moy, vous y trouvons un agile assure, un Pere, un Protecteur"). "Paroles de Beauharnois a trois 
chefs hurons," 28 June, 1742, in CAOM, C11A, vol. 77, fol. 163v. 
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1705, Governor Philippe Rigaud de Vaudreuil fretted that the Hurons "are only waiting 
for an opportunity to avenge themselves" against the Ottawas and that they hoped to 
abscond to the Iroquois. 18 In 1707 he reiterated that the Hurons "would have very much 
liked to destroy the Outavois."19 This long-running Huron "animosity" against the 
Ottawas remained in 1718 when, according to Alphonse de Tonty, then commandant of 
Detroit, the Hurons silently hoped for a war between the Miamis and the Ottawas. 20 
Even more than these observations, however, a series of sometimes violent clashes 
between the groups forcefully bespeaks an endearing mutual animosity. Born of ethno-
cultural differences, exacerbated by the pressures of colonialism, and finally triggered by 
the immediate context of the Hurons' reconciliation with the Flatheads, this nagging 
mistrust led to confrontation in 1738. 
I. "people of whose customs you are ignorant": Culture and Politics 
This animosity was premised, fundamentally, on a number of cultural and ethnic 
differences. This diversity, especially evident among the Iroquoian Hurons and the 
Algonquian-speaking Ottawas, survived the upheaval of the seventeenth century. Even 
after living "so close" to one another for some six decades, a colonial official reported in 
1710, the two nations still retained distinct "customs."21 Cadillac also testified to the 
18 
"ils n'attendons que l'occaision pour se venger," Vaudreuil au rninistre, 5 May 1705, in ibid., vol. 22, fol. 
23lv. 
19 Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 24 July 1707, in ibid., 328. 
20 
"l'animosite qu'ils [les Hurons] ont depuis Longtem[p]s Contre les 8ta8ais [Ottawas], qui desoir la 
guerre alurninee entre celles derniers et les Miamis," Vaudreuil au Conseil de Marine, 30 Oct. 1718, ibid., 
vol. 39, fols. 150v-151 ; Claude de Ramezay and Michel Begon de la Picardiere to the Minister, 7 Nov. 
1715, WHC, 16:333. 
21 
"les coutumes de ces derniers [les Hurons] sont differentes de celles des sauvages dontje vous ay parle 
jusqu'a present [les Ottawas] et quoyqu'ils fussent si proches de l'Outavois et quasi sous leur domination, 
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differences separating the Ottawas and the Hurons. While the four Ottawa nations shared 
much in common, he emphasized that "the Huron nation does not form a body" with 
them. Not only were the villages "separated one from the other by a palisade," but the 
two spoke different languages and held different cultural traditions. 22 These cultural 
differences worked to separate the two nations and created an environment of mistrust 
and mutual incomprehension that, under the right circumstances, bred conflict. 
Language was, of course, the most obvious difference. While the Hurons spoke 
an Iroquoian tongue, the Ottawa language belonged to the Algonquian language family. 
The Hurons could speak with other Iroquoians easily-the languages being as similar, by 
one estimation, as Norman and French-and the Ottawas could understand Potawatomi, 
Ojibwa, and certain other Algonquian languages. 23 But the differences between Huron 
and Ottawa were so great that the two groups could "only understand one another through 
interpreters. "24 The inability to communicate presented a considerable challenge to the 
groups. Even the most mundane interactions required translation. 25 The net effect was to 
enforce a sense of separateness between the two neighbors. For this reason, the Jesuits 
assigned separate missionaries to the Hurons and Ottawas at Michilimackinac, and the 
ils ne les ont point changees," Antoine Denys Raudot, and Antoine Silvy, Relation par lettres de 
!'Amerique Septentrionalle (annees 1709 et 1710), ed. Camille de Rochemonteix (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 
editeurs, 1904), 131. 
22 
"Relation de Lamothe Cadillac," [ca. 1694], MDE, 5 :80-81. 
23 In fact, Iroquois people often served as interpreters at conferences between the Hurons and British, 
Lahontan, New Voyages, 733; "Conference between the Commissioners oflndian Affairs and some 
Western Tribes," 29 May 1723, NYCD, 5:693. 
24 
"Elle [la nation Huronne] parle une langue differente, en sorte que les unset les autres ne s'entendent que 
par les interpretes," Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac," [ca. 1698], MDE, 5:80. 
25 Franc;:ois Clairambault d' Aigremont, "Letter of Sr. d' Aigremont," 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 33:433. 
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French later maintained separate interpreters for each group at Detroit. 26 This isolation 
could easily breed mistrust. The Hurons found the Ottawas incomprehensible, and 
therefore unpredictable, and vice versa. 27 
More abstractly, language became a marker of difference and, to the Hurons' 
minds at least, inferiority. According to Gabriel Sagard, the Hurons did not bother to 
learn the Algonquian languages of their neighbors before the fall of Huronia because they 
did not "feel the need to learn another."28 Sagard's observation indicates that the Hurons 
may have seen the Algonquian-speakers' language as an indicator of cultural 
backwardness. Their cultural cousins, the Iroquois certainly did. Philological evidence 
suggests that "Dowaganhaw"-the generic Iroquoian term for a western Algonquian-
speaker-meant "one who rolls (or gulps) their words."29 In contrast, the Iroquois 
referred to another Iroquoian-speaking people "those who speak the language of men."30 
This wording communicates much about the Iroquois' attitudes toward Algonquian 
peoples. Not only did the Algonquian-speakers mumble and swallow their words, their 
inability to speak an Iroquoian tongue classified them as non-humans, and thus perhaps 
as other-than-human persons like animals and slaves. Just as the ancient Greeks mocked 
26 Vaudreuil, "[Reply of the Governor-General to the Memorial Presented by Monsieur de la Mothe 
Cadillac on the 31st of March, 1706]," in ibid., 256. 
27 James Axtell describes the intrinsic hazards of the inscrutable other. See Natives and Newcomers: The 
Cultural Origins of North America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 42-43. 
28 Gabriel Sagard Theodat, Histoire du Canada et Voyages que les Freres mineurs Recollects y ontfaicts 
pour la conversion des infidelles, 4 vols. (Paris: Librairie Tross, 1866), 1:226. I would like to thank my 
colleague Celine Carayon for bringing this quotation to my attention. 
29 Frederick Hodge, "Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico in Two Parts," in Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Bulletin, 2 vols. (Government Printing Office, 1912), 2:136. 
30 The specific reference is to the "ontati onDa," which bears at least a passing resemblance to "Iontady-
haga," the Iroquois name for the Hurons or "Tionontate" ("les ontati on De, c'est des hommes ainsi 
nommes par les iroquois parcequils s'entendent"). "Denombrement des nations sauvages qui ont rapport au 
gouvernement du Canada, des guerriers de chacune avec leurs armoiries," 1736, CAOM, CllA, vol.66, fol. 
254v. 
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the indecipherable "barbarians" at their borders, the Iroquois, and perhaps their Huron 
cousins and relatives, discounted those foreigners who grunted and murmured like 
animals rather than speaking like humans. 
If language was the most noticeable difference, the subsistence strategies each 
group employed, and the resulting social, cultural, and political structures, proved to be 
the most important and far-reaching divergence. While the Hurons focused on growing 
food, the Ottawas, occupying a slightly different ecological niche, developed a much 
more diversified economy that relied less upon cultivation. These economic preferences 
shaped the two nations' cultures in profound ways. 
The Hurons, like other northern Iroquoian culture groups, focused extensively on 
horticulture, and relied on hunting, fishing, and gathering only to supplement their 
crops.31 Accordingly they developed a somewhat sedentary lifestyle, built substantial 
and permanent villages, and settled in greater density than their neighbors. The Hurons 
brought this preference west after they abandoned Lake Huron. In western Lake 
Superior, they tried-and failed-to create a horticultural homeland by attacking the 
Dakotas. 32 Later, living at the relatively infertile Straits of Mackinaw, they grew and sold 
surplus corn to their neighbors. They may have even decided to move Detroit in order to 
take advantage ofthe comparatively rich soils there.33 Cadillac noted that, after a fire at 
the fort in 1704, the Hurons generously gave Cadillac fifty minots of grain and sold more 
31 Some estimates suggest that some three-quarters of the Hurons' food supply came from cultigens, and 
this was also true of the neighboring Tionnontates (Children of Aataentsic, 52-54). More recent 
archaeological evidence suggests that cultigens accounted for a smaller, but still significant, amount of the 
Huron diet. Stephen Monckton, "Huron Paleoethnobotany," (PhD. diss., Dept. of Anthropology, 
University of Toronto, 1990), 122. 
32 Perrot, Memoire, 87. 
33 Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 230. 
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"at the usual price," suggesting that the Hurons had become market farmers. 34 In 
addition to the traditional maize and beans, the Hurons also grew French peas and 
wheat.35 
Few French observers passed an opportunity to praise the Hurons' agricultural 
ability, often at the expense of the Ottawas and other nations. Fran<;ois Clairambault 
d' Aigremont, a French official, noted in 1708 that the Huron nation had "applied itself 
most diligently to cultivating land" and thus agricultural production at Michilimackinac 
had fallen sharply when the Hurons left for Detroit. 36 Noting that the Hurons were 
"naturally industrious," the trader Nicolas Perrot claimed that Huron men helped their 
women farm, "contrary to the customs of the [other] savages."37 Observing the Hurons 
first-hand in 1721, Father Charlevoix concluded that Hurons were "always more 
occupied than the others in the culture of the soil." Indeed, the Hurons boasted to the 
Jesuit that "without the Hurons the other Savages of Detroit would die of hunger." 
According to the Hurons, the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis, had little desire to 
cultivate the lands they occupied, and the Hurons were happy to sell their surplus grain to 
them.38 
34 Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 1704, MPHSCR, 33:233; Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, in 
ibid., 429; The Hurons were apparently selling corn to the French as early as 1688. The Baron de Lahontan 
reported that the natives of Michilimackinac charged more for their crops in years of poor beaver harvests, 
indicating market farming had already become part their economic strategy. Lahontan, New Voyages, 148; 
Raudot and Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle, 175. 
35 [Sabrevois], "Memoire on the Indians between Lake Erie and the Mississippi," 1718, WHC, 16:368. 
36 Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 33:447. 
37 
''[les Hurons] sont sortis, homes et femmes ensemble, travailler dans leurs terres, pour parmi ce nation, 
qui sont industrieux naturelles, les hommes aident les femmes dans leurs travailles, contre les coutumes des 
sauvages," Perrot, Memoires, 192-93. 
38 Charlevoix, Journal, 1:448. 
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In contrast to the Hurons, the Ottawas chose a more diversified economy. 
Although the Ottawas did cultivate crops, a skill probably acquired from their 
interactions with the Tionnontates themselves, agriculture played a much smaller role in 
Ottawa subsistence. Lying north of Huronia, the Ottawa's original territory proved less 
hospitable to cultivation. The Ottawas could count on a growing season just long enough 
to grow com, but not long enough to provide a reliable harvest. If the region was less 
suited to agriculture, it nonetheless provided sustenance for the Ottawas in other ways. 
Occupying the boundary between Carolinian and Canadian forest ecosystems, the region 
offered a wide diversity of resources. Moving around the region in an intricate seasonal 
rhythm, the Ottawas fished for whitefish near Michilimackinac, hunted for moose and 
beaver north of Lake Huron, and gathered berries and other plants. 39 The Ottawas carried 
these preferences with them when they left Georgian Bay. Even in the apparently fertile 
Detroit River Valley, the Ottawas left the farming to the Hurons, preferring to buy grain 
than to grow it.40 
The Hurons' and Ottawas' subsistence strategies and preferences trickled down to 
every comer of their cultures. The Hurons' commitment to farming, in particular, shaped 
their culture and society and set it apart from that of the Ottawas. Because they relied so 
heavily on cultigens, the Hurons adopted a more sedentary lifestyle than the Ottawas, 
who moved frequently to take advantage of a wider range of resources. Since the Hurons 
spent more time in their villages, they constructed more substantial-and less mobile 
lodgings-and larger and more impressive fortifications. The Ottawas, in contrast, 
39 Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 28, 41, 47-53. 
4
° Charlevoix, Journal, 1:543. 
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moved frequently and so preferred portable structures.41 Because agriculture allowed 
them to sustain a larger population on less land and stimulated their fertility rates, the 
Hurons formed larger towns and settled more densely than the Ottawas. To mediate the 
conflicts and manage the difficulties of these denser settlements, the Hurons formed "a 
more marked form of government" than their neighbors.42 The Hurons' subsistence 
patterns even influenced the position of women within society. Because of their 
importance to agriculture and thus to survival, Huron women, even more than Ottawa 
women, enjoyed "principle authority" and were "absolutely the mistresses" of their 
communities. 43 
Their relatively sedentary economic patterns and denser populations made the 
Hurons the darlings of the French. French praise for the Hurons reflected the perceived 
proximity of Huron culture to that of early-modern France. As well as being "the wisest, 
most industrious, hardworking, and provident" people of the pays d' en haut, the Hurons 
were the "most civilized and trustworthy" of France's allies. 44 The Ottawas, committed 
to a lifestyle significantly different from the French, fared poorly in comparison. Indeed, 
reaching for familiar language, Father Gabriel Sagard pronounced the Hurons "nobility," 
41 Brian L. Dunnigan, Frontier Metropolis: Picturing Early Detroit, 1701-1838. (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2001), 30. 
42 
"une forme de gouvernement plus marquee." Charlevoix, Journal, 1:451; Newbigging, "The History of 
the French-Ottawa Alliance," 28, 50-2; Garrad and Heidenreich, "Khionontateronon (Petun)," in HNAl, 
15:394-7. 
43 
"Les Femmes ont la principale authorite chez tous les Peuples de la Langue Huronne." Charlevoix, 
Journal, 1:557; "elles [les femmes Huronnes] sont absolument les maistresses, en sort que les hommes ne 
font quasi rien sans leur consentment," Lamothe Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe," [ca. 1698], 
MDE, 5:119-20. The fur trade furthermore enhanced native women's status as they became intermediaries 
between their communities and French husbands. See Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-
Trade Society in Western Canada, 1670-1870. (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Watson & Dwyer Publishing, 1980). 
44 
"le plus sage, plus industrieux, plus laborieux, plus prevoyant." Charlevoix, Journal, 1:448 ; Perrot, 
Memoires, 192-93. 
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while the Ottawas were merely humble "bourgeois."45 The baron de Lahontan went even 
further, dismissing the Ottawas as "cowardly, ugly, ungainly Fellows," while the Hurons 
were "a brave, active, and daring People."46 The Hurons' greater "civilization" and 
closer proximity to French social and cultural ideals clearly shaped French perception of 
the groups. 
More importantly the Hurons attributed meaning to this cultural difference. In 
1721 they boasted to Father Charlevoix that "without the Hurons the other savages of 
Detroit would die of starvation."47 Sneering at the Ottawas' inability to grow enough to 
feed themselves, the Hurons contemptuously reported that the Ottawas "thought about 
nothing more than amassing Pelts" suggesting that the Ottawas continued to rely more on 
hunting than the agricultural Hurons.48 The Hurons, already accomplished market 
farmers, thus drew a sharp distinction between themselves, the provident farmers, and the 
Ottawas, the wandering hunters. The Hurons used such differences to define themselves 
as ethnically distinct and to measure the distance between them and their Ottawa 
neighbors. 
While the first two cultural wedges separating the Hurons and Ottawas-language 
and subsistence strategies-had existed well before the French arrived, the third was a 
product of the colonial encounter. While some Ottawas welcomed the black robes, the 
Hurons seemed more disposed toward the new religion than did the Ottawas, and many 
45 Gabriel Sagard, Legrand voyage du pays des Hurons situe en /'Amerique (Paris: Denys Moreau, 1632), 
184. 
46 Lahontan, New Voyages, 415. 
47 
"Ceux, qui m'avoient conduit dans ce [Huron] Village, m'assftrerent que sans les Hurons les autres 
Sauvages du Detroit mourroient de faim." Charlevoix, Journal, 1:543. 
48 In 1711, a French official confirmed the Hurons' claim, noting that they grew a surplus which they sold 
both the French and other natives (Raudot and Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle, 
174). 
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Hurons became willing acolytes of their adopted faith. No less than in contemporary 
Europe, religious heterogeneity-or the perception thereof-divided and alienated 
natives who retained traditional beliefs and those who converted to some form of 
Christianity. 
To be sure, Jesuit missionaries enjoyed some success among the Ottawas. In 
1668, Father Claude Allouez reported that the Kiskak:on Ottawas living at the mission of 
Saint Esprit at Chequamegon Bay had converted en masse, and the Jesuits long 
maintained a mission to the Ottawas at Michilimackinac. 49 Yet other French observers 
found the Ottawas only marginally committed to Christianity. Cadillac, always happy to 
take a cut at the Jesuits, sniped that the Ottawas "would have themselves baptized a 
hundred times a day for a glass of brandy." More troubling still, every Ottawa cabin 
recognized "its own private divinity" to which they regularly offered sacrifices.50 A more 
dispassionate witness, Father Charlevoix, confirmed that there "were no Christians 
among" the Ottawas at Detroit in 1721.51 Three decades later, the court itself confirmed 
that the Ottawas and most other natives in the pays d'en haut still had not "embraced the 
49 JR, 52:206, 208. While Neal Leavelle argues that this Kiskakon conversion was heartfelt, Newbigging 
dismisses it as a stunt meant to please and manipulate the French. Immediately before the conversion, 
Alloeuz had reported that he planned to abandon the Chequamegon mission, and the Kiskakons probably 
feared losing their tenuous tie to the French. Regardless of the Kiskakons' sincerity, however, the Ottawas, 
as a whole, appeared less interested in Christianity than the Hurons. See Leavelle, "Religion, Encounter, 
and Community in French and Indian North America" (PhD. diss., Dept. of History, Arizona State 
University, 2001 ), 168-183, and Newbigging, "History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 156-157. 
5° Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 1704, MPHSCR, 33:219,238-39. 
51 
"II n'y a point de Chretiens parmi eux," Charlevoix, Journal, 537. 
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Christian religion."52 Nor were the Detroit Ottawas likely to convert any time soon, since 
the Jesuits never opened an Ottawa mission at the post.53 
While the Ottawas continued what Cadillac deemed "their deplorable sacrifices to 
Baal," the Hurons proved more receptive to the black robes' message. 54 From the 
beginning of their missions, the Jesuits had focused their attention more on the sedentary 
and comparatively "civilized" Hurons and the neighboring Tionnontates than on the 
mobile Ottawas, and that effort continued at Chequamegon and the mission of St. Ignace 
at Michilimackinac.55 The fathers' hard work apparently bore fruit. In 1710, a colonial 
official averred that the Hurons had embraced Christianity with "the most intensity" and 
were the "best catholics" of all of the nations in the pays d' en haut. 56 Another observer 
opined in 1718 that, although the Hurons did not currently have a missionary, they 
nonetheless avoided ceremonial dancing-which the Jesuits pronounced demonic-and 
imbibed less liquor, which the fathers blamed for all sorts of villainy-than other 
nations. 57 Father Charlevoix declared them Christians as well and reported that most of 
the Hurons desired a missionary in 1721.58 The Jesuits finally satisfied that request in the 
52
" Instructions to the New Governor, the Marquis de la Jonquiere," 20 April1749, WHC, 18:18-19. 
53 This absence was the product of a power struggle between Cadillac-who resented the Jesuits' temporal 
meddling and pretentious to power-and the fathers, who saw the captain as a grasping tyrant. Father 
Fran<;ois Vaillant de Gueslis, a Huron-speaking Jesuit, had been deployed to Detroit in 1701 but had left the 
same year after Cadillac accused him of plotting the post's destruction. Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 
1704, MPHSCR, 33:202-3. A priest from the Seminary in Quebec served briefly at the post, but spoke 
neither Huron nor Ottawa and left after three years . "Etat des depenses faites par Lamothe Cadillac," 29 
Sept. 1706, in ibid., 297; "Cadillac Again Petitions to Be Put in Possession of Detroit," 4 Nov. 1721, in 
Ibid., 682-83. The Jesuits never established an Ottawa mission at the post, though they founded one for the 
Hurons in 1728, long after Cadillac had left. 
54 Cadillac au ministre, 18 Oct. 1700, MDE, 5:171. 
55 Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," vii. 
56 Raudot and Silvy, Relation par lettres de I' Amerique Septentrionalle, 175. 
57 Jacques-Charles de Sabrevois, "Memoir on the Indians between Lake Erie and the Mississippi," 1718, 
NYCD, 9:887; Charlevoix, Voyages, 1:541. 
58 Ibid. 
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person of Armand de la Richardie, who arrived at Detroit in 1728 and established a 
mission to the Hurons. By 1741 he could report that "not even one person in the whole 
nation remained obdurate," and they flocked to the Gospel with "unfeigned heart." 59 
Even while sequestered at Sandusky, the Hurons risked the Ottawas' vengeance to return 
to Detroit for the saints' days.60 Richardie obviously overstated his point; many Hurons 
resolutely refused to convert, and those who did probably incorporated Christianity into 
more traditional religious constellations. 61 Yet the Hurons' embrace of Christianity, 
especially in the decade before 1738, served to distance them even further from the 
Ottawas, and created potential grounds for dispute. 
The Hurons, more importantly, perceived these differences to be meaningful. 
When a group of Detroit Hurons and mission Iroquois attacked a group of Foxes in 1732, 
they identified their enemies as "dogs who did not acknowledge the master oflife." The 
Hurons, then, had begun not only to identify themselves as Christians, but as defenders of 
the faith. In the aftermath of the 1738 encounter, furthermore, they fretted that they could 
never be "fully confirmed in their Religion" as long as they lived among the Ottawas and 
59 Richardie's claim that he had found "not a single savage professing the christian faith" when he arrived 
in 1728 contradicts Charlevoix's earlier assessment. The Father very likely downplayed the Hurons' initial 
piety to make his accomplishments seem all the more impressive. Indeed he wrote that assessment in a 
letter requesting aid from his Order's leader in 1741. Richardie a Pere Franciscus Retz, 21 June 1741, in 
JR, 69:50-53. 
60 Richardie to Jean-Baptiste de Saint-Pe, 26 Aug. 1740, MPHSCR, 34:173. 
61 For example, the Huron leader, Le Baron, suggested that the dead be placed upon above-ground biers 
rather than in graves, so that the deceased "may the more easily take the road to Heaven," and mistakenly 
placed the Sabbath on the eighth day. "Narrative of the most remarkable Occurences in Canada, 1694, 
1695.," NYCD, 9:607. In 1732, the Hurons, who had asked for and received a missionary in 1728, 
nonetheless practiced traditional ceremonies before engaging in battle. Henri-Louis Deschamps de 
Boishebert to the marquis de Beauharnois, 28 Feb. 1732, WHC 17:153. Recent studies confirm that other 
natives in New France synthesized new Catholic ideas and practices into more traditional belief systems 
and ceremonies. For the Ottawas and Illinois, see Neal Tracy Leavelle," "Religion, Encounter, and 
Community in French and Indian North America" (PhD. diss., Dept. of History, Arizona State University, 
2001). For the Christian Mohawks of New France, see Alan Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha 
and the Jesuits. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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other unbelievers.62 Granted, the Hurons issued this proclamation in part for the benefit 
of the French; they were trying to convince the governor to resettle them near Montreal. 
Yet it does suggest that they had begun to distinguish themselves as Christians and their 
neighbors as infidels. 
The cultural distance that separated them allowed the Hurons and Ottawas to view 
each other both as alien and, to some degree, as culturally inadequate. The Hurons 
clearly saw the Ottawas as cultural inferiors; they were market hunters who could not 
feed themselves without the Hurons and heathens whose presence inhibited the Hurons' 
own conversion to Christianity. This may explain, in part, why the Hurons and Ottawas 
rarely married, even though they lived in close proximity (see Chapter One). In this 
sense, cultural distance was a necessary precondition to violence. The Canadian Iroquois 
of Kahnawake and the Two Mountains explicitly made this connection late in the 
seventeenth century. They noted that the Hurons lived among "a Multitude of Nations 
who do not love you, you do not Understand their language, you are ignorant their 
Customs, and by that, even Every day," the Hurons risked provoking some "bad 
affairs."63 Yet the differences in Huron and Ottawa culture do not, by themselves, 
explain the enmity between the groups or the eruption of violence in 1738. Cultural 
difference, after all, does not necessarily lead to cultural conflict any more than cultural 
homogeneity guarantees peaceful relations. The Hurons and Iroquois spoke mutually 
62 
"ils disent que leur Religion ne serajamais bien afferrnie qu'en se separant des Nations qui ne sont pas 
Chretiennes." "Resume de lettres de Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie," in 
CAOM, CllA, vol.75, fol. 133v. 
63 
"Mes freres, Vous Etes icy au milieu d'une Multitude de Nations qui ne Vous aiment point, Vous 
n'Entendez point leur Langue, vous ignorer leurs Coutiimes, Et par la, Vous Etes a meme Chaque jour, de 
vous faire de mauvaises affaires," "Paroles des Hurons de Detroit adressees a Noyelles pour le marquis de 
Beauharnois," CAOM, C11A, vol. 74, fol. 72; "Paroles de Beauharnois aux Hurons," 12 June 1741, 
MPHSCR, 34:192. 
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comprehensible languages and shared many cultural traits, but nevertheless spent much 
of the seventeenth century fighting. Necessary though it might have been to the Huron-
Ottawa conflict, cultural difference, in itself, was not sufficient to spark violence. These 
potent differences needed the right catalyst to transform their animosity into conflict. 
II: "Who are you, Huron, to make laws for me?": Status at Detroit 
Disputes over power and status in the region provided just such a catalyst and 
gave added meaning to cultural differences. The disruptions of the mid-seventeenth 
century, particularly the defeat of Huronia, upset the traditional power relationships in the 
Great Lakes region. In a significantly changed world, each nation sought to assert its will 
and shape affairs in the pays d'en haut. The Hurons tried to regain the power and the 
dominance they had enjoyed before the fall of Huronia, while the Ottawas sought to 
exploit their new ascendency in the region and their ties to the French. 64 As a result, the 
two nations found themselves entangled in a high-stakes zero-sum game. Unable to 
survive without one another and unwilling to submit to their neighbors, they each tried to 
gain the upper hand over and to shape events within the pays d'en haut. Such rivalry, of 
course, caused friction and gave added meaning to the cultural differences separating the 
nations. 
The fall of Huronia in the mid-seventeenth century upset the traditional 
relationship between the Hurons and Ottawas. Before 1649, the Huron nations and their 
neighbors, the Tionnontates, had been the undisputed senior partners in their relationship 
64 Newbigging likewise attributes the violent encounter between the two nations in 1706 to competition 
between the two nations ("The French-Ottawa Alliance," 262, 264). 
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with the Ottawas. Demographically powerful and strategically located, the Hurons 
dominated trade with the Ottawas, especially the Kiskakons who lived on the Bruce 
Peninsula in Lake Huron.65 They were, according to Cadillac, "lyons" prowling the 
Great Lakes. 66 
All that changed, however, when the Five Nations finally defeated and dispersed 
the Hurons in 1649, allowing the Ottawas to step into the power vacuum left by the 
Hurons. With the Hurons in disarray and diaspora, the Ottawas, who had extensive 
connections with their Anishinaabe kinspeople, positioned themselves as intermediaries 
between the French and the nations of the pays d'en haut.67 As a result, the Ottawas soon 
emerged as the most influential players in the region. Recognizing their standing among 
the nations of the region, the French regarded them as the "elder sons in my heart" and 
"eldest son," and focused on courting them as strategic and commercial partners. When 
the British assumed control of the region in 1760, they also hailed the Ottawas as the 
"Oldest nation" and referred to the people of the region as the "Ottawa Confederation." 
Contemporary scholars have likewise recognized the Ottawas as New France's "most 
65 Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic, 166-68. 
66 
"C'estoit autrefois la nation la plus puissante, la plus forte et mesme la plus nombreuse, mais !'Iroquois, 
I' a destruite et I' a chassee de ses terres, en sorte qu' elle est a present reduite a un fort petit nombre," 
Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe," [1690s], MDE, 5:80. Archaeologist Gary Warrick estimates that 
in 1615 some 21,600 Hurons lived in about twelve villages, while 6,500 Tionnontate-Petuns occupied at 
least seven more villages. Each of these villages probably housed 1000 denizens, considerably larger than 
the villages at Michiiimackinac and Detroit. By the time they reached Detroit they numbered less than a 
thousand. (A Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 218-20, 245, and Table 1, infra). 
67 Havard, Empire et metissages: Indiens et Franr;ais dans le pays d'e haut, 1660-1715 (Quebec: 
Septentrion and Presses de l'Universite Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 206; Donald Fixico, "The Alliance of the 
Three Fires in Trade and War, 1630-1812," Michigan Historical Review 20:2 (Fall1994), 1-25 at 9-10. 
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important ally," and "principal intermediary for the French," in the Great Lakes, and the 
"central nation of the alliance. "68 
For their part the Hurons now found themselves dependent upon the Ottawas for 
their very survival. After leaving their homeland, the Huron and Tionontate refugees 
sought refuge with the Ottawas, first at Manitoulin Island and Michilimackinac, before 
moving with the Ottawas to western Lake Superior. Here again, the Hurons depended on 
the Ottawas for protection. In the 1660s, they attacked the Dakotas, whom they 
considered their cultural inferiors because they lacked European tools, in order to 
establish a new horticultural homeland. When the numerically superior Dakotas easily 
routed them, the Hurons fled to the Ottawa settlement at Chequamegon Bay.69 Years 
later, the Detroit Ottawa leader, Outoutagan, boasted that he had saved the ungrateful 
Hurons from destruction more than once. 7° Cadillac confirmed that "the Hurons 
[Hurons] are only friends with the Ottawas by necessity, being the weakest, [because] the 
other nations have killed and mistreated them so much."71 
Such protection, however, came at a price for the Hurons. They had to 
acknowledge, and submit to, Ottawa dominance. For their part, the Ottawas, long the 
junior partners in the relationship, likely reveled in the Hurons' new-found weakness and 
dependence upon them. Nicolas Perrot reported that the Hurons at Michilimackinac lived 
68 Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 1, 249; Dennis Delage, "L'alliance frano-
amerindienne, 1660-1701," Recherches Amerindiennes au Quebec 19 (1989), 13; "la nations central de 
l'alliance," Havard, Empire et metissages, 223. 
69 Perrot, Memoire, 86-91. 
70 
"Words of the Outavois on the 18th ofJune with the Answers," 18-20 June 1707, MPHSCR, 33:323. 
Vaudreuil specifically enlisted the Ottawas to protect the Hurons in 1711 ("Words of the Marquis de 
Vaudreuil to the Savages who Came down from the Upper Country,"[1711], in ibid., 505). 
71 
"Les Hurons ne sont amis de Outavois [Ottawas] que par necessite, estant les plus foibles, tant les autres 
les ont tuez et maltraitez," Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe," [1690s], MDE, 5:120. 
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in fear of the Ottawas whom they worried "would molest and aggrieve them" if the 
Hurons failed to "obey them."72 The Marquis de Vaudreuil vaguely alluded to the 
Hurons' "just causes of complaint. .. against the [Ottawas]" in 1705."73 Fran~ois 
Clairambault d' Aigremont, a colonial official, reported in 1708 that the Ottawas had 
"held them [the Hurons] in a sort of slavery" at Michilimackinac and that this ill-
treatment had inspired "a natural dislike" for the Ottawas.74 Another French observer 
confirmed that the Hurons lived "almost under their [the Ottawas'] domination."75 
Perhaps the Ottawas, themselves indifferent farmers, demanded that the green-thumbed 
Hurons provide grain for them, while they invested more extensively in hunting and 
trading. Indeed, crop production declined after the Hurons moved to Detroit, forcing the 
Ottawas still at Michilimackinac to feed their children grass in the summer of 1707.76 
The Hurons' later claim to supply all Detroit with grain further suggests such a 
relationship. 
For the Hurons, this position of weakness and subordination represented an 
embarrassing inversion. Finding themselves weak and vulnerable, the once-powerful 
"lions" and "aristocrats" now ingloriously submitted to their cultural "inferiors." 
Numbering, by one 1711 estimate, only a meager 60 warriors to the Ottawas' 500, the 
72 Les Hurons "se trouvoient au milieu des Franc;;ois et des Outaoiias [Ottawas], qui les auroient molestez et 
chagrinez s'ils avoient refuse d'obeir." Perrot, in fact, argued that the Huron only pretended to fight with 
the Iroquois, with whom the French and their allies were at war, out of fear of the Ottawas and French. 
Perrot, Memoire, 145. 
73 Vaudreuil to the Minister, 4 Nov. 1705, MPHSCR, 33:306. 
74 Les Hurons "n'ont quite ce poste que par I' aversion naturelle qu'ils ont pour les [Ottawas], et que ceux 
cy Ies tenoient dans une espece d'esclauvage," Aigremont au ministre, 14 Nov. 1708, in CAOM, CllA, 
vol. 29, fol. 69. 
75 Raudot and Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle, 131. 
76 Aigremont au ministre, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 33:447; "Council Held at Detroit on the 6th of 
August," 6 Aug. 1707, in ibid., 334. 
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Hurons had no choice but to endure this indignity and accept Ottawa protection.77 
Moreover, the relationship had inescapable gender implications. Like most eastern 
woodland cultures, the Ottawas and Hurons observed a gendered division of labor, in 
which women grew the crops, while men hunted and fought enemies. The Hurons' 
responsibility for growing crops coupled with the Huron men's inability to protect 
themselves, therefore, created a symbolic marriage in which the Ottawa "men" fought 
while the Huron "women" farmed.78 
To be sure, these gender divisions did not carry the same implications of 
domination and subordination for the Hurons and Ottawas as they did for contemporary 
Europeans. French observers like Cadillac disapprovingly noted that Huron and Ottawa 
women held considerable authority and that Huron and Ottawa "men do almost nothing 
without their consent."79 Although such observations probably exaggerated the power 
that native women exercised, they nonetheless demonstrate that native men and women 
shared power.80 But even if these gender divisions did not necessarily imply the 
77 Raudot and Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle, 131, 176. 
78 The Iroquois explicitly entered a similar relationship with the Delawares, in which the Delawares were 
designated "women" who grew grain for the other nations in return for their protection. The Iroquois 
actually forbad the Delawares to wear breechcloths-a symbol of masculinity-and forced them to wear a 
machicotte or skirt. "Memoir ofBougainville," 1757, WHC, 18:193-194; Nancy Shoemaker, "An Alliance 
between Men: Gender Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East of the 
Mississippi" Ethnohistory, 46:2 (Spring 1999), 241-45. 
79 
"Les Outavois [Ottawas] ne sont pas jaloux de leurs femmes, les Hurons [Hurons] le sont encore moins, 
et elles sont absolument les maistresses, en sort que les hommes ne font quasi rien sans leur consentment." 
Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe," [ca. 1696], MDE, 5:119-20. Father Charlevoix confirmed that 
Huron women had "principle authority" ("Les Femmes ont la principale authorite chez to us les Peuples de 
la Langue Huronne"). Charlevoix, Journal, 1:557; Chev. de Beauharnois to the marquis de Beauharnois, 2 
Aug. 1741, WHC 17:354. 
80 Women's status and gender divisions within native cultures varied considerably. Among some groups, 
like the Illinois nations, men severely repressed women and graphically punished unfaithful wives. In 
others, like northern and southern Iroquoian nations, however, women enjoyed sexual freedom and even 
some authority over traditionally "male" spheres like warfare. Gender relations among the Ottawas and 
Hurons more closely followed the second pattern. See Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French 
Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
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hierarchical relationship found in Europe, Huron men doubtlessly resented being styled 
as "women." Huron and Ottawa warriors evidently used "women" as an epithet to mean 
"cowardly."81 The Ottawa man, Mekoua or Le Pesant, complained in 1706 that if 
Onontio did not allow him to revenge himself, the Ottawas' neighbors would no longer 
"Esteem us, and they would regard us as women."82 Cadillac noted that only "two 
articles distinguish true men": war and hunting. 83 Unable to protect themselves from 
their enemies and forced to grow food while the Ottawas hunted, the Hurons failed on 
both accounts. They therefore found their masculinity challenged and resented the 
Ottawas for forcing them into such a relationship. 
If the Hurons no longer enjoyed the ancient strength, they refused to submit to 
their Ottawa "inferiors." Haunted by memories of their ancient might and resentful of the 
Ottawas' haughty pretentious, the Hurons struggled to reassert themselves. In the 1670s 
both the Hurons and Kiskakon Ottawas moved to Jesuit missions at Michilimackinac. By 
1682, the two nations had begun to fight for ascendency. In that year, the Hurons 
reported that, when the Hurons warriors were away from Michilimackinac, the Ottawas 
frequently harassed and insulted Huron women, children, and old men "without any 
Press, 2001); Sylvia Van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade Society in Western Canada, 
1670-1870. (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Watson & Dwyer Publishing, 1980); Natalie Zemon Davis, "Iroquois 
Women, European Women," ed. Margo Hendricks and Patricia Parker, Women, "Race," and Writing in the 
Early Modem Period. (New York: Routledge, 1994); Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and 
Culture Change, 1700-1835. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). 
81 On at least two occasions, native warriors mocked their enemies as "women" when they sought refuge in 
their forts. The Hurons called the Ottawas "nothing but women" because they would not fight them in the 
open in 1706. "Speech ofMiscouaky ... " 26 Sept. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:292. In 1712, the Foxes likewise 
called the Ottawa, Huron, and other warriors fighting from the French fort "women." Gaspard Chaussegros 
de Lery, "Another Account of the siege of Detroit", [1706], WHC, 17:294. 
82 Le Pesant (Mekoua): "on ne nous Estimeroit, et on nous regarderoit comme des femmes," "Conseil tenu 
au fort Pontchartrain le 8 Mars 1706," in CAOM, F3, vol. 2, fol. 321. 
83 
"Deux articles font la distinction des veritables hommes : le premier c'est laguerre, le deuxieme c'est la 
chasse." Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe," MDE, 5:86-87. 
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reasons or cause." The Ottawas, well aware that the Hurons lacked the strength to resist 
them, treated their neighbors as they pleased and thus reminded them of their 
subordination. Resentful of the Ottawas' "rashness and violent conduct" but unable to 
attack the Ottawas by themselves, the Hurons reportedly tried to enlist the Senecas to 
betray the Ottawas. 84 Six years later, after the Ottawas killed a Huron headman of some 
importance, the Hurons again appealed to the Iroquois to help them "destroy" the 
Ottawas. Fearing retaliation, the Ottawas constructed a more formidable fort "1000 or 
1200 paces" from the Huron village. 85 Finally, a party of Sable Ottawas likewise 
assassinated a Huron leader in 1696.86 In the context of such competition for status, the 
cultural gulf separating the two groups-their language, customs, and religion-became 
important markers separating the nations. 
Figure 10: Detail of map of the Mackinac Straits by Louis Armand de Lorn d'Arce, Baron 
de Lahontan, printed in Lahontan, Nouveau voyages de Mr. le baron de Lahontan dans 
!'Amerique Septentrionale, (The Hague: les freres l'Honon~, 1703), vol.1, between pages 
116-117 
84 
"Les hurons ... ont beaucoup a souffrit to us Les jours & principalement quand ils sont absens de leurs 
Cabanes, ou ils [les Outaouais] vont faire des Insultes, et leurs Vieillards femmes et enfans qu'il 
maltraittent en toutes rencontres sans raison ny sans aucun fondement," "Paroles echangees entre Frontenac 
et les allies hurons [Hurons], outaouais [Ottawas] et miarnis," Aug. 1682, in CAOM, C11A, vol. 6, fols. 8-
8v; Lahontan, New Voyages, 149. 
85 Ibid., 145. 
86 
"Narrative of the most remarkable Occurences in Canada. 1695, 1696.," NYCD, 9:648. 
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When deputies from the two nations arrived at Montreal for a peace conference in 
August 1701, then, they were already primed for confrontation. After signing the Great 
Peace of Montreal, the Ottawa man, Outoutagan addressed Gov. Calliere. Claiming to 
speak for the Hurons and Ottawas-who, after all, formed "only one body," despite their 
occasional disagreements-the Ottawa man asked Calliere not to allow the traders to 
carry eau-de-vie, or brandy, to the pays d'en haut.87 Ostensibly, Outoutagan's speech 
testified to the Ottawas' and Hurons' enduring friendship-the two nations, after all, 
formed only one cozy family. Yet the Cheanonvouzon heard the address very differently. 
The Huron leader remonstrated that Outoutagan had not sought his input on the matter-
in fact he was planning on taking a load of eau-de-vie to the pays d'en haut himself-and 
therefore did not speak for the Hurons. In this light, Outoutagan's claim to speak in both 
the name of Ottawas and Hurons implied a power relationship: the Ottawas spoke for the 
Hurons. If they formed only a single body, then the Ottawas represented that body's 
head. Moreover, the influential Huron headman, Sioi.ia, or Le Rat, had died just days 
earlier. 88 Sioi.ia had been, by French reckoning, the "first mover of his Nation and all the 
[Ottawas]," and his death had created a power vacuum at Michilimakinac.89 Outoutagan 
and Cheanonvouzon thus sought to claim Sioi.ia' s mantle. 
The two nations carried this considerable resentment with them when they moved 
to Detroit in the early years of the eighteenth century. In the spring of 1702 
87 Outoutagan's speech bears the unmistakable impression of the Jesuits, who had long railed against the 
effects of eau-de-vie among the natives, and whom Outoutagan had reason to flatter. 
88 
"Le Rat," or Siotia, was also known as Kondiaronk and Adario. Lahontan, New Voyages, 149. 
89 Siotia "etoit le premier mobile de sa Nation & de tousles Outaouaks [Ottawas]," Claude-Charles 
Bacqueville de Potherie, Histoire de !'Amerique, 4 vols (Paris: Jean-Luc Nion ... et Franc;:ois Didot, 1722), 
4:222-23. See Chapter One, infra. 
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Cheanonvouzon grumbled that "the French were preventing him from revenging himself' 
on the Ottawas, and openly wondered if the English might be more obliging."90 Nor did 
the Ottawas do much to alleviate the Hurons' resentment. After sacking an Iroquois 
village, Michilimackinac Ottawa warriors planted a distinctively Huron hatchet on one of 
the slain Iroquois men to cast suspicion on the Hurons.91 The Hurons finally found an 
opportunity to avenge themselves in 1706, as chapter two narrates in depth. As much as 
the crisis of 1738, this breach threatened to destroy the alliance and to plunge New 
France into a war it could not win. 
The Ottawas felt particularly betrayed by Cheanonvouzon's treachery. The 
Ottawas and Hurons had been allies for a long time, after all, and had sent out a joint war 
party against the Flatheads earlier that spring. The Ottawas had even met frequently with 
the Hurons after the initial battle "without fear, always reckoning them among our allies." 
As the Hurons put it when they invited the Ottawas to a feast in hopes of ambushing 
them, the Hurons and Ottawas had "been brothers for a long time and fought together 
against the Iroquois."92 When they learned of Cheanonvouzon's role in the conflict, his 
torture of captive Ottawa warriors, and his attempts to betray them, therefore, the Ottawas 
were hurt and angry. 93 Their erstwhile allies and close neighbors had killed thirty of their 
men and threatened their destruction. The Ottawa headman, Miscouaky, seemed 
90 Lamothe au gouverneur, 17 Feb., 1702, MDE, 5:266; Jean Mermet to Cadillac, 19 April 1702, MPHSCR, 
33:118-119. 
91 Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 1704, in Ibid., 235. 
92 
"Speech of Miscouaky, Chief of the Outaouas to Marquis de Vaudreuil," 26 Sept. 1706, in ibid., 291. 
93 Ibid., 291-3, Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, in ibid., 435. 
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personally hurt by the Hurons' betrayal. "I am stricken to the heart" he reported to 
Governor V audreuil. 94 
In spite of Cadillac's fumbling statecraft, the Ottawas and Hurons apparently 
reached a reluctant detent on their own. Both nations participated in Cadillac's campaign 
against the Miamis, and some Ottawas returned to Detroit in the spring of 1708.95 Yet 
neither nation had forgotten the conflict. As late as 1711, Gov. Vaudreuil enjoined the 
two nations to "cast off ... the evil suspicions" that the two nations still harbored and to 
live in harmony.96 Ultimately, only hostility toward the Foxes, and not Onontio's pleas, 
bound the wounds opened in 1706, and then only temporarily.97 
The cultural differences separating the two nations, then, provided a basis for the 
Hurons' and Ottawas' conflict, and that conflict gave added meaning to those differences. 
Cultural difference proved essential to the two nations' struggle for power in that it 
created and reinforced a sense of differentness between the two nations. The Hurons and 
Ottawas had to perceive one another as separate, as distinct, in order to sustain such a 
determined and prolonged rivalry, and their cultural differences allowed them to see each 
other as alien. Indeed, had they not seen each other as separate, the nations might have 
integrated more fully-creating a composite group as the Huron refugees and 
Tionnontates had. Moreover these cultural differences provided a sense of cultural 
superiority which animated the rivalry between the nations. Because of the Ottawas' 
94 
"Words ofthe Outavois on the 18th of June with the Answers," 18-20 June 1707, in ibid., 323. 
95 Ibid.; "Parolles que les hurons ont prie Mr Dubuisson d'ecriver a Mr Le gouverneur," in CAOM, CllA 
22 :62v. 
96 
"[Words of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Savages]," [1711], MPHSCR 33:533. 
97 In the winter of 1711-1712, the two groups wintered together at Saginaw Bay, where they plotted to 
attack the Foxes during the following spring. Jacques-Charles Renaud Dubuisson to Vaudreil, 15 June 
1712, in ibid., 538. 
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cultural traditions, the Hurons deemed them cultural inferiors and so fought bitterly 
against the Ottawas' attempts to dominate them and to shape the pays d'en haut. The 
competition for resources and status, in tum, intensified both the sense of separateness 
between the two nations and the cultural assumptions premised upon them. Engaged in a 
pitched battle for authority, the Hurons and Ottawas ascribed greater importance to these 
cultural differences. 
The nations even drew the French into their rivalry. Each nation cultivated ties 
with the French in order to win access to French trading goods and military alliance, and 
to thereby gain an upper hand over its neighbors. For example, in 1703 the principal 
Detroit Huron leader, probably Cheanonvouzon, asked Gov. Calliere to build him a house 
"in French fashion," and Onontio consented. The Ottawas, not to be outdone, demanded 
the same favor. These houses, after all, symbolized alliance with the French and the 
Ottawas demanded that the French show them as much regard as they had the Hurons.98 
Native leaders also asked for other tokens of French esteem-an ornate military coat or 
medals-to prove their standing within the region.99 The "children of Onontio" thus 
vied for their "father's" affection, in order to outmaneuver their neighbors and ensure 
their own status within the region. 
III. "evil suspicions": The Immediate Context of 1738 
Thus the Huron elders huddled behind their palisade in 1738 could recall a long-
running hostility toward the Ottawas, reaching back several decades. Born of cultural 
98 Cadillac to the Minister, 31 Aug. 1703, in ibid., 166. 
99 
"Paroles des Outaouais de Michillimakinac a Vaudreuil," 18-20 June 1707, in ibid., 320; Beauharnois au 
rninistre, 6 Oct. 1739, in CAOM, CllE, vol. 16, fol. 225. 
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difference, this animosity had been aggravated by a competition for status and the 
difficulties inherent in cohabitation. Yet this tradition of conflict and strife cannot, by 
itself, explain the timing of the violence of 1738. After the troubling crisis of 1706 had 
settled down, the Ottawas and Hurons had reconciled, and resumed wintering together 
and launching raids against Onontio's enemies. For the next three decades, the two 
groups coexisted at Detroit without any major incident. By all appearances, the long-
running enmity between the groups had finally subsided; the two nations seemed to have 
transcended those old grievances. Yet if the Hurons and Ottawas had lived in harmony 
for thirty years, it was not because the old animosity had been forgotten but because it 
had been suppressed. The hostilities did not surface because the Pax Vulpinae served to 
draw the Ottawas' and Hurons' attention off one another and toward common enemies. 
As those conflicts drew to a close, the Hurons' reconciliation with the Flatheads, and 
their suggestion that their neighbors do the same, also rekindled fear of a Huron-Iroquois 
alliance and, in the context of the ancient Ottawa-Huron animosity, foreboded danger for 
the Ottawas. 
From the very beginning, conflict with the Foxes served to mend the Ottawas' and 
Hurons' relationship. In 1712 Huron and Ottawa warriors had fought side-by-side 
against the Foxes and Mascoutins from the cramped Fort Pontchartrain. Shortly after the 
siege, the Huron and Ottawa warriors combined to attack a group of Kickapoos, allies of 
the Foxes, the first of many such cooperative campaigns. 100 The two groups also 
launched raids against the southern nations allied to the British-the Chickasaws, 
100 Dubuisson to Vaudreil, 15 June 1712, MPHSCR, 33:550-551; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 Oct. 1716, 
in ibid., 578. 
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Cherokees, Choctaws, and the Flatheads. As a result, between 1712 and 1738 the Hurons 
and Ottawas seemed to be perpetually preparing for, carrying out, or returning from war 
with either the Foxes and their allies or the southern nations. Such cooperation served 
not only to heal wounded feelings but also, by creating a common enemy, to redirect the 
Hurons' and Ottawas' anger away from one another and toward an external target. 
Indeed, the Detroit natives, especially the Hurons, displayed an enthusiastic hostility 
toward the Outagamis and their allies. They declared themselves "unwilling that a single 
one of [the Outagamis] should be left," and wanted to attack a group of peaceful natives 
only because they "bear the name of Sakis."101 
When the Fox Wars ended in the years before 1738, conversely, the Hurons and 
Ottawas lost a common endeavor which had bound them together for decades. As they 
lost reasons to get along, the two nations found reasons to distrust one another once 
again. 102 Particularly, the Hurons' alliance with an old foe made the Ottawas uneasy. 
The Hurons, hoping to augment their position in the region, had apparently made peace 
with the Flatheads in 1729. 103 Given the Hurons' and Ottawas' long history, the Ottawas 
viewed the Hurons rapprochement as threatening. The Flatheads, after all, had been 
101 Beauharnois and Hocquart to the Minister, 1 Oct. 1732, in ibid., 34: 100; Hocquart to the contr6leur 
general des finances, 26 Oct. 1735, in ibid., 132. Asking the French to attack the Outagamis and 
Mascoutins in 1712, the Hurons had called for the French and allies to "absolutely destroy them and 
extinguish their fire" ("absolument les destuire et esteindre leur feu"). Dubuisson a Vaudreuil, 15 June 
1712, in CAOM, CllA, vol. 33, fol. 164v. 
102 Newbigging suggests that the Ottawas rekindled their rivalry with the Hurons because of the Ottawas' 
burgeoning alliance with the Potawatomis. Where the Ottawas had once depended on the Hurons to supply 
them with grain, they now began trading with the horticultual Potawatomis instead and they therefore no 
longer needed the Hurons. Yet the Potawatomis had been at Detroit more than two decades before the 
Ottawas and Hurons started fighting again. While this development might have contributed to the 
animosity between the two nations, the Ottawas' reactions owe more to their misgivings about the Hurons' 
dealings with the Flatheads ("The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 345). 
103 According to Beauharnois, the Miamis were "irritated" (lrritis) with the Hurons for making peace with 
the Flatheads without telling their allies. Beauharnois au ministre, 21 July 1729, in CAOM, CllA, vol. 51, 
fol. 127. 
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fierce enemies of b~th groups for some time, and the Ottawas and Hurons had long and 
frequently formed joint raiding parties against the southern foes. One such party, 
ironically, returned to Detroit just at the time that the two groups broke into violence in 
1706.104 As the Ottawa headman reminded the Hurons in council in 1738, Ottawa "bones 
are in their [the Flatheads'] Cabins and our scalps hung above them" and the stakes 
where the Flatheads had tortured and killed Ottawa captives still stood in their villages. 105 
Moreover the Flatheads were allied to the British colonies, Onontio' s treacherous foes 
and the "enemy of prayer."106 The Ottawas thus saw treachery in the Hurons' 
reconciliation with the Flatheads. 107 
A 1735 letter suggests another layer of apprehension for the Ottawas. In a 
dispatch to the Minister of the Marine, Monsieur de Beaucours, the governor of Montreal, 
described a conversation he had held with three Onondagas and a Seneca headman. 
These Iroquois leaders told Beaucours that the Six Nations had held a council with the 
Flatheads, at the request of the British, in which the Flatheads asked for an alliance very 
similar to that they had offered to Hurons. 108 These negotiations belonged to an intensive 
Anglo-American effort to proctor a peace between the British-allied Catawbas and 
Cherokees (the Flatheads), and the British-allied Six Nations-what Jon Parmenter 
deems the "holy grail" of British-native diplomacy. 109 By 1738, such a truce seemed 
104 
"Speech ofMiscouaky ... ," 26 Sept. 1706, MPHSCR, 33:289. 
105 
"nos os sont dans leurs cabanes Et nos Chevelures pendues dessus," Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 
1738, in CAOM, C11A, vol. 69, fol. 126. 
106 
"il [I'anglais] est ennemy de la priere." Dubuisson a Vaudreuil, 15 June 1712, in ibid., vol. 33, fol. 167v. 
107 Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1738, in ibid., vol. 69, fol. 126. 
108 Josue Dubois Berthelot de Beaucours au rninistre, 2 Oct. 1735, in Ibid., vol. 64 fols. 253-253v; Reponse 
ala memoire du roi par Beauharnois et Hocquart, 13 Oct. 1735, vol. 63, fols. 91-91 v. 
109 Concluding that a peace between the Iroquois and the Catawbas and Cherokees would "be very 
beneficial to all his Majeys Colonies inN. America," the British urged the Six Nations to finally reconcile 
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more likely than ever. The Catawbas, bloodied by the frequent Iroquois raids, seemed to 
be in a "more pacific dispesition" toward the Six Nations, and at least some Iroquois 
advocated peace with the Flatheads. 110 In 1737, the Six Nations agreed to meet with the 
Catawbas and Cherokees, although they insisted that the conference take place at Albany, 
not in Williamsburg, Virginia, as the Flatheads had suggested. The Iroquois and 
Flatheads also agreed to observe a twelve month cease fire. 111 
In the light of the Catawba-Iroquois negotiations and truce, the Hurons' invitation 
to make peace with the Flatheads in the spring of 1738 appeared suspect to the Ottawas 
and their Anishinaabe allies. The Hurons were not simply suggesting an alliance with the 
Flatheads, but a larger coalition which included the Six Nations as well. Just as had 
Cheanonvouzon's collaboration with the Miamis and Iroquois earlier in the century, the 
Hurons' recent cooperation with the Flatheads and the Iroquois troubled the Ottawas. 
They discerned in this rapprochement another Huron attempt to challenge Anishinaabe 
dominance of the region and expand Huron influence in the region. The Ottawas had no 
interest in seeing a rival military and commercial coalition emerge in the region, much 
less in becoming a junior partner in an alliance dominated by the Iroquois and Hurons. 
Nor could they broach such a brazen Huron grab for power and declaration of 
with them. Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs Contained in four Folio Volumes, 
Transacted in the Colony of New York,from the Year 1678 to the Year 1751 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1915), 194-199, 210,211,217-20 at 211; Jon Parmenter, "At the Wood's Edge: Iroquois 
Foreign Relations, 1727 -1768" (Ph.D. diss. Dept. of History, University of Michigan, 1999), 260. 
110 James Logan to William Gooch, 2 Feb. 1738, Logan Papers, Pennsylvania State Archives, quoted in 
James Merrell, "Their Very Bones Shall Fight: The Catawba-Iroquois Wars," in Daniel Richter and Merrill, 
eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1987): 125. 
111 Conrad Weiser, "Narrative of a Journey, made in the year 1737, by Conrad Weiser, Indian Agent and 
Provincial Interpreter," trans. Heiser H. Muhlenberg, in Pennsylvania Historical Society, Collections of the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, J. Pennington, 1853), 1:6, 16, 20; Parmenter, "The Woods' 
Edge," 124-25, 134-35, 141-45. 
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independence from Ottawa suzerainty. Within the context of a long and troubled Ottawa-
Huron relationship and an equally long tradition of Iroquois-Huron intimacy, the Ottawas 
found the Huron invitation to make peace with the Flatheads and threat to defend the 
Flatheads troubling. 
Thus, when the Ottawa leader fretted that the Hurons wanted to "do bad things ... 
[and] take refuge with the [Flatheads]," he might well have had an intensified Huron-
Iroquois alliance in mind. 112 In the early 1730s, in fact, the Ottawas reportedly invited 
the Iroquois to join them and "entirely destroy" the Hurons. 113 They hoped thereby to 
drive a wedge between the Hurons and their would-be allies. 114 The Ottawas' attack on 
the Flatheads in the summer of 1738 might have in fact been an attempt to keep the 
scheduled Iroquois-Flathead in Albany from convening. Betraying their fears of a 
Huron-Iroquois alliance, the Ottawas also pleaded that the Iroquois "take no part" in the 
quarrel shortly after the conflict in 1738. Ominously for the Ottawas, the Iroquois 
deferred their response. 115 
As they had in 1706, questions about status and authority played a role in the 
violent encounter of 1738. At Michilimackinac, the Ottawas had exploited the Hurons' 
weakened position and subjected them to a sort of "slavery." After 1706, however, the 
tables seemed to have turned again, this time against the Ottawas. In the peace talks of 
112 
"je pense que tu as Envie de faire mauvais affaires pour te refugier chez les Tetes-plattes [Flatheads]," 
Beauharnois au ministre, 6 Oct. 1738, in CAOM, C11A, vol. 69, fol. 126. 
113 The Ottawas and Iroquois both pleaded their innocence and denied any knowledge about the plot 
("frapper sur les hurons du detroit et les detruire entierement," Beauharnois au ministre, 1 Oct., 1731, in 
ibid., vol. 54 , fol. 406-407v). 
114 The Ottawas' proposal to renew the "Peace & good Correspondence [which] had been formerly 
established" with the Iroquois in 1735 also indicates an attempt to prevent the Hurons and Iroquois from 
forming an alliance which excluded them. Wraxall, Indian Abridgements, [1 0 June 1735], 191-92. 
115 
"Les Outa8ais [Ottawas] ont donne trois branches de Porcelaine aux cinq Nations Iroquoises pour les 
Inviter de ne prendre aucun party," Beauharnois au ministre, 6 Oct. 1738, CAOM, vol, 69, fol. 128v. 
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1707, Cadillac praised the Hurons for their support and defense of the French during the 
previous year. Although the commandant had heretofore counted the Ottawas as his 
"elder son," that group's rebellion had cost them his esteem. Henceforth, the 
commandant promised, the Hurons would take their "elder brother's"-the Ottawas'-
place "in my heart."116 Charlevoix found that the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas 
accorded the Hurons "the honor of speaking for all" the natives at Detroit. 117 In 1730, 
Capt. Pierre-Jacques de Payan de N oyan noted that "All the Savages" of Detroit "are 
guided exclusively by the feelings of the Hurons. [Hurons]"118 French officials explicitly 
attributed the 1738 conflict to the Hurons' "haughtiness," which the Ottawas heretofore 
"endured impatiently."119 This continuing contest for status and authority sheds light on 
the Ottawas' angry dismissal of the Hurons' proposal in 1738. "Who are you, Huron," 
the Ottawa headman charged, "to make laws for me?"120 
Conclusion 
The conflagration of 1738, then, had a complicated lineage. General cultural 
differences-linguistic, economic, and religious-combined with conflicts over status 
and power to produce an abiding animosity between the Hurons and Ottawas. This 
116 
"il est vrai qu'autrefois L'outauois etoit mon fils aisne; mais puis qu'il a leve son feu d'ici, et qu'il a 
Comis un ... desobeissance, ... , il sera avenir mon enfans cadets, et vous hurons rentez vous aujourd'huy 
que par6tre obeissance, nous avez pris dans mon Creur et dans mes bien fait Le place de v6tre aisne, 
... vous d'avoir profitier d'un grand heritage," "Proces-verbaux des conseils tenus a Detroit." Aug. 1707, 
CAOM, C11A, vol. 26, fol. 123v. 
117 
"l'honneur de parler pour tous est ordinairement defere aux Hurons [Hurons], quand il s'en trouve dans 
un Conseil," Charlevoix, Journal, 1:539. 
118 Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et de Chavoy, "Memoire," [1730], MPHSCR, 34:76. 
119 
"sa [les Hurons'] hauteur la fait hai'r des autres, Et I' on ne doit passe flatter de la reconcilier bien 
sincerement avec les Outaoiiais qui soufrront toujours impatiemment sa fierte," Resume de lettres du 
Canada avec commentaires des autorites metropolitaines, 1740, CAOM, C11A, 74 :235-235v. 
120 
"qu'est-tfi huron [Huron] pour me faire la loy ... ?" Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1738, in ibid., vol. 
69, fols. 125-126v. 
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animosity could be muted, overcome by the very real ties of affection and alliance that 
bound the groups together, but not completely forgotten, even after thirty years of peace. 
Two dynamics, then, were at play among the Detroit Hurons and Ottawas; one 
emphasized their shared interests and history of cooperation while the other accentuated 
their differences and reminded them of previous slights. In 1738 animosity won out. 
At bottom, the violence of 1738 demonstrates a simple but overlooked truth about 
the Hurons and the Ottawas. No matter how much they may have cooperated with-
indeed depended on-one another, no matter how much they hunted together, fought 
alongside each other, traded, laughed, or played lacrosse, they remained separate. Their 
cultural identities-buffeted by colonial pressures such as depopulation and dislocation-
proved durable, resilient, and consequential. So consequential, in fact, that these long-
allied neighbors seemed poised to destroy each other. 
That these two groups, perhaps the most important French allies in the region, not 
only retained their cultural identities but also harbored a genuine resentment for one 
another forces us to reconsider cultural exchange in the pays d'en haut. Specifically that 
relationship poses problems for Richard White's description of the region. The Hurons 
and Ottawas would be especially susceptible to the sort of disintegration that White 
describes. Both groups, but especially the Hurons, faced depopulation on a massive 
scale. As Cadillac observed, the Hurons' "sword" had been cut "too short" for the nation 
to act with complete autonomy; the once numerous Ottawas could barely fill three 
villages in 1721. 121 The two nations had also been forced to flee their ancient territories 
in the face of the determined and relentless Iroquois juggernaut. That exodus precipitated 
121 Cadillac, "Relation du Sr. de Lamothe," [1690s], MDE, 5:80; Charlevoix, Journal, 1:429. 
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a painful sojourn through the region. In only a few years' time, the Hurons had moved 
from Huronia to Green Bay, western Lake Superior, and Michilimackinac before finally 
settling at Detroit. The Hurons and Ottawas also dealt more closely with the French than 
the other nations of the area, living with the French and welcoming the Jesuits among 
them. By White's account, these pressures should have obliterated the Hurons' and 
Ottawas' distinct identities. But they did not. Their complicated relationship 
demonstrates that the Ottawas and the Hurons refused to leave their cultural identities 
behind. Colonial pressures had battered these nations, but they had not destroyed 
them. 122 As the Hurons noted when rejecting an Iroquois invitation to settle among the 
Five Nations 1707, they could not allow "the Huron name [to] become extinct."123 
The Hurons and Ottawas eventually reconciled. In the aftermath of a joint 
campaign against the Chickasaws in 1741 the Hurons and Ottawas met and finally 
reached an accommodation. 124 As in the seventeenth century and the 171 Os, war against 
a common enemy served to ameliorate the conflicts between the two allies. The Hurons 
and Ottawas demonstrated their newly reestablished harmony in 1744, when the 
commandant of Detroit, Paul-Joseph LeMoyne de Longueuil, offered a war belt to the 
nations of Detroit to attack the British. The Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, noting that the belt 
could not be cut up and distributed to each nation, pointedly offered the entire belt to his 
"brothers the Hurons."125 The Ottawas thereby publically testified to the Hurons' 
122 Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 27, 410; Heidi Bohaker, Nindoodemag: The 
Significance of the Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern Great Lakes Region 1600-1701," WMQ, 
36:1 (Jan. 2006), 29, 46. 
123 Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 33:447. 
124 Hocquart au ministre, 11 June 1742, CAOM, C11A, fol. 77, fols. 281-82; Beauharnois au ministre, 17 
Sept. 1743, ibid., vol. 79, fols. 108-14v. 
125 
"Conseil tenu par M. de Longueuil," [1744], in ibid., vol. 18, fols. 336-36v. 
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Figure 11: Detail from 
Jacques-Nicolas Bellin 
after Joseph-Gaspard 
Chaussegros de Lery, 
"La Riviere du Detroit 
Depuis le Sainte Claire 
jusqu'au Lac Erie," 
1764. From Archives of 
Ontario, Toronto, C 78, 
AO 6699. Accessed 
online. 
This detail shows the 
proximity of the Huron 
(lower left) and Ottawa 
("Outaoums," lower nght) 
villages m 1749 
Importance and 1mphcitly offered to reconcile with the Hurons. The Huron headman, 
Sastaretsy, accepted the belt, thus renewing the ancient alliance. Soon thereafter, the 
Hurons established a village on the south side of the DetrOit River, directly adjacent to 
their erstwhile persecutors. 126 Once agam the two groups renewed a centunes-old 
acquaintance. Yet their proximity and cooperation Imphed no cultural or political fusion. 
They remamed distinct. 
I26 Joseph-Gaspard de Chaussegros de Lery, "Carte de la Riviere du DetrOit fmt a Quebec le 22 Oct. 1749," 
Newberry Library, Chicago, MapPhoto France MC No. 547 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"One heart and one body": The Huron Community 
To illustrate what he saw as a crisis in the Huron community in September 1750, 
the Jesuit missionary in charge of the Huron mission at Detroit, related a story to the 
commandant of the fort, Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville. He told the officer that the 
Detroit Huron man Otiok8andoron, known to the French as Babi, had come to him and 
asked for a knife with which he could cut a roll of tobacco. When the priest gave him the 
tool, the Huron man confided that he and his fellow Detroit Hurons kept their knives 
handy, "even when we sleep ... to defend ourselves in Case of attack." The missionary 
inferred that Otiok8andoron and the other French-aligned Hurons living at Detroit feared 
"some Coup of treason on the part of the rebels," referring to those Hurons led by Nicolas 
Orontony who, after trying unsuccessfully to surprise and massacre the French at Detroit, 
had abandoned Detroit. Otiok8andoron' s fear of his "false brothers," in Potier's telling, 
indicated a significant rift between two separate Huron communities: one which had 
remained loyal to the French and to the Faith and which had stayed at the Huron mission 
at Detrot, and another which had apostatized, embraced the Protestant British, and had 
established a separate village on the Muskingum River. Father Potier found it "hard to 
Believe" that the fracture in the Huron body politic could ever be mended, and predicted 
that the fabric of Huron identity and unity had been rent forever. 1 By all appearances, the 
1 
"meme quand nous dormons, nous avons toujours un Couteau a notre cote pour nous deffendre en Cas 
d'attaque," "il Croignoit quelque Coup de traitre de La part des rebelles," "faux freres," "si ces scelerats 
sont dans Le dessein de se repatrier avec Le fran~ois (ce que j'ai peine a Croire)," Potier a Pierre-Joseph 
Celoron de Blainville, 11 Sept. 1750, in Robert Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, (Ottawa: Les Presses 
de l'Universite d'Ottawa, 1996), 642-43. 
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Huron community had been divided into two separate groups-one British-aligned and 
the other French-aligned-living in two different places-Sandusky and Detroit.2 
Yet within six years of this supposedly decisive break, most of the Hurons 
returned from the Ohio Valley to Detroit. On the third of May 1753, the Hurons held a 
council with their neighbors, the Ottawas, Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and French of Detroit 
and announced that their "brothers the Hurons" had "returned forever."3 As the Hurons 
attested in May 1753, the Hurons had not divided into two separate peoples after 1747. 
Ultimately what Potier and subsequent observers saw as a decisive break in the Huron 
community was merely an animated debate over how to position itself in a changing geo-
political climate. While some Hurons favored remaining aligned with French and staying 
at Detroit, others favored a more neutral or explicitly British-aligned stance and 
suggested moving to Sandusky (or Conchake on the Muskingum River) to facilitate that 
position. These two groups waged a determined contest to win supporters and build 
consensus for their position, but they always did so within the context of loyalty to the 
2 Following Potier's reading of this crisis in Huron politics after 1747, many scholars have likewise pointed 
to Orontony's failed coup as the decisive moment of division in the Huron community in which some 
Hurons moved from Detroit and constituted a separate community. James Clifton saw the event as the 
beginning of a "re-ethnogenesis" in which Orontony and his followers moved from Detroit to Sandusky, 
embraced a long-dormant Huron ethnicity, and became a separate people, the "Wyandots." "TheRe-
emergent Wyandot: A Study in Ethnogenesis on the Detroit River Borderland, 1747." In Papers from the 
Western District Conference, ed. K.G. Pryke and L.L. Kulisek (Windsor, Ont.: Essex County Historical 
Society and Western District Council, Windsor, 1983):1-15. Richard White likewise casts Orontony's 
rebellion as an emphatic denunciation of the traditional, French-allied Huron leadership and "a fundamental 
fracture in Huron-Petun society." The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 147,195, 201. Peter MacLeod 
likewise claims that the Huron controversy was "resolved by fission rather than negotiation" and that they 
thus formed "separate villages located at Detroit and on Sandusky Bay on Lake Erie." "Une conspiration 
generate": The Exercise of Power by the Amerindians during the War of Austrian Secession." (Ph.D. Diss. 
Department of History. University of Ottawa, 1992), 11, 134. Gregory Dowd attributes the rift to religious 
differences between the "non-Christian Wyandots from Sandusky" and the "Catholic Wyandots" of Detroit. 
War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002), 110. 
3 
"Conseil des hurons en presence des outaoiiais, et pouteouatarnis [et Sauteux] et reponse," CAOM, C11A, 
vol. 99 fol. 7 5-77. 
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Huron community.4 Rather than "evidence of dysfunctional factionalism," this debate 
reflects an innovative and experimental approach in which Huron people sought to 
advance the interests of their people. 5 
This chapter contemplates the decade-long debate between shifting Huron groups 
from 1738 until its ultimate denouement in 1753. The controversy unfolded in three 
identifiable stages. After a brief introduction about Huron political culture, I will 
describe each of these phases in a separate section. In the first stage, lasting from 1738 
until1744, the recent conflict with the Ottawas created a controversy within the Huron 
community. While most of the Hurons favored moving from Detroit to the St. Lawrence 
Valley and aligning themselves more closely with the French and the Canadian Iroquois, 
a small but important group favored moving to Sandusky and intensifying their contacts 
with the British, Shawnees, and Iroquois. Although the Hurons eventually elected to 
remain at Detroit, the episode had illuminated important divisions within the Huron 
community and had created two separate groups. The resumption of war between Great 
Britain and France in 17 44 significant! y changed the terms of the controversy and 
initiated a new, more contentious, phase in the crisis. After the British-aligned Hurons 
tried to attack Detroit in 1747, the two sides became more defined and more antagonistic. 
One side, residing at Detroit, remained loyal to the French, while the other, living on the 
Muskingum River, allied themselves with the British. At the same time the attack 
4 Terms like "pro-British" and "pro-French" imply a fixity to these two groups that rarely existed. I use 
French- or British-aligned instead to indicate that the faction favored one side or the other. I also 
sometimes refer to these groups by the names of their leaders. 
5 Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, I 534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2010), 81; Parmenter "At the Wood's Edge: Iroquois Foreign Relations, 1727-1768," (PhD. diss., 
Dept. of History, Univ. of Michigan, 1999); MacLeod, "Une conspiration generate," 35-36. 
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deepened divisions between the groups, it also prompted the two parties to seek 
reconciliation. In the final phase, therefore, both sides sought to win the other to its 
position. The Detroit Hurons, aided by geopolitics and the smallpox virus, ultimately 
won the contest when the Conchake Hurons returned in 1753. 
This story of Huron survival and continuity, rather than fracture and 
disintegration, during the 1740s and 1750s testifies to the durability and adaptability of 
native peoples in the face of serious challenges. Many scholars have read this incident as 
further evidence of the destructive power of colonial forces. Forced to choose sides in an 
imperial conflict, the Hurons renounced the bonds which tied them together and divided 
into feeble fragments. When the crisis is seen as a fairly ordinary groupal dispute within 
an integrated political and social Huron community, however, that community appears to 
be a flexible and integrated entity which could absorb the "hammer blows" of 
colonialism.6 The Hurons could do so largely because of the social and cultural bonds 
which held them together and created a Huron identity. That identity was not a flat 
formulation or self-conscious articulation of what it meant to be Huron, but a living and 
breathing set of practices which bound the Hurons together. The fact of Huron 
persistence, of the durable bonds tying that nation together, in turn tells us much about 
the integrity of native communities in spite of the forces agitating against it. The Great 
Lakes region, in fact, was populated by these persistent, durable, and discrete peoples, not 
by shattered refugees. 
I. ''families" and "bandes": Huron Political and Social Economy 
6 White, The Middle Ground, 1. 
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In order to understand the context in which this crisis took place, we must 
understand how political leadership worked in the Huron community. As monarchist 
French officials repeatedly observed, Huron leaders lacked the authority to command 
their people to act. Instead they had to navigate a baroque and multivalent set of political 
and social institutions and convince several different constituencies in order to create 
consensus on issues. Given this complexity and decentralization, these coalitions often 
proved unstable and consensuses on issues frequently shifted. To clarify the context in 
which the Huron debate took place, this section explores the principal institutions and 
interest groups which shaped Huron foreign policy. 
Membership in the Huron community operated simultaneously on several 
different levels. The most basic of these was that of the "longhouse," which the French 
referred to either as a "famille," "cabanne," or "cabannee." These longhouses consisted 
of the members of an extended family, who lived in the long segmented structures 
common to all northern Iroquois peoples.7 The population of these longhouses varied 
considerably from four individuals to as many as seventy-five, with an average of about 
twenty per dwelling. 8 Henri-Louis Deschamps de Boishebert, onetime commandant of 
Detroit, counted twenty-eight such longhouses at the Huron village in 1732 (see figure 
12), and Pierre Potier recorded the same number of inhabited longhouses at the two 
7 These units were also called "matrilineages." Conrad Heidenreich, Huronia: A History and Geography of 
the Huron Indians, 1600-1650 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971), 76-77; Jules M. Boucher, 
"The Legacy of Iouskeha and Tawiscaron: The Western Wendat People to 1701" (M.A. thesis, Dept. of 
History, University of Kansas, 2001 ), 26-28. 
8 Robert Toupin has recreated these longhouses from Potier's 1746-1747 census of the Hurons (Les icrits 
de Potier, 181-99). Garry Warrick estimates the average size of Huron longhouses in southern Ontario 
hovered around sixteen at the time of the Iroquois invasion. Gary Warrick, A Population History of the 
Huron-Petun, (New York: Cambridge U.P., 2008), 125-33. 
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Figure 12: [Henri-Louis 
Boishebert], "Plan do Village des 
hurons au Detroit, Erie," 1732. 
Bibliotheque nationale de France, 
Paris. 
Boishebert, the commandant at Detrmt 
sketched this plan of Detrmt, mcluding 
an elevation of a Huron longhouse and 
an intenor plan of a longhouse. 
villages on the Bois Blanc Mission in 1746.9 These longhouses functioned as social units 
as well, and each apparently had its own "head."10 
Besides the longhouses, the Hurons also organized themselves into exogamous 
matrilineal clans, which the French referred to as "bandes." 11 As they did in societies 
throughout North America, the bonds of fictive kinship and descent from a totemic figure 
tied these clans together. 12 The Detroit Hurons counted ten such separate clans. These 
clans were both exogamous, meaning that the Hurons considered marriage within one's 
9 Boishebert, "Plan du village des hurons du Detroit erie, 1732," reprinted in Brian Dunnigan, Frontier 
Metropolis: Picturing Early Detroit, 1701-1838 (Detrmt: Wayne State University Press, 2001), Fig. 2.10; 
Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 200-26. In 1757, a captive from 
Pennsylvania counted sixty or seventy of these houses at the Point au Montreal Huron VIllage. "The 
Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-57 ," m Beverley Bond, ed., Mzsszssippi Valley Hzstorical Revzew vol. 13 
(1926-1927): 73. 
10 In Potier's census, he Identifies each longhouse or "cabane" by the name of a head, which could be a man 
or a woman (Ibid). Richard1e also identified them by reference to one "head." R1chardie to Potier, 10 Dec. 
1750, in Toupm, Les ecrits de Potier, 654-55. 
11 Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, m Toupin Les ecnts de Piere Potier, 259-60. 
Unfortunately, the French used the term "bande" rather carelessly to refer not only to speCific clans, but 
also to larger phratries and also to non-related groups, makmg it difficult to discern how the term is being 
used at any given time. For example, Gov. Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissoniere and Intendant Giles 
Hocquart referred to the "ban de" of Sastaretsy and Tayachitin, the leaders of two separate hontaxen . 
Journal, 1746-1747, CAOM, C11A, 87:74v. 
12 Charlevoix, Pierre-Franc;:ms-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un Voyage. 2 Vols, ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 
(Montreal : Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744] 1994), 1:552. 
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own clan to be incest and instead insisted that young people find spouses from different 
clans, and matrilineal, meaning that children inherited their clan designation from their 
mothers, not their fathers. 13 
The Hurons further divided these clans into three larger social units of related 
clans, known by titular animal totems, the Deer, Turtle, and Wolf and denoted as 
"bandes," or "tribus" by French writers. 14 Pierre Potier, the longtime superior of the 
Huron mission at Detroit, noted that these interrelated clans claimed a sort of fictive 
kinship with one another, that they were "hontaxen," meaning that their members were 
"brothers and sisters in a moral sense."15 The members of these "Families, or, Tribes," 
according to Charlevoix, were "intermixed" within the Huron community "without being 
confused."16 The origins of these social units-which I refer to as "hontaxen"-remain 
disputed. 17 While the Tionontates, or Petuns, had apparent! y included both "Deer" and 
"Wolf' hontaxen before the fall of Huronia, they had no division associated with the 
Turtle. This hontaxen, then, might have consisted of non-Tionontates, perhaps remnants 
of the constituent nations of the Huron Confederacy or the Ontario lroquoian Neutrals. 18 
Regardless of their origins, these hontaxen operated as a powerful motif and organizing 
principle in Huron social life. While they remained at Michilimackinac in the 1670s, for 
13 Elisabeth Tooker, "Northern Iroquoian Sociopolitical Organization," American Anthropologist, 72 
(1970): 90-97; Heindereich, Huronia, 77-79. 
14 Potier, "Rescensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 359-60; Charlevoix, 
Journal, 1:552. 
15 Robert Toupin, "Families occupant les 45 cabanes," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 178, 181; John 
Steckley, "The Clans and Phratries ofthe Huron," Ontario Archaeology 37 (1982): 29-34. 
16 Charlevoix, Journal, 1:552. 
17 I prefer the Huron term "hontaxen" to the Greek "phratry," the name used by anthropologists to denote 
these supra-clan units. Although hontaxen probably did not serve in Huron as a noun, I find it more 
appropriate than associating it generically with a foreign Western concept. 
18 James A. Clifton, "TheRe-emergent Wyandot," 12-13; Lucien Campeau, "Appendice I : Les Hurons de 
Detroit," in La mission des jesuites chez les Hurons, 1634-1650 (Montreal: Institutum Historicum S.l., 
1987), 361-67; Boucher, "The Legacy oflouskeha and Tawiscaron," 154-59. 
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example, the Hurons participated in a Christmas celebration in which they organized 
themselves into three separate bodies, each of which was associated with one of the 
magi. 19 Nearly a century later, in 1761, Sir William Johnson noted that the Huron council 
room contained "three fires burning," suggesting the political and cultural importance of 
the Hurons' tripartite division.20 When the Hurons undertook important diplomatic 
missions, moreover, they often sent three representatives, apparently representing these 
different social units. 
Huron conventions of leadership and political authority derived from the Huron 
social structure and therefore likewise operated on several different levels at once. 21 The 
longhouse appears to have been the most basic unit of Huron decision-making. On 
several occasions individual ''families" or longhouses made their own decisions that 
deviated from those of the clans and of the Huron community generally. In 1738, for 
instance, three or four "cabanes" opposed the plan to move to Montreal; ten years later 
Potier noted that some clans had decided to return to Detroit on their own. 22 In addition 
to these households, each clan had both male and female elders, which constituted an 
important council and deliberated on issues common to the entire community. Potier 
19 Clifton, "TheRe-emergent Wyandot"; Vincent Bigot, "Relation de ce qui s'est passe ... en la Nouvelle 
France en l'annee 1679," in JR, 10:114. 
20 
"Extracts from the diary of Sir William Johnson of his journey to Detroit," July 4-0ct. 30, 1761, WHC, 
18:247. A cross-section of a Huron longhouse also shows that these dwellings had three separate fires. See 
Map 1. 
21 This discussion focuses on the "civil" political apparatus, as opposed to the "war" leaders and councils. 
For descriptions of pre-1649 Huron government, see Elisabeth Tooker, An Ethnography of the Huron 
Indians 1615-1649, Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 190 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1964), 43-51; Heindreich, Huronia, 79. 
22 
"Paroles des hurons du Detroit," [12 aofit 1738], CAOM, C11A, vol. 74, fol. 74 ; Father de la Richardie 
to Pere St. Pe [M. de Boucherville], [26 aofit 1740], ibid., fol. 268v; Potier to Gabriel Marcol, in Toupin, 
Les ecrits de Potier, 629. For further examples, see Richardie to Potier, 10 Dec. 1750, ibid., 654-55; 
"Conseil des hurons en presence des outaotiais, et pouteouatamis [et Sauteux] et reponse," [3 Mai 1753], 
CAOM, CllA, vol. 99, fols 75-77; Boucher, "The Legacy oflouskeha and Tawiscaron," 91-92. For a 
discussion on the role of such families among the Iroquois, see Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, 141. 
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listed thirty-three men-"anciens"-and twenty-nine women-"anciennes" in the Huron 
community. 23 In 1746, the commandant of Detroit invited the Hurons to meet with the 
governor but stipulated that they should be represented only by "the captains, the elders, 
and only the elders, because the young people are not powerful."24 In decentralized 
Huron politics, these elders had to reach consensus in order to make a decision. 
Finally, the Hurons also recognized three principal chiefs, representing each of 
the three hontaxen. 25 Each of the three exercised considerable power in the community 
and important decisions required their unanimous consent. In all important diplomatic 
affairs, therefore, the Hurons sent representatives of the three hontaxen. In 1668, Father 
Philippe Pierson noted that the Hurons were divided into three bands and each their own 
separate "Chief."26 When the Hurons asked Gov. Beauhamois for permission to move to 
the St. Lawrence Valley in 1738, they did so in the name of the principal chiefs of each of 
the three hontaxen. When the governor's nephew, Claude de Beauhamois, the Chevalier 
de Beauharnois, visited Detroit in hopes of bringing them to the St. Lawrence in 17 41, 
moreover, he distributed three gorgets-a metal device worn around the neck by 
European officers-to three Huron chiefs, presumably the leaders of each hontaxen?7 
23 Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 178, 179. 
24 
"les Ouendats, les capitaines, les anciens, et seulement les anciens, car les jeunes gens ne sont pas 
puissants," Paul-Joseph leMoyne, Baron de Longueuil, et Richardie aux Hurons en hivernement, 20 mars 
1746, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 590 ; Toupin, "Introduction," ibid., 40. 
25 Charlevoix, Journal, 552. 
26 
"tousles hurons ... se diuiserent en trois bandes selon les diferentes nations qui forment leur village, et 
ayant Choisi leurs Chef chascun de sa nation." Bigot, "Relation ... de l'annee 1668," in JR, 10:114. 
27 Chevalier de Beauharnois, "Memoire des depenses que J' ay Este oblige de faire au Detroit Et Sandoske 
tant pour les Suavages de ce Poste que Ceux du Sault St. LoUis Et du Lac des deux Montagnes qui 
m'acompagnoient," 19 Oct. 1741, CAOM, C11A, vol. 77, fol. 292v. The Hurons also sent three men back 
with Beauharnois, each representing one hontaxen. "Memoire concernant diverses nations indiennes," 
1742, ibid., fols. 388-92. 
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The following year, three Huron "Sachems" arrived at Albany to represent the Hurons.28 
Three "principal men of the Weyondotts [Hurons]" met with the British Indian agent 
George Croghan in 1759 to discuss a peace between their nation and Great Britain.Z9 In 
1761, Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, spoke to "the Huron 
Chiefs."30 Some evidence suggests that the Hurons ranked these principal chiefs-indeed 
"Sastaretsy," the hereditary title of the leader of Deer hontaxen, ruled as "king" of the 
Hurons and his name even served as a metonym for the entire population.31 Yet the 
evidence suggests that each exercised considerable power and that the unanimous consent 
ofthese leaders remained vital to Huron decision-making. 
In addition to the household, clan elders, and principal leaders, a number of other 
powerful institutions operated constituted the Huron political structure. For example, 
Huron women, in addition to serving as clan elders, exercised their own autonomous 
influence in the community. As early as 1721, Charlevoix noted that Huron women 
exercised considerable power and that they had asked the Jesuits to send a missionary to 
their village. When some Hurons proposed abandoning the French and moving to Seneca 
territory in early 1739, the Jesuit missionary, Armand de la Richardie, had to use the "old 
28 30 July 1743, Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs, ed. Charles Howard Mcilwain, (New 
York: Benjamin Blom, [1915] 1968, 230-31. 
29 
"George Croghan's Journal April3, 1759 to April [30], 1763," in Nicolas B. Wainwright, ed., 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 71:4 (Oct. 1947): 358. 
30 Minutes of the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson Bar[one]t with the Indians on his Way to, and at the 
Detroit in 1761, [July-Sept. 1761], WJP, 3:494. 
31 Charlevoix, Journal, 1 :539; Relation du Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac, [1718], in MDE, 5: 122; "Conseil 
tenu dans le fort Pontchartrain par les Hurons." 3 June 1703, in ibid., 291). The French reported that 
Tayachitin, the leader of the Wolf hontaxen was the "second chief' or the nation and the Turtle leader was 
the "third chief." "Journal of Occurrences in Canada, 1746, 1747," in NYCD, 9:120; "Indian Mfairs at 
Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR, 34:201). Potier even lists the three leaders in this order in his 
1747 census of the Huron nation. Potier, "Rescensement des Hurons," Texte II, Toupin, Les ecrits de 
Pierre Potier, 260. 
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women's influence" to prevent them from doing so?2 In 1741, the Chevalier de 
Beauhamois, arriving to find most of the men gone to war, spoke to the Huron women 
whom he concluded possessed "absolute power over the Minds of the men."33 The 
Pennsylvanian Charles Stuart identified an "old Indian Squaw" as one of the "Chief 
Leaders of the Wondot [Huron] Council at Detroit."34 Likewise the "young people" or 
"young men"-the Huron warriors not yet old enough to serve as elders-also held 
political power and acted independently from their principal leaders. These young people 
successfully subverted their elders in 1742, leading Gov. Beauhamois to question if the 
principal chiefs were really the "masters of deciding" things for their village.35 Finally, a 
few French people, most notably the superiors of the Huron mission, Fathers Armand de 
la Richardie and Pierre Potier, enjoyed considerable influence in Huron policy-making. 
Serving as external advisors to influential Huron elders, these missionaries provided 
critical access to French power and mediation between the Hurons and French. Richardie 
proved able to influence the Hurons not to abscond to the British in 1739, to exclude his 
Huron enemies from council in 1740, to "place" the Hurons at a new mission site in 
32 Richardie wrote the letter on 15 June 1739 ("Ete oblige d'Employer la credit de Vieilles femmes pour en 
arreter le Course," "Resume de lettres de Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie," 1738-
1741, CAOM, CllA vol. 75, fol. 130v. 
33 The officer certainly exaggerated this, especially since he noted that the same was true of paternalistic 
French society (Chevalier de Beauharnois to Governor Beauharnois, 2 Aug. 1741, WHC, 17:354). 
34 
"The Captivity of Charles Stuart," 1755-57, in Bond, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 71-72. 
35 
"si vos Chefs n'etoient pas les maitres de decider du sort de leur Village, il ne devoient pas me parler en 
son nom," "Paroles de Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois Gouverneur General de la nouvelle France, a 
trois Chefs hurons du Detroit qui Sont descendfis de cet Entroit L'autornne dernier avec M. leCher de 
Beauharnois," 28 Juin 1742, COAM, C11A, vol. 77, fol. 164v. In another instance in 1741, the young men 
wanted to attack the Flatheads in order to ingratiate themselves with the Ottawas, but the elders 
successfully halted this plan. Richardie to St. Pe, 10 June 1741, WHC, 17:339. 
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1742, and to bring some of the Hurons back to Detroit in 1751.36 Father Pierre Potier, 
furthermore, "Assisted" in a Huron council in 1756 and in 1763, a French habitant at 
Detroit noted that the missionary likewise "led" ( conduire) all of the Hurons. 37 
Huron political culture, like Huron social organization, then, was a matrix of 
several cross-cutting institutions and interests which exercised influence and crafted 
policy. Decisions_could only be reached, accordingly, through careful and tedious 
consensus-building and could easily be destabilized by any one of these groups. Huron 
politics, therefore, was a complicated machine with many moving parts. When a series 
of crises struck the Hurons beginning in 1738, the Hurons sought to form coalitions and 
to shape Huron policy and their response to those external problems. 
II. "within sight of the Outa8acs & Sauteurs": Debating Removal, 1738-1743 
This crisis in the Huron community began in the immediate aftermath of their 
violent conflict with the Ottawas in 1738. Noting that the Ottawas-with whom they had 
been quarrelling for decades-had tried to enlist the Iroquois to attack them in 1731 and 
1732 and had actually done so in the summer of 1738, the Hurons finally concluded that 
they could no longer hope to live "within sight" of their persecutors. 38 If the Hurons 
agreed that they could no longer remain at Detroit, they could not reach consensus on 
36 
"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," [1741], MPHSCR, 34:172; Beauharnois to Richardie, 
14 June 1741, ibid., 203; "Paroles des Sonont8ans a Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois Gouverneur," 17 
July 1742, vol. 77, fol. 205v; Richardie to Potier, 10 Dec. 1750, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 654-55. 
37 
"The Captivity of Charles Stuart," 1755-57, in Bond, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 71-72.; 
[Robert Navarre], Journal de La conspirarion de Pontiac, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 711. 
38 For the rumored attack on the Hurons, see Beauharnois to the Minister, 1 Oct. 1731, CAOM, C11A, vol. 
54, fol. 406-407v; Beauharnois to the Minister, 10 Oct. 1731, ibid., 417 -18v; Parolles de Monsr le M. de 
Beauharnois aux chefs Iroquois, Octobre 1732, ibid., vol. 57, fols. 352-53. For quotation see, "Indian 
Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR, 34:201-202; Payen de Noyan to the Minister, in 
CAOM, CllA, vol. 89, fol. 194v. 
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where they should go. This controversy divided the Huron community into at least two 
parties and exposed rifts within the community. These groups centered on not only 
where to live, but more fundamentally on two different visions about how the Hurons 
should situate themselves diplomatically and geographically, based on their foreign 
policy objectives. While one party-whom I refer to as French-aligned, or Detroit 
Hurons-espoused a steady French-aligned orientation and advocated moving to one of 
the mission settlements in the St. Lawrence Valley, closer to the seat of Onontio's power 
at Montreal, the other-the British-aligned, or Sandusky (later Conchake) Hurons-
supported a British alignment and advocated living at Sandusky, south of Lake Erie, 
where they could easily access British trade at Oswego and in the interior of the Ohio 
Valley, or moving to one of the islands in the Detroit River. During this early phase of 
the crisis, these two Huron groups began to articulate two different visions of Huron 
geostrategy which they later intensified. 
The first group, led by Mattias Sastaretsy, the latest leader of the Deer honaXen 
and "true chief' of the entire Huron community and Tayachitin, the leader of the Wolf 
honaXen, advocated moving to the relative safety of the St. Lawrence Valley, most likely 
at the Christian Iroquois village of Kahnawake or the settlement at Iroquois-Algonquin-
Nipissing settlement at Oka, or Lac des Deux Montagnes?9 In advocating this position, 
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin sought to ally their nation more closely to the "domicilies"-
the Christian peoples of the St. Lawrence Valley-and, of course, to the French. The 
Hurons had long been allied to the Christian Iroquois at both Oka and Kahnawake, whom 
they considered "our brothers who love us." Those communities had invited them to 
39 Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, "Relation du Sr. De Lamothe,"[ ca. 1698], in MDE, 5:119. 
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settle among them around the tum of the eighteenth century, and Huron men and women 
had married and had children with the Iroquois from these mission settlements.40 These 
bonds had only intensified after the resumption of the Jesuit mission to the Hurons in 
1728. In 1732, for example, the Christian Hurons and Christian Iroquois from Oka 
launched a raid against the Foxes, whom they deemed "dogs who did not acknowledge 
the master of life" and the Iroquois later chided their Christian brothers for their 
syncretistic religious practices.41 The Hurons thus concluded that, if they settled near 
their Canadian Iroquois kin-and near the French settlement of Montreal-they would no 
longer have anything to fear. The Ottawas and Potawatomis would not dare provoke the 
Canadian Iroquois or the French by attacking the Hurons in the St. Lawrence Valley. 
They hoped for "their Father's Protection ... from every attack."42 Accordingly, 
Sastaretsy sent a message to Beauhamois and to the Canadian Iroquois in October 1738, 
just months after the attack, and asked him for a safe haven.43 
Yet not all Hurons agreed with Sastaretsy and Tayachtin. A splinter group, 
involving three or four longhouses and led by the leader, "highly considered" Ang8irot, 
the leader of the Turtle hontaxen and "third chief' of his nation, purposed that the Hurons 
settle, not at Montreal, but at Sandusky, where the Hurons had fled for safety in the 
40 
"ces freres qui nous aiment," "Paroles des Hurons du Detoit aM. de Beauharnois," [1740], CAOM, · 
C11A, vol. 74, fol. 72; Beauharnois to Richardie, 14 June 1741, MPHSCR, 34:304; "Baptisme de Marie-
Anne," 1 Aug. 1718, in RPD, 1 :70; "Baptisme de Madelene Michelle," 2 Aug. 1718, in ibid., 71. 
41 Boishebert to Beauharnois, 1732, WHC, 17:150, 153-54. 
42 Richardie to Beauharnois, 17 Sept. 1740, in ibid., 287. 
43 
"Paroles des hurons du Detroit ... ," 12 Aug. 1738 [1740], CAOM, CllA, vol. 74, fols. 72-76v; "Resume 
de lettres du Canada avec commentaires des autorites metropolitaines," [1740], ibid., fols. 232-36v, 
"Paroles de Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois, Gouverneur general de la Nouvelle France, aux Iroquois 
du Sault st Louis et duLac des deux Montagnes," 12 June 1741, ibid., vol. 75, fol. 93; "The Huron of 
Detroit Desire to Migrate," WHC, 17:279; Hocquart au ministre, CAOM, C11A, vol. 70, fol. 118v. 
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autumn of 1738, or some other place in the Ohio Valley (see figure 13).44 Sastaretsy 
grudgingly alluded to these dissenters in his August 1738 message to Beauhamois, 
although he dismissed them as "only three persons ... who were not heeded."45 These 
three individuals most likely represented distinct longhouses because Richardie later 
noted that "three or four longhouses (cabanes)" still opposed removal in 1741.46 Another 
officer noted in April of the following spring that many Hurons remained at Sandusky, 
"which they wanted to assign as their resting place."47 By 1740, Ang8irot and other 
Hurons had begun preparing land for cultivation at Sandusky, suggesting that they hoped 
to settle there permanently, rather than just hunt in the area.48 As late as 1741 Richardie 
noted that Ang8irot and a few others still opposed migration and that "a large number" of 
the nation remained at Sandusky.49 When the Chevalier de Beauharnois arrived at 
Detroit in 1741, he found Ang8irot "more obstinate than ever" and worried that the leader 
would spoil his mission to bring the Hurons to Montreal. 50 
Just as Sastaretsy and Tayachitin hoped to insulate themselves from Ottawa 
violence by allying themselves with the Canadian Iroquois and French and moving to the 
St. Lawrence Valley, Ang8irot hoped that moving to Sandusky would allow him to 
develop closer ties with the Shawnees and Senecas and to orient the Hurons to the 
British. Sandusky, positioned several days from Detroit, was closer to Seneca territory 
44 
"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR, 34:201; "Copie d'une lettre de 
Beauharnois au pere Armand de La Richardie," 14 June 1741, CAOM, CllA, vol. 75, fol. 154v. 
45 
"il n'y a que trois personnes qui y Soient opposees, Encore ne sont elles point Ecoutees." "Paroles des 
hurons du Detroit. .. ," 12 aout 1738 [1740], in ibid., vol. 74, fol. 74. 
46 Father de la Richardie a Pere St. Pe [M. de Boucherville], [26 aout 1740], in ibid., vol. 74, fol. 268v. 
47 
"Memoire des fournitures ... hurons rester au fond duLac-Erie, en un endroit nomme Sandosket ou Ils 
voueloient assigner leur demeurre," 24 April1739, in ibid., vol. 73, fols. 149-49v 
48 
"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," [1741], MPHSCR, 34:201. 
49 Father de la Richardie to Pere St. Pe [M. de Boucherville], [26 aout 1740], CAOM, C11A, 74 :269. 
5° Chevalier de Beauharnois to Governor Beauharnois, 2 Aug. 1741, WHC, 17:354. 
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Figure 13: Detail from Lewis Evans, "Bowles's new pocket map of the following independent 
states of North America," in Bowles's Universal Atlas (London: Bowles, Carington, 1784). 
Lawrence H. Slaughter Collection, New York Public Library, Map Div. 97-6006[LHS 228]. 
Accessed on-line. 
Tlns detml shows the three maJor Huron settlements between 1738 and 1743-Bms Blanc Island m 
the Detrmt River, Pomte a Montreal across the nver from Fort Pontchartram (near the "Outawas" 
VIllage), Junundat (Et10nnontout) at Sandusky (the small bay south west of Lake Ene), and 
Muskmgum, or Conchake (m the bottom left-hand corner) Also shown are the lands "allotted for 
the WIANDOTS," or Hurons, by the Six NatiOns lroqums 
and more easily accessible to Bntish traders from Pennsylvama.51 As the Marqms de La 
Jonqmere, governor of New France, would later complam. "the Enghsh always have a 
very considerable Commerce at Ossandousket [Sandusky]."52 Indeed, begmnmg m the 
early 1740s, the lrish-Pennsylvaman trader George Croghan operated a tradmg factory at 
51 For the length of the tnp from Sandusky to Detrmt, see "A Journal of Account of the Capture of John 
Pattm," reproduced m Howard Eavenson, "Who Made the 'Trader's Map?,"' Pennsylvama Magazme of 
Hzstory and Bwgraphy, 65 4 (October, 1941) 427 
52 
"les Anglms font tOUJours un Commerce tres considerable a Ossandousket,"Copie de l'mstruct10n secrete 
donnee aM de Celoron par M le marqms de La Jonqmere, 9 July 1750, CAOM, C11E, vol 13, fol 212 
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the mouth of the nearby Cuyahoga River south of Lake Erie. 53 Some Hurons had 
evenconsidered moving even closer to the British than Sandusky, either to the Ohio River 
Watershed or to Seneca territory, to which the Senecas had invited them. Richardie noted 
that the Iroquois and British had been playing on the Hurons' fear of the Ottawas "to 
attract them to one or the other nation," and that many Hurons seemed inclined to "listen 
to nothing but their terror and the words of the English and Iroquois."54 Even 
Sastaretsy-who supported moving to the St. Lawrence Valley-alluded to this 
possibility in his message to Beauharnois. The leader noted that, if Beauharnois failed to 
grant his request, the Hurons "might take a part which you [Beauharnois] would perhaps 
not approve."55 Nodding to AngBirot's British-aligned position, Potier scawled the note 
"janus quirinus" next to his name in his 1746 census of the Huron community; by 
invoking the two-faced Roman god, Potier suggested that AngBirot maintained a 
duplicitous attachment to both the French and to the British. 56 
53 Nicolas Wainwright, "George Croghan and the Indian Uprising of 1747," Pennsylvania History, 21:1 
(Jan. 1954): 23. Cartographer John Mitchell called Cuyahoga "The seat of War, the Mart of Trade, & chief 
Hunting Grounds of the Six Nations, on the Lakes & Ohio." Mitchell, A Map of the British and French 
Dominions in North America, 1755, Newberry Library, VAULT oversize Ruggles 259. 
54 
"Etoient Entierement determines a ne rien Ecouter, que leur frayeur et des paroles angloises et 
Irqouoise," "l'anglois et !'Iroquois profitoient des allarmes des hurons pour les attirer aupres de l'une ou 
l'ature Naiton (131v)"; Resume de lettres de Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie, 
1738-1741, CAOM, CllA, vol.75, fols. 130-30v, 131v. 
55 
"il poura prendre un party que vous n'aprouverts peut-etre pas si vous rejetties sa parole," ibid., fol. 
133v. 
56 Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 239. An ethnic 
component also overlaid this dispute about Huron diplomacy and real estate. While the leaders of two 
hontaxen, Sastaretsy representing the Deer, and Tayachitin, representing the Wolves, supported removal to 
the St. Lawrence Valley, Ang8irot, leader of the Turtles, opposed it in favor of Sandusky. To be sure, 
many Turtles, like Nicolas Orontony and Otiok8andoron, remained at Detroit and loyal to the French while 
some Deer and Wolves may have joined Ang8irot's British-aligned group. Potier a Pierre-Joseph Celoron 
de Blain ville, 8 Sept. 1750, in ibid., 637. Yet the disagreement among the principal leaders of the 
hontaxen points to at least the possibility that larger social and ethnic considerations fed the conflict. That 
Nicolas Orontony, another Turtle leader, eventually joined Ang8irot's group and took an even harder 
stance against the French than had Ang8irot likewise confirms that impression. Potier, "Recensement des 
Hurons," Texte II, in ibid., 260. 
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Although many contemporary French observers and subsequent historians have 
seen this controversy as evidence of Huron disunity or "dysfunctional factionalism," the 
debate reflected a pragmatic and very functional response to the challenge that the 
Hurons faced in 1738. By forming different groups which worked to build consensus 
among the various Huron interest groups, the Hurons could fully explore the range of 
options open to them. As Jon Parmenter observes about the Iroquois, the Hurons 
demonstrated an "openness to innovative attempts to build consensus around a particular 
initiative," which "ultimately facilitated a far greater degree of cohesion" within the 
Huron community. 57 The groups led by Sastaresty and AngBirot, then, were not too 
separate communities in the making, but simply two interest groups pursuing the good of 
the entire Huron community. AngBirot' s move to Sandusky and his courtship of the 
British should not be read, in this light, as a renunciation of Sastaresy and the other 
Hurons, but as an attempt to explore an alternative geopolitical policy which would best 
serve Huron interests. His dealings, ultimately, were not British-aligned any more than 
Sastaresty's were pro-French. Both positions were explicitly pro-Huron.58 This 
controversy conformed to a longer Huron tradition of decision-making in which different 
groups explored different alternative solutions to the problems facing the Hurons. The 
Hurons had reacted to similar challenges at the tum of the eighteenth century by forming 
a pro-Iroquois/British group led by LeBaron and Cheanonvouzon which settled at St. 
57 My thinking on Huron factionalism is indebted to Parmenter's work on the Iroquois communities in 
Iroquoia, the St. Lawrence Valley, and, later, the Ohio Valley. Parmenter, The Wood's Edge, 87; "At the 
Woods' Edge". 
58 This formulation is shamelessly borrowed from Peter MacLeod's description of the Miamis during this 
period ("Une conspiration generate," 35-36). 
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Joseph, and French-aligned group led by Kondiaronk which remained at 
Michilimackinac.59 Those groups had reached consensus and moved Detroit by 1704. 
Attempting to win support for their relative positions, then, both AngBirot and 
Sastaresty maneuvered politically. AngBirot' s opposition to removal created a problem 
for Sastaretsy and Tayachitin. Without the consent of each hontaxen, the Hurons could 
make no decision of such magnitude. Deftly navigating the complicated and 
decentralized Huron political system, Sastaretsy deployed a sophisticated two-pronged 
political strategy. He sought first to isolate and marginalize AngBirot as the leader of the 
Turtle hontaxen, while simultaneously promoting another leader, Nicolas Orontony, as 
the true representative of that hontaxen. Such maneuvering would give him at least the 
perception of consent from each hontaxen and allow him to proceed with his plans. Once 
the Hurons had moved, AngBirot and the others would thus be forced to follow their kin 
to the St. Lawrence Valley. 
In order to marginalize AngBirot, Sastaretsy called upon the support of his ally, 
Father Armand de la Richardie, known to the Hurons as OndechaBasti, or the "beautiful 
country."60 Dismissing the stubborn AngBirot as a "drunkard" and a "dangerous and 
pernicious person," Richardie sought to actively undermine his authority, both among the 
Hurons and the French. More seriously, the Jesuit, and presumably Sastaretsy, barred 
AngBirot from attending Huron councils and ignored AngBirot' s supporters. 61 
59 Boucher, "The Legacy of Iouskeha and Tawiscaron," 261-68, 282. 
60 Ondecha8asti translates into French as "le Grand Terre" (Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in 
Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 261; Richardie to the Hurons, 29 Dec. 1746, in ibid., 622). 
61 
"le seul yvrogne An8irot" Extract of letter from Richardie to Saint-Pe, 26 Aug. 1740, CAOM, Cl1A, 
vol. 74, fol. 268v; "un Sujet dangereux et pernicieux" Copy of a Letter from Beauharnois to Richardie, 14 
June 1741, in ibid., vol. 75, fol. 154v. Years later, Potier also mentioned that Ang8irot was a "drunkard" 
(bibax) . "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 239. 
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While marginalizing Ang8irot, Sastaretsy simultaneously sought to promote the 
Turtle elder, Nicolas Orontony, as Ang8irot's replacement. Although Orontony was a 
"great chief' of the nation and listed as a "consideree" in 1747, he was apparently not the 
leader of the Turtle hontaxen.62 Yet he, unlike Ang8irot, the rightful claimant to that 
authority, supported Sastaretsy and Tayachitin and their plan to move to Montreal, and 
Sastaretsy therefore sought to install Orontony as the de facto leader of the Turtle 
contingent. In the winter of 1738-1739, Sastaretsy sent Orontony to Detroit to ask 
Nicolas Joseph des Noyelles, commandant at Detroit, for permission to settle in the St. 
Lawrence Valley "on the part of the whole village."63 The following spring, Sastaretsy 
and his allies crafted a message to be sent to the governor, once again asking him to 
remove them to the region. The heading of this missive, delivered to the governor in July 
of 1739, claimed to be the "Words of Sastaretsy, Tayatchatin and Orontony to be sent to 
the General."64 By all accounts, Ang8irot, and not Orontony, led the Turtle hontaxen. 
He, and not Orontony, had the authority to speak for his people. By ignoring him and 
presenting Orontony as the legitimate representative of the Turtle hontaxen, Sastaretsy 
and Tayachitin sought to stage a coup d'etat. Moreover, they entrusted the delivery of 
these words to none other than Orontony himself, whom they "put in charge of their 
affairs."65 Purportedly speaking for the "whole nation" and "all the elders"-a palpable 
62 
"grand chef de cette nation," Extract of a letter from Nicolas Joseph des Noyelle to Beauharnois, 1 Feb. 
1739, CAOM, CllA, 71:103v; Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de 
Potier, 260. 
63 
"de la part de tout son village," "Extract of a letter from Nicolas Joseph des Noyelle to Beauharnois," 1 
Feb. 1739, CAOM, C11A, vol. 71, fol. 103v. 
64 
"Resume of the Letters of Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan, and La Richardie," 1738-1741,in 
ibid.,vol. 75, fol. 133. 
65 
"Nicolas charge de leurs affairs," "Resumee of the Letters of Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan, 
and la Richardie," 1738-1741, in ibid., 134. 
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lie-Orontony accordingly brought the message to Montreal in the summer of 1739 and 
spoke directly with Beauharnois.66 
In entrusting the message to new headman, Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, and Richardie 
sought to accomplish two ends. Not only did they minimize Ang8irot's influence and try 
to replace him with Orontony, but they also sought to tie Orontony more firmly to their 
party by granting him authority to speak for the whole nation. This attempted coup by 
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin sought to place a pretender, Orontony, at the head of the Turtle 
hontaxen. This may explain the French sobriquet for Orontony: the "Regent."67 In 
European political culture, a regent not only reigned during the minority of a monarch, 
but also during his or her absence. Orontony therefore appeared to exercise authority for 
the absent Ang8irot. Like regents in contemporary European political science, Orontony 
exercised authority that he did not in fact possess. 68 
Sastaretsy's ploy worked at first. Beauhamois had responded to the initial, 1 Oct. 
1738, message by granting the Hurons leave to come settle in the St. Lawrence Valley, 
for which the Hurons enthusiastically thanked him.69 When Orontony arrived the 
following summer, Beauharnois reiterated his promise to "receive them with great 
66 
"toutle village Etoit dans ces Sentimens," "Paroles de Beauharnois aux Hurons de Detroit," 12 June 
1741, in ibid., vol. 75, fol. 150v; "de tous nous anciens," "Paroles de Hurons ... , [1740]," in ibid., vol. 74, 
fol. 72-26 (quote on 74); Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1739, CAOM, CllE, vol. 16, fol. 225. 
67 Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 241. 
68 The first edition of the Dictionnaire de l'Academiefranqaise notes that "regent" could denote both a 
proxy who ruled during a young monarch's minority and a ruler who ruled during the monarch's absence. 
("Regent, [reg]ente. adj. Qui regit, qui gouverne l'Estat pendant une rninorite, une absence du Souverain"). 
Dictionnaire de l'Academie franqaise, 1st Ed. (1694), accessed online from the University of Chicago's 
ARTFL Project. 
69 Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1739, CAOM, CllE, vol. 16, fol. 224, "Resume of the Letters of 
Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan, and La Richardie," 1738-1741, CAOM, C11A, fol. 75, fol. 134. 
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pleasure" and would "cede them the land" near Montreal.7° Finally in the spring of 1741, 
Beauhamois issued a formal invitation for the Hurons to come settle in the St. Lawrence 
Valley. He sent his nephew, the Chevalier de Beauharnois, to Detroit with a large 
contingent of Canadian Iroquois from both Oka and Kahnawake, as well as Hurons from 
the settlement of Lorette.71 In a speech to be delivered by the younger Beauhamois, 
Onontio told the Hurons that their "complaints, and apprehensions had reached their 
father Onontio's ears" and that he therefore offered to shield them in the "sanctuary of a 
father who cherished them."72 The "principal chiefs"-Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, and 
presumably Orontony-who had all continued to support the move, received the message 
enthusiastically.73 Although nearly all the Huron warriors were away from Detroit 
fighting the Chickasaws, the Huron elders promised to discuss the matter when the young 
men retumed. 74 They even sent three representatives-one for each "band," or 
hontaxen-to Montreal to chose lands for the future Hurons emigrants. 75 
70 
')e les recevois avec grand plaisir, Et que je leur cederois la terre que j'avois," Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 
Oct. 1739, CAOM, C11E, vol. 16, fol. 225v. 
71 
"Paroles de Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois, Gouverneur general de la Nouvelle France, aux 
Iroquois du Sault St. LoUis et duLac des deux Montagnes," 12 June 1741, CAOM, C11A, vol. 75, fols. 93-
93v. 
72 
"Vos plaintes, et vos justes aprehentions, sont venus fraper Les oreilles de votre pere Onontio," "vous 
mettre sous les ailles d'un pere qui vous cherir," "Conseil Particulier aux huronnes," 2 Aug. 1741, ibid, 99-
99v. 
73 Richardie noted that Orontony still supported the move in the summer of 1740, and presumably still did 
in 1741. Tayachitin had bought porcelain from Richardie on credit, presumably to form wampum belts. 
"Resume des lettres ... ," 1738-1741, CAOM, C11A, in ibid., 135-35v; Catherine Cangany, "Frontier 
Seaport: Detroit's Transformation into an Atlantic Entrepot, 1701-1837, (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, The 
University of Michigan, 2009), 44-45. 
74 Chevalier de Beauharnois to Gov. Beauharnois, 2 Aug. 1741, WHC, 17:353-55; Chevalier de 
Beauharnois, "Memoire des depenses que J'ay Este oblige de faire au Detroit Et Sandoske tant pour les 
Suavages de ce Poste que Ceux du Sault st. LoUis Et du Lac des deux Montagnes qui m' acompagnoient," 
19 Oct. 1741, CAOM, CllA, vol. 77, fols. 291-93. 
75 Beauharnois au rninistre, 30 Sept. 1741, in ibid., vol. 75, fol. 187; Gov. Beauharnois to the Minister, 8 
Oct. 1741, MPHSCR, 34:209-211. 
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By the time Chevalier Beauharnois arrived at Detroit, however, the delicate 
consensus to move to Montreal had already begun to collapse for several reasons. First 
and foremost, the Hurons' reconciliation with the Ottawas made the removal to Montreal 
much less pressing. In the aftermath of the joint campaign against the Chickasaws in 
1741-the same campaign which had crippled the Chevalier de Beauharnois's mission-
the Hurons and Ottawas met and finally reached an accommodation.76 With the hostility 
between the Hurons and Ottawas gone, the Hurons had less incentive to seek asylum in 
the St. Lawrence Vallley. As Pierre Jacques Payen de Noyan, the post's commandan, 
pointed out, "in banishing the fear, the desire of moving away was also banished."77 At 
the same time that relations improved with the Ottawas, relations with the Canadian 
Iroquois had apparently dimmed. The Canadian Iroquois had been cool to the Hurons' 
plea from the beginning. Before May 1740, a Canadian Iroquois headman from 
Kahnawake had apparently made "threats" about the Hurons' relationship with Flatheads, 
and this had "taken from them [the Hurons] all taste for coming to settle near them [the 
Kahnawakes]."78 Moreover, when the Canadian Iroquois escort arrived at Detroit, they 
told the Hurons that there were not enough resources in the St. Lawrence Valley to 
sustain the Hurons and actively discouraged them from moving.79 If these changes were 
not enough, Richardie apparently turned against the plan when he learned, erroneously, 
that the Sulpician missionaries at Oka had begun making space for the Hurons to move 
76 Hocquart au ministre, 11 June 1742, CAOM, CllA, vol. 77, fols. 281-82; Beauharnois au ministre, 17 
Sept. 1743, ibid., vol. 79, fols. 108-14v. 
77 
"en Banissants la crainte a aussi Bani le desir de s'eloigner," Payen de Noyan au ministre, 20 Aug. 1742, 
ibid., vol. 77, fol. 352. 
78 
"les menaces d'Entatsogo, chef de Sault S. Loi.iis, faites a L'occasion de la Paix des hurons avec les tetes-
plates, paroissoient leur avoir ote le gofit de venir s'Etablir aupres d'Eux," Beauharnois to the Minister, 1 
Oct. 1740, ibid., vol. 74, fol. 81 v. 
79 Payen de Noyan au ministre, 20 Aug. 1742, ibid., vol. 77, fol. 352. 
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there. Fearing that his charges would be wrested from his order and given to the rival 
Sulpicians, Richardie lobbied the Hurons not to move to the St. Lawrence Valley.80 
In response, many Hurons, particularly the "young people," instead suggested that 
the Hurons settle on Grosse lle, an island in the Detroit River. The island, about ten 
miles from Fort Pontchartrain, would be sufficiently far away from the Ottawas, Ojibwas, 
and Potawatomis, they believed, to keep the Hurons safe. 81 As early as April 17 41 the 
commandant at Detroit, Payen de Noyan, reported that the Hurons "are divided," with 
"some wanting to Establish themselves at the gosse ysle," while "the others do not want 
to Hear any talk but of Montreal."82 Ang8irot, although he probably still would have 
preferred to move to Sandusky rather than to Grosse lle, saw this changing political 
climate as an opportunity to finally scuttle the plan to move to Montreal. When the 
80 Beauharnois au ministre, 9 Sept. 1742, ibid., vol.75, fol. 121-125v. Although Richardie seemed willing 
for the Hurons to move to Kahnawake, where the Jesuits ran the mission, he had vociferously opposed the 
idea of moving to Oka because the Sulpicians had jurisdiction there. In a not-so-coded message, he told his 
Jesuit conferee that "people ... from the Lake ... are not good in my books, as you may think," and noted that 
the Hurons "are not pleased with the Indian observances of the place where they are to be settled." "Indian 
Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR 34:172, 200. Hearing a rumor that the Sulpician 
superior, Frangois Piquet had cleared lands atOka, the missionary concluded that he and the Chevalier de 
Beauharnois had conspired with the Sulpicians to "take this mission away from" his Society. "Excerpt 
from a Letter from Richardie to Father Janauy," Dec. 1741 in ibid., 210-11. Accordingly, when the 
Chevalier de Beauhranois arrived at Detroit the following summer, he correctly sensed that the missionary 
was undermining him. Chev. Beauharnois au Marquis de Beauharnois, 2 Aug. 1741, WHC, 17:355; 
Richardie to Father Jaunay, Dec. 1741, CAOM, C11A, vol. 75, fol. 123v; Universite Laval, Les pretes de 
Saint-Sup/ice au Canada: Grands figures de leur histroire, 1657-1759, (Quebec: Universite Laval, 1992), 
181. Embarrassed at having committed the Crown's resource to a failed endeavor, Beauharnois railed 
against Richardie and the Jesuits in general and unsuccessfully tried to have the priest removed from 
Detroit. See Beauharnois au ministre, 9 Sept. 1742, CAOM, CllA, 75 : 121-125v; 2 Nov. 1742, ibid, fols. 
241-42v; 12 Nov. 1743, in ibid., fols. 349-50v; 7 Sept., 1742, ibid., vol. 79, fols. 108-10v. The governor, 
seeking to deflect blame from himself, chose to minimize the other, equally pressing, reasons for the 
Hurons' change of heart and instead to tap into anti-Jesuit currents in European culture. 
81 The island was three or four leagues from the fort, or about ten miles (Beauharnois to Richardie, 14 June 
1741, MPHSCR, 34:204). 
82 Richardie blamed this change of heart on what he deemed Beauharnois' sluggish response to the Hurons' 
plea. Beauharnois had indeed put off removing the Hurons in hopes that he could reconcile the Ottawas 
and Hurons by inviting the Hurons to fight the Flatheads and thereby to erase the lingering bad feelings 
between the two nations ("ils sont divises de Sentiments, les uns voulant s'Etablir dans la gorse ysle, et que 
les autres ne veulent Entendre parler que de Motnreal, mais que tous sont pour laisser le detroit,") 
"Resume ... , 1738-1741," CAOM, CllA, vol. 75, fol. 137). 
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Chevalier de Beauharnois arrived at Detroit and Sandusky in the summer of 1741, 
therefore, he found Ang8irot as "obstinate as ever." No matter how many presents the 
officer offered, Ang8irot remained unmoved. 
In the shifting political and diplomatic climate, Ang8irot's position won out. By 
April 1742, Father Richardie marked the "Entire opposition especially among the young 
people" to the removal, although the principal chiefs still supported the plan. 83 Two 
Hurons, who had gone to trade at the British post of Oswego that summer told some 
Senecas that they "would not descend" to Montreal and that their missionary "had placed 
them on grosse isle."84 Hearing these rumors in late June, Beauhamois assembled the 
three Huron elders, who had remained in Montreal since the previous fall, and angrily 
reproached them for their nation's inconsistency. Reminding the Hurons that they had 
repeatedly asked him to remove them, the governor rhetorically wondered why Sastaretsy 
and the other "elders have left the decision of all things to the young people."85 
Between 1738 and 1742, then, the Hurons had conducted a serious debate about 
the future of their community and had exposed serious dissension within their ranks. 
Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, and their supporters had attempted to outflank Ang8irot by 
presenting Orontony as the true representative of the Turtle hontaxen. In response, 
Ang8irot argued against the removal to Montreal and, when the conditions changed in his 
83 
"une Entiere opposition surtost dans les jeunes gens, quoyques les 4 principaux Chefs persistent toujours 
dans les memes sentiments et soient tous prests a obeir aux ordres qui leur fera donner," Hocquart au 
ministre, 11 June 1742, ibid., voL 77, fols. 277-83. 
84 The Senecas reported this to Beauharnois on 17 July 1742, suggesting that they had spoken with the 
Hurons in question sometime in June and that the Hurons had made their final decision around that time. 
"Paroles des Sonnont8ans a Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois Gouverneur general de la Nouvelle 
France," CAOM, C11A, vol. 77, fols. 205-205v. 
85 
"Paroles de Beauharnois a trois chefs hurons de Detroit descendus avec le chevalier de Beauharnois," 28 
June 1742, CAOM, CllA, voL 77, fol. 162. 
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favor, convinced the "young people" to oppose the movement. While AngBirot had not 
convinced the majority of the Huron to move to Sandusky, he had prevented them from 
moving to the St. Lawrence Valley and had maintained at least the possibility of a British 
alliance. Both Sastaretsy and AngBirot had proven adept at creating consensus and 
manipulating Huron politics to their ends. 
Despite disagreements over where, and with whom, to live, the Hurons never 
rejected their unity. Indeed, following the failure of the Montreal plan, the Hurons 
unified once again. Most of the Hurons, including AngBirot, returned from Sandusky to 
the new Jesuit mission located, not on Grosse lie as initially suggested, but on Bois Blanc 
lie, ten miles downstream from Fort Pontchartrain (see Map 3).86 Although a rumored 
attack by some Ojibwas sent the greater part of the Hurons to exile in Sandusky in the 
winter and spring of 1743, reassurances from the Ottawa headman, Kinosaki, convinced 
"nearly all" the Hurons to return to Detroit that summer.87 Moreover, the Hurons joined 
one another to go to war against common enemies; nearly all the Huron warriors 
participated in a campaign against the Chickasaws in the summer of 1741 and others 
launched raids in the following years. Reconciled with their Anishinabeg neighbors and 
settled in a new mission, the Hurons had overcome their differences by the summer of 
1743. 
86 Beauharnois to the Minister, 2 Nov. 1742, CAOM, C11A, 75 :241-42v. Ang8irot, who had recently 
died, was mentioned as having had a longhouse in the smaller of the two Huron villages located at the Bois 
Blanc mission around 1747. Potier, "Recensement des Hurons,' Texte I, in Toupin, Les icrits de Pierre 
Potier, 248. 
87 
"Paroles de Kinousaki aux hurons Etablis a Sandoske portee par six chefs Outa8acs," 5 May 1743, 
CAOM, CllA, vol. 79, fols. 95-96; Beauharnois au ministre, 7 Sept. 1743, ibid., fols. 108v-109v. 
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Figure 14: Detail From 
Charles-Nicholas Bellin. "La 
riviere du Detroit depuis le 
lac Sainte-Claire jusqu'au 
lac Erie," 1764. From 
Archives of Ontario, 
Toronto, C 78, AO 6699. 
Accessed online. 
This detail shows the two sites 
occupied by the Detroit 
Hurons between 1738 and 
1753, after leaving their 
original village Gust north of 
the river out of view). They 
first occupied Isle au Bois 
Blanc Island (the small island 
in the bottom left-hand 
corner), then the Point au 
Montreal (Immediately to the 
left/west of "Villages des 
Outaouais" mdicates the 
Huron village and mission). 
III. "a general conspiracy": The Hurons and King George's War, 1744-1748 
Huron internal relations might have remained auspicious had it not been for the 
ill-timed death of the Holy Roman Emperor in 1740. The controversy over who would 
succeed Charles VI triggered a war between France and Great Britain as well as other 
European states, the War of Austrian Succession, which spread to North America in 
1744. King George's War, the American component of that conflict, reached Detroit in 
August of that year. The commandant, Paul-Joseph le Mayne, Baron de Longueuil, 
called a council at which he invited the Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Ottawas, and Hurons-his 
"four invincible arms"-to immediately attack the British merchants in the Ohio Valley 
and Britain's "brother the Flathead." Playing on the nations' loyalty to Onontio, 
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Longueuil wondered "what would become of me in this conjuncture if my Children held 
Themselves as Simply spectators of my quarrel with the English?"88 
Longueuil's invitation to war both renewed the conflict within the Huron 
community and changed the terms of that controversy. Since Cheanonvouzon' s day, the 
Hurons had maintained an ambiguous relationship with the British, and British-aligned 
and pro-Seneca sentiment remained a latent position in Huron foreign policy. They 
traded with them regularly at Oswego (some had been there in the summer of 1742) and 
stayed on peaceful, if distant terms, with them, while maintaining relationships with the 
Senecas and Flatheads, both had ties to the British. As recently as the summer of 1743, 
the Hurons, probably annoyed at the rising prices and scarcity of French trading goods, 
had sojourned to Albany to speak with the commissioners there. 89 The three 
representatives, probably representing each of the three hontaxen, renewed the "Antient 
Treaty" between the Hurons and Great Britain and showed them a large wampum belt-
the same that the commissioners had given Cheanouvouzon's emissaries in 1703.90 That 
the Hurons had kept the belt-which depicted the Hurons connected to the Covenant 
88 
" les quatre bras invincibles," "son frere le tete-plate," " si mes Enfans Se tiennent Simples spectateurs de 
mon demele avec L'anglois," "Conseil tenu par Mr de Longuei.iil Commandant pour LeRoy au Detroit, aux 
4. nations de Son Poste, au Sujet dela declaration de laguerre contre L'anglois," [1744], ibid., fol. 134v. 
Although this address was misdated, the references to King George's War and the identification of 
Longueuil as commandant points to a date in 1744. The conference took place before 1 Sept., because 
Longueuil mentioned it in a letter to the governor and probably took place around August, when an habitant 
noted that he had provided a cow for a "war feast" lfestin de guerre"). Beauharnois to Count de Maurepas, 
7 Nov. 1744, NYCD, 9:1111; "Fournitures faites par moy Jean Baptis bondist [Bondy] pour le Service du 
Roy Suivant les ordres de Monsieur Chevalier de Longueuil," 31 Juillet 1745, CAOM, C11A, 83 :298. 
89 The British blockade of French shipping had created an acute shortage of goods, recognized not only by 
the French (who often exaggerated these shortages), but also by the British and natives themselves. 
MacLeod, "Une conspiration generale", 1, 32, 57-67. 
90 Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 230-31. 
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Chain-demonstrates the lingering attachment of at least a group of Hurons to the 
British, which became problematic with the renewal of war in 1744.91 
Since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the tentative and grudging peace between the 
French and British in North America facilitated the Hurons' ambiguous geo-strategic 
situation: the French had not asked the Hurons to fight the British since 1713, although 
the Hurons had regularly raided British allies like the Flatheads and Chickasaws. In 
August 1744, however, Longueuil and Beauhamois rendered such ambiguous neutrality 
less tenable and intensified the debate between those Hurons who supported British 
alignment and those who wished to remain within the French orbit. As had the dispute 
over how to respond to the Ottawa threat in 1738, the controversy about whether either to 
support the British and live at Sandusky or to support the French and remain at Bois 
Blanc Island once again exposed disagreement within the Huron polity and the same two 
groups reemerged. In the context of an Anglo-French conflict, however, the stakes were 
much higher and the rhetoric more charged. Indeed, the debate reached its apogee in 
1747, when Orontony and other dissenters allegedly tried to destroy Detroit. 
Nonetheless, the debate within the Huron community was not whether to remain united, 
but how a united community should position itself in a rapidly changing world. 
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin once again led the French-aligned group, who 
supported remaining at the Bois Blanc Island and fighting the British and Flatheads. 
During the council, the Sinago Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, pointedly offered the war belt to 
91 The Hurons' British-aligned position was not, as Peter MacLeod suggests, simply a response to the 
shortage of French goods in the region during the war. That position had a much longer lineage and 
involved a significantly different vision of how the Hurons would position themselves in a shifting world 
("Une conspiration generate, 67, 152). 
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Sastaretsy and asked him to be its "guardian." Although the Huron leader initially 
demurred-perhaps an indication of the indecision within the Huron ranks-Kinosaki 
insisted and Sastaretsy accepted the belt.92 In the spring of 1745, several Huron parties 
set out from Detroit to attack the Flatheads and British.93 Huron warriors also joined the 
Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas in a campaign on the Carolina frontier later that 
summer. Although the foray had limited success, two Hurons parties refused to "return 
[to Detroit] without doing anything" and remained until they finally succeeded.94 In the 
spring of 17 46 the Hurons hosted a war feast at Bois Blanc for the Potawatomis, Ottawas, 
and Ojibwas and then left to fight the Chickasaws and Flatheads. 95 That summer a large 
contingent of Hurons joined an army commanded by Fran<;ois-Pierre de Rigaud de 
Vaudrueil, son of the longtime governor, and participated in the sack of Fort 
Massachusetts. 96 The Huron warriors loitered around Montreal during the following fall 
and winter, occasionally participating in raids on the British frontier. 97 
92 l(jnosaki's insistence that the Hurons keep the belt, even after they had declined it once, might have been 
a subtle threat to the Hurons, whose friendship with the British and Flatheads had generated the crisis in 
1738. "Conseil tenu par Mr de Longueliil Commandant pour Le Roy au Detroit, aux 4. nations de Son 
Poste, au Sujet dela declaration de laguerre contre L'anglois," [1744], CAOM, C11A, vol. 18, fols. 136-
36v. 
93 A series of claims, submitted by various officers and habitants for Huron war parties, demonstrates the 
extent to which the Hurons participated in these conflict. See CAOM, C11A, C11A, vol. 83 :293-95, 299, 
300,301,302,303-303v,304,305,307,308,310,312-13,314,315,vol. 84:260,270,271,117:355,457. 
See also, MacLeod, "Une conspiration generale," 54-56. 
94 
"n'avoient point voulu revenir sans rien faire," Beauharnois au ministre, 28 Oct. 1745, CAOM, C11A, 
vol. 83, fol. 104. 
95 That Antoine Moison, who had supplied a cow for this gathering, made a claim for compensation from 
the Crown strongly suggests that the event was a war feast. "Antoine Moison, Certificat," 25 April1746, 
ibid., vol. 118, fol. 58. For the Hurons' war parties against the Chickasaws, see ibid., vol. 83, fol. 289, vol. 
84, fol. 292, vol. 85, fol. 305v. 
96 
"Etat de la depense qui a ete faite a Montreal pour eta l'occasion du parti de fran<;:ais et Sauvages 
Command€ par M. Rigaud De Vaudreuil. .. pour aller sur les Costes de la Nouvelle Angleterre party de 
Cette Ville Le Trois Aoust 1746," [30 Sept. 1746], ibid., vol. 115, fols. 254-276v. 
97 For evidence of Huron participation in this attack and their subsequent stay in the St. Lawrence Valley, 
see Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), ibid., vol. 87, fol. 26, and the following in CAOM, CllA, 
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While Sastaretsy and other Hurons supported war against Great Britain, a second 
group, once again led by Ang8irot, but now joined by Orontony, slowly emerged after the 
beginning of war.98 Based at Sandusky, where at least a few Hurons had remained since 
the general exodus in the fall of 1738, this group openly courted British favor. If this 
option had been attractive in 1738, it seemed even more so now. Although the war had 
not reached North America until1744, the War of Austrian Succession had begun in 
17 40, and the British navy had severely crippled France's ability to ship trading goods to 
New France.99 Indeed, Longueuil complained that the British had "reddened the ocean 
with my Blood."10° Consequently the prices of these goods rose, when they could be 
found at all. By 1744, the scarcity of goods at Detroit and Niagara had driven the "far 
Indians" like the Hurons to shop at Oswego. 101 When the Hurons returned the following 
year, the British commandant of the post, Lt. John Lindesay, was ready for them. He 
bluntly told the natives that the French would soon be completely unable to supply their 
needs and that they should regard the British "as the only ones who will be able to 
fournish them with merchandise." The peoples of Detroit had obliged the British 
vol. 85:193, 292v, 228-228v, 306-307; vol. 86: 214v, 218, 224v, 225v; vol. 87:6-6v; vol. 115: 260-70v, 
vol. 117 :210v, 261,263, 372,373, vol. 118: 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59. 
98 Although the reasons for Orontony's defection remain unclear, Orontony might have simply taken a 
pragmatic approach during the crisis. During the first phase of the controversy, Orontony had temporized 
with Sastaretsy and Tayachitin because cooperating with these two leaders allowed the "Regent" to 
exercise influence within the community at a time when Ang8irot formally led the Turtle hontaxen. Even 
at that early date, Sastaretsy and Tayachitin worried that he might be won over to Ang8irot's side. 
Beauharnois au ministre, 6, Oct., 1739, CAOM, CllE, 16:225. With Ang8irot's death in 1747, however, 
Orontony had no need to work with Sastaretsy and Tayachitin and thus claimed Ang8irot's mantle. 
99 Nicolas Wainwright, "George Croghan and the Indian Uprising of 1747," Pennsylvania History, 21:1 
(Jan. 1954): 27. 
100 
"L'anglois a rougi lamer demon Sang," "Conseil tenu par M' de Longuetiil Commandant pour LeRoy 
au Detroit, aux 4. nations de Son Poste, au Sujet dela declaration de laguerre contre L'anglois," CAOM, 
C11A, vol. 18, fol. 135. 
101 Gov. Clinton to the N.Y. Assembly, 20 Aug. 1744, in E.B. O'Callaghan, Papers relating to the first 
settlement and capture of Fort Oswego, 1727-1756, (Albany: Weed, Parsons, & co., 1849), 469-70. 
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commandant and were "leaving continually" to go to Oswego. When confronted, the 
Detroit natives told Longueuil that "Goods Were too dear here and at Niagara."102 As 
these Hurons later explained to the Irish trader, George Croghan, the French had charged 
so much for trading goods that the Hurons "cou'd not buy them."103 
Making a gamble that the French would indeed run out of goods and perhaps even 
succumb to British arms-which the British assured them would happen-this second 
Huron group began dealing directly with the British. Many of them moved to the Huron 
settlements in the Ohio Valley, particularly at Sandusky, in order to deal more easily with 
British traders, who frequented the spot. In addition to visiting Oswego in 1744 and 
1745, these Hurons began conspiring with the Iroquois to reject the French alliance 
altogether and to join the Covenant Chain. The British had distributed "subterranean 
belts" throughout the pays d'en haut to encourage the natives to "declare themselves 
against the French." 104 This message had apparently reached the Hurons because 
Longueuil sent them an urgent message in March 17 46 asking them not to listen to either 
the Senecas or the British, who were "sowing terror" among the peoples of the pays d' en 
haut. He begged them to return to Detroit that spring and meet with him. 105 Yet 
Longueuil' s effort failed: some Hurons appear to have fought alongside the British or the 
102 
"L'anglois leur declare qu'ils doivent les regarder. .. comme les Seuls qui pourront leur fournir des 
Marchdises," Copie de la lettre adressee a Beauharnois par Paul-Joseph LeMoyne de Longueuil, 28 July 
1745, CAOM, CllA, 83 :61-61 vS; For a biographical note about Lindesay, see NYCD, 6:707, nl. 
103 
"Journal of Conrad Weiser, Esqr., Indian Interpreter, to the Ohio," 1748, in Reuben G. Thwaites, Early 
Western Travels: Travel to the Interior of North America, 1748-1856, 32 vols. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. 
Clark Company, 1904-1907) 1:29. Orontony also cited the constant French demands that they fight as a 
reason for abandoning the French. Yet, as the Hurons had already demonstrated and would again, the 
French could scarcely force them to do anything against their will. 
104 Beauharnois au minsitre, 28 Oct. 1745, CAOM, C11A, 83 : 103v. 
105 
"sement l'effroi," Longueuil et Richardie aux Hurons en hivernment, 20 March 1746, in Toupin, Les 
ecrits de Potier, 589-91 (quote on 590). 
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Flatheads in the autumn of 1746. The French rewarded the Detroit Kiskakon leader, 
Mikinac, for deterring his warriors from attacking "five huron prisoners" who arrived at 
Detroit in November 1746.106 Father Richardie, who had retired as superior of the Bois 
Blanc mission that summer and moved to the Jesuit mission at Jeune Lorette (near 
Quebec), alluded to the Hurons' dealings with the British at the end of 1746. Sending a 
message with some Hurons from the Lorette settlement who went to Detroit, he pleaded 
with the Hurons to "listen to the message [of the Governor] there where you are. Don't 
listen to any other."107 Yet the Hurons had already listened to, and heeded, the messages 
coming from the British and Iroquois. 
In moving to Sandusky and dealing directly with the British, the Hurons joined a 
larger movement taking root in the Ohio Valley in the 1740s. Delawares and Shawnees 
from the Susquehanna Valley had been moving into the region in increasing numbers 
since the 1720s and reached "a flood stage by midcentury."108 Members of the Six 
Nations Iroquois, especially the Senecas, also moved to the region in search of game. 
Often referred to as "Mingos," these Ohio Iroquois effectively extended the influence of 
the Six Nations into the region and claimed authority over their neighbors. 109 Many of 
106 
"Estate des fournitures que j' ay [Bellestre] fait aux Sauvages pour leRoy pend[an]' mon Sejour au 
Detroit, 16janvier 1747," CAOM, CllA, vol., 117, fol. 111v. 
107 
"vous ecouterez le message la ou vous demeurez. N'ecoutons rien d'autre," Richardie wrote this letter 
at the end of December,l746 and sent it to the Hurons via a delegation from the Huron village of Lorette, 
who delivered them in early April, 1747 (Pierre-Daniel Richer a Potier et aux Hurons, 25 Dec. 1746, 
Toupin, Les icrits de Pierre Potier, 618-20; Richardie aux Hurons, 29 Sept. 1746, in ibid., 620-23; Journal 
(de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), CAOM, C11A, vol. 87, fol. 75). 
108 Eric Hinderacker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 27-32. 
109 The Six Nations explained to the Hurons that they looked "upon you as our Children, tho' you are our 
Brethren." Weiser, "Journal," in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 36. The British later placed those 
Hurons in the Iroquois "charge," and indicated that the land that the Hurons, and others in the Ohio Valley 
held were "allotted" to them by the Iroquois. "A Treaty with the Indians of the Six nations, Delawares, 
Shawonese, Owendatts, and Twightees," in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:67; Jeffreys, "A general 
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these new settlers in the Ohio Valley lived in cosmopolitan villages which the royalist 
French disparaged as mongrel "republics" existing outside of any recognizable political 
order. 110 The presence of these groups set the stage for the last phase of the Anglo-
French rivalry in continental North America during the 1740s and 1750s. 
The Hurons' prefatory dealings with the British paled in comparison to the failed 
attempt by Orontony and other discontented Sandusky Hurons to attack Detroit in May 
1747. Orontony apparently heeded the British wampum belts and Seneca encouragement 
and believed the British warnings about New France's imminent collapse. 111 In the 
winter of 1746-1747, while some Hurons were in Montreal from where they launched 
raids against the New England colonies, Orontony and his people decided to attack Fort 
Pontchartrain, where they planned to assassinate at least Father Potier and Commandant 
Longueuil and perhaps all the French people at the fort. Accordingly, in early May 
Orontony and some Huron warriors killed five French traders at Sandusky and left for 
Bois Blanc Island, where they arrived on 20 May, ostensibly to celebrate the Vigil of 
Pentecost on the following day. 112 According to later reports, Orontony and his followers 
planned go to Fort Pontchartrain the following day, Sunday, to celebrate the holiday and 
map of the middle British colonies in America," 1754; Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 Nov. 1763, 
NYCD, 7:573; "Enumeration oflndians within the Northern Department," 18 Nov. 1763, ibid., 583. For 
more on the Mingos, see Jon Parmenter, "At the Wood's Edge: Iroquois Foreign Relations, 1727-1768," 
Chap. 2. 
110 White, The Middle Ground, 186-89; "The President of the Council of the Marine to La Jonquiere," 4 
May 1749, WHC, 18:20-23. 
111 Indian Letter to Gov. Thomas, 16 May 1747, in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1:741; Memorandum of 
the Cayugas, 17 July 1747, NYCD 6:391; MacLeod, "Une conspiration generate," 77. 
112 
"20 Mai, arrive de Nicolas a L'ile aux bois-blanc avec les guerriers," Pierre Potier, "Journal," Gazette de 
Potier, Archives Jesuite de Canada, Monreal, AJC, BELl-17/03-05-0SA, pg. 43. The Hurons gave one of 
these scalps to some Ohio Senecas, who presented the trophy to George Croghan on 16 May. They also 
told the trader that they expected to "have Complated a victory" over the French "very Soon," a reference 
to the attempted attack on Detroit. "Indian Letter to Gov. Thomas (PA)," 16 May 1747, in Samuel Hazard, 
ed., Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Ser., vol. 1, "Commencing 1644" (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns, 1852), 
741-42. 
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remain there Sunday night. The Hurons apparently slept in the French fort frequently and 
the French, as yet unaware of the murders at Sandusky, had no reason to suspect 
Orontony' s motives. In the middle of the night, the warriors would awaken and massacre 
the unwitting French people entirely, then bathe the fort in "fire And Blood."113 
Unfortunately for Orontony, a loyal Huron woman overheard the conspirators 
discussing the plan on Saturday night and immediately told one of the lay Jesuit brothers 
at the mission. 114 Father Potier hastened to Fort Pontchartrain, where he arrived at 
midnight, and breathlessly told Longueuil of the anticipated plot. 115 Having discovered 
the conspiracy, Longueuil had all the French people assemble in the fort and, addressing 
the natives with "prudence and Firmness," prevented the deliberated attack. 116 Although 
the French had thwarted the plot, the failed coup set off alarms throughout the pays d' en 
haut and the French, convinced that the British had turned their allies against them, saw 
would-be conspirators behind every tree. Continued rumors of conspiracies from around 
the Great Lakes and actual attacks, such as the murder of a trader by Ojibwa warriors and 
raids on the cattle of Detroit, convinced the French that there was "a general Conspiracy 
of the black skin against the White."117 
113 
"mettre tout a feu Et Sang," "Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart)," CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fols. 
74-75 (quote from 74v); Jose Dubois Berthelot de Beaucours," Memoire de Canada en 1747," ibid., fols. 
16-16v; Madame Jorbert de Longueuil au rninistre, 2 Nov. 1747, ibid., vol. 89, fol. 252v. 
114 Beaucours, Memoire de Canada de 1747, CAOM, CllA, fol. 87, fol. 16. 
115 Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), ibid, fol. 75; Pierre Potier, Journal, Gazette de Potier, AJC, 
BEL1-17/03-05-08A, pg. 43. 
116 
"La prudence et La fermete," Madame Jorbert de Longueil au rninistre, 2 Nov. 1747, CAOM, C11A, 
89 :252v; "Memoire de Canada de 1747 par Beaucours, gouverneur de Montreal," ibid., vol. 87, fol. 16. 
117 
"une Conspiration generalle de la peau noir contre la Blanche," Beaucours, Memoire, ibid., vol. 87, fol. 
16; For the Ojibwas' looting, the murder of the habitant, Pierre St. Onze dit Martineau, and evidence of a 
larger conspiracy, see ibid., vol. 87, fol. 16v; "Enterrement de Pierre St. Onze," 31 Aug. 1747, RPD, 
1:439 ; Journal (de la Gallisoniere et Hocquart) in CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fols. 179, 180 ; "Indian Letter to 
Gov. Thomas," 16 May 1747, Pennsylvania Archives, 1 '1 Ser., 1:741. For evidence of anti-French activity 
elsewhere in the pays d'en haut, see "Journal of Occurrences," 1747, NYCD, 10:119, "Occurrences in 
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Orontony' s failed coup sharpened the divisions between the "faithful" French-
aligned Hurons who remained at Detroit and the "rebellious" British-aligned Hurons who 
lived at Sandusky and later on the Muskingum River in Ohio. Led by Sastaretsy and 
Tayachitin, the "loyal," or Detroit, Hurons-amounting to about half of the population-
charted a path that affirmed their loyalty to the French and sought to win Orontony and 
his band back to Detroit. 118 Sastaretsy and Tayachitin immediately denounced the attack 
and declared that they had "no part" in Orontony' s attack and pledged unconditional 
loyalty to the French. 119 Afraid to remain at the exposed Bois Blanc Island, these leaders 
and about half of the Huron population set up a temporary encampment adjacent to Fort 
Pontchartrain-figurative and literally attaching themselves to the French-and later 
settled at the Pointe au Montreal, directly across the river from the fort. 120 Longueuil 
Canada during the Year 1747-1748," in ibid., 140, 156; La Galissioniere to the Minister, 23 Oct. 1748, 
ibid., 182, Peter MacLeod, "Une conspiration generale." 
118 The number of Hurons supporting the two groups remains unclear and probably vacillated a good deal. 
Yet it appears that about 100 warriors--or 400 people-supported Orontony, while some 70 sided with the 
Sastaretsy group-making about 240. The new Sastaretsy reported in early 1748 that he had convinced 
seventy warriors to return to Detroit, but that 119 remained with Orontony. "Occurrences in Canada during 
the year 1747-1748," NYCD, 10: 162). Later that year, Conrad Weiser reported that "100 Owendats 
[Hurons]," presumably referring to fighting men, lived at Conchake and that seventy remained at Detroit. 
Weiser, Journal, 1748, in the Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, vol. 5 (1745-1754), 
(Harrisburg, PA: Theodore Fenn & Co., 1851), 351; Journal, in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 29; 
Christopher Gist estimated that the Huron population had been divided in half and that there were a 
hundred families at Orontony' s settlement in Ohio [A Journal of Christopher Gist's Journey, 1750-1751, in 
George Mercer papers relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia, ed. Lois Mulkearn (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 101. Charles Stuart counted eleven longhouses at the Sandusky 
settlement as well in 1755. "The Captivity of Charles Stuart," in Bond, Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, 72). 
119 A marginal note indicates that the two "were not present at the coup" ("n'Estoient pas presents au 
coup)," "Sastaretsy Et Tayachatin sont aussy venus parler aM. de Longueiiil, Et luy ont Egalements assure 
qu'ils ne trempoient pas dans le mauvais coupd des gens de Nicolas [Orontony]," "Journal (de La 
Galissoniere et Hocquart)," CAOM, C11A, vol. 87, fol. 74v; Beaucours, "Memoire de Canada de 1747," 
ibid., fol. 16v. 
120 Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), ibid., fol. 74v; Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 
1747-1748, ibid., 176v. By September 1748, they had moved to a new Jesuit mission farm at the Pointe au 
Montreal, directly across the river from Fort Pontchartain and south of the Ottawa village. Occurences in 
Canada during the year 1747-1748, NYCD, 10:178; Lery, Etablissement du Detroit, 22 Oct. 1749, CAOM, 
Depot des Fortifications, vol. 9, 35-36. The Jesuits buHt this mission at the Crown's expense, see CAOM, 
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even employed the Hurons as retainers to defend the weakly garrisoned fort, providing 
food and repairing weapons for the Hurons at the Crown's expense. 121 Several of these 
loyal warriors went to war against the French foes, the Chickasaws. 122 Sastaretsy and 
Tayachitin, along with thirteen other French-aligned Hurons elders, left Detroit in mid-
June to address the governor directly. 123 Although Sastaretsy died soon after their arrival 
in Quebec, Tayachitin and the others addressed the new governor, Roland-Michel Barrin 
de La Galissoniere, in early August. Tayachitin maintained that his people, and those of 
Sastaretsy, remained "good children" and asked for pardon for Orontony and the errant 
Hurons.124 
Although Tayachitin also died before he could leave Montreal, both his and 
Sastaretsy' s successors continued their policy of French alliance and appeasement of 
Orononty. 125 Sometime in September, "two Huron Chiefs," presumably the heirs of 
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin, met with Longueuil, the Potawatomis, and the Ottawas at 
Detroit. These "seemingly faithful" Hurons pledged their loyalty once more and agreed 
to visit Orontony at Sandusky. 126 The following April, the French-aligned Hurons met 
CllA, vol. 118 : 345, 349, 352, 353, 355, 359, 361, 375, 392, 393, 394, 398, 402, 403, vol. 119:226; 
Potier, "Livres de Compte," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 547, Potier to Marcol, 29 Sept. 1749, in ibid., 
629; La Jonquiere and Bigot to the President of the Council of the Marine, 5 Oct. 1749, WHC, 18:32. 
121 
"Memoire des Ouvrages d'armurerie et Taillandrie que J'ai fait moy Charles Chauvin par les ordres de 
Monsieur de Longueil Capitaine d'Infantrie Commandant pour LeRoy au Detroit depuis Le Vingt Janvier 
dernier Jusqu'a ce Jour," 21 Oct. 1747, CAOM, C11A, 117 :43-47; "Fournitures faites par moy charles 
Courtois Pour le Compte et Service Du Roy au detroit Suivant les ordres de Mr De Longuetiil Commandant 
aud. Lieu," 22 Octobre 1747, ibid., 117 : 128-128v; "Occurrences in Canada during the year 1747-1748," 
NYCD, 10:151. 
122 
"Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fol. 176. 
123 
"Depenses a I' occasion de laguerre 8 premiers mois 1747," 1 Sept. 1747, ibid., vol. 117, fols. 271-71 v. 
124 
"Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1746-1747," ibid., vol. 87, fols. 80, 81-81 v ; Potier, 
"Registre Mortuaire," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 922. 
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"Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1746-1747," CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fols. 84, 85. 
126 
"deux Chefs hurons du nombre des pretendues fideles," "Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart)," 
1747-1748, ibid., vol., 87, fol. 180. 
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with representatives of other nations around Detroit and joined them in swearing their 
"fidelity and obedience" to Onontio. This time, however, they went a step further and 
pledged to defend their French allies from any would-be attackers. They would treat 
such aggressors-even if they happened to be Hurons-as a "common enemy."127 Once 
again, Huron representatives from the "Sastaredzy band" visited Montreal in July 1748. 
Once again, they denied any part in Orontony's dealings. As proof of their continued 
loyalty, they offered to send the warriors in a campaign against the British. 128 These 
Hurons reportedly agreed to strike against the renegade Miamis. 129 
In stark contrast to the group led by Sastaretsy and Tayachitin, Orontony and his 
people not only fully embraced the British cause, but actively recruited other nations to 
do the same in the months following the attack. Some four hundred of these "rebel" 
Hurons returned with Orontony to Sandusky after the conflict. In July William Johnson 
noted that these Hurons had "cut off all communication" between the western posts and 
Montreal. 130 The next month they received British traders who, according to Longueuil, 
supplied Oronotny and his followers with ammunition and arms. 131 Later that month 
some Cayugas told Sir William Johnson that the "Chienondadeys," or the Sandusky 
Hurons, were "resolved to Destroy Niagara" (the French trading post) which they viewed 
as an "Impediment in their way to Oswego" (the British entrep6t). 132 By September a 
British factor observed that the "Inguns att this side of Lake Eary is Makeing war very 
127 
"L'Ennemi Commun," "Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," ibid., fol. 205. 
128 
"des hurons bande de Sastaretdzy," ibid., fols. 214, 215v, 217v. 
129 La Jonquiere a Celoron, 1 Oct. 1751, ibid., vol. 97, fols. 166v-167. 
130 Johnson to Clinton, 17 July 1747, NYCD, 6:386. 
131 Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748, CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fol. 176v. 
132 
"Chienondady" or "Jenundady," a term that the British frequently used for the Hurons, came from the 
Iroquois Ionontady Ragas or Huron Tionontate. Sir William Johnson to George Clinton, 4 Aug. 1747, 
WJP, 1:106; Johnson to Clinton, 19 Aug. 1747, NYCD, 6:389. 
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Briskly Against the French."133 That autumn, Conrad Weiser reported that these Hurons 
had sent a "Black Belt" to the Delawares, Shawnees, and Susquehannas, to "cut off a 
French Settlement to the South of Lake Erie," probably Niagara. 134 They also gave them 
the five scalps they had lifted from the French people at Sandusky. 135 Around the same 
time, Theata or Tahake, a leader of the Orontony group, visited the British and brought 
back messages from them for the Hurons. 136 The following winter, traders from 
Pennsylvania visited Orontony twice at Sandusky. 137 
In addition to courting the British directly, Orontony sought to bring neighboring 
nations into his anti-French coalition. According to Louis La Come, a French officer, 
Orontony and his people served as a "conduit" for the "Solicitation of the English."138 As 
early as April of that year, the Hurons were actively engaged in attracting the 
Kahnawakes and the people of Oka to the British alliance. 139 They continued these 
efforts following the attack. In August, Orontony intercepted at Sandusky a Shawnee 
delegation headed to Detroit. He persuaded them not to continue to the fort, and only a 
single delegate went to the post to meet Longueui1. 140 The commandant of Kaskaskia 
likewise learned that a Huron representative, "a firm Scoundrel," had traveled to the 
133 George Croghan to Thomas Lawrence, 18 Sept. 1747, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1:770. 
134 The "Jonontadyhagas," were from "Deoghsagronty," or Detroit. "Council held at Philadelphia," 6 Nov. 
1747, Hazard, Minutes from the Provisional Council of Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, 
136. 
135 
"Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fol. 204v. 
136 
"Continuation du journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart) concernant ce qui s'est passe d'interessant 
dans la colonie," Oct.-Nov. 1747, ibid., fol. 99. 
137 
"Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," ibid., fol. 198. 
138 La Corne au ministre, 1 Oct. 1747, ibid., vol. 89, fol. 236. The governor and intendent also claimed that 
Orontony sought to facilitate British settlement south of Lake Erie. "Journal (de La Galissioniere et 
Hocquart)," 1747-1748, ibid., vol. 87, fol. 177. 
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"Colonel Johnson's Speech to the Indians and their Answer," 25 April1747, NYCD, 6:359. 
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"Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," CAOM, CllA, 87:176v. 
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Shawnee settlement of Scioto to further "Their bad designs toward the French." 141 
Orontony also received a delegation of Miamis, whom he encouraged to join the British 
alliance and whom he informed that Detroit had already been destroyed. Some of these 
Miamis, led by the headman La Damoiselle, "allowed themselves" to be seduced by 
Orontony and formed a British-aligned village of their own at Pickiwillany. 142 The 
Hurons even convinced some Ottawas to establish themselves along the Miami River, 
where they could trade with the British. 143 
Orontony further amplified this divergent trajectory by moving from Sandusky to 
Conchake, a village at the head of the Muskingum, where he would be more convenient 
to the British and more distant from the French (see Map 2). Conchake was well suited 
to Orontony' s needs. While Sandusky was reachable from Detroit in two or three days, 
the journey from Detroit to Conchake-some one hundred miles south of Sandusky-
took closer to two weeks. 144 Accordingly, Orontony and his village could escape the 
watchful eye of the French. Located in the Ohio River watershed, the Hurons could 
141 Chevalier de Berthet a Longueuil, 5 March 1748, Toupin, Les Ecrits de Potier, 632-34 ; "Occurrences 
in Canada during the year 1747-1748," NYCD, 10:142. 
142 Les Miamis "se sont Laisses gagner par les colliers de Nicolas," "Journal (de La Galissoniere et 
Hocquart)," 1747-1748, CAOM, CllA, 87:177-79v.; George Ironstack, "From the Ashes: One Story of the 
Village of Pinkwi Mihtohseeniaki," (M.A. thesis, Dept. of History, Miami University, 2006). The 
following year the "Rebel hurons" again offered the Miamis "hatchet of the English to strike" Onontio. 
"Parolles Des iroquois et hurons Reblles de la belle riviere aux misamis qui avoient estes en chasse Dans 
cette riviere," 1748, CAOM, C11A, vol. 97, fols. 406-406v. 
143 
"Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart)," 1747-1748, ibid., vol. 87, fols. 204-204v. Some Senecas 
told George Croghan that "ye Misagas [Ojibwas] & Toaways [Ottawas]" had joined their conspiracy before 
16 May 1747. "Indian Letter to Gov. Thomas," 16 May 1747, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives,1 Ser., 
1:741. 
144 In 1755, the royal cartographer Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Lery, fils, left Detroit on 15 March and 
did not arrive at Conchake until 30 March. Yet the officer might have made the trip more quickly had he 
not stopped to measure distances and make sketches of the area. He estimated that the Conchake was 30 to 
35 leagues from Sandusky, which translates into some 100 miles. "Journal de Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros 
de Lery, Lieutenant des Troupes, 1754-1755", in RAPQ pour 1927-1928, vol. 7, ed. Pierre-Georges Roy, 
(Quebec: L. Amable Proulx, 1928), 405, 420-27. 
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expect regular visits from British traders from Pennsylvania and frequent contact with 
other groups, such as the Shawnees settled at nearby Scioto, the British-aligned Miamis 
at Pickiwillany, and the Ohio Iroquois at settlements such as Cuyahoga. 145 Orontony 
asked the Ohio Iroquois permission to move further into the Ohio Valley, and sometime 
in late January or early February 1748 Orontony and his people left Sandusky and 
sojourned to Conchake. 146 By 1751, Christopher Gist noted that some one hundred 
"Wyendott" families inhabited the town, which he called Muskingum, and that George 
Croghan maintained a trading post there. 147 This Huron-British intimacy even produced 
a child, a little boy named Nicolas born to an unknown English father and a baptized 
Huron mother in 1751.148 Both metaphorically and geographically, Orontony had moved 
his people further from the French and closer to the British. 
Orontony's dealings with the British culminated in a September 1748 meeting at 
Conchake. Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian agent, along with traders George 
Croghan and Andrew Montour, arrived at Conchake and held a council with the 
"Wondots" on Sept 6. As they had in 1743, the Hurons displayed the belt which the 
Hurons had long ago given to Cheanonvouzon's delegates and reminded the British 
representatives of the "Treaty of Friendship" the two nations had completed long ago. 
145 Pattin, "Journal," in Eavenson, "Who Made the Traders Map?," 431. According to a British officer, 
Conchake, or Muskingum, was a mere 150 miles from Logstown, a British settlement. William Trent, 
Journal of Captain William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany, A.D. 1752, (New York: Arno Press and 
the New York Times, 1971). 
146 Gov. La Galissoniere reported that Orontony and his people left after they had secured the release of 
some Iroquois prisoners from Detroit, which happened in February 1748. "Journal (de La Galissoniere et 
Hocquart)," 1747-1748, CAOM, CllA, 87:198; M. de la Galissoniere to Count de Maurepas, 23 Oct. 1748, 
NYCD, 10:182. 
147 Gist, Journal, 1751, in Mulkeum, George Mercer Papers, 101; Albert T. Volwiler, George Croghan and 
the Westward Movement, 1741-1782 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1926), 34. 
148 Potier, "Continuation de L'extrait des Registres De Bapteme de La Mission des hurons du detroit," in 
Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 856. 
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The Hurons, according to Weiser, were "mightily pleas'd" that they regarded them as 
"Brethren of the English." To consolidate this new friendship, the Senecas, Onondagas, 
Hurons, and Britons met and formally solemnized the Hurons' entrance to the Covenant 
Chain. As the Seneca speaker put it, the Hurons, having left the French, would "now join 
us, & our _Brethren, the English & you to become one People with us." The Seneca man 
then presented them with a belt from the British with which he symbolically tied the 
Hurons to the British, Six Nations, and other nations of the Ohio Valley. 149 
By September 1748, then, the crisis within the Huron community had become 
more serious than ever. The Detroit Hurons had vowed to support and defend the French 
force against any attack, thereby committing themselves, in theory, to fighting their 
Huron brothers, while Orontony had conspired with the Hurons' neighbors in the Ohio 
Valley to attack the French. In addition to their figurative estrangement, the two parties 
had literally moved farther apart from one another and closer to their respective allies. 
The Sastaresty/Tayachitin group had moved from Bois Blanc Island to a new mission on 
Pointe a Montreal, just across the river from Fort Pontchartrain, and the Orontony group 
had left Sandusky for Conchake, near the Pennsylvania frontier and in proximity to 
Logstown and other British posts. Orontony's band had even informed the Iroquois that 
they "no longer saw themselves as Hurons ... but as Iroquois."150 A few years later, 
Otiok8andoron related his fears about his "false brothers."151 
149 George Croghan, "Report, 1748, in Hazard, Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 350-58; Conrad Weiser, 
"The Journal of Conrad Weiser, Esqr. Indian Interpreter, to the Ohio." 1748, in Thwaites, Early Western 
Travels, 1:28-37. 
150 Les Hurons "ne se regardoient plus Comme hurons attendu leur petit nombre, mais comme yroquois, 
puisque La plus grande partie de leur village, (des hurons) En Estoient Enfants," "Journal (de La 
Galissoniere et Hocquart)," 1747-1748, CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fol. 186. 
151 
"faux freres," Potier to Celoron, 11 Sept. 1750, Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 642-43. 
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This growing estrangement was not lost on local observers. The Kiskakon 
Ottawa headman, Mikinic, for example, observed toward the end of 1747 that the 
Sandusky Hurons had become "a separate part" of the Huron nation. 152 Marking this 
rupture between the two Huron groups, French observers likewise began to embrace a 
taxonomy of divergence. They differentiated between the Hurons of Detroit-"those 
who remain faithful to the French," and the Sandusky Hurons whom they termed 
"evildoers," the "fugitive hurons," the "rebels," and the "nicola"ites."153 At the same time, 
these observers grew pessimistic about the possibility-and even the desirability-of the 
Sandusky Hurons' return to Detroit. Father Pierre Potier, Richardie's replacement at 
Detroit, concluded that "Nicolas and his adherents ... will always persist in Their schism." 
Moreover, in the improbable case that the Sandusky Hurons would return, the missionary 
feared that they would ruin the faithful disposition of the Detroit Hurons and "reignite the 
land." 154 Clear lines had been drawn between the Sandusky and Detroit Hurons and the 
smart money held that reunification was unlikely. 
IV. "Our mats are reunited": Resolution, 1749-1753 
In many ways, by 1748 the Hurons appeared to have divided into two separate 
groups living in two separate places and following two incompatible trajectories. By then 
the Hurons had been engaged in a serious controversy for a full decade. Between 1738 
152 
"quoyqu'Elle fasse un Corps separe du Village du Detroit," "Journal (de la Galissoniere et Hocquart)," 
1747-1748, CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fol. 185. 
153 
"ceux qui restez fideles aux Franc;:ois," Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 641; "scelerats," ibid., 639, 640, 
642 ; "Les hurons fugitifs" ibid. 639; "rebelles," ibid., 643, 648 ; "Les nicola"ites," ibid., 646, 648. 
154 
"Nicolas et ses adherans ... preserverent toujours dans Leur schisme." Complaining that the Hurons 
"d'en haut" were "miserable villains" ("vilaines gueuseries") with a "Luciferian arrogance" ("un orgueuil 
Luciferien"), Potier feared that, if Orontony's group did return, they would corrupt the Hurons who had 
heretofore remained loyal. Potier a Marcol, 29 Sept. 1750, ibid., 629. 
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and 1743 elements of the Huron polity had angrily disagreed about where best to settle 
and how to orient themselves diplomatically. The resumption of war between France and 
Great Britain in 1744 only intensified the controversy and defined the sides more clearly. 
This escalation culminated in Orontony' s failed strikes and subsequent dealings with the 
British. Yet if the groups had become more ossified, the Huron community had not yet 
completely divided into two irreconcilable entities. Indeed, the boundaries between the 
groups remained fluid, and many Hurons remained profoundly ambivalent in their 
loyalties. Moreover, the Hurons demonstrated a stubborn desire to remain united in the 
years and months following 21 May 1747. Unwilling to simply divide and go their 
separate ways, each group instead struggled to win the other over to its position and once 
again to operate as a single, integrated community. These attempts resulted in the return 
of nearly all the remaining "rebel" Hurons to Detroit, and the subsequent abandonment of 
the Huron settlements in the Ohio Valley. This period should be read, therefore, not as 
the moment of ethnogenesis of two distinct groups, but of a determined and earnest 
controversy within a robust and well-integrated community. The Hurons' persisting 
durability testifies to the internal coherence within native groups. 
From the beginning, the lines between the Conchake Hurons and those of Detroit 
had always remained ambiguous and the two groups had never really operated as closed 
and fixed entities. Hurons from both camps easily passed back and forth between both 
Detroit and the Ohio Valley, especially Sandusky. AngBirot and Orontony even 
maintained houses at Detroit as late as the winter of 1746-1747, and Orontony lived two 
doors down from Sastaretsy. Sastarety's mother-in-law, moreover, lived at the Sandusky 
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settlement.155 In the months following the failed attack, the French knew about 
Orontony' s dealings during these months in surprising detail, suggesting that Hurons 
continued to travel easily between the settlements and passed information along to their 
missionaries and the French officers. 156 Moreover, many Hurons seemed to be genuinely 
ambivalent about where their loyalties lay and therefore did not easily fit into either 
camp. The fact that Father Potier described Ang8irot as "janus quirinus" also suggests 
that the leader's position was ambiguous and ambivalent, not rigid and irreconcilable. 157 
George Croghan believed that if the British failed to supply Orontony sufficiently, the 
Hurons would "Tum to the French" once again. 158 After Orontony' s failed attack, the 
French frequently testified to this ambiguity, expressing concerns that the "seemingly 
loyal" Hurons were actually serving as spies for Orontony and that they might at any 
moment betray the French.159 Although these fears were perhaps exaggerated, they 
nonetheless suggest that lines between the two groups had not yet hardened completely. 
If contemporary French observers could not readily distinguish between the "faithful" 
155 Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, Tableau I, pg. 173, 225. 
156 Longueuil testified to these "goings And comings," ("ces alles Et venUes) and correspondence during 
1747 and 1748 indicated that the French were well aware of Orontony's activities, via the Detroit Hurons. 
See "Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart)," 1747-1748, CAOM, C11A, vol. 87, fols. 175-184v. A 
Huron woman named Marie Agnes i8ennoh8e informed Potier and Commandant Celoron of the desire of 
some Hurons to kill Richardie in the autumn of 1750. Potier to Celoron, 8 Sept. 1750, in Toupin Les ecrits 
de Potier, 637; Celoron to Potier, 9 Sept. 1750, ibid., 639. 
157 
"ang8irot Ganus quirinus ... ),"Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de 
Pierre Potier, 239. Quirinus was a pre-Roman god whose cult merged with that of Janus. 
158 George Croghan to Thomas Lawrence, 18 Sept. 1747,Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1:770. 
159 Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748, CAOM, C11A, vol. 87, fol. 180. Longueuil 
noted that the Hurons wished to return to Bois Blanc, where they could cut off Detroit if they so desired, 
and worried in 1748 that the Detroit Hurons would warn Orontony of any intended attack by the French 
(ibid., fols. 177, 223v). The following year, Chaussegros de Lery remained concerned that the Hurons, 
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and "rebellious" Hurons, perhaps those lines were not as clearly demarcated as they 
sometimes seemed. 
Not only had the two groups been ambiguous and fluid, but the Hurons showed a 
resolute commitment to reunite the fractured Huron community. These efforts 
differentiated the Ohio Huron communities from those formed by the Iroquois in the 
region. According to Jon Parmenter, migration served as a means of diffusing potentially 
destructive dissent for the Six Nations. Parmenter argues that discontented Iroquois 
frequently left their villages in Iroquoia to settle in the Iroquois settlements in the St. 
Lawrence and Ohio valleys. These splinter communities continued to communicate and 
cooperate with the Iroquois Confederacy, however, and in fact facilitated the projection 
of Iroquois influence far from Iroquoia. 160 Yet the Hurons, who numbered somewhere 
between six and eight hundred people compared to perhaps 6,400 Iroquois, could ill 
afford to lose such a substantial part of their population. Such a split would have 
severely compromised the Hurons' ability to survive as independent and to retain th~ir 
hard-won autonomy. With their population divided into two, the Ottawas would have 
dominated the Hurons remaining at Detroit (as they had when they lived at 
Michilimackinac ), and the Ohio Iroquois would have subsumed the Conchak:e Hurons. In 
fact, the British had given the Hurons "over in [the Iroquois] charge," and the Iroquois 
claimed to be "fathers and brothers." Although settlement at nearby Sandusky would 
allow the Hurons to remain socially and politically unified, settlement at Conchak:e would 
have only diffused Huron power instead of extending it. 
160 Parmenter, "At the Wood's Edge," 118. 
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Rather than accept division as a means of keeping peace and of extending Huron 
influence, therefore, leaders of each side pursued a campaign to win the others to their 
camp. The Detroit Hurons, for their part, immediately sought to rehabilitate Orontony 
and to bring the Hurons separatists back to Detroit. Knowing the regard that Orononty 
and his supporters had for Father Richardie, the Hurons who descended to Montreal in 
the summer of 1747 convinced Gov. La Gallisoniere to send the priest to Sandusky to 
meet with the rebels. Interestingly, the Hurons asked for Richaride to "reestablish 
tranquility in this Nation," suggesting that the conflict was an interior crisis for the 
Hurons as much as a diplomatic crisis for the French. 161 Accordingly, Richardie arrived 
in October 1747.162 After the death of the elder Sastaretsy in August 1747, the new 
Sastaretsy went to Sandusky to invite Orontony to speak with Longueuil. Although 
Sastaretsy finally convinced Orontony to come to Detroit, where the leader surrendered 
the belts he had received from the British, a strategic attack by a handful of Hurons and 
Iroquois on some Frenchmen near the fort successfully scuttled these talks. 163 
Undeterred, Sastaretsy sent deputies to Conchake in the spring of 1748 and again invited 
the errant Hurons back to Detroit, and succeeded in bringing back seventy men with their 
families. 164 Thereafter Sastaretsy and Richardie continued to lobby the Conchake Hurons 
to return to Detroit. 165 
161 
"a retablir la tranquillite dans cette Nation," Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1746-1747, 
CAOM, CllA, vol. 87., fols. 80, 81. 
162 Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748, in ibid, fol. 181. 
163 Ibid., fol.190v-91, 198. 
164 Ibid., fol. 204v 
165 Potier au Gabreil Marcol, 29 Sept. 1749,in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 639 ; Potier a Paul-
Joseph LeMoyne, Baron de Longueuil, ibid., 631. ; Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville a Potier, 8 Sept. 
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These efforts by the loyal Hurons and Richardie soon began to bear fruit. When 
Conrad Weiser passed through the Ohio Valley later in 17 49 he heard that "the Wondots 
[Hurons] had a mind to go back again to the French." Although he later concluded that 
this news was unfounded, the rumor nonetheless suggests that some of the Conchake 
Hurons had doubts about remaining in the Ohio Valley and had contemplating returning 
to Detroit. 166 In September, shortly after Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville led an 
expedition of St. Lawrence domicilies and French soldiers through the Ohio Valley, 
Potier noted that "some families" from Orontony's band had "settled at the mission."167 
Richardie even boasted that "the rebels were beginning to come to repentance" and that 
Orontony was losing supporters "every day."168 
Orontony also toiled to attract the Hurons of Detroit to Sandusky and later 
Conchake. The Sandusky leader, Theata, visited the British in the summer of 1747 and 
returned to speak to the Detroit Hurons., which had a "very bad Effect," on the loyal 
Hurons. 169 When he spoke to Conrad Weiser the following September, Orontony told the 
Pennsylvanian that the rest of his nation had been "left behind at another Town a good 
distance off'-meaning Detroit-but that he hoped those Hurons "wou'd follow" him 
and denounce the French alliance. 170 In September 1749, Theata visited either Oswego 
166 Weiser, "Journal," 1748-1749, in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:28. 
167 
"Q[uelque] families qui se sont ranges ala mission," Potier to Marcol, 29 Sept. 1749 in Toupin Les 
ecrits de Pierre Potier, 629; "Copie de !'instruction secrete donnee aM. de Celoron ... par M. le marquis de 
La Jonquiere," [1749], CAOM, C11E, vol. 13, fols. 212-15; William J. Eccles, "Celoron de Blainville, 
Pierre-Joseph," DCB, vol. 3 [on-line]. 
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1749," in JR, 69:192. 
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or Albany. Giving Theata a belt to present to Sastaresty, the British officials asked the 
Huron leader to invite the "faithful" Hurons to come trade at Oswego. 171 According to 
one French officer, the Hurons who "had remained faithful until now" had accepted this 
belt and planned to join Orontony at Conchake in the autumn. 172 The Conchake Hurons 
apparent! y believed this as well. In January 17 51 they confident! y asserted that the 
"other Part of the Wyendott Nation would desert the French" and "join their Brethren" at 
Conchake. 173 Gist, Montour, and Croghan met with these Hurons again the following 
year. Noting that the Huron nation still remained divided in its loyalty, Gist hoped that 
Conchake Hurons would "endeavor to bring over your brethren."174 These continued 
efforts, and the possibility of complete Huron defection to Conchake, demonstrates that 
there was an ongoing debate within a cohesive Huron community. At one point, Celoron, 
the new commandant of Detroit, even suggested that the Conchake Hurons might come 
back to Detroit in order to "dethrone sasetaredzy" and to corrupt the heretofore faithful 
Hurons. 175 These attempts by both groups to win over the other demonstrate that neither 
had accepted the division of their nation. Despite their differences, they thought of 
themselves as one nation. 
After the death of Orontony in the summer of 1750, these negotiations reached a 
critical juncture. The departure of the charismatic figure and the purported ringleader of 
171 Potier a Paul-Joseph LeMoyne, Baron de Longueuil, 29 Sept. 1748, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre 
Potier, 631; "Parolles des Anglains a Chouaguen au nomme Tahake huron en luy donnant un Collier pour 
les hurons du detroit et pour Nicolas Orontony chef des hurons rebels," 1749, CAOM, C11A, vol. 93, fol. 
61. 
172 
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175 Celoron to Potier, 9 Sept. 1750, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 639. 
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the Huron mutiny created a diplomatic opportunity and gave the Detroit Hurons hope that 
they could reconcile with their brothers at Conchake. While Orontony had French blood 
on his hands and had invested everything in his British-aligned stance, his successors 
might prove better able to reach an accommodation. Accordingly the Detroit Hurons 
launched a diplomatic mission to convince the Conchake Hurons to return to Detroit. The 
"2 principal chiefs" of the Detroit Hurons-Sastaretsy, and OtiokBandoron, or Babi, a 
leader of the Turtle hontaxen-accompanied by several other Huron elders and Father 
Richardie, left Detroit in early September to meet with the Conchake Huron elders and to 
winter in the Ohio Valley. 176 When the party reached the site of Tanouatekiori on the 
Vermilion River, a day and half journey from Conchake, the Detroit Huron elders left 
Richardie, who had been warned that the Conchake Hurons intended to kill him, and 
continued on to Conchake. Once Sastaresty, OtiokBandoron, and the other Hurons 
arrived at Conchake, they planned to hold councils with the Conchake Hurons for a few 
days and then repair to Tanouatekiori to meet with Richardie. 177 
Sastaretsy and Richardie, however, made little progress until a critical misstep by 
the British turned the tide toward the Detroit Hurons. Sometime in November or early 
December, some British traders had ransacked the longhouse belonging to Atironta at 
Sandusky and stolen a blanket, deerskins, and a broken musket. When news of the crime 
reached Conchake, it galvanized the community and created a "general Consternation 
among the Hurons."178 Indeed sentiment had shifted so dramatically against the British 
176 Celoron to Potier, 8 Sept. 1750, in ibid., 635-36 ; Potier to Celoron, 8 Sept. 1750, ibid., 637 ; Potier to 
Celoron, 17 Sept. 1750, ibid., 64. Quotation from Potier to Gabriel Marcol, 13 Oct. 1750, in ibid., 647. 
177 Richardie to Potier, 30 Sept. 1750, in ibid., 646. 
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by January 1751 that few of the "great men" bothered to come meet the Pennsylvania 
Indian Agent, Christopher Gist, at Conchake. 179 Making the most of this opportunity, 
Father Richardie convinced not only the longhouse led by Aritonta but five other 
influentiallonghouses to abandon the treacherous British and to return to Detroit. 180 As a 
result, a "large party of fugitive Hurons" arrived at the Jesuit mission at the Pointe au 
Montreal the following summer. In June and July, several French habitants at the fort 
supplied goods and services, at the Crown's expense, to the "four families returned to the 
Mission."181 More Conchake Hurons followed in the summer of 1752, and Longueuil 
heard that they all planned to return that summer. 182 
After the defection of these families in 17 51, the Conchake Hurons found their 
position increasingly untenable. Although the British had proved energetic and attractive 
allies during King George's War, the end of hostilities and the return of the French into 
the region made their separate existence in the region less tenable. Following the end of 
hostilities in 1748, Gov. Galissoniere sent a detachment of 230 French and native soldiers 
into the Ohio Valley to reassert French claims to the region. The army, led by Celoron , 
also sought to "chase the Hurons who had assassinated some Frenchmen" and to "whip 
179 Gist, "Journal," 1751 ,in Mulkearn, George Mercer Papers, 104. 
180 Although Robert Toupin credits Richardie with having single-handedly redeemed these Hurons, 
Sastaretsy and OtiokBandoron likely played an equally critical role. Richardie, never one to let a good deed 
go unclaimed, minimized their contribution and exaggerated his own. Rumors had circulated as recently as 
September that the Conchake Hurons had intended to assassinate Richarde, after all, and they had refused 
to let him visit Conchake directly, suggesting that his influence was more modest than he pretended. 
Toupin, "Introduction," Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 43-44; Richardie to Potier, 10 Dec. 1750, ibid., 652-53. 
181 
"le retour d'un grande partie des hurons fugitifs," La Jonquiere au ministre, 21 Aug. 1751, CAOM, 
C11A, vol. 97, fol. 61. See also various certificates of habitants who provided materials and labor to help 
resettle these Hurosn, ibid., vol. 119, fols. 291-91v, 292v, 293,298, 299v. 
182 Fran<;ois Bigot, Etat des depenses faites pour le service du roi dans les pays d'en haut a l'occasion des 
mouvements des nations sauvages et qui ont ete acquittees la presente annee, 4 Nov. 1752, ibid., vol. 119, 
fol. 298 ; Longueuil to the Minister, 21 April1752, NYCD, 10:249. 
225 
Home" the Miamis at Pickiwillany and the Hurons at Conchak:e. 183 The French also 
established a fort at Sandusky at the same time. 184 Although the British reported that the 
Hurons ofConchak:e had dismissed Celoron's mission "as ajest," the natives clearly 
found it troubling. In an angry message to governors of the British colonies, the Hurons 
charged that the British, contrary to their word, had not included the Hurons in the treaty 
at the conclusion of King George's War. As a result, the French "are always threatening 
us," and the Hurons "dare not" stray too far from their village. They implored the 
British, therefore, to "have us included in the Peace." 185 Unwilling to provoke another 
war with France, the British did nothing but reassure the Hurons of their good intentions 
and wish them luck. 186 
Even more intimidating than Celoron's mission, the French organized another 
campaign against the Conchak:e Hurons' neighbors, the Miamis of Pickiwillany, in the 
summer of 1752. 187 Although that mission faltered, a number of Ottawas from 
Michilimackinac and Potawatomis from Fort St. Joseph did decisively strike the Miami 
183 
"pour chasser les hurons qui ont assassine des fran<;ois," Galissoniere au ministre, 26 juin 1749, CAOM, 
C11A, vol. 93, fols. 143-145v (quote on 143v); Jonquiere au ministre, 20 Sept. 1749, ibid., fol. 93, fol. 
103v; Celoron's Expedition down the Ohio, WHC 18 :36-58; Sir William Johnson, Correspondence on 
Indian Affairs, [2 Oct. 1749], WJP, 1:910; Gov. James Hamilton (PA) to Gov. George Clinton (NY), 2 
Oct. 1749, NYCD, 6:531-33. 
184 See CAOM, CllA, vol., 119, fols. 297v, 304v, 316v; Lery, "Journal," 1754, RAPQ, 7:391. 
185 Message of the Miamis and Hurons to the Governor of Pennsylvania, 20 Sept. 1750, NYCD, 10 :596. 
On 4 May 17 51, some French had "run off' some Shawnees, Hurons, and Miamis from around the 
Cuyahoga (Lieutenant Lindesay's Report of Indian News, 4 May 1751, in ibid., 6:706). 
186 
"A Treaty with the Indians of the Six nations, Delawares, Shawonese, Owendatts, and Twightees 
[Miamis], Logstown," 28 May 1751, Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:65. The Pennsylvanians seemed 
unable to provide support to these anti-French forces. MacLeod, "Une conspiration generale," 175-76. 
187 Lieutenant Lindesay's Report oflndian News, &c. at Oswego. [4 May 1751], NYCD, 6:706; La 
Jonquiere a Celoron, 1 Oct. 1751, CAOM, CllA, 97: 166v-68 ;Longueuil au ministre, 21 April 1752, 
NYCD, 10:249-50; William Trent, Journal of William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany, A.D. 1752, 
(New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1971) 85-105. See also certificates relating to the attack, 
CAOM, CllA, 98 :88v, 171v-72, 269-72,269-76,352, 457v, 99:280. 
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settlement.188 When the British did nothing to protect their Miami allies from a French-
instigated attack, the Hurons finally turned against the British alliance. Exasperated by 
the British abandonment, they sent a curt message to the governor of Pennsylvania in 
1755 telling them they had left Conchake. 189 
If the French threat had not been menacing enough, the Conchake Hurons also 
faced the prospect of a poor harvest and a smallpox outbreak in the spring and summer of 
1752. The harvest had been particularly bad in the autumn throughout the pays d'en 
haut, but especially in the "southern posts."190 Weakened by hunger and suffering from 
malnutrition, the peoples of the pays d' en haut faced an outbreak of smallpox in the 
spring of 1752. At Detroit alone, the disease had killed fourteen Ottawas, including the 
Sinago Ottawa headman Kinosaki, around the same number of Potawatomis, and at least 
one Huron woman, before the end of April. The Ottawa headman, Mikinic, furthermore, 
refused to attack Pickiwillany in autumn 1751 for fear of the disease. 191 The disease 
apparently persisted throughout the summer, killing a native slave in September of that 
year. 192 This hunger and disease apparently hit the Hurons of Conchake especially hard. 
In 1755 Chaussegros de Lery noted that a hundred and twenty Hurons had perished in a 
188 Longueuil au ministre, 18 Aug. 1752, CAOM, CllA, vol. 98, fol. 351v; Bigot au ministre, 5 Nov. 1752, 
ibid., vol. 119, fols. 288-290; "Depenses a I' occasion des pais d'Enhaut," 4 Nov. 1752, ibid., vol. 119, fols. 
297v-98v, 299v, 302, 304; Thomas Jefferys, "A general map of the middle British colonies in America," 
1758, Newberry Library, Ayer Collection, 133 39 1758. 
189 William Hunter, "Orontony" in DCB on-line. 
190 Bigot au ministre, 6 May 1752, CAOM, C11A, vol. 98, fol. 88v ; Bigot au ministre, 8 May 1752, in 
ibid., vol. 98, fol.111; Bigot au ministre, 10 Oct. 1752, in ibid., 172; "Feuille au net concernant 
principalement le poste de Detroit," 1752, in ibid., vol. 98, fol. 457v; Longueuil to the Minister, 21 April 
1752, NYCD, 10:249-50. 
191 Longueuil to the Minister, NYCD, 10:246, 249. 
192 Enterrement de Jean Baptiste, RPD, 1:545. 
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single summer, presumably that of 1752.193 Such losses were dramatic for the "rebel" 
group, which probably did not number more than four hundred at the time. In June and 
July of 1753, Father Potier interred six different Hurons, who had perished "at 
Conchak:e," in the mission cemetery. If the Hurons continued to practice the Feast of the 
Dead, then these Hurons had likely died the previous year and their cleaned bones were 
now being interred. 194 Celoron hoped that the disease might "contribute a great deal" to 
the Conchake Hurons' return. 195 
The Conchak:e Hurons therefore faced some unpleasant realities. They had lost 
the charismatic Orontony in 1750 and an important part of their population in the 
following year. The British and Iroquois, moreover, seemed unwilling or unable to 
satisfy their promises to protect the Hurons. The French remained intent on rooting the 
British out of the Ohio Valley and on either reabsorbing or entirely destroying the 
Pickiwillany and Conchake communities. 196 The Detroit Hurons likewise continued to 
refuse to join their brothers in Conchak:e. Now they had lost a serious portion of their 
population to disease. Without British support and with continuing pressure, the 
Conchak:e Hurons could do little but concede that their position was untenable and seek 
reconciliation with their brothers at Detroit. 
The messages that Celoron and Mikinac, the Detroit Kiskak:on Ottawa leader, sent 
in the winter of 1752-1753, therefore found receptive ears at Conchak:e. Speaking 
193 Lery, "Journal, 1754-1755," RAPQ, 7:427. 
194 Potier, "Registre mortuaire," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 924. 
195 Longueuil to the Minister, NYCD, 10:249; McConnell, "The Search for Order," 24. 
196 Celoron to Vaudreuil, April23, 1751, in Theodore Pease, and Ernestine Jenison, Illinois on the eve of 
the Seven Years' War, 1747-1755, Illinois State Historical Library and Collections, Vol. 29 (Springfield: 
State Historical Library, 1940), 245-47. 
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through the Turtle Huron elder, Theata, Celoron once again invited the Hurons to return 
to Detroit. The officer promised that "when [the Conchake and Detroit Hurons] no 
longer make but one single nation," then "Nothing bad would happen" to them.197 
Moreover, if they returned to Detroit, he would ensure their safety ensconced "in the 
Arms of you father ononthio and [those] of your brothers the outaoais, pouteouatamis and 
Sauteux."198 The Hurons could expect to see their children grow and their wives live at 
peace. Mikinic sent a message during the same winter. Noting that it pained him to see 
the Hurons divided into two parties, the Ottawa leader implored the Conchake Hurons to 
return. Since the entire episode had been sparked by the controversy between the 
Ottawas and Hurons, Mikinic's assurance that the Conchake Hurons would find peace 
and tranquility at Detroit carried added weight. Such promises resonated among a people 
battered by threats of war, famine, and disease. As a result the Conchake Hurons testified 
to the "joy which they felt intensely" upon receiving this message. 199 
On 3 May 1753, accordingly, Huron elders from both Conchake and Detroit met 
with Celoron, the Ottawas, and Potawatomis at the commandant's house at Detroit. 
Speaking for the Conchake Hurons, Theata told the assembly that it was a "Beautiful" 
day for he only had "Good Things to say."200 At long last, Theata announced, the 
Conchake Hurons had "Returned for forever," never again to "abandon their village" at 
197 
"tu [Celoron] as dit que quand nous ne fera qu'un meme nation il ne nous arriveroit Rien de mauvais," 
"Conseil des hurons en presence des outaoiias, et pouteuatamis [et Sauteux] et reponse," 3, 13 May 1753, 
CAOM, CllA, vol. 99, fols. 75-75v (quotation). Celoron specifically thanked TMata for carrying his 
message to Conchake. 
198 
"y ete en surete dans les Bras de v6tre pere ononthio et trouves de vos feres les outaoais, pouteouatarnis 
et Sauteux," ibid., fol. 75. 
199 
"lajoye qu'on Ressente nos freres de Konchaket," ibid., fol. 76. 
200 
"n'ayant que Bonnes Choses a dire," ibid., fol. 75. 
229 
Detroit.201 Although the Huron community had long been "divided into two," they now 
proclaimed that "we no longer differentiate our nation which now only makes one Body." 
The Huron "heart" had been mended. 202 
Responding to the Hurons speech ten days later, Celoron and the Potawatomis, 
Ottawas, and Ojibwas all testified to their joy in seeing the Conchake Hurons returned to 
Detroit. Celoron figuratively widened the reed mat-a metaphor which denoted home-
to make room for the Conchake Hurons at the Pointe au Montreal village. The 
commandant also offered to "Entirely Erase" any past unpleasantries between the two 
nations and strongly cautioned them to abandon the British interest. The Hurons must 
"Reject all the poisoned discourse that the English have made to deter them from 
returning near to me." As a token of their renewed loyalty to Onontio, Celoron presented 
them with a flag to fly over their village. The commandant poignantly asked the Hurons 
to trade the King's Colors of Britain-which the Hurons had flown at Conchake-for the 
white banner of French Bourbons.Z03 Echoing Celoron, the Potawatomis and Ottawas 
presented strings of wampum to "plug up their ears" from listening to British lies and 
encouraged them adhere only to Onontio's "wi11."204 
The Hurons concluded the conference by asking Celoron to send Charles 
Chauvin, the longtime blacksmith at the Huron mission, and the Huron interpreter to 
201 
"les voila Revenfi pour touiours; ils seront Stables et n'abandonneront plus leur village," ibid. In 
eighteenth-century usage "ressentir" meant "sentir fortement" (Dictionnaire de l'Academie fram;aise, 1 '1 
ed., 1694). 
202 
"notre village partage en deux,"" nous ne distinguont plus notre nation qui ne fait a present qu'un meme 
Corps," ibid., fols. 76-76v, 77v. 
203 
"Soit Entierrement Efface" "Rejettent tous les discours empoissonnes que langlais leur a fait pour les 
detourner de revenir aupres de moy," ibid., fols. 75-76. 
204 
"debouchons les Oreilles par ces Brances des porcelain," "sa volonte" ibid., fols. 76v-77v. 
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Conchake to "Raise the road" for the Hurons from Conchake back to Detroit.205 By 
October, most of the Conchake Hurons had settled at the Huron mission at Pointe au 
Montreal, and the reunited village had sent war parties against Onontio's enemies, the 
Chickasaws and, ironically, the Flatheads.206 As a result, French engineer and officer 
Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery found only two longhouses occupied by some 
Iroquois at Conchake in 1754 and the derelict "pits and vestiges of the village."207 In 
fact, by 1761 the Huron community at Detroit numbered around eight hundred, a number 
consistent with or even a bit higher than estimates from the mid-1730s, suggesting the 
majority had returned to Detroit?08 The Huron community had been reunited. 
Although some of the Hurons continued to live at Sandusky after 1753, they did 
not constitute a separate people from the Huron village at Detroit, as many have 
supposed?09 Instead the settlement served as a satellite outpost that was socially and 
politically connected to the Detroit settlement. Passing through Sandusky with his Huron 
masters in 1755, the captive Pennsylvanian, Charles Stuart, described a Huron 
geopolitical strategy which was centered at Detroit and spread far into the Ohio Valley. 
205 
"pr montrer le Chernin," ibid., fol. 77. 
206 Duquesne au rninistre, 31 Oct. 1753, CAOM, CllA, vol. 99, fol. 120. The Huron speaker at the May 
1753 conference allowed that three extended families, or longhouses ("cabanees"), still refused to come 
back. In 1746, Father Potier had counted forty-three such family units ("cabanes") in the various Huron 
settlements, suggesting that very few of the Hurons had refused to come. In 17 54, the Virginia Gazette 
reported that there were some "Wyendotts" at Conchake, who had pledged to protect the British traders at 
the fort, but that these did not number more than thirty men. Virginia Gazette, 29 March 1753, in Mulkearn 
, George Mercer Papers, 84. 
207 
"les fosses et les vestiges du village," "Journal de Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery, 1754-1755," 
RAPQ, 8:427. The same year, Croghan mentioned that the "Owendats" were at "Fort DeTroit" once again 
(Croghan, Journal, 1754, in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1 :76). Lery did note, however, that some 
Hurons and Iroquois hunters had been in Conchake during the winter of 1754-1755 ("Journal," RAPQ, 
8:404-405). 
208 Nau a Bonin, JR, 68:283; Hocquart, "Detail de toute la colonie," 1737, CAOM, C11A, vol. 67, fols. 
103v-104; "Sir William Johnson, Minutes of the Proceedings .. .in 1761," WJP, 2:501. 
209 James Clifton argues this most fully in "TheRe-emergent Wyandot." See also the concluding section of 
this chapter. 
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The Detroit settlement on the Point au Montreal served as the "ChiefWondot [Huron] 
Town," while Sandusky was the "Head Quarters of the Wondot Hunters during the 
Winter Season." Radiating from this latter settlement, the Hurons maintained several 
other smaller camps placed a day's travel apart from one another inhabited by a handful 
of Huron people?10 These settlements were not separate Huron communities, but Huron 
nodes or outposts integrated with the Detroit community. As Stuart's own passage from 
western Pennsylvania through Huron settlements in the Ohio Valley demonstrates, Huron 
people constantly traveled between these villages in the years following 1753, as they had 
in the preceding years. The Hurons, in fact, seemed to be a people in constant motion 
during this period, and frequently travelled between posts-a three day voyage.211 These 
communities also remained politically connected. As late as 1775, the Hurons at 
Sandusky told Virginia rebel authorities that the "King of the Wiandots and wise 
men .. .live at Detroit" and proclaimed that they would be "ruled by them in our 
210 
"The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-57" in Bond, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 69-72; 
"Examination of Moses Moore and Isham Bernat," 1749, 632-33; Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin. Indians of 
Northwest Ohio: An Ethnohistorical Report on the Wyandot, Potawatomi, Ottawa, and Chippewa or 
Northeast Ohio, (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1974), 14, 21, 27, 37, 40. 
211 Lery, for instance, noted that the Huron man whom the French called "le Glorieux" had wintered with 
the Shawnees at Scioto in 1755 and had easily travelled over the snow between Scioto, Sandusky, and 
Detroit (Lery, Journal," 1754-1755, in RAPQ, 8:409). For a small sample of the evidence of travel between 
these villages, see George Croghan, "Journal," 1748, in Wainwright, Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography, 373; Stuart Captivity, in Bond, The Mississippi Historical Review, 78; Croghan to Johnson, 
26 January 1760, WJP, 10: 137; Croghan's Journal, in Thwaites, Early Western Travel, 1:108). James 
Smith noted that he and his captors traveled from Sandusky to Detroit in three days (Smith Captivity, in 
Drake, Indian Captivies, 233). 
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determinations."212 As James Smith, another British captive, explicitly confirmed in 
1758, the Hurons at "Sunyendeand [Sandusky] and those at Detroit were connected."213 
This geopolitical strategy served Huron interests well.214 Economically, the 
settlements reduced pressure on the Hurons' resources at Detroit and opened up access to 
fresher soils and new hunting grounds. Indeed, the Hurons had begun to complain of the 
encroachments of French settlers on their lands and the scarcity of resources around 
Detroit.215 Politically, these Huron outposts allowed the Hurons to keep contacts with 
their allies in the Ohio Valley, the Shawnees, Ohio Iroquois, and Delawares, and of 
course the British. They also facilitated the movement of Huron people and information 
from the Ohio Valley to the Huron leaders at Detroit. Such an arrangement allowed the 
Hurons to remain apprised of events throughout the region and to project their influence 
over a large swath of the region. This strategy would serve the Hurons well following the 
fall of New France in 17 60. 
212 
"The Journal of Richard Butler, 1775," ed. Edward Williams, in The Western Pennsylvania Historical 
Magazine 47:1 (Jan. 1964): 36; "Treaty at Pittsburgh," 1775, in Reuben Thwaites and Louise Kellogg, The 
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Detroit. They also served as safety valves to reduce quarrels within the Huron community, without thereby 
ending the connections between them (Parmenter, At the Woods' Edge; "At The Woods' Edge"). 
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[Jehu Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit" 1763-65, in Franklin Hough, ed., Diary of the Siege of Detroit, 
(Albany, NY: J. Munsell, 1865), 89-91; Gage to Johnson, 22 April 1764, WJP, 4:403). 
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V. "The Huron Name": Huron Identity 
By the time the Conchake Hurons limped back to Detroit in 1753, their nation had 
been racked by continual controversy for fifteen years. The fear of further Ottawa 
violence had exposed a rift between French and British supporters, which the resumption 
of war between those two nations only exacerbated. Orontony and his warriors had tried 
to attack Detroit and kill the inhabitants there, and his move to Conchake and further 
courting of the British only confirmed the distance between the two groups. All of the 
original participants-the elder Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, Ang8irot, and Orontony-were 
dead and buried. And yet, in spite of all of this turmoil, both groups had remained 
committed to reconciling with one another, and to reunification. When it became clear 
that the Detroit Hurons would not move to Conchake, Theata and the other Hurons had 
moved back to Detroit, rather than integrate themselves into another nation, such as the 
Shawnees at nearby Scioto, the Miamis at Pickiwillany, the Iroquois, or even the 
Flatheads. 216 They had in fact been invited to do so before on several occasions and 
French observers thought they would join the Ohio Iroquois, but they had declined these 
invitations?17 The Conchake Hurons' decision to return to Detroit demonstrates the 
nature of the decade-long debate in which they had engaged. Different Huron groups had 
pursued very different alternatives but had done so within the context of a coherent 
Huron community. No matter how much they may have disagreed or how heated their 
216 In 1749, Celoron worried that the Hurons and Miamis would join the Flatheads, "who are not so very far 
away" from Conchake ("Celoron's Expedition down the Ohio," WHC, 18:57). 
217 
"Resume de lettres de Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie, » 1738-1741, CAOM, 
C11A, vol. 75, fols. 130-30v, 131 v. In 1748 one French officer expected the Hurons to settle among the 
Ohio Iroquois immanently, and in 1750 Richardie thought that the Hurons were on the verge of joining the 
Senecas, although he did not specify whether he meant those in the Ohio Valley or in traditional Seneca 
territory ("Occurrences in Canada, 1747-1748," NYCD, 10:146; Richardidt Potier, 10 Dec. 1750, in 
Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 654. 
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disputes became, the Hurons always affirmed their loyalty to other Hurons. Ultimately 
the Hurons' unity-their strength-derived not from the lack of division but from their 
ability to contain potentially devastating disagreements. 
The key to this fractious integrity lay in a powerful Huron identity. A set of 
forces created a durable sense of Huron exceptionalism and unity which bound the 
community together and contained the groups, diverging interests, and ancient ethnic 
loyalties that otherwise might have divided the Huron community. In particular, a sense 
of Iroquoian linguistic and cultural superiority (enhanced and made more important in the 
presence of Algonquian and Siouan peoples), a long-term commitment to Christianity, 
and a shared narrative of suffering and sojourn combined to fuse the Hurons into a single, 
integrated community, while the practices of clan exogamy buttressed this unity. This 
identity was not timeless or fixed, but supple and durable. Huron identity changed over 
time, but it continued to provide a touchstone for the people whom the French called 
Hurons. 
The first constituent of this Huron identity was a set of broad Iroquoian cultural 
assumptions and practices and, of course, language. To be sure, the refugees who first 
composed the Huron community in the seventeenth-century-the Tionontates, Neutrals, 
and various Hurons-possessed a wide range of cultural expressions and beliefs.Z18 Yet 
they also possessed crucial similarities-overlapping matrilineal clans, a heavy 
investment in horticulture, mutually intelligible Iroquoian languages, and similar 
218 Lucien Campeau argues that there was no Huron or Neutral component among the Detroit Hurons and 
that the group was thoroughly Tionontate, although others suggest that there was a least a component of 
these peoples among the Hurons. Campeau, Appendice 1: Les Hurons de Detroit, in La mission des jesuites 
chez les Hurons, 1634-1650, (Montreal: Editions Bellarmin, 1987), 361-67. 
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settlement strategies, hierarchies of authority, and gender norms-which allowed them to 
construct a common Iroquoian culture and identity. Exposure to other non-Iroquoian 
peoples they encountered after 1649 further enhanced this sense of Iroquoian 
commonality. In contrast to the significant cultural differences separating them from 
Siouan and Algonquian speakers they encountered, the differences between the different 
southern Ontario Iroquoians seemed less and less meaningful. This sense of cultural 
commonality and superi01ity created a sense of Huron solidarity and cultural kinship 
critical for the creation of a stable community. The Hurons were quicker to acknowledge 
cultural and political kinship and to intermarry with distant Iroquoians like the Iroquois 
and the Huron community of Jeune Lorette near Quebec, than their immediate 
Algonquian-speaking neighbors, testifying to their sense of Iroquian exceptionalism and 
1 1 ° 0 219 cu tura supenonty. 
The Hurons' long-term commitment to Christianity also provided a critical 
marker of Huron self-conceptions and contributed to a sense of commonality. Not only 
the Detroit Hurons, who remained at the Jesuit mission, but even the British-aligned 
219 Just as the Hurons maintained close connections to the Iroquois, they also remained close to the Hurons 
of Lorette, a community of Huron refugees who fled toward Quebec after 1649. Potier, for example, notes 
that sohendinnon, "le lorretain," lived at the Jesuit mission in 174 7, and recorded the names of several 
prominent "hurons de Lorette" in the accompanying dictionary. Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte 
I, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 226, 236. Shortly before Orontony's attempted strike, moreover, came to 
convince their "brothers of the heart" to remain loyal to the French. Pierre-Daniel Richer a Pierre Potier, 
25 Dec. 1746, in ibid., 618-20; Armand de la Richardie aux Hurons, 29 Dec. 1746, in ibid., 620-23 
(quotation on 622). During Pontiac's War, Andre otechiodi, a Huron leader from Lorette, played a 
prominent role among the Hurons of Detroit. "Indian Intelligence from Detroit," 20 December 1764, in 
Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet (Harrisburg: 
Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942-1943) Series 21655:254; William Murray to Andrew, a Huron 
[of Lorette?], 23 Dec. 1764, WJP, 4:628; ([Robert Navarre], "The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," in The 
Siege of Detroit in 1763: The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy and John Rutherford's Narrative of a 
Captivity, ed. Milo M. Quaife and trans. R. Clyde Ford (R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.: Chicago, 1958), 193, 
198; [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," in Hough, The Siege of Detroit, 51-54; 82, 89, 112-13). 
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Conchake Hurons remained committed to Christianity.220 These Hurons allowed the 
Jesuits to winter near Sandusky during the 17 40s. 221 Even Nicolas Orontony continued to 
embrace Christianity. Mere months after his attempted attack on Detroit, he had Potier 
solemnize his marriage to a Huron woman in November 1747, although Longueuil 
demurred that the sacrament was a sacrilege. 222 After his death in 1750, moreover, Potier 
interred him at Detroit.223 The Pennsylvania Indian agent, Christopher Gist, noted that 
they mistook him for a minister and asked him to perform baptisms and marriages for 
them. One Huron showed him "a kind of Almanack" by which he kept track of the 
Sabbath and told them that he "always observed" the holy day.224 In 1764, the Hurons 
told the British that "we are Baptized" and expected to live eternally. 225 George Croghan 
confirmed that the Hurons retained "a particular attachment to the Roman Catholic 
religion."226 As had the distinctly Iroquoian Christianity among the Iroquois Catholics in 
the St. Lawrence Valley, Huron Christianity provided an ideological and ritual unity 
among the Hurons.227 
A shared history of common suffering and mutual support, finally, gave these 
cultural and linguistic commonalities meaning and allowed the Hurons to formulate a 
shared narrative of what it meant to be Huron. This people had faced a crisis of biblical 
220 Although Richard White describes these people as "non-Christian," the evidence strongly suggests 
otherwise. White, The Middle Ground, 195. 
221 Toupin, "Introduction," Les ecrits de Potier, 35-43. 
222 Potier, "Registre de Mariages," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 909 ; W. Eugene Shields, "The Jesuits in 
Ohio in the Eighteenth Century," Mid-America, New Series, 7:1 (Jan. 1936): 42-43. 
223 Potier, "Registre Mortuaire," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 923. 
224 
"A Journal of Christopher Gist's Journey," 1750-1751, Mulkearn, George Mercer Papers, 102-103. 
225 
"An Indian Conference," 7-10 May 1764, WJP, 11:179. 
226 George Croghan, Journal, in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:152-53. 
227 Alan Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 110. 
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dimensions. After having been forced into exodus by the Five Nations, they had 
wandered through what seemed to them a wilderness of strange peoples and strange 
lands. Once they had escaped the wrath of the Iroquois, they provoked the ire of the 
Sioux. They had endured a rocky relationship with their Ottawa allies. They had fought 
against the Foxes and Mascoutins, the Dutch and the British, the Catawbas and 
Chickasaws. They had loved and married one another, quarreled and laughed with one 
another, and lived day-by-day in the presence of their fictive and real kin. All of this 
provided a basis of trust and kinship among the Hurons and allowed them to write a 
narrative, a collective history, of what they had endured and how they had relied on one 
another. For a century after the Huron dispersal, the people who had come to be known 
as Detroit Hurons had relied on each other, had suffered alongside one another, and had 
remained united. It is no surprise, then, that they chose to reunite in 1753. 
If a sense of Iroquoian exceptionalism, Christianity, and a shared Huron story 
provided the basis of a Huron identity, the practice of clan exogamy-epitomized by the 
institution of the longhouse-supplied the practical means and the technology of that 
unity. 228 The practice of marrying outside of one's clan found its expression in the Huron 
institution ofthefamille or cabanne, which referred to those related people who lived in 
the same longhouse. Because of the Hurons' matrilineal, matrilocal, and exogamous 
customs, these longhouses were, by necessity, integrated units which involved peoples 
from different clans. Because the Hurons were matrilineal and matrilocal, the women in 
228 This notion-and the language of clan as "technology" --comes from a conference panel, chaired by 
Joshua Piker, in which I participated at the 2010 meeting of the American Ethnohistorical Society. Megan 
McCullen and Jean-Franc;:ois Lozier suggested that clan exogamy served as a unifying force for the Hurons. 
For a discussion of the cohesive role of clanship, see Elisabeth Tooker, "Northern Iroquoian Sociopolitical 
Organization," 93; Boucher, "The Legacy of Iouskeha and Tawiscaron," 27-28. 
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each longhouse all belonged to the same clan, as did their children. Because of the 
Hurons' exogamous tradition and matrilocality, the men living in the longhouses 
belonged to different clans from their wives. Each longhouse, then, contained many 
related women and children from the same clan and men from different clans. Elders 
from the Deer and Wolf hontaxen clan even lived in the same longhouses as those of the 
Turtle hontaxen?29 
In a very real way, then, the longhouse brought together people from different 
clans into one integrated institution and actual, inhabited space. They therefore tied the 
different Huron clans, and separate hontaxen, into one and made it difficult to imagine a 
division within the Huron polity. If clan identity continued to mean something, so did 
loyalty to one's household. Ties not only of intermarriage but cohabitation in these 
integrated longhouse units provided the mechanism of Huron cohesion. 230 
These components combined to create a sense of belonging and loyalty to the 
Huron community. The Hurons were, as the French never tired of pointing out, an 
extremely proud and haughty people, a fact which little endeared them to their native 
neighbors.231 The Hurons themselves testified to this loyalty as well. In 1707, they 
rejected an invitation by the Senecas to move to Iroquois territory because they feared 
that their existence as a distinct people would be subsumed and "the Huron name [would] 
229 Robert Toupin has painstakingly identified six longhouses in which elders from both the Deer and Turtle 
hontaxen lived and one in which Turtle elders cohabitated with a female elder of the Wolf hontaxen. These 
exclude those men from different clans living in a single longhouse, who were not clan elders. Toupin, Les 
ecrits de Potier, 176. 
230 Jon Parmenter similarly notes the importance of similar clan relations and exogamous imperatives in 
creating loyalty and community across an expansive Iroquoia. Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, xl-xlii. 
231 
"sa [les Hurons'] hauteur la fait ha"ir des autres, Et l'on ne doit passe flatter de la reconcilier bien 
sincerement avec les Outaoi.iais qui soufrront toujours impatiemment sa fierte," Resume de lettres du 
Canada avec comrnentaires des autorites metropolitaines, 1740, CAOM, CllA, vol. 74, fols.,235-235v. 
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become extinct." They again rejected such invitations in 1739 and 1750.232 Thirty years 
later, when Sastaretsy requested permission to live close to Montreal, he stipulated that 
they did not want to be "mingled with other nations."233 When the Conchake Hurons 
finally returned in 1753, they likewise testified to the bonds that held them together. 
They noted that their previously intact "body" had been divided but that it now had been 
healed once again. 234 
Nor was this the first time that the Hurons had survived such a dispute over 
whether to support the English or the French. In the 1690s, the pro-Iroquois and British-
aligned leader Le Baron, and his successor, Cheanonvouzon had articulated an explicit 
pro-Iroquois and British stance, while their rivals, Kondiaronk and the current Sastaretsy, 
had favored French alliance. Just as Ang8irot and Orontony had moved to settlements to 
Sanduske and Conchake, Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon had moved from 
Michilimackinac to the Miami settlements on the St. Joseph River in order, others 
surmised, to facilitate their interactions with the Iroquois and English. Kondiaronk and 
Sastaresty, like Babi and the latter-day Sastaresty, had remained at the French post and 
had supported French-sanctioned raids. In the 1690s, as in the 1740s, the two sides had 
quarreled bitterly, and Kondiaronk even warned the Miamis that Cheanonvouzon planned 
to betray them. Yet in 1704, after Kondiaronk' s death, Cheanonvouzon had effected a 
reconciliation and both had settled once again in the same village near Fort Pontchartrain. 
The defection of about forty Huron families to the Shawnees, who lived in the Ohio 
232 Aigremont to the Minister, 14 Nov. 1708, MPHSCR, 33:447. 
233 
"de ne nous point meier avec d'atures Nations," Paroles des hurons du Detroit a Mr Le Mis de 
Beauharnois, Gouverneur general de la Nouvelle France, parlant aM. De Noyelle Commadant aud. Poste, 
[1738], CAOM, C11A, vol. 74, fol. 75v. 
234 
"Paroles des Hurons ... ," 13 May 1753, ibid, vol. 99, fol. 75v. 
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Valley, in 1740s, might have also reflected an ongoing debate about Huron foreign 
policy. Each time they had countenanced dividing and each time they had come back 
again. The Hurons displayed a desire to remain united and an ability to contain 
factionalism without division. 
Conclusion 
My reading of the episode-of a period of factional controversy within a unified 
community, and of Huron persistence in the face of long odds-deviates from other 
interpretations of that story, and those differences have important consequences for how 
we understand the history of early America. The most sustained analysis of the event 
comes from an essay written by anthropologist James Clifton in 1983. Clifton asserts 
that Orontony' s defection signifies the moment of a decisive ethnogenesis of a new 
group-the Wyandots of Sandusky-which formed a separate community from the 
Huron community at Detroit. Using Potier's census from the winter of 17 46-17 4 7, 
Clifton noticed that both of the main leaders of the British-aligned Sandusky/Conchake 
group-Ang8irot and Orontony-and many of those living at Sandusky, and later 
Conchake, belonged to Turtle hontaxen. Next he observed that there had not been any 
Turtle clan among the Tionontates before the Iroquois invasion in 1649 and that these 
Turtles must have come from outside the Tionontates. Noting that the British-aligned 
group sometimes used the name Wyandot, the autonym of the members of the Huron 
Confederacy, Clifton concluded that the Turtles must have thus been composed primarily 
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of the descendents of the Huron Confederacy and Neutral tribes, rather than of the 
Tionontates. 
Therefore, Clifton read Orontony's defection from the Detroit community and 
failed attack as the decisive moment of "ethnogenesis"-or "re-ethnogenesis"-of a 
long-dormant Huron identity which had remained separate from the Tionontate part of 
the community and resented Sastaretsy's domination of Huron politics?35 These Hurons 
thereafter claimed the mantle of the defunct Huron Confederacy and proudly styled 
themselves as "Wendat" or "Wyandot" to distinguish themselves from the Tionontates 
who remained near Detroit. These groups later became the distinct communities of the 
Sandusky Wyandots and Detroit Hurons?36 Richard White likewise suggests that 
Orontony rebelled against the French in 1747 to "underline his own independence from 
the Huron-Petuns" of Detroit. 237 
Yet Clifton's characterization of Orontony' s defection has serious flaws. Given 
the traditions of intermarriage between Huron clans, for instance, the idea that a portion 
of the population could remain discemably distinct and separate from the rest after nearly 
a century of intermarrying seems unlikely. Evidence suggests, moreover, both that the 
Tionontates and members of the Huron Confederacy used the autonym "Wendat" before 
1649 and that the purportedly "Tionontate" portion of the population called themselves 
235 Lucian Campeau rejected Clifton's assertion that the Turtles were really members of the Huron 
Confederacy in disguise. He instead inserted that they might have been Ottawas who had been 
incorporated into the Huron community. As I hope to have made clear in the previous chapter, I find this 
possibility very unlikely (Campeau, La mission des jesuites chez les Hurons, 261-64. 
236 Clifton, "The Emerging Wyandot," 1-17. 
237 White, The Middle Ground, 201. 
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"Wendats" as well, even if the French called them Hurons.238 More importantly, Clifton 
underplays the significant communication and interaction between the allegedly 
separatist Hurons and those who remained loyal to the French. Clifton seemed entirely 
unaware of the May 1753 conference and White only mentioned it passing. The fact that 
nearly all of the Hurons returned from Conchake and joined their compatriots at Detroit 
seriously undermines Clifton's reading of the event. If the Hurons had continued to 
interact after the Orontony' s defection, if each side tried to coax the other to reunite, and 
if they eventual did reunite, then Clifton's assertion of Huron division rings false. 
The consequences of the Hurons' survival reach far beyond the Huron community 
and beyond Detroit itself. For White and Clifton, the Hurons' dissolution and division 
demonstrated the corrosive power of imperialism and the inherent weakness of native 
polities. In the face of imperialism, the Hurons had been devastated by disease and had 
been chased hundreds of miles from their homes. Finally, imperial rivalries between 
France and Britain had broken the weak bonds that had tied the community together and 
had broken the Hurons into even smaller fragments. Their story seems to confirm the 
narrative of dissolution and shattering of native peoples throughout North America. Yet 
if the Hurons did persist in spite of all of this, if they did continue to be Huron, if they 
could overcome these serious divisions and remain a united people, the story reads much 
differently. Instead of seeing the Huron community, and others like it, as weak and 
238 The Huron linguist, John Steckley, suggests that Tionontates also used the autonym "Wendat." John 
Steckley, "How the Huron Became Wyandot: Onomastic Evidence," in Onamastica Canadiana, 70:198 
(1988): 59n2; For evidence that Hurons of Detroit continued to refer to themselves as "Wendats," see 
Potier, "Rescensement des Hurons," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 162, 230, 589, 590; "Donation des 
Hurons au Pere Potier," 22 Dec. 1780, in Ernest J. Lajeunesse, ed., Windsor Border Region (Toronto: The 
Champlain Society, 1960), 281. See also Charles Garrad and John Steckley, "A Review of TheRe-
Emergent Wyandot," Kewa: Newsletter of the London Chapter, Ontario Archaeological Society, 84:7 (Oct. 
1984), 10-14; Jules M. Boucher, "The Legacy oflouskeha and Tawiscaron," 14-18. 
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degraded, we should rather see them as cohesive and supple enough to survive the 
admittedly disastrous effects of colonialism. If even the Hurons-perhaps the most 
embattled people in the pays d'en haut next to the Foxes-survived as a united and 
distinct polity, other nations must have as well. The pays d' en haut, then, was peopled by 
a number of distinct nations who pursued their own goals and who interacted with the 
French, and sometimes the British, if and when it suited their current needs. 
Although the Hurons' internal crisis is the best documented, it was not 
exceptional. Other nations responded to the resumption of hostilities between the British 
and French in similar ways, and, like the Hurons, ultimately affirmed their commonality 
and membership in robust, distinct communities. The Ottawas living at Detroit, for 
example, developed different groups which favored the French and British. While the 
Sinago Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, adamantly supported the French, the Kiskakon leader 
Mikinic appeared inclined toward the British. Like Sastaresty and the French-aligned 
Hurons, Kinosaki and his followers swore their allegiance to the French, and Longueuil 
supplied provisions for them. 239 Yet Longueuil suspected that Mikinic, along with 
Ottawas and Ojibwas from Saginaw "would declare themselves against us."240 Mikinic' s 
wife, whose name the French did not deign to record, had in fact visited the British at 
239 
"Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart)," 1747-1748, COAM, C11A, vol. 87, fols. 180, 205; "Estate 
de Boeuf que moy jacques pilet Boucher ay tues Suivant les ordres de Mr de Longuetiil," 1747, ibid., vol. 
117, fol. 143; Certificat, 15 Oct. 1747, in ibid., vol. 118, fol. 96; "Etat des fournitures faites au Roy par 
ordres de M. Le Commadant par moy Derusseau," 20 Oct. 1747, in ibid., vol. 118, fol. 131; "Fournitures 
fait au Roy par moy Chesne," 30 Oct. 1747, in ibid., vol. 118, fol. 128; "Fourny pour leCompte du Roy 
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Oswego and returned to Detroit with two British flags and wampum belts.241 He 
reportedly claimed in council that he would decapitate Longueuil, "devour his heart and 
drink his blood." As had the Huron groups, the dispute among the Ottawas generated a 
serious controversy. Seventeen years later the Sinago leader Pontiac reported that he had 
confronted Mikinc and told him that, if he wished to kill the French "he would have to 
begin with me and my men" who would defend the Frenchmen. 242 Yet the Ottawas had 
quickly resolved their disputes. Soon after the conflict, the Ottawas of Detroit, joined by 
their Ottawa and Ojibwa kin from Saginaw, professed their unity and support for the 
British. By 1748 Longueuil counted Mikinac as "a trusty Outaouas chief."243 The 
Miamis likewise confronted and overcame similar factional disputes during this period?44 
The bonds connecting the Ottawas and Miamis, like the bonds connecting the Hurons, 
could not be cut so easily. 
241 [Raymond?] a Galissoniere, 1748, in ibid., vol. 97, fols. 396-96v. 
242 [Robert Navarre], "Journal," in Quaife, 99. 
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Great Lakes." In David C. Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds., The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
"Elder Brother ... in My Heart": The Local Context of Pontiac's War 
On 11 May 1763, the Detroit Ottawa Pontiac visited the Hurons and demanded 
they join his campaign to oust the British from the post. 1 The Ottawa leader had already 
invited the Hurons to participate earlier that spring and they had unceremoniously 
rejected the offer.2 Now, Pontiac insisted they join and threatened to "cut them to pieces" 
if they refused.3 Remonstrating against the Ottawas' threat of violence and presumption 
of authority over them, some of the Huron warriors suggested that they attack the 
Ottawas instead of the British.4 Ultimately, however opposed they were to Pontiac's war 
with the British, the Wendats had little choice but to consent to Pontiac's demand. 
Pontiac's coalition-composed of Ottawa, Potawatomie, and Ojibwe, and even some 
Huron warriors-vastly outnumbered the Hurons. As the Huron leader Theata lamented, 
even if the Hurons tried to flee Detroit, Pontiac's forces would "fall upon us and kill our 
wives and children and then compell us to assist them." The Hurons therefore grudgingly 
1 I use the Anglicized "Detroit" instead of the French "Detroit" to refer to the post during the periods of 
British and Anglo-American occupation (after 1760). 
2 Although Pontiac was never identified as a Sinago, indirect evidence suggests that he was. By the 1730s, 
two large and distinct Ottawa contingents, the Sinagos and Kiskakons, lived at Detroit ("Enumeration of 
the Indian Tribes connected with the Government of Canada," 1736, NYCD, 9:1058). During the siege, 
Pontiac reminded the French habitants that he had remained loyal to them during the 1747 crisis, but that 
Mikinic, the Kiskakon leader, had threatened to decapitate the French commandant. Pontiac claimed to 
have traveled to Mikinic's "village" to declare his loyalty to the French and convince Mikinic to remain 
loyal as well. This exchange strongly suggests Pontiac was not a Kiskakon, and was thus a Sinago. First, 
he had shown no deference whatsoever to Mikinic in 1747, nor to his memory in 1763, suggesting that he 
did not feel bound to respect the Kiskakon leader. Second, by noting that he "travelled" to Mikinic's 
"village" Pontiac indicated that he did not live in the same village as the Kiskakon Mikinic and hence 
revealed his Sinago identity. [Robert Navarre], "The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," in The Siege of 
Detroit in 1763: The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy and John Rutheiford's Narrative of a Captivity, ed. 
by Milo M. Quaife, trans. by R. Clyde Ford (R.R. Donnelley & Sons: Chicago, 1958), 99. 
3 Ibid., 62-65; quote from [Jehu Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," in Franklin Hough, ed., Diary of the 
Siege of Detroit, (Albany, NY: J. Munsell, 1865), 43 (quotation). 
4 
"Journal of Indian Congress,"15 December 1763, WJP, 10: 965. 
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conceded to Pontiac's demands, promising to join the siege of Detroit after they had 
celebrated Mass the following day.5 As the Hurons would later complain to anyone who 
would listen, they had been "compelled to take up arms against Detroit by the Outawas."6 
The confrontation on that May day was simply the most recent skirmish in a 
months' long struggle between the two nations, which itself was part of the generations-
long struggle between the Hurons and Ottawas for status in the region. In demanding that 
the Hurons join the campaign and demonstrating the Ottawas' superior strength, Pontiac 
sought to force the Hurons to acknowledge the Ottawas' status as elder brothers and to 
restore the order at Detroit. In resisting those attempts and working to undermine 
Pontiac's campaign, these Hurons asserted their autonomy and independence from the 
Ottawas. The drama, therefore, followed a familiar pattern of interaction between the 
two nations dating at least to their time at Michilimackinac, nearly a century before. In 
1763, just as they had in 1706 or 1738, the two inseparable allies struggled to assert 
power over one another. Conditions had, of course, changed through the years and 
different stresses and issues precipitated conflict at different times. But the long-running 
dynamic proved durable. Much had changed at Detroit, but much remained the same. 
The most recent Huron-Ottawa power struggle had been triggered by the fall of 
New France in 1760 and the subsequent British occupation of Detroit and the rest of the 
Great Lakes Region. Particularly, a dispute over how to respond to a set of grievances 
against the British pitted the old rivals against one another yet again. As the first section 
below describes, the Ottawas, who had been old and enthusiastic allies of the French, 
5 [Navarre], "The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 62-65. 
6 A Court of Enquiery held by Order of Major Gladwin to enquire into the Particulars of the Loss of the 
Post at Presque Isle, 9 July 1763, CCOD, 421-24. 
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reacted angrily and violently to disrespectful British behavior. Seeking to oust the British 
from the region to allow the French to return, Pontiac turned to his Anishinaabe allies 
throughout the Great Lakes in order to accomplish his ends, as his predecessors had done 
when threatened by external threats. 
Unlike the Ottawas, however, the Hurons had less reason to oppose the British 
and more incentive to support the new regime, as I discuss in the second section. Due to 
their long association with both the Iroquois and the British, the Hurons were able to 
claim an unprecedented degree of autonomy and authority after the fall of New France. 
By 1758 the Hurons had positioned themselves as mediators between the nations of the 
Great Lakes and the Anglo-Iroquois alliance. As a result, most, but not all, Hurons 
refused to participate in Pontiac's anti-British campaign in the spring and summer of 
1763. These differing reactions set up a power struggle between the Hurons and Ottawas, 
which I describe in the third section. Insisting that the Hurons acknowledge Ottawa 
seniority, Pontiac demanded that the Hurons participate in his campaign. Determined not 
only to assert their autonomy but to defend their newfound ascendance, the Hurons 
doggedly resisted these attempts. The conflict, like many before, was a fight for seniority 
at Detroit to determine, as Cadillac put it many years before, whether the Hurons or 
Ottawas would the "elder brothers" at Detroit. 7 
The story of Huron-Ottawa conflict during Pontiac's War tells us much about 
both the nature of the alliance between these peoples, which predated and long outlived 
this conflict, but also something about how colonialism worked at Detroit. In the first 
7 
"il [the Ottawas] sera avenir mon enfans cades, et vous hurons rentez vous aujourd'huy que parotre 
obeissance, nous avez pris dans mon Cceur et dans mes bien fait Le place de votre aisne," "Proces-verbaux 
des conseils tenus a Detroit," Aug. 1707, CAOM, CllA, vol. 26, fol. 123v, 
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instance, the conflict demonstrates, once again, that the vagaries of colonialism had not 
shattered the Hurons or Ottawas into feeble shards. Colonial pressures had not succeeded 
in breaking the barriers between the two communities, and had, in fact, sharpened those 
boundaries. The exchange between the peoples also testifies to the durability of the age-
old dynamic between the two peoples. The Hurons and Ottawas had long cooperated 
against common foes and had lived together at Chequarnegon Bay, Michilirnackinac, and 
finally Detroit-even in nearly adjacent villages since the 1750s. Still they had nurtured 
a determined rivalry and looked for opportunity to prevail over their neighbors. Even 
during one of the most celebrated examples of pan-Indian cooperation in American 
history, the Hurons and Ottawas bickered about who would rule at horne. Not even the 
unifying threat of a common enemy-which had unified the nations against the Iroquois 
in the seventeenth century and the Foxes more recently-could overcome the hostilities 
between the nations. This is not to say that this relationship was unchanging or stuck in 
time, only that this dynamic continued to operate according to a familiar logic in new 
circumstances. 
Moreover, the Huron-Ottawa conflict demonstrates the degree to which 
longstanding local concerns and relationships between native communities shaped 
Pontiac's War and, by extension, the exercise of colonial power in the Great Lakes 
region. The Huron-Ottawa rivalry affected every phase of the conflict, from its 
beginning to the final reconciliation between the combatants and the British. The 
relationship between the British and the peoples of Detroit, as had that between the 
French and those peoples, was shaped by the Huron-Ottawa relationship. And that 
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relationship was premised upon the Anishinaabe alliance which allowed the Ottawas to 
wield power in the region, and the Huron-Iroquois friendship which allowed the Hurons 
to claim enhanced status after 1760. In short, the relationship between the colonized and 
the colonizers was conditioned by and circumscribed within a set of relationships among 
native peoples. 
I. "welcome to our Country": The British Occupation of Detroit 
When British soldiers arrived to take possession of Detroit in early December 
1760, a few months after the French had surrendered Montreal to the British and signed 
articles surrendering New France to British forces, they found the peoples of Detroit 
welcoming. Although the nations had supported the French during much of the Seven 
Years' War, they had begun to waver as French military fortunes turned and the French 
proved unable to supply them with powder and merchandise.8 When the French 
abandoned Fort Duquesne in 1758 and surrender of Niagara in 1759, the peoples of the 
region began openly negotiating a separate peace with the British at the newly renamed 
Fort Pitt.9 Promising the natives unprecedented riches in the case of French defeat, the 
Britons pledged that "all the Rivers were to run in Rum, that presents from the great King 
were to be unlimited, [and] that all sorts of goods were to be in utmost plenty and so 
8 Michael N. McConnell, "The Search for Security: Indian-English Relations in the Trans-Appalachian 
Region, 1758-1763» (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, College of William and Mary, 1983); Peter MacLeod, 
The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996); Gregory Dowd, War 
under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002). 
9 
"George Croghan's Journal April 3, 1759 to April [30], 1763," ed. by Nicolas B. Wainwright, 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 71:4 (Oct. 1947): 305-444. 
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cheap as a Blanket for two Beavers."10 The peoples of Detroit, who had often traded with 
the British at Oswego and who now suffered severe shortages due to the blockade of 
British posts, defected from the French and pledged neutrality in further hostilities. 
Accordingly they not only allowed the British to take of possession of the post 
unopposed, but celebrated the change. Meeting George Croghan near the mouth of 
Detroit on 27 Nov., the Hurons, Ottawas, and Potawatomis "bid us welcome to their 
Country." 11 In the following months, they sold venison to the commandant for the 
garrison, and organized war parties against the Cherokees when the British invited them 
to do so. 12 In January of 17 61, the new British commandant of the post, Donald 
Campbell, found the peoples of the region "well pleased and seemingly reconsiled [sic] to 
the change of Govemment."13 
The honeymoon, however, proved short-lived. The peoples of Detroit and the rest 
of the region had apparently expected the British to administer Detroit on the same terms 
that the French had. Specifically, the natives expected the British to treat them as 
honored allies rather than subjects; they wanted them to continue offering cheap trading 
goods, distributing annual presents to each nation, and providing liquor. Yet the British 
10 
"A Court of Inquiry Ordered to Take the Depositions of the Following Persons Taken by the Savages in 
the Summer," 1763, CCOD, 662. 
11 
"Croghan's Journal, 1760-1761" in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:104-5, 110-13, at 113; Donald 
Campbell to Henry Bouquet, 2 Dec. 1760, in Louis Waddell, ed, The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 5, 
"September 1, 1760-0ctober 31, 1761» (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 
1984), 41. 
12 
"Croghan's Journal1760-1761," in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:117, 119; Campbell to Amherst, 
23 Jan. 1761, CCOD, 33; Campbell to Amherst, 14 Feb. 1761, ibid., 40; Campbell to Amherst, 10 March 
1761, in ibid., 51; Gladwin to Amherst, 26 Jan. 1763, ibid., 290. Regarding the Cherokees, see Croghan, 
"Journal," in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:116-17; Donald Campbell to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, 22 Mai 
1761, CCOD, 73; Meyer to Bouquet, 30 September 1761, Waddell, Bouquet Papers, 5:787; "Niagara and 
Detroit Proceedings, July-September 1761," WJP, 2:498; Gladwin to Amherst, 26 January 1763, CCOD, 
291; Johnson to Amherst, 19 June 1763, ibid., 525. 
13 Donald Campbell to Jeffrey Amherst, in ibid., 34. 
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quickly signaled that they had no intention of continuing the French practices or fulfilling 
their promises to the nations of Detroit. Eager to trim his budget in the aftermath of the 
war, Sir Jeffrey Amherst insisted that the commandants of Detroit and other officers in 
the region curtail their presents to the natives. The commander frequently refused to 
"purchas[e] the good behavior of the Indians, by presents."14 The traders, according to 
Pontiac, peddled shoddy goods on the natives for higher prices. 15 Donald Campbell, 
moreover, banned the sale of liquor to natives in early 1761, prompting the same dismay 
and outrage the French had encountered when they tried to do the same. 16 A Briton who 
had been held captive by the Ottawas listed the "prohibition of rum" as the Ottawas' 
"chief complaint" against the British.17 When Thomas Hutchins, a British officer, 
declined to supply the natives with an annuity in gunpowder, as the French had always 
14 Amherst to Johnson, 9 Aug. 1761, WJP, 3:515. Regarding the Ottawas' and others' expectation that the 
British would continue to distribute gifts and the British refusal to do so, see Amherst to Johnson, 22 Feb. 
1761, in ibid., 345; Campbell to Bouquet, 1 June 1761, Waddell, Bouquet Papers, 5:517; Campbell to 
Bouquet, 8 June 1761, in ibid., 533; Amherst to Campbell, 18 June 1761, CCOD, 554; Campbell to 
Amherst, 8 Nov. 1761, in ibid., 124; Amherst to Campbell, 21 March 1762, in ibid., 585; Campbell to 
Amherst, 20 April1762, in ibid., 163; Campbell to Amherst, 1 June 1762, in ibid., 176; "Gladwin's Orders 
to officers commanding the outposts," 27 Aug. 1762, in ibid., 213-14; Gladwin to Amherst, 9 Sept. 1762, in 
ibid., 204; Johnson to Lords of Trade, 1 July 1763, in NYCD, 7:525; Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, 30 
Dec. 1763, WJP, 4:281; Johnson to Lords of Trade, 13 Nov. 1763, NYCD, 7:575; McConnell, "The Search 
for Security," 296-304. 
15 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 22. 
16 Donald Campbell to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, 22 Mai 1761, CCOD, 71-74. Henri Bellestre, the last French 
commandant at Detroit, believed "drink which governs all your actions" to be the "Sole cause" of the 
natives' defection to the British in 1760 ("Il est facheux pour vous de vous etre laisse Seduire par les 
Ennemis d'Onontio: mais la boison qui gouverne toutes vos actions en est Seule cause"). "Conseil tenu a 
Detroit par les Hurons, Ouiatenons, Pouteouatamis et Sauteux a Fran<;ois-Marie Picote de Belestre et 
Reponse de Picote de Belestre," 28 Novembre 1760, CAOM, C11A, vol. 105, fols. 358-358v. 
17 
"A Court of Inquiry Ordered to Take the Depositions of the Following Persons Taken by the Savages in 
the Summer, 1763," 21 Feb. 1764, MPHSCR 27:662-63). Although this statement was certainly an 
exaggeration, it does signal the extent to which the peoples of Detroit had been motivated by Neolin's 
movement. That movement, after all, preached against the consumption of alcohol. Yet, native warriors 
frequently seized British rum and drank it during the siege, suggesting that, far from desiring to banish 
alcohol use, the natives sought to ensure their access to hard drink (Dowd, War under Heaven, 103-104). 
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done, he found that the natives "think it very strange that this Custom should be so 
immediately broke off by the English."18 
Not only did the British communicate their disregard for the natives by failing to 
satisfy these expectations, they often treated the natives with open contempt. While Capt. 
Campbell had treated them as generously as he could, his replacement, Major Henry 
Gladwin, neglected and mistreated the natives. According to later testimony, Gladwin 
not only failed to distribute gifts to the natives but also "call'd them hags and o{ Names, 
telling them to get along & go about their business, & would not hear them."19 Pontiac 
himself complained that the British had "endlessly" asked the natives how they "dared to 
speak" and reminded them that they, the British, were "the Masters of all these lands, & 
of all that which was your [French] father's." 20 Such declarations, combined with the 
neglect of traditional protocol, alienated the natives and British. They interpreted these 
grievances, quite logically, as evidence of British disregard for native people. Wh~reas 
Onontio had regarded the natives as indispensible allies and respected friends, Amherst 
saw them as racial inferiors and expensive liabilities. 21 
18 Lieut. Thomas Hutchins, "Journal," 1762, in Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., The Papers 
of Col. Henry Bouquet. (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942-1943) Series 21655:173. 
Other British officers and officials commented upon this disappointment as well (Campbell to Boquet, 11 
Dec. 1760, in Waddell, Bouquet Papers, 5:171; Croghan to Johnson, 1765, in Thwaites, Early Western 
Travels. 1: 172). 
19 
"A Court of Enquiery held by Order of Major Henry Gladwin Commandant at Detroit," 8 Sept. 1763, 
CCOD, 513. 
20 
"Les Anglois nous disent, sans cesse, quoi vous autre Sauvages ! vous osez parler ; voyer ce que nous 
avons fait ; Nous avons renverse votre pere & les Espagnols ; Nous sommes Maitres de toutes ces terres, & 
de tout ce qui etoit a votre pere," "Paroles des OutaDas appuyes par un grand Colier," 1763, CCOD:535. 
For other examples, see "Proceedings of a Court of Enquiery held by order of Major Henry Gladwin 
Commanding at the Detroit," 9 Aug. 1763, ibid., 522-23; [Jehu Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," in 
Diary of the Siege of Detroit, ed. by Franklin Hough, ed., (Albany, NY: J. Munsell, 1865), 3; [Navarre], 
"Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 22. 
21 William Nester, "Haughty Conquerors": Amherst and the Great Indian Uprising of 1763 (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2000), ix; Jon Parmenter, "Pontiac's War: Forging New Links in the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant 
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By 1761 the peoples of the nations had begun grumbling about what they 
perceived as an abrogation of their expectations. In September the Hurons, acting on 
behalf of all the nations, pressed Johnson to address the poor trading conditions at 
Detroit.22 The Ottawas likewise addressed the superintendent "chiefly on the begging 
order. ,m That frustration remained the next summer when Campbell reported that the 
nations of Detroit "grumble & even threaten us."24 An Onondaga man reported to 
Croghan that a large number of nations had convened at the Ottawa village at Detroit and 
met with unnamed Frenchmen from Michilimackinac. Croghan's informant concluded 
that these nations were "Meditating Something Against Us."25 Rumors from 
Michilimackinac also indicated trouble in that area?6 By the spring of 1763, and perhaps 
earlier, Pontiac and the Ottawas had conferred with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Ohio 
Iroquois to launch a coordinated strike against the British. Angered at the British and 
encouraged by the message of the Delaware mystic, Neolin, natives from Sault Ste. Marie 
to Fort Pitt and from Niagara to Green Bay colluded to strike against the British?7 
II. "Dogs Clothed in Red": The Anishinaabe Challenge to British Rule 
By at least the summer of 1762, these grievances had convinced Pontiac to drive 
the British (whom he called "dogs clothed in red" in reference to the redcoated British 
Chain, 1758-1766," Ethnohistory 44:4 (Fall, 1997): 617-54; Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians 
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), ch. 7; Dowd, War under Heaven; McConnell, "The Search for Security," 189-207. 
22 
"Niagara and Detroit Proceedings," July-September 1761," WJP 2:496. 
23 
"Conference at Detroit," 1761, WHC, 18:235. 
24 Campbell to Amherst, 1 June 1762, CCOD: 176a 
25 
"Indian Intelligence," 28 September 1762, WJP, 10:534-35. 
2~illiam Leslie to Amherst, 6 September 1762, CCOD, 229-30. 
27 Dowd, War under Heaven, 90-104. 
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regulars) out of the Great Lakes Region.28 Onontio would then return triumphantly, 
Pontiac believed, and restore the terms of the old alliance. Yet the Ottawa leader realized 
that his people were "too weak" to defeat the British garrison at Detroit?9 Accordingly, 
he held a council with the Potawatomis early in 1763 to ask for their help.30 In so doing, 
Pontiac did what his forebears had done whenever they felt Ottawa dominance was at 
risk: he enlisted his Anishinaabe neighbors to help him reassert Ottawa hegemony in the 
region. Pontiac's admission that the Ottawas could not carry out their plans without the 
help of the Potawatomis, as well as the Ojibwas, and his invocation of the Anishinaabe 
ties explain why they had been able to dominate affairs in the pays d' en haut during the 
French regime. By themselves the Ottawas represented a powerful, but ultimately limited 
force. They derived their clout in the region from maintaining close ties to Anishinaabe 
people. The Ottawas were economically, strategically, and culturally situated in an 
impressive regional network with Anishinaabe communities from Manitoulin, Sault Ste.-
Marie, and Michilimackinac in the north, Green Bay and St. Joseph in the west, and 
Detroit and Saginaw in the east. Stitched together by common interest, culture, and 
intermarriage, these Anishinaabe communities collaborated to deal with outside threats-
such as the Sioux, Foxes, and Southern Alliance-and moved goods throughout the 
region. It is thus no surprise that when another external enemy-the British-arrived and 
initiated a series of unwelcome reforms, Pontiac turned to his people's allies. Indeed 
28 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 16. 
29 Pontiac enjoyed the support of 250 Ottawa warriors, which outnumbered the British garrison of 156 (140 
effectives). Yet the British force, well-armed and fortified and larger by far than the French garrison had 
ever been, still intimidated Pontiac, and he thus looked for support from his neighbors. Ibid, 29; Return of 
the Detachment, 21 Feb., 1763, CCOD, 312. 
30 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 5. 
255 
Pontiac himself may have been the child of both Ottawa and Ojibwa parents. The same 
intimacy and cooperation among the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas, which 
Pontiac's own personal heritage demonstrates, made Pontiac's War possible. As British 
observers frequently noted, Pontiac's coalition was primarily an Anishinaabe one-led 
by Anishinaabe leaders like Pontiac and carried out by Anishinaabe warriors. James 
MacDonald, a lieutenant present at Detroit during the siege reported that the conspiracy 
had been generated "particularly by the Ottawa Nation."31 
Pontiac and the Ottawas had not been eager to see the French go and had never 
really reconciled themselves to the Britons' arrival. During the war, they had provided 
energetic support for the French allies. Louis Antoine de Bourgainville identified the 
Ottawas, along with the Ojibwas and Potawatomis as the "most attacked to our interests, 
never having dipped their hands in the blood of any Frenchman."32 At Fort Duquesne in 
1757, for example, Pontiac had made a full-throated defense of the French alliance. He 
severely reprimanded George Croghan for claiming, incorrectly, that the British had 
already taken Quebec and his neighbors who had been foolish enough to believe the Irish 
trader's lies.33 During the siege of Fort Niagara in 1759, Ottawa warriors defending the 
31 MacDonald, "Journal," CCOD, 3; The Delawares only identified the "Ottawas & Chepawas" among the 
hostile nations at the end of May 1763. "Indian Intelligence," 27 May 1763, WJP, 10:686. A few weeks 
later, Edward Jenkins concluded that the "Ottawas and Chippewains have drawed" the other nations into 
the present crisis. Jenkins to Amherst, 11 June, CCOD, 431. Gladwin identified the "Ottawas and 
Chippawas" as the, two instigators. Gladwin to Amherst, 8 July 1763, CCOD, 395. Daniel Claus 
concluded that "none but the Chipeways at Missilimk and those of the same Nation & Ottawas at Detroit" 
were "concerned in the present Breach." Daniel Claus to Johnson, 6 Aug. 1763, WJP, 10:778. Gladwin 
bitterly wished that the "Ottawas were eat up" because of their centrality in the violence. Gladwin to 
Johnson, 11 May 1764, in ibid., 11:192. William Edgar cursed "our most implacable Enemys the 
Ottawas." William Edgar to Johnson, 1 Nov. 1763, in ibid., 10:915. 
32 Louis Antoine de Bourgainville, "Memoires sur l'etat de la Nouvelle-France de Bougainville," RAPQ, 
1923-24, 4:46. 
33 Unfortunately the letter itself has been lost and all that remains is a brief description in William 
Johnson's calendar of papers., see WJP, 1:771. 
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French installation vowed to "die with their [French] father."34 Later that year, the 
Ottawas were poised to torture and kill an English prisoner, when a Huron man 
intervened to save his life.35 Even in the waning moments of the French regime, many 
Ottawas refused to abandon Onontio. While some Ottawas had decided to support the 
British by the end of 1759, the nation was "devided, some remaining in the French 
Interest."36 Early the next year, an Iroquois man who had long lived with the Hurons at 
Detroit reported that the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and a few other nations were contemplating 
an attack on the Iroquois and the British that year, and felt certain that the Ottawas would 
defend Detroit from the British.37 In August 1761, an Ottawa man told ... Gamelin, a 
French merchant, that "Detroit would be destroyed in a few days."38 Clearly, the Ottawas 
remained loyal to Onontio long after the Hurons had embraced the British. As Pontiac 
said shortly before he led a coalition against the British in 1763: "I am French, and I want 
to die French."39 
British conduct after 1760 did nothing to endear themselves to the Ottawas. 
Pontiac was personally insulted by British behavior. Pontiac accused the British traders 
' 
of charging double what the French merchants had, denying them credit, and foisting 
shoddy wares on them. Moreover, the British had "insulted" the Ottawas. Instead of 
"bewailing" the deaths of prominent native peoples as the French had, Pontiac claimed, 
34 Pierre Pouchot, "Journal of the Siege of Niagara," in NYCD, 10:982. 
35 
"Journal of George Croghan," in Nicolas B. Wainwright," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography, 71:4 (Oct. 1947): 354. 
36 Ibid., 360. 
37 Ibid., 370-71. 
38 
"Minutes of the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson Bart with the Indians on his Way to, and at the 
Detroit in 1761," WJP, 2:460. 
39 [Navarre], "Journal, of Pontiac's Conpiracy", 100. 
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Gladwin only "laughs at me."40 When the Shawnees and Delawares spread Neolin's 
prophesy and invited the Ottawas to join an anti-British campaign, then, the Ottawas 
proved more than willing to join the coalition. 
To build his anti-British coalition, Pontiac relied largely on the networks of 
kinship and culture that bound Anishinaabe peoples living in the critical nodes of 
Michilimackinac, Saginaw, St. Joseph, and Detroit. Before Pontiac could reach out to his 
Anishinaabe neighbors, however, he first had to convince his own people-the Detroit 
Ottawas-to join the fight. Despite the coronation of Pontiac as the Detroit nation's 
"greatest Chief (or King as they are pleased to call him)" and "over-chief' by European 
observers, Pontiac lacked the authority to command his community to act. He had to 
build consensus among not only his fellow Sinagos at Detroit, but also the Kiskakons 
living at the Ottawa village.41 Though close neighbors, members of the two Ottawa tribes 
living at Detroit had often competed for status.42 The defection of the Ottawa leader 
Mahiganne, who informed Gladwin about Pontiac's attempted coup and thereby probably 
saved Detroit from capture, indicates the difficulty that Pontiac had in creating consensus 
40 (Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 22, 97-98; Amherst to Lords of Trade, in Hough, ed., 
Diary of the Siege of Detroit, xiii-xiv; "A Court of Inquiry Ordered to Take the Depositions of the 
Following Persons Taken by the Savages in the Summer, 1763," 21 Feb. 1764, MPHSCR, 27:662-63. 
41 James MacDonald, "Journal of the Siege of Detroit By Lieutenant James MacDonald of the 60th Reg\ 
Oct.," (1763], CCOD, 2; [Navarre], "Journal ofPontiac's Conspiracy," 129. 
42 When the Kiskakon Mikinic learned that the French had given the Sinago leader Kinosaki an ornate suit 
of clothes, the leader demanded the same tokens of esteem. "Occurrences in Canada during the year, 1747-
1748," in NYCD, 10:147-49. 
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even among his own people.43 Nonetheless, he won over a sufficient "Number of Men" 
h . . C" d 44 among IS nation to move 10rwar . 
Once he had convinced the Detroit Ottawas to join the anti-British campaign, 
Pontiac began building a regional alliance through his Anishinaabe connections. As we 
have seen, he first turned to his Potawatomi neighbors for help at least by the spring of 
1763, and the Detroit Potawatomis, led by the leader Ninivois, joined the campaign. 
Although Robert Navarre, a French notary at Detroit who chronicled the conflict, 
indicated that the Potawatomi leader only consented because "Pontiac was his superior 
chief and treacherous" and the Potawatomis themselves later claimed that Pontiac had 
"obliged" them to participate, the Potawatomis apparently joined the coalition willingly.45 
They shared the Ottawas' grievances against the British and a stake in preserving 
Anishinaabe dominance in the region. Accordingly, Ninivois hosted a conference of the 
conspirators at the Potawatomi village on 5 May, and the Potawatomi warriors 
participated eagerly from the beginning of the siege.46 When Pontiac asked Gladwin to 
allow Donald Campbell to attend a meeting outside the fort, he left two Potawatomi men 
43 [Navarre,] "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 24; "Indian Intelligence," 4 July 1764, WJP, 11:218; 
Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte I, in Robert Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, (Ottawa : Les 
Presses de l'Universite d'Ottawa, 1996), 237. 
44 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 4; [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 43. 
45 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 5; MacDonald, "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," CCOD, 
13. For other protestations of the Potawatomis' relative innocence, see [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of 
Detroit," 22-24, 27, 43. According to a conference between Iroquois representatives and Johnson, the 
Potawatomis claimed that the Ottawas had threatened to kill them if they did not participate and that they 
only cooperated in order "to save their Lives." "Journal of Indian Congress," 15 Dec. 1763, WJP, 10:965. 
46 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 21,59-61, 65, 101, 107, 133; [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of 
Detroit," 84-85. 
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as sureties for their safety, indicating the degree to which the Potawatomis were 
implicated in the proceedings. 47 
In addition to supporting the siege at Detroit, the post's Potawatomis also worked 
to enlist the "rest of their Nation at St. Josephs" in the anti-British campaign.48 As the St. 
Joseph Potawatomis later testified, the Detroit Potawatomis had "solicited us often to join 
them" in attacking the British.49 Although the Potawatomis living at St. Joseph initially 
resisted these efforts and even "declar' d great deal of Friendship for the Garrison" in 
mid-May, the Detroit Potawatomis finally convinced their "Relations" at Fort St. Joseph 
to join in the campaign by the end of the month. 5° A delegation of Detroit Potawatomis 
arrived at St. Joseph on the morning of 25 May and informed their kin that the siege had 
begun at Detroit. Later that day a party of Potawatomis, including a leader named 
Washee (Washashe) entered the British fort to meet with Francis Schlosser, the 
commanding officer. On cue, these Potawatomis seized Schlosser while other warriors 
stormed the fort and killed ten of the thirteen British soldiers billeted there. 51 After 
sacking Fort St. Joseph, many of the Potawatomi warriors travelled to Detroit with their 
relatives and captives and participated in attacks on the post. Some of these Potawatomis 
came to Detroit "to join the Potawatomis of Detroit" in June. 52 Seventy more 
47 MacDonald, "Diary the Siege of Detroit," CCOD, 7; Richard Winston to Johnson, 19 June 1763, CCOD, 
415; [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 137-38. 
48 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 42. 
49 Gladwin to Amherst, 11 Aug. 1763, CCOD, 481 
50 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 11; "A Court of Enquiery held by Order of Major Henry Gladwin 
to Enquire into the Manner of the taking of the Forts Sandusky, St. Joseph, Miamis & Presquill," 6 July 
1763, CCOD, 325-26. 
51 Ibid.; [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 24-25. 
52 
"Testimony of Caesar McCormick and Samson Fleming," 11 June 1763, CCOD, 408; [Navarre], 
"Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 130-31. 
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Potawatomi warriors arrived later that summer. 53 After Pontiac lifted the siege in the late 
summer of 1763, some Potawatomis remained with the Ottawas, with whom they formed 
a "flying camp."54 Potawatomi warriors loitered around Detroit much of the following 
winter and spring, hoping to "take a Scalp if possible."55 Thus their later protestations 
that the Ottawas had forced them into the campaign against their will, the Potawatomis 
seemed to have eagerly supported their Ottawa cousins against the British. 
Pontiac also convinced his Ojibwa neighbors, the Mississaguas and Sauteux 
settled around Lake St. Claire, and even those living on the Thames River near Lake Erie, 
Saginaw Bay, and Sault Ste.-Marie, to join the siege at Detroit. On 5 May, just three 
days before he first tried to surprise the British fort, Pontiac told the Potawatomis and the 
pro-French Hurons that he had "sent wampum belts and messengers to our brothers, the 
Chippewas of Saginaw, and to our brothers, the Ottawas of Michilimackinac, and to those 
of the Thames River to join us."56 The very next day, Ojibwas from the vicinity of Lake 
St. Clair attacked a small detachment, took the Englishman John Rutherford captive, and 
tortured, killed, and, according to Rutherford, ritually cannibalized two Englishmen.57 In 
so doing, the Ojibwas became the first nation to initiate violence against the British 
during the conflict. Some of these warriors from the Lake St. Clair villages came to 
53 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 69-70. 
54 
"Enumeration of Indians within the Northern Department," 18 Nov. 1763, in NYCD, 7:583. 
55 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 84-85, 88, 91. The Potawatornis were apparently still unsatisfied 
in December 1754 when they killed two Anglo-American soldiers "within a few hundred Yards the fort" at 
Detroit ("Indian Intelligence from Detroit," 20 Dec. 1764, in Kent and Stevens, The Papers of Col Henry 
Bouquet, Series 21655: 254). 
56 [Navarre], "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," 24. 
57 
"John Rutherford's Captivity Narrative," in Quaife, The Siege of Detroit in 1763, 224-31. Pontiac also 
indicated that the Ojibwas were privy to his plot when he blamed an Ojibwa woman for informing Gladwin 
of the impending attack. That an Ojibwa woman would be aware of the intended attack-or at least that 
Pontiac would believe so-indicates the Ojibwas' involvement in the plan and the violence. [Navarre], 
"Journal of the Siege of Detroit," 30-31. 
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Detroit before the middle ofMay.58 These "Saulteurs" had met with Pontiac and had 
together asked the French habitants for aid and supplies to support their cause. After 
Pontiac had spoken, they testified that they "approve[ d) the words of the OutaOas" and 
promised to "always hold the hand of our [French] father."59 
Together with Pontiac, the Lake St. Claire Ojibwas had also sent "Belts of 
Wampm" to their real and fictive kin around Saginaw and Sault Ste. Marie and 
Michilimackinac in May, informing them of the "Rupture with the English" and inviting 
them to participate.60 On 15 May Navarre learned that Pontiac expected 
"reinforcements ... from the Chippewas of Grand [Thames] River" (in southern Ontario 
near Lake Erie) to arrive imminently.61 Those reinforcements, a hundred and twenty 
Mississauga warriors led by the leader Sekahos, arrived sometime around 21 May, and 
almost fifty more arrived in early June.62 At about the same time, the Saginaw Ojibwa 
leader Wasson (Warsong) arrived at Detroit with even more warriors.63 The Ojibwa 
58 Rutherford reported around 9 May that the Ojibwa family that had captured and later adopt him had left 
"to join the rest of the warriors encamped at Detroit," suggesting that there were already Ojibwas in 
Pontiac's camp. "John Rutherford's Captivity Narrative," in Quaife, The Siege of Detroit in 1763, 224-26, 
233. 
59 
'Tapprouve les paroles des OutaDas," "Je tiens toujours la main de notre pere," Paroles des Sauteurs, 
[1763], CCOD, 536. This document is unfortunately only dated to the year 1763 and does not give the date 
of this conference. We do know that Pontiac held a council with the influential habitants, including the 
merchant Antoine Cuillerier, on 12 May 1763, and this could be from that meeting. MacDonald, "Journal 
of the Siege of Detroit," 1763, in ibid., 6,8; "Testimony of Caesar McCormick and Samson Fleming," 11 
June 1763, in ibid., 407-409. The Ottawas, their co-conspirators, and the "oldest of the French settlers," 
also met on 18 May to send a request for help from the French stationed in Illinois, so these words could 
date from then as well. [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 87. 
60 The Ojibwas from the Sault St. Marie and Michilimackinac area claimed that they had received belts 
from Pontiac "in conjunction with ye Chiefs of their Nation living there [Detroit]." Daniel Claus to 
Johnson, 6 Aug. 1763, WJP, 10:778. 
61 [Navarre], "The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 61, 79. 
62 Ibid., 79, 128-29. 
63 Wasson later contended that he was not "concern'd in the Beginning of the Insurrection." [Hay], "Diary 
of the Siege of Detroit," 22,40-41, at 103; [Navarre], "The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 121, 175; 
"John Rutherford's Captivity Narrative," in Quaife, The Siege of Detroit in 1763,247, 255; John 
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communities around Michilimackinac and Sault Ste. Marie also heeded the call to arms. 
The Ojibwas surprised the garrison at Michimackinac on 2 June and took the commander 
George Etherington hostage. 64 Later that month, some Ojibwa warriors from the Sault 
came to Detroit, where they reinforced Pontiac's army.65 Although the headman 
Kinonchamek publicly chastised Pontiac for his brutality during the siege, and especially 
for damaging French habitant property, some of these northern Ojibwas apparently joined 
Pontiac's army. 66 "Seventy Soutones [Saulteux] or Chippawas" joined the others in late 
July.67 Charlotte, a "French savage" sent by Pontiac to the French in the illinois Country, 
alleged that a thousand Ojibwa warriors had arrived in 200 canoes sometime in August. 
Although Pontiac surely inflated this number in order to impress the French and convince 
them to send a French army to Detroit, the number suggests the Ojibwa's key role in the 
siege.68 By Navarre's estimates, the Ojibwa warriors outnumbered Ottawa fighters 320 
to 250, and Pontiac feared alienating a "nation superior in numbers to his own."69 These 
warriors participated in every stage of the siege, and, after it ended, many of these lived 
with Pontiac in his settlement on the Maumee River.7° Contemporary observers 
Montresor, "Journals of Capt. John Montresor," in G. D. Skull, Collections of the New- York Historical 
Society for the Year 1881. vol. 4. (New York: New York Historical Society, 1882), 283, 288. 
64 Etherington to Gladwin, 12 June 1763, CCOD, 411-14; Daniel Claus to Johnson, 6 Aug. 1763, WJP, 
10:777-78; [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 50. 
65 A native woman named Charlot, whom Pontiac had sent to appraise the French officers in the Illinois 
posts of what had happened at Detroit, somewhat implausibly claimed that a thousand Sauteur warriors had 
arrived at Detroit shortly before her departure. "Deposition du Nomme Charlot sauvage francaise Et Eleve 
ala Religion Catholique," Oct. 1763, CAOM, C11A, vol. 105, fols. 417-17v; [Navarre], "The Journal of 
Pontiac's Conspiracy,"143; Jenkins to Amherst, 28 July 1763, CCOD, 445. 
66 [Navarre], "The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 155. 
67 MacDonald, "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," 1763, CCOD, 13. 
68 
"Deposition du Nomme Charlot," Oct. 1763, COAM, CllA, vol. 105, fols. 417-17v. 
69 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy,"129; "The Captivity Narrative of John Rutherford," in 
Quaife, The Siege of Detroit in 1763, 255. 
70 
"Indian Intelligence," 4 July 1764, WJP, 11:218. The Potawatornis persisted in their hostility at least 
until December 1763. Neyon de Villers to d' Abbadie, WHC, 18:259-60. 
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frequently identified both the Ojibwas and the Ottawas as the chief instigators and 
executors of the violence.71 Daniel Claus, an Indian department official stationed in 
Montreal, reported in August that he could "find none but the Chipeways at Missilmk and 
those of the same Nation & Ottawas at Detroit, are concerned in the present Breach."72 
Of the 870 warriors that Navarre estimated had amassed at Detroit in early July, 
all but fifty Hurons belonged to an Anishinaabe community. The siege of Detroit was, 
for all intents and purposes, an Anishinaabe project begun for reasons particular to the 
Anishinaabe peoples and carried out by them. Granted, non-Anishinaabe groups in the 
Great Lakes Region, like the Miamis and Weas, staged attacks on forts near where they 
lived, but their involvement seemed incidental compared to that of the Anishinaabe. 
Many Miamis lived closer to Detroit than some of the Ojibwa and Potawatomi 
participants, after all, but none apparently cooperated in the assault of Detroit. 
If the Anishinaabe acted in concert to remove the British from the Great Lakes 
region, they did not act in lockstep. Playing out a familiar dynamic, the Anishinaabe 
peoples acted with remarkable solidarity, but nonetheless acted as autonomous and 
sovereign nations. Despite being heralded as the "head chief of all the northern nations," 
Pontiac failed to convince some of his neighbors to join his coalition, and even those who 
did continued to act as autonomous peoples.73 Although Pontiac persuaded the Ojibwas 
from Michilimackinac, Sault-Ste.-Marie, and Lake St. Clair and the Potawatomis from 
both Detroit and Fort St. Joseph to participate in his anti-British campaign, he utterly 
71 For instances of the British and native people identifying the Ottawas and Ojibwas as the chief culprits, 
see "Indian Intelligence," 27 May 1763, WJP, 10:686; Jenkins to Amherst, 11 June, 1763, CCOD, 431; 
Gladwin to Amherst, 8 July 1763, ibid., 395. 
72 Daniel Claus to Johnson, 6 Aug. 1763, WJP, 10:778. 
73 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 7. 
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failed to convince others to join him. The Mississauga Ojibwas living near Toronto, for 
example, refused to join their Anishinaabe cousins during the conflict and remained loyal 
to the British.74 Some Saginaw "Indians"-presumably Kiskakon Ottawas-likewise 
disclaimed participation in the hostilities, telling Gladwin that their people "had not 
enter'd into the War." 75 More seriously and likely more poignantly, Pontiac could not 
convince his fellow Ottawas living at the Jesuit mission at Arbre Croche, near 
Michilimackinac, to join his cause. When Pontiac sent a wampum belt to the 
Michilimackinac Ottawas, the headman Bindanowan "scarcely looked on, & imediately 
threw away," or at least claimed to have done so.76 Even threats from the Ojibwas, who 
had accepted Pontiac's invitation, could not budge the resolute Michilimackinac Ottawas. 
When they learned that the Ojibwas from Sault Ste. Marie had attacked Michimackinac, 
the Ottawas reacted angrily and intervened to save the British survivors. In July these 
Ottawas and their Jesuit missionary visited Detroit, where they angrily reproached 
Pontiac and his people for having struck against the British.77 
Even those Anishinaabe peoples who had cooperated with Pontiac pursued their 
own course and acted independently from Pontiac. Emissaries from the Sault Ste. Marie 
Ojibwas, for example, visited Pontiac during the siege and chastised him for the brutality 
74 Heidi Bohak:er, "Nindoodemag: Anishinaabe Identities in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1900 
(PhD. Diss., Dept. of History, University of Toronto, 2006), 263-66. 
75 
"A Court of Enquiry held by Order of Major Henry Gladwin Cornrnandant at Detroit," 8 Sept. 1763, 
CCOD, 514; WJP, 10:861. 
76 
"A Conference with Foreign Nations," 9-11 Aug. 1764, WJP, 4:466, 476; "An Indian Congress," 17 July 
1764, WJP, 11:302. 
77 Etherington to Gladwin, 12 June 1763, CCOD, 411-14; Gladwin to Amherst, 8 July 1763, ibid., 391-93; 
Gladwin to Amherst, 26 July 1763, ibid., 441b; Daniel Claus to Johnson, 6 Aug. 1763, WJP, 10:777; "An 
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of the siege there, particularly the damage to French habitant property and lives.78 The 
Ojibwas and Ottawas, furthermore, feuded in early June. After the French killed one of 
Wasson's nephews on 4 July, the Ojibwa leader blamed Pontiac for his "ill look [luck]" 
and for having "caus'd them [the Saginaw Ojibwas] to enter into the War."79 To appease 
Wasson, Pontiac grudgingly surrendered the former commandant, Donald Campbell, 
whom the Ottawas had held hostage since early May. When the Ojibwa leader promptly 
killed Campbell, a well-liked and valuable captive, the Ottawas were "enraged ... and 
resolved upon having satisfaction." Rutherford thought that there might be a "war" 
between the Ottawas and Ojibwas, while Jehu Hay, a British lieutenant serving at Detroit 
who kept a journal chronicling the crisis, reported that the groups had "quarrel' d and 
were going to separate."80 When the siege stalemated and the tide began to turn against 
Pontiac in July, furthermore, the Potawatomis defected from Pontiac's camp. Claiming 
that Pontiac had "hurried" them into the rebellion and "obliged" them to participate, they 
sought to distance themselves from the Ottawas.81 They repeatedly met with Gladwin in 
July, pleaded for forgiveness, and turned over the loot and the prisoners they had taken. 82 
Six Sauks who lived with the Potawatomis later alleged that the Potawatomis had only 
pretended to make peace in order to ransom one of their leaders whom the British had 
detained. 83 Yet the Potawatomis' willingness to conduct diplomacy without the Ottawas, 
discuss a separate peace that excluded Pontiac, and blame the entire affair entirely on the 
78 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 143-45. 
79 Ibid., 175; [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 40-41. 
8° Captivity Narrative of John Rutherford, in Quaife, The Siege of Detroit 1763, 247; [Hay], "Diary of the 
Siege of Detroit,", 48. 
81 [Hay] Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 27; MacDonald, "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," CCOD, 13-14. 
82 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 135, 137-38, 178-79, 184-85; [Hay], "Diary ofthe Siege of 
Detroit,", 22-27, 38, 41-43, 46-47; MacDonald, 13) 
83 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit,", 84-85. 
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Ottawas demonstrates just how far Anishinaabe solidarity stretched. The Potawatomis, 
like the Ojibwas, remained independent from Pontiac and the Ottawas. 
Once again in the spring and summer of 1763 the Anishinaabe peoples had 
responded to a common cause of concern in the region. They had called on ties of 
kinship stretching across a wide geographic span to act in their shared interest and to 
defeat a foreign interloper. Once again those peoples had acted not as a monolithic 
whole, but as a collection of closely related and allied but ultimately autonomous 
peoples. This dynamic, worked out decades and even centuries before 1763, made 
Pontiac's War possible. Yet this Anishinaabe cooperation against the British also set up 
a confrontation between the old rivals, the Hurons and the Ottawas. While the 
Anishinaabe peoples had good reasons to oppose and little incentive to support the 
British, the Hurons had every reason to support them: their newfound regional 
ascendency owed everything to their exceptional connections to the Iroquois and British 
Gust as the Ottawas' former dominance had been a product of their connections to the 
Potawatomis and Ojibwas). The disruption of the status quo at Detroit therefore sparked 
another Huron-Anishinaabe conflict which became intertwined with the larger struggle 
between the British and the anti-British coalition. 
III. "the Head of the Ottawa Confederation": The Hurons and Pontiac 
At the same time he invited the Potawatomis to join his campaign, Pontiac also 
asked his Huron neighbors to join the conspiracy. While some Hurons led by Sastaretsy 
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and Take consented, others firmly refused to do so.84 Speaking for the Huron majority, 
the turtle hontaxen elders Babi and Theata dismissively returned Pontiac's war belt 
without "caring to listen" to his proposals. 85 These Hurons' curt dismissal of Pontiac's 
plan reveals their attitudes toward the British and highlights a fundamentally different 
reaction to the fall of New France from the Ottawas. While the Ottawas were never 
much impressed with the British newcomers and welcomed Neolin's anti-British 
prophesy, the Hurons seemed quite reconciled with the British occupation of Detroit and 
quite ambivalent about the prospect of a return to French rule. In fact, as one Onondaga 
man told Sir William Johnson in July 1761, "many of the Ottawas were not yet well 
inclined toward us, but that the Wiandots seemed to be entirely our [Great Britain's] 
friends." Early that summer, the Hurons had even thwarted a Seneca plan to form an 
anti-British coalition, and they been "vastly pleased" when the Onondaga informant told 
them that other five nations had no part in the Seneca conspiracy. 86 
Ultimately, the Hurons proved better inclined toward the British than the Ottawas 
and other Anishinaabe peoples because the advent of British rule had been an marked 
84 Navarre identifies a man named Take as the chief leader of the "bad band" of Hurons, meaning those 
who collaborated with Pontiac, but that name does not appear anywhere in the Pierre Potier's writings. 
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in Kent and Stevens, The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet, Series 21655: 228. Sastaretsy spoke for the 
"Hurons of Sandusky," indicating that he was the leader of the pro-French faction which had taken refuge 
at Sandusky after the siege in 1763. "Bradstreet's Articles of Peace," 12 August 1764, WJP, 4:503; "Treaty 
of Peace," 12 Aug. 1764, WJP, 11:330. The British routinely appended the prefix "ag" to the name 
Sastaretsy, referring to him as "Augshatghregi chief of all the Hurons" and "Agstaghregck," the "Chief 
Man of the Hurons." "Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pontiac and other Indians," July 1766, 
WJP, 10:854; "Indian Proceedings," April1762, WJP, 3:699. Moreover the death of "Aughstaghregi chief 
of all the Hurons" in July 1766 coincided with the internment of "sastaretsi" in the Huron cemetery. Ibid.; 
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boon for the Hurons. Their old friendship with Iroquois had led to a mediated but 
meaningful relationship with the British, which had begun in the seventeenth century and 
intensified since the 1740s. Because the Hurons enjoyed this relationship and the 
Ottawas and others did not, the British chose to treat the Hurons as their representatives 
at Detroit and in the region, a move which greatly enhanced the Hurons' status and 
influence in the region. In 1761, in fact, Johnson told the Hurons at Detroit that "he 
looked upon them as the head of the Ottawa Confederacy," in which he included most of 
the peoples of the eastern Great Lakes Region. 87 These Huron heads of the titular Ottawa 
Confederacy in fact dominated diplomacy in the region between 1759 and 1762. This 
special relationship and the Huron ascendency it made possible ensured at least partial 
Huron support for the British in 1763 and 1764. It also ensured that Pontiac's struggle 
with the British would be bound up and invested with the long Huron-Ottawa rivalry. 
This is not to say that the Hurons had no grievances with British rule. They had 
just as much reason to complain of the high prices, the neglect of protocol, and the 
dismissive British attitudes as the Ottawas, and some Hurons led by Sastaretsy even 
accepted Pontiac's war belt. Yet, unlike the Ottawas, the Hurons also had incentive to 
support British rule. The Hurons, beneficiaries of the transition from French to British 
rule, had good reason to support the British and the new political order they represented, 
even if they, like the other nations of the pays d' en haut, resented some of the British 
practices. In the sophisticated calculus of geopolitics, the promise of Huron ascendency 
over the Ottawas at least partially compensated for these grievances. For this reason, 
87 Ibid., 494. 
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many Hurons declared neutrality and actively collaborated with the British against the 
Ottawas and Pontiac. 
The Hurons owed their newfound ascendency at Detroit to their unusually close 
relationship with the Iroquois and the British. A large and "very Curiously wrought" 
wampum belt that the Hurons presented to Conrad Weiser in 1748 symbolizes both the 
intensity and dynamic of that relationship. According to Weiser, the belt displayed seven 
human figures "holding one another by the Hand." The Hurons explained that the figure 
on one end represented the "King of Great Britain," that the middle five figures 
represented the five original nations of the Haudensaunee alliance, and that the last figure 
represented the Hurons. Two parallel lines ran under the figures along the length of the 
belt. 88 The Hurons told Weiser that the governor of New York and the Five Nations had 
given them the belt some fifty years before to symbolize the covenant which the Hurons 
had just made with the Iroquois and the English. 89 The belt, in other words, was the one 
that the Lord Cornbury had given the Huron delegates at the 1702 council at Albany. 
The device-which the Hurons had carefully curated for fifty years-eloquently 
symbolizes not only the intimate connection that the Hurons, uniquely among the nations 
of the Great Lakes region, enjoyed with the Iroquois and British, but also the central 
dynamic of that relationship. The Hurons' relationship with the British had always been 
mediated by and inextricable from their relationship with their Iroquois cousins. The 
88 According to Jon Parmenter, the "Two Row" design on the belt, a common motif on Iroquoian wampum 
belts, symbolized the notion of a "kaswentha" relationship between two peoples. In this relationship, the 
parties recognized their mutual interest and cooperation, but promised to respect the other's sovereignty 
and not to attempt to "steer" its allies course (Parmenter, At the Wood's Edge, 24). 
89 
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"Ancient Chain of Friendship," as a Huron speaker later put it, existed "between our 
Ancestors the Six Nations & you [the British]."90 As the Hurons oriented themselves 
toward the Ohio Valley between 1738 and 1763, their relationships with both Iroquois 
and the British grew exponentially. 
The key to the Hurons' relationship with the British rested, as it always had, on 
the close identification between the Iroquois and Hurons, an identification which 
increased after 1738. The latest Sastatesty testified eloquently to this intimacy when 
commandant Fran<;ois Marie Picote, sieur de Belestre, invited the nations of Detroit to 
strike the Six Nations people in the Ohio Valley in March 1758. When some of the 
nations agreed to the attack, Sastaretsy-presumably the man who had taken the title 
when the previous Sastaretsy died in 1747-reacted angrily. Grabbing the belt that 
Belestre had presented, he chastised his neighbors for so easily betraying the Iroquois. 
The Huron leader rhetorically asked how "1, whom am Flesh and Blood of the Six 
Nations and in whose Towns Number of our Friends & Children are living and settled, 
declare War against them." He then reminded his neighbors that they, too, were allied 
with the Six Nations and implored them to reject the "French Hatchet." Sastaretsy 
handed the belt, meaningfully, to the Miamis, fellow members of the decayed Southern 
Alliance with the Hurons and Senecas, who likewise rejected the belt.91 
90 
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Sastaretsy's angry reaction to Belestre's invitation and unwillingness to attack the 
Six Nations testifies to the long-term and exclusive relationship between the Hurons and 
the Iroquois, especially the Senecas. Reaching back to Cheanonvouzon's time, and even 
into the late seventeenth century, the Hurons had enjoyed social intimacy and diplomatic 
cohesion with the Six Nations which the other peoples of Detroit had been unable to 
match. The "great affinity" that Clairambault d' Aigremont had noted between the 
Hurons and Iroquois in 1708 had persisted well after Cheanonvouzon' s death in 1707, but 
the conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738 intensified the relationship even 
further. 92 Shortly after that conflict, the Ottawas, well aware of the Iroquois' and 
Hurons' intimacy, implored the Six Nations to remain neutral in the affair.93 Yet the 
Senecas invited the Hurons to join them once again and the Hurons seemed ready to do 
so in the winter of 1738-1839.94 Father Richardie noted that he had to use all of his 
influence to dissuade the Hurons from moving to Seneca territory. Hoping to take 
advantage of this alliance in the summer of 1739, Orontony stopped at Niagara on his 
way to Montreal where he invited the Iroquois to hold a council with him, and later met 
with the St. Lawrence Valley Iroquois. Gov. Beauharnois suspected that the headman 
intended to enlist Iroquois support against the Ottawas, since the Hurons were naturally 
"proud, and they only search for opportunities to avenge themselves."95 Shortly after the 
Hurons heard that the "Nations of the lakes" planned to attack the Hurons in 1743, 
92 
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Sastaretsy visited the Seneca village of Sonnontuan to warn them and perhaps to ask for 
assistance. The Senecas repaid the visit and thanked the Hurons later that year.96 As they 
had for so long, the Hurons turned to the Senecas for help when they faced external 
threats. 
The Hurons' reorientation toward the Ohio Valley in the 17 40s and 17 50s, which 
corresponded with a similar reorientation among the Six Nations, especially the Senecas, 
further cemented the alliance. The establishment of settlements south of Lake Erie 
allowed the Hurons to develop ever more regular and intimate contact with the Senecas 
and other Iroquois settlers filtering into the region from the east and north. Sandusky, for 
example, was easily accessible from the mostly Iroquois settlement of Cuyahoga, and the 
Iroquois and Hurons regularly passed back and forth between these settlements.97 The 
French noted that several "vagabond Iroquois" had joined with the Hurons who lived at 
Sandusky in 1747, and Father Potier noted that Senecas and other Iroquois lived in the 
Huron settlements south of Lake Erie.98 The French trader Joseph Guoin noted that the 
Hurons and Iroquois had been present at Sandusky in late 1754.99 James Smith, an 
Englishman taken captive at the beginning of the Seven Years' War and later held by 
Kahnawake Iroquois living in the Ohio Valley, described the frequent contact between 
his adopted people and the Hurons living at both Detroit and the Sandusky settlements. 
One of his adopted Kahnawake brothers, for example, was married to a Huron woman, 
96 Beauharnois au rninistre, 17 Sept. 1743, CAOM, C11A, vol. 79, fols. 108v-109; Paroles des 
Tsonnontuans addressees aux Hurons, [1743], CAOM, CllA, vol. 79, fols. 179-79v. 
97 John Mitchell, "A Map of the British and French Dominions in North America," 1755, photostatic 
reproduction, VAULT oversize Ruggles 259. Newberry Library, Chicago. 
98 Journal of Occurrences in Canada; 1746, 1747, in NYCD, 10:115. 
99 Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery, "Journal de Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery, Lieutenant des 
Troupes, 1754-1755," in RAPQ,8 :404-405. 
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and his family regularly hunted and visited with Huron people in the Sandusky and 
Cuyahoga areas. 100 
Situated together, the Hurons, especially Orontony and his band, cooperated 
closely with the Ohio Iroquois, as well as those of the Six Nations themselves. 101 The 
French in fact blamed the Iroquois for the Hurons' apparent rebellion against Onontio in 
1747. After Orontony's failed strike on Detroit in 1747, the Huron leader claimed to be 
"no longer Hurons, but Iroquois" and asked the Iroquois for permission to settle in their 
territory. The Six Nations, and the Senecas specifically, had allowed the Hurons to settle 
at Conchake-an area the Iroquois claimed-and the Iroquois had "received [the Hurons] 
as our own flesh." Such remarks were more than mere rhetorical flourishes. They 
attested to a powerful connection between the Hurons and Iroquois which was rooted in 
their cultural and familial ties and expressed through close political and diplomatic 
cooperation. The Hurons continued to visit and conduct policy in coordination with the 
Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, during the Seven Years' War and even into Pontiac's 
100 James Smith, "An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Colonel James 
Smith ... during His Captivity with the Indians, in the Years, 1755, '56, '57, '58, and '59," in Samuel G. 
Drake. Ed. Indian Captivities, or Life in the Wigwam, (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby and Miller, 1852), 190-91, 
225. 
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Foreign Relations, 1727-1768» (Ph.D. Diss. Dept. of History, University of Michigan, 1999), 8. 119. 
102 
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Although other nations, such as the Ottawas and Ojibwas, also increased their 
contacts in the Ohio Valley in this period and some married Iroquois spouses, they never 
managed to develop the kind of relationship that the Hurons and Iroquois enjoyed. 103 
The Ottawas tacitly attested to the Hurons' exceptional relationship with the Iroquois-
and the Ottawas' lack of such a relationship-when they "called the Wyandotts to a great 
Council" in April1760. At the conference, the Ottawas "complain'd heavily" about the 
Iroquois conduct during the siege of Niagara the proceeding summer. The Ottawas' 
erstwhile Iroquois allies had not only killed several Ottawas, including two "Great 
Captains," but they had failed to come and cover the dead. The Ottawas therefore 
suspected that the Iroquois "had some further design against them in Conjunction with 
the English," and noted that, if the Iroquois failed to come to "Condole with them" within 
the next two months, they would go to war with the Iroquois and their British allies. In 
July of that year, some "Deputies of the Wyandotts" arrived at the Iroquois Confederation 
council at Onondaga carrying calumets and wampum belts "from 10 Different Tribes of 
Indians" in order to "renew their ancient Friendship" with the Iroquois. 104 
the Siege of Detroit,", 70, 72-73, 85; Ensign H.C. Paulie to Col. Henry Bouquet, 16 March 1762, Stevens 
and Kent, The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet, 18, part 1: 51; MacDonald, "Journal of the Siege of the 
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The Ottawas' actions clearly indicate that they viewed the Hurons as mediators 
between the Iroquois and "all the Nations to the Westward." 105 In summoning the 
Hurons to a council and issuing an ultimatum, the Ottawas hoped that the Hurons would 
relay their concerns directly to their Iroquois cousins and proctor a reconciliation between 
them. The Hurons did just this when they traveled to Onondaga deputized to conclude a 
peace between the offended Ottawas (and other nations) and the Iroquois the following 
July. The Ottawas simply lacked the contacts with the Six Nations that the Hurons 
enjoyed, as the Iroquois treatment of the Ottawa captives demonstrates in the first place. 
That an Iroquois man who had lived with the Hurons at Detroit for the last fourteen years, 
perhaps the Mohawk man Aaron, relayed this message to George Croghan, further attests 
to the proximity of the Hurons and Iroquois, which the Ottawas had long resented and 
coveted and which had so frequently sparked conflict between the two nations. 
As it had since 1702, the Hurons' relationship with the Six Nations facilitated 
their contact with the British, and, as the Huron-Iroquois alliance grew in the 1740s and 
1750s, the Hurons enjoyed more frequent contact with British officials and traders in the 
Ohio Valley. The Iroquois who had symbolically linked hands with the Hurons in the 
kaswentha belt, after all, had also clasped hands with the British. In 1743, shortly before 
the beginning of King George's War, the Hurons ventured once more to Albany. The 
commissioners noted that "Three Janondadee Sachems" arrived in July of that year, most 
likely indicating that they representatived each of the three hontaXen and hence the 
entirety of the Huron nation. When the Hurons produced the belt that the British and Six 
Nations had given them in 1702, the commissioners affirmed that the belt symbolized the 
105 Ibid. 
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"Everlasting Peace between this Govt the 5 Nations & their [the Hurons'] Nation."106 
This meeting encouraged Orontony and his followers to openly support the British when 
war broke out the following year. As detailed in the previous chapter, the Hurons met 
regularly with British representatives and, probably with British encouragement, planned 
an attack on Detroit and encouraged other nations to join in the campaign against the 
French. Testifying to the growing contact between the Hurons and British and 
symbolizing the growing alliance between them, a Huron woman gave birth to the child 
of an Englishman in 17 51.107 
The Hurons consolidated their exclusive relationship with the British during the 
Seven Years' War by honly tepidly supporting the French cause and by maintaining 
contact with the British throughout the conflict. Although they purportedly accepted the 
French war hatchet and frequently fought for the French during that conflict, the Hurons 
maintained a flexible and pragmatic position during the war. When Henri Belestre, the 
new commandant of Detroit, prompted the Hurons and other nations to join a French 
campaign into the Ohio Valley in August 1754, the natives ominously and evasively 
replied that "We will see what will happen."108 The following year they articulated the 
same strategy in a message to the colony of Pennsylvania. Travelling to Philadelphia in 
the company of some Iroquois in August 1755, the Hurons informed the British that the 
principal Huron leaders could not attend the conference for fear that the French would 
suspect them. Yet, they promised that the "old Men" would soon "tum their Faces 
106 Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs, ed. by Charles Howard Mcilwain, (New York: 
Benjamin Blom, [1915] 1968), 230. 
107 Potier, "Registre des baptemes," in Toupin, ed., Les ecrits de Potier, 860. 
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towards" the British. They also noted that, "If you should get the better of the French and 
come into our parts," the British would "find us your Friends and we will join you." 109 
The Hurons thus revealed their Janus-faced and quasi-neutral status-they were 
simultaneously unwilling to alienate the French by travelling to Philadelphia, but were 
quick to assure the British of their friendship in case the British "should get the better of 
the French." As some Weas complained of the Hurons and the Iroquois during the siege 
of Niagara in 1759, they "constantly made fine promises [to the French] without ever 
doing anything" against the British. 110 Such behavior allowed the Hurons to maintain a 
delicate balance: they did just enough to appease the French without thereby alienating 
the British. 
In the latter phases of the war, the Hurons took a more explicitly pro-British 
position. As the French military position declined and French merchants proved unable 
to supply their native allies, the Hurons signaled their full support of the British. During 
the winter of 1756-1757, a "Tynondady [Tionontate] Indian" named Anias and other 
Hurons lived in the Mohawk village near Fort Johnson, and Sir William provided them 
with weapons and merchandise and even consoled the death of a Huron girl. 111 In early 
1759, following the French defeat at Fort Frontenac and the abandonment of Fort 
Duquesne in 1758, the Hurons accepted belts from the Cayugas enjoining them to remain 
109 
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neutra1. 112 That summer the Hurons regularly visited the British at Fort Pitt, and some 
may have lived there for parts of the year. These Hurons served as spies for the British, 
particularly for the Indian Agent George Croghan, passing regularly from Detroit to the 
French fort of Venango to Fort Pitt to report on the intentions and relative strength of the 
French force in the region. 113 Huron representatives met with Croghan in July and 
August of 1759 to work out a preliminary peace agreement, and the Hurons took the lead 
in chastising a Delaware man for "spiriting up the Indians to continue the War against the 
English."114 In October 1759, just over a month after the fall of Quebec, several 
"Weyondotts who live near Fort D'Troit" visited Fort Pitt and explained that they had 
participated in the war only by "necessity" and that they "were obliged to come [to war] 
by French Measures." In the following months, Huron parties arrived frequently to 
surrender British captives and to trade for the necessities which Onontio could no longer 
provide for them. 115 Even before the fall of Quebec in September 17 59 and Montreal in 
1760, the Hurons had effectively abandoned the French war effort and had negotiated a 
separate peace with the British. Testifying to the Anglo-Huron relationship, a British 
112 
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official noted in 1759 that "tho' engaged in the War against us," the Hurons "have a 
regard for the English."116 
By the end of the Seven Years' War, the Hurons had perfectly positioned 
themselves geopolitically to take advantage of French defeat and British victory. For 
decades their relationship with their Iroquoian cultural cousins had afforded them 
protection and guaranteed access, albeit indirectly, to the British. The Hurons had 
intensified these relationships in the 1740s and 1750s and had proven their loyalty to the 
British even while supporting the French in the Seven Years' War. When the French 
surrendered Montreal in 1760 and the British took control of the region, therefore, the 
Hurons gained an unprecedented seniority at Detroit. The Hurons enjoyed a trust and 
familiarity of the now ascendant Iroquois and British which their neighbors simply 
lacked. Between 1759 and 1761 they translated that relationship into a position of 
heretofore unknown influence, which Cheanonvouzon had long ago dreamed of. 
The implications of French defeat for the Hurons' political fortunes were evident 
even before that defeat was final. When the nations of Detroit and others in the pays d' en 
haut made overtures to the British in the summer of 1759, they naturally turned to the 
Hurons to facilitate a peace. In July Huron representatives presented themselves to 
Croghan at Fort Pitt and delivered a message from nine nations, including the Ottawas, 
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis, who had met at Detroit that summer and had "impower[ed] 
the Weyondott Deputys to treat for the whole at this meeting." After these promising 
preliminaries, the Hurons pledged to return to Detroit and report Croghan's words to the 
"Nations the[y] represent." The following month, Ottawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and 
116 
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Miami representatives met with the British and Delawares at Pittsburgh. Once again, the 
Hurons had the honor of speaking "in behalf of themselves, and the other Western 
nations," who only spoke to confirm what the Hurons had already said. 117 When the 
Hurons, Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis met with Gen. Robert Monckton, the 
commander of British forces in the southern provinces, to conclude a more formal peace 
at Pittsburgh in August 1760, the Hurons had the privilege of speaking first at the council 
and spoke, as was now becoming common, "in Behalf of the rest." 118 
The Hurons displayed this newfound authority when the British officers who had 
just taken possession of Detroit met with the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Hurons on 4 
December 1760. The Huron leader took the lead and spoke for the Ottawas and 
Potawatomis, who formed "one People" with the Hurons. The speaker thereby 
articulated a new, and surely contested, vision of protocol and precedence at Detroit. Just 
as Onontagan had claimed that the Hurons and Ottawas formed only "one body" and 
pretended to speak for the Hurons some sixty years earlier, the Huron speaker now 
claimed that the Hurons spoke for the unified peoples of Detroit. As the Potawatomis 
explained the following day, their "Uncles the Wyendots spoke to you for all" of the 
nations because they had "more Understanding in Council Affairs than us." The 
Potawatomi speaker thereby acknowledged Huron seniority, even referring to them by 
the honorific title of "uncle," and acquiesced to Huron judgment in diplomatic affairs. 
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The Hurons, after all, knew the British and Six Nations better than the Potowatomis or 
Ottawas. Their "greater Understanding" derived from the Hurons' long-term relationship 
with those people. Once again producing the "Belt [which] was delivered us by our 
Brethren the English & Six Nations when first you came over the great Water" and which 
they had presented to the British in 1743 and 1748, the Hurons reminded the British and 
Six Nations of their "Old Friendship." 119 In doing so they made an explicit argument 
about the antiquity of their relationship with the British and a case for the Hurons' loyalty 
to the British Crown and their reliability as allies. No one else at Detroit could 
convincingly make that argument. Although some Ottawas did marry Iroquois women 
and some lived in the Ohio Valley, they never enjoyed the relationship with the Iroquois 
that the Hurons did. 
The Hurons' leadership in these councils and their role as mediators speak not 
only to their unique relationship with the British and Iroquois but to the power and 
authority which that relationship bestowed upon them. Even the Ottawas, long the 
Hurons' rivals for status and authority at Detroit, now asked the Hurons to conduct 
diplomacy for them and, we can imagine, grudgingly "impowered" them to mediate 
between the British and Iroquois, allowed them to speak first in councils, and even to 
speak in their name. 120 That the Ottawas would surrender their right to speak for 
themselves to the Hurons demonstrates that something profound had changed in the pays 
119 
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d'en haut. By carefully cultivating relationships with the Iroquois cousins over several 
decades and forging a close relationship with the British from the 17 40s onward, the 
Hurons had positioned themselves perfectly for a post-French world. When the British 
replaced the French in 1760, the Hurons claimed a position of seniority and prestige over 
their pays d' en haut neighbors. 
The titles used in these councils further signaled the Hurons' new ascendance at 
Detroit. Representatives invariably referred to the Hurons by a more elevated honorific 
title than they did the Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and others present. At the August 
1759 conference, for example, the Delaware man whom the British called the Beaver 
addressed his words to the Delawares' "Uncles the Wayondotts [Hurons], and you our 
Cousens of the several other Western Nations," including, among others, the Ottawas, 
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis. 121 Almost exactly a year later, the Hurons, Ottawas, 
Potawatomis, and Ojibwas met with the Beaver, as well as representatives of the Six 
Naitons and Monckton. Addressing the council, the Beaver again identitfied the Hurons 
as "Uncles the Wyandots," but now demoted the "Ottowas, Cheepowees [Ojibwas], & 
Pottowattmies" from "Cousens" to "Grandchildren." The following day an Iroquois 
headman identified the same audience as his "Brethren the Wyandots, & Nephews of all 
the Other Nations."122 These familial categories, of course, had tremendous currency 
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among the native peoples of North America. While "brother," and presumably "cousin," 
signified rough equality between two peoples, the term "nephew" connoted a subservient 
status in a society in which maternal uncles assumed control over their sisters' children. 
While "Grandchildren" did not carry the same implications for these peoples as it did for 
patriarchal Europeans, it nonetheless indicated a lesser status. In all these cases, 
therefore, the speakers suggested that the Hurons occupied a superior status to the 
Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas. To the Delawares, the Hurons were honored elders 
(uncles), while the other nations were the Delaware's equals (cousins) or subalterns 
(grandchildren); the Iroquois counted the Hurons as equals (brothers) but designated the 
Anishinaabeg as inferiors (nephews or grandchildren). 
The Ottawas and others were of course free to disagree about Huron seniority and 
they certainly did (even though they did recognize the Delawares as "our Grandfathers"). 
But this language, repeated in front of Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibwa audiences, 
suggested a new and alternative ordering of social and political relations at Detroit, which 
the British themselves embraced. In this new vision, the Hurons enjoyed seniority among 
the peoples of Detroit thanks to their contacts with the Iroquois and British. They were 
the "head" of a confederacy that included the Ottawas, Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and other 
nations in the region. 
If the Hurons had won a new precedence at Detroit by 1760, they consolidated it 
in June 1761, when two Seneca delegates arrived at the post purportedly to condole the 
Draper Series, vol. 2 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908), 85-86; Delaware Chief to Col. Daniel 
Brodhead, 22 June 1779, in ibid., 369). 
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death of the Detroit warriors killed during the siege of Niagara. 123 Recognizing Huron 
seniority and attesting to their close kinship, the Senecas went to the Hurons first and 
stayed with them in their village. To demonstrate their position of authority in matters of 
diplomacy and their centrality at Detroit, the Hurons subtly controlled events. After 
delaying the council for a few days during which the Huron leaders remained too 
intoxicated to conduct diplomacy, the Hurons refused the Iroquois' suggestion that they 
convene the council at Sandusky and instead insisted that it be held at the Huron village 
at the Point au Montreal, thereby dictating the time and place of the proceedings. 124 
When the Hurons and Iroquois finally met with the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis 
on 3 July, the Iroquois deputies addressed themselves "particularly to the Wiandots 
[Hurons]" and confessed that "We look upon you as the head of all the Nations here, & 
know [that] ... all the Other Nations will follow your Example."125 Accordingly, they 
asked the Hurons to join them in attacking the British throughout the Great Lakes region. 
Although some of the Hurons seemed inclined to join the Iroquois, they eventually 
decided against it and convinced their neighbors to do the same. They instead informed 
Campbell of the conspiracy. 126 Later that month the Hurons invited the Shawnees to 
meet with the British and publically chastised them for having heeded the "bad Councils 
of the Six Nations." The Hurons then recommended their Shawnee friends "in the 
123 Johnson to Amherst, WJP, 3:511; Minutes of the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson, 1761, in ibid., 
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strongest Manner to be friends of the English." Later that month they likely advised the 
Delawares not to "listen to the bad Councils of the Six Nations."127 The following year, 
the Hurons once again informed the British about an alleged anti-British conspiracy 
spearheaded by the Shawnees, Iroquois, and several southern nations. 128 
In not only declining the Senecas' offer, but informing Campbell of the plot, the 
Hurons secured for themselves an honored place at Detroit. They had proven their 
loyalty to the British, ironically at the expense of the Six Nations who had long facilitated 
and mediated the relations between the British and Hurons. 129 Campbell thanked the 
Hurons for the "good behaviour" and loyalty to the Crown. 130 Sir William Johnson, the 
superintendent for Indian affairs, likewise commended the Hurons behavior, which 
"entitle[ d) them to our particular notice."131 Visiting Detroit in person later that summer, 
Johnson personally thanked the Hurons for their loyalty and affirmed their seniority at 
Detroit. He greeted the Hurons first, before the Potawatomis, Ottawas, and Ojibwas, and, 
when all the nations assembled in council on Sept. 9, the Hurons once again responded 
first to Johnson's message. At another council on Sept. 16, Johnson bluntly told the 
Hurons that he regarded them as the "head of the Ottawa Confederacy" and hoped that 
the Hurons would maintain the symbolic "Council fire" which he had just ignited at 
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Detroit. 132 Finally, before leaving Detroit Johnson spent the night of Sept. 17 at the 
Huron village and held a separate, private council with them at which he gave them an 
additional gift of trade goods. 133 
Observers frequently testified to the Hurons' newfound authority. In a letter to 
Johnson in July 1761, Campbell referred to the Hurons "whom you know leads the other 
Nations here."134 In a letter written the same day to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, the governor of 
the British Province of Quebec, Campbell repeated that the Hurons "in all affairs of 
consequence lead the other Indian Nations here."135 And of course Johnson himself told 
the Hurons at Detroit that "he looked upon them as the head of the Ottawa 
Confederacy."136 In similar words, the Iroquois representatives likewise recognized the 
Hurons "as the head of all the Nations" at Detroit and believed that "all the Other Nations 
will follow [their] Example." 137 Even the Detroit Potawatomis attested to Huron 
seniority at Detroit noting that their Huron "uncles" possessed "more understanding in 
Council affairs than us."138 In 1763, another British officer noted that the Hurons have 
"much influence over the rest of the [Ottawa] Confederacy."139 Many years later, the 
Anglo-American officer Daniel Brodhead told George Washington that the Hurons "are 
132 Jon Parmenter argues convincingly that Johnson took this opportunity to undermine the Six Nations, 
which he and other British officials feared might grow too powerful after the fall of New France 
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respected by the western Indians as much as the six nations are by the Northem."140 The 
Hurons had become, as one twentieth century historian called them, "the leading group" 
at Detroit. 141 
At length Cheanonvouzon's plan had worked. The Hurons had translated their 
age-old alliance with the Six Nations into a position of power in the pays d' en haut. Not 
only was there a new imperial order at Detroit after 1760, but also a new hierarchy 
among the peoples of the post. This Huron ascendency proved important during 1762 
and 1763. Although the Hurons had the same incentive to oppose British policies that led 
Pontiac and the other Anishinaabe people to align against them, the Hurons also had 
compelling reasons for supporting the British. French rule had meant Huron submission 
to Ottawa seniority. British rule meant Huron ascendency over the Ottawas. Although 
loyalty to Onontio and impatience with the British led Sastaretsy and other Hurons to 
support Pontiac, the promise of British-backed Huron seniority convinced others to 
support the British. Meanwhile, the Ottawas, who had not enjoyed such a relationship 
with the Iroquois or British and who were invested in French rule in a way that the 
Hurons simply were not, had less reason to tolerate British behavior. In fact the British 
promotion of Huron status at Detroit proved yet another reason for the Ottawas to oppose 
British rule. Not surprisingly, the Ottawas and Hurons not only responded differently to 
Pontiac's War, but also fought bitterly over status during Pontiac's War. 
The Hurons' ascendency in the aftermath of the fall of Niagara did not lead to 
unanimous Huron support for the British, of course. Since at least the 1740s, pro-French 
14
° Col. Daniel Brodhead to Gen. George Washington, 7 May 1779, Thwaites and Kellog, The Revolution 
in the Upper Ohio, 311. 
141 McConnell, "The Search for Security," 363. 
288 
and pro-British Huron factions had struggled to build consensus within the community. 
Many Hurons had supported the French during the Seven Years' War even if others 
remained ambivalent. As late as 1758 one Huron vowed that he would "live and Die" 
with his Onontio.142 With just as much cause to be angry at British trading policies as the 
Ottawas and a tradition of loyalty to the French, Sastaretsy and the "bad (mauvaise) 
band," as the pro-British chronicler Robert Navarre called them, promised Pontiac that 
they would do "whatever he wished."143 These Hurons participated in the siege from the 
beginning, contributed to the sacking of Presqu'lle and Sandusky, and may have fought 
in the Battle of Bloody Run in late July. 144 After the siege, the anti-British Hurons fled to 
the Maumee River and Sandusky, where they formed a "nest of thi[e]ves."145 As had the 
same debate nearly twenty years earlier, this division between pro-French and pro-British 
Hurons led to an intra-community struggle. Theata and the pro-British Hurons-the 
"good (bonne) band" in Navarre's reckoning-even feared, or at least claimed to fear, 
that the pro-French Hurons might attack them, and sought to convince them to abandon 
Pontiac's alliance. 146 The pro-British Hurons succeeded in convincing many of the 
142 
"George Croghan's Journal April3, 1759 to April [30], 1763." Nicolas B. Wainwright, ed., 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 385. 
143 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 7. 
144 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 23, 26, 36-37, 56; "Deposition du Nomme Charlot sauvage 
francaise Et Eleve ala Religion Catholique," Oct. 1763, CAOM, C11A, vol.l05, fol. 417v, "A Court of 
Enquiery held by Order of Major Gladwin to enquire into the Particulars of the Loss of the Post at Presque 
Isle," CCOD, 421-24; MacDonald, "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," in ibid., 12; [Navarre], "Journal of 
Pontiac's Conspiracy," 149, 155. 
145 Johnson to Amherst, 6 Oct. 1763, WJP, 10:867; "Journal of Indian Affairs," 4-17 Oct. 1763, in ibid., 
10:892; Gage to Johnson, 22 April1764, in ibid., 4:403, Gage to Johnson, 23 Jan. 1764, in ibid., 4:303; 
Gladwin to Amherst, 1 Nov. 1763, MPHSCR, 27:676. 
146 [Navarre,] "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy,"64, 178; [Robert N avaree], "Journal de la conspiration de 
Pondiac," in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 712; [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit,", 16, 26, 43, 45; 
Gladwin to Amherst, 26 July 1763, CCOD, 442b. 
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hostile warriors to return in the summer of 1764, and as late as 1766 they still sought to 
reconcile a few holdouts. 147 
Yet the Hurons' internal struggle for power between Sastaretsy and Theata took 
place within the context of their larger struggle with the Ottawas (which in tum took 
place within a larger struggle between the British and native peoples of the Great Lakes). 
Whatever their internal disputes may have been, the Hurons renewed an argument with 
the Ottawas that they had rehearsed for at least a century. Each nation sought to augment 
their position; the Ottawas by effecting Onontio's return and Ottawa seniority, and the 
pro-British Hurons by defending their new prerogatives. This new conflict, prompted by 
significant changes and occurring in drastically changed conditions, echoed the same 
issues which the Hurons and Ottawas had hashed out since at least the 1670s. 
IV. "Elder brother in my heart": The Hurons, Ottawas, and Status at Detroit 
By the time Pontiac delivered his ultimatum to the Hurons on 11 May 1763, the 
peoples of Detroit had witnessed a profound political and diplomatic revolution. As they 
often had since 1649, questions over status sparked conflict between the Hurons and 
Ottawas. When the British had toppled Onontio, the Ottawas' had lost their favored 
place atop the hierarchy at Detroit, and the Hurons had gained unprecedented influence. 
In the context of both recent changes and decades' long processes and relationships, the 
Hurons' and Ottawas' reactions on that May day become more explicable and more 
147 
"A Conference between Bradstreet and the Wendots," 29 Sept. 1764, WJP, 4:547; Navarre, "Journal of 
Pontiac's Conspiracy," 149-50; Montresor, "Journals of Capt. John Montresor," in G. D. Skull, Collections 
of the New-York Historical Society, 275, 288-91; "Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pontiac and 
other Indians," July 1766, WJP 10:862; Toupin, "Introduction" to "Rescensement des Hurons," in Toupin, 
ed., Les ecrits de Potier, 190. 
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meaningful. Pontiac sought not only to reinforce his army by demanding the Hurons join 
the campaign, he also sought to make an explicit statement about politics and status at 
Detroit. By demanding that the Hurons join his campaign, Pontiac asserted Ottawa 
precedence over Huron affairs and sought to demonstrate to everyone involved-the 
Ottawas, his Anishinaabe allies, the French habitants, the British officers, and especially 
the Hurons themselves-that the Ottawas would broach no disrespect. As had 
generations of Ottawa leaders, Pontiac relied on the Ottawas' superior numbers and 
extensive regional ties to the other Anishinaabe peoples to demonstrate Ottawa power. 
The Hurons' initial refusals to participate in the violence, the warriors' suggestion that 
they attack the Ottawas rather than the British, their hesitance to do so even when Pontiac 
threatened their lives, and their later attempts to undermine the campaign, furthermore, 
corresponded to a century-long Huron desire not only to assert their autonomy from the 
Ottawas but to regain the authority their people had long ago enjoyed in southern 
Ontario. The Hurons did not, therefore, oppose the conflict because they, as Catholics, 
rejected Neolin's message of spiritual renewal, but because they had good political 
reasons to oppose the movement. 148 
To the disappointment of the young Huron warriors, the conflict did not result in 
violence between the Hurons and the Ottawas as it had in 1706 and 1738; the Hurons 
dared not attack Pontiac's impressive Anishinaabe coalition. Instead the struggle took 
the form of a no less determined and serious diplomatic and political struggle between the 
148 Dowd suggests that the Hurons resisted Pontiac's rebellion because they, as Catholics, were less 
disposed to Neolin's message than the Ottawas and others. Yet this explanation ignores the considerable 
inversion of status at Detroit since 1758 played in the Hurons' decision to oppose the movement. It also 
ignores the fact that some Catholic Hurons participated in the siege as well (Dowd, War under Heaven, 
109-10). 
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Ottawas and the Hurons. Beginning in 1762 and continuing through the summer of 1764, 
Pontiac sought to demonstrate Ottawa sovereignty over Huron affairs by repeatedly 
demanding that his numerically weaker neighbors recognize Ottawa seniority and join his 
campaign. For Pontiac, in other words, Huron participation in the siege became a symbol 
of Ottawa governance in the region, and continued Huron resistance became an 
undeniable and unacceptable challenge to his and his people's authority. The majority of 
the Hurons responded to these demands impudently. Refusing first to accept Pontiac's 
invitations in 1762 and early 1763, the Hurons only joined the campaign under duress in 
May 1763 and abandoned it after two days. Thereafter, they actively sought to 
undermine the siege. In the months following the siege and throughout 1764, the Hurons 
played a part in reconciling former combatants with the British and thereby reducing 
Pontiac's ability to continue the war. This section first places the Hurons' recent 
ascendance in the context of traditional Ottawa seniority, then describes the power 
struggle which that inversion of status engendered. 
The exchange at the Huron village that day therefore represented only the most 
recent exchange in a long and tumultuous dynamic the precedents of which had been set 
decades before 1763. After a century of intimate contact and cooperation, the Hurons 
and Ottawas remained distinct and autonomous from one another and sought to pursue 
their own advantage. Their rivalry demonstrates the degree to which longstanding local 
concerns shaped Pontiac's War and, by extension, the exercise of colonial power within 
the Great Lakes region. The Huron-Ottawa rivalry affected every phase of the conflict, 
from its beginning to the final reconciliation between the combatants and the British. 
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The relationship between the British and the peoples of Detroit, as had that between the 
French and those peoples, was shaped by the Huron-Ottawa relationship, which in turn 
was shaped by the Anishinaabe alliances and the Huron-Iroquois nexus. That colonial 
relationship can not be separated from the interlocking relationships which helped to 
constitute it, and Pontiac's War can not be understood apart from the Huron-Ottawa 
struggle. 
The renewal of Ottawa-Huron conflict ended a period of relative peace and 
cooperation between the two groups. After the 1738 crisis the trajectory of the Huron-
Ottawa dynamic had swung again toward peaceful cohabitation. The Hurons and 
Ottawas had finally reached a truce in 1741 in the aftermath of a joint Huron-Ottawa 
campaign against the Chickasaws. The Hurons had signaled their loyalty and reliability 
by participating in the warfare, and cooperative violence against an external enemy had 
once again affirmed the ties which bound the Ottawas and Hurons together, as had the 
Iroquois wars in the seventeenth century and the Fox Wars between 1712 and the 1730s. 
Testifying to the newly repaired Ottawa-Huron relations, the Kiskakon Ottawa leader 
Mikinic had promised Ottawa protection for the Hurons and had convinced them to 
return to Detroit in the spring of 1743. Kinosaki, a Sinago Ottawa, likewise confirmed 
this reconciliation at the August 1744 meeting between Longueuil and the Detroit 
nations. By offering the war hatchet pointedly to Sastaretsy and demanding that the 
Huron take it, Kinosaki signaled that he trusted the Hurons, even if the incident carried 
implications of Ottawa power and an implicit threat if the Hurons failed to comply. 
Mikinic's efforts, finally, had been instrumental in convincing the Conchake Hurons to 
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return to Detroit in 1753. When the Hurons met with the Ottawas and other nations in 
1753, Mikinic pledged to reunite "your heart with ours." By then the Hurons had moved 
to a new village site at Point au Montreal, directly across the river from Fort 
Pontchartrain. This village was only a mile from the Ottawas', close enough that an 
Anglo-American captive detained in the Huron village could hear the Ottawas 
carousing. 149 This proximity suggests an intimacy and mutually trust between the nations 
which had been seriously tested in 1738 and thereafter. 
Yet the shift in local politics after the fall of New France ensured that this 
harmony would not last. To understand fully how Pontiac and other Ottawas experienced 
the Hurons' new ascendency-and to explain his anti-Huron and anti-British animus-
we must understand the vaunted position they held during the French regime and the 
secondary status they enjoyed in the new British regime. Consider, for example, the 
August 1744 council held by the Detroit commandant, Paul-Jospeh leMoyne, Baron de 
Longueuil and the four nations of the post. After inveighing against the wickedness of 
the British, the commandant held a wampum belt aloft and turned to the Ottawas. "My 
eldest son the Ottawa," he told them, "It is to you that I address myself first." 150 When he 
finished, an unnamed Ottawa war chief began singing a war song and the other nations 
then followed his example. Finally, the Sinago Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, took the 
wampum belt and addressed the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas. "My brothers, as it 
is not possible to Cut this belt so that we can each have a part, I think that you will not 
149 Smith, "Journal," in Drake, Indian Captivities, 219. 
150 
"Monfils aine L'outaoliais, C'est-a-toi le premiers a quije m'adresse," "Conseil tenu par Mr de 
Longueliil Commandant pour LeRoy au Detroit, aux 4. Naitons de Son Poste, au Sujet dela declaration de 
laguerre contre L'anglois," [1744], COAM, CllA, vol. 18, fol. 134v. 
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disapprove if I give the entire [belt] to our brothers the hurons."151 Although the Hurons 
at first demurred, Kinosaki insisted and the Hurons accepted the belt. 152 
Longueuil, Kinosaki, and the Hurons, as well as the Potawatomis, and Ojibwas, 
had therefore dramatized Ottawa precedence at Detroit. Longueuil had, by speaking to 
the Ottawas first and referring to them as Onontio's "eldest son," explicitly recognized 
Ottawa seniority at the post. By taking the lead in singing and forcing the Hurons to be 
custodians of the war belt, Kinosaki furthermore had affirmed Ottawa leadership and 
reminded the Hurons, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas of Ottawa seniority in such affairs. 
And, by finally acquiescing to Kinosaki's demands, Sastaretsy and the Hurons tacitly 
acknowledged the Ottawas' authority. The conference therefore dramatically illustrates 
the political status quo at Detroit in 1744. The Ottawas, the most numerous and the best 
connected nation at Detroit, enjoyed a privileged position at the post and commanded the 
deference, if not the submission, of their neighbors. Although the Ottawas had long been 
the most powerful nation at Detroit, the 1740s and 1750s represented a golden age of 
Ottawa leadership in the region. The careers of two Detroit leaders, the Sinago Kinosaki 
and Mikinic, the headman of the Detroit Sinagos, demonstrate the Ottawas' influence in 
the region. 
Representing the two Ottawa subnations who lived at the Detroit village, the 
Sinago leader, Kinosaki, and Kiskakon headman, Mikinic, positioned themselves as 
indispensable statesmen in the pays d' en haut in the final decades of French rule and 
151 
"Mes freres, comme il n 'est pas possible de Couper ce collier pour que no us en ai"ons chacun un 
morceau, je pense que vous ne me desaprouveres point Si je le remets to us entire a nos freres les hurons." 
ibid., fol. 136. 
152 Ibid., fols. 133-36v. 
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thereby ensured Ottawa precedence at Detroit. 153 Both men played active roles in the 
Huron-Ottawa conflict between 1738 and 17 43,154 as well as the crisis of French 
authority between 1747-and 1753.155 In recognition of their influence among the peoples 
of the region and loyalty to Ononio, the French showered the men with gifts and tokens 
of their authority. 156 Attesting to their loyalty and leadership during the crisis of 1747, 
the governor even paid the habitants of Detroit to provide the materials and build 
western-style houses for each Ottawa headman and to fill them with furniture. 157 Even 
153 Donald Chaput identified Mikinic as a Michilimackinac Ottawa, but he is elsewhere clearly identified as 
being associated with Detroit and having a house there. Lery refers to "Mikinak chief of the OutaDois 
village of Detroit» (Chaput, "Mikinic," DCB; Lery, "Journal, 1754-1755," RAPQ, 8:414 ). 
154 Although the Mikinic and Kinosaki had been in Montreal visiting Onontio when the crisis with the 
Hurons erupted in the summer of the following year, the two men had worked assiduously to restore peace 
and to keep their young men from retaliating against the Hurons. Mikinic, for example, carried presents to 
his fellow Kiskakons at Saginaw to convince them to forgive the Hurons. "Estat de Depenses faites pour 
Moin Capitaine Commandt au fort PontChartrain du Detroit En les Annees 1738, 1739, Et 1740," 20 June 
1740, COAM, CllA, vol. 74, fols. 136-37. The French similarly called on Kinosaki in 1743, when the 
Hurons fled again to Sandusky because they feared an attack by the "peoples of the lakes" -presumably 
the Ojibwas and other Anishinaabe groups. The new commandant, Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville, 
believed that the Hurons would not respond if he sent a French officer to Sandusky, so he instead enlisted 
Kinosaki, a "trusted man," and five other Ottawa chiefs to speak to the Hurons. Assuring the Hurons of his 
friendship and protection, Kinosaki convinced the Hurons to return to Detroit that summer ("une homme 
asside aux franc;ois"). Beauharnois au ministre, 7 Sept. 1743, ibid., vol. 79, fols. 108v-109v at 109; 
"Paroles de Kinousaki aux hurons Etablis a Sandoske portee par six chefs OutaDacs," 5 May 1743, ibid., 
fols. 95-96. 
155 The commandant provided food and firewood to the Mickinic and Kinosaki, whom he regarded as 
retainers, during the summer and fall of 1747. See Estate de Boeuf, 1747, ibid., vol. 117, fol. 143; 
Certificat, 15 Oct. 1747, vol. 118, fol. 96; Etat des fournitures faites au Roy par ordres de M. Le 
Commadant par moy Derusseau, 20 Oct. 1747, ibid., fol. 131; Fournitures fait au Roy par moy Chesne, 30 
Oct. 1747, in Ibid, fol. 128; Fourny pour leCompte du Roy par moi:s chevaliez [L'huiller Chevalier] Livre 
au Kinosaki, Barbie, Mikiniac, 1 Nov. 1747, ibid., vol. 117, fol. 142; Memoire des Charriages de Bois de 
Chauffage et Autres faits, 17 July 1748, Ibid, 241 ; ]Navarre], "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," 99 ; 
Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748, CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fols. 185-85v, 188-88v, 204-
204v, 205. 
156 Onontio gave each an ornate suit of clothes, including a scarletjustacorps-or military coat-with silver 
facings, a shirt, and a silver-hilted saber and even paid for a local carpenter to build a trunk in which 
Kinosaki could store these valuables (Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748, ibid., vol. 87, 
fol. 185v; Memoire des ouvrages de Menuserie faittes par Moy Nicolas LaSelle au detroit sur La demande 
de Monsieur de Longuetiil pour LeCompte et Service du Roy, 9 July 1748, Ibid, vol. 118, fol. 246; 
Memoire des ouvrages, Feb.-Sept. 1747, ibid., fols. 378-79; Depenses a I' occasion des pais d'Enhaut, 4 
Nov. 1752, ibid., vol. 119, fol. 293). 
157 Memoire des Ouvrages de Mac;onnierie, 22 June 1748, in ibid., vol. 118, fol. 364; Fournitures, faites par 
Jorian et Compagnie au detroit, 30 June 1748, ibid., fol. 125v; Memoire des ouvrages de Menuserie, 9 July 
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the Hurons, normally loathe to recognize Ottawa authority, acknowledged the authority 
these men commanded. When the Conchake Hurons returned to Detroit in 1753, they 
addressed Mikinic by the honorific "father" which, if it did not imply subjection, at least 
signaled the Hurons' respect for the man. They likewise promised that they "would 
never forget the name of the dead nor the Sentiments of Kinousaki," who had died shortly 
before the conference. 158 Finally, the Hurons allowed that the Ottawas possessed "a force 
of Virtue that we do not have."159 In so doing, they publicly attested to the Ottawas' 
seniority and, at least outwardly, accepted their place as junior brothers in Onontio' s 
family. 
This, then, was the legacy Pontiac inherited when he became a senior Ottawa 
chief, probably soon after the death of Kino saki in 17 51.160 As Cadillac had proclaimed 
in 1707 and Longueuil repeated in 1744, the Ottawas represented the "eldest brother" of 
the Detroit nations. 161 The Ottawas were, as scholars have recognized, New France's 
"most important ally," "principal intermediary for the French," in the Great Lakes, and 
1748, in ibid., fols. 246-46v; Ouvrages fait par moy Janisse masson [ma9on] au detroit, 16 July 1748, ibid., 
fol. 198; Depenses a l' occassion des pais d'Enhaut, 4 Nov. 1752, ibid., 119:291 v, 292v, 293, 293v, 295v, 
297, 299v. 
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"nous n'oublions point le nom des morts niles Sentiments de Kinousaki," May 1753, "Conseil des 
hurons en presence des outaoiiais, et pouteouatarnis [et Sauteux] et reponse," Ibid, vol. 99, fol. 76. 
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"Nos freres les outaouais nous vous Remer9ions de nous parler, comme fait notre pere, nous aves une 
force d'Esprit que nous n'avons pas." ibid. 77-77v. 
160 Although Pontiac was clearly one of the senior Detroit Ottawa leaders by 1763, there is little direct 
evidence that indicates when he acceded to that position. Potier listed him as a chief in 17 4 7 and he had 
been listed along with two other Ottawa headman who received firewood from the French in 1748. Potier, 
"Recensement des Hurons," Texte I, Toupin, Les icrits de Potier, 231; "Memoire des Charriages de Bois 
de Chauffage," 17 July 1748, COAM, C11A, 118:241. He claimed to have confronted Mikinic in 1747, 
suggesting that by that point he had already assumed some influence, particularly among the Sinago 
warriors. [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 99. If he was indeed a Sinago, then, he might 
have become a senior chief when Kino saki died in the spring of 17 51. He gave a speech decrying the 
British in 1757 at Fort Duquesne, which was recorded but subsequently lost (see WJP 2:771). 
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"L'outauois etoit mon fils aisne," Proces-verbaux des conseils tenus a Detroit, Aug. 1707, in COAM, 
CllA, vol. 26, fol. 143v. 
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the "central nation of the alliance," and they expected to retain this status during British 
tenure. 162 The British promotion of the Hurons as the "Head of the Huron Confederacy," 
therefore constituted both an inversion of status and an unacceptable slight to Pontiac and 
the other Ottawas. Pontiac and his fellow leaders must have seethed as they watched the 
Hurons speaking first in council, purportedly for the Ottawas, the Potawatomis accede to 
Huron judgment, and the Hurons and British conferring privately. The erstwhile elder 
brothers now listened as the Delawares, Shawnees, and Iroquois referred to them as 
"grandchildren," and "nephews" while addressing the Hurons as the Ottawas' elders. 
The Hurons claim in December 1760 that the peoples of Detroit lived "as one People" for 
whom the Hurons spoke also surely nettled the Ottawas. 163 The exchange almost 
perfectly mirrors one in Montreal in 1701, when the Ottawa leader Ontontagan claimed 
that the Hurons and Ottawas shared "one body" and proceeded to speak in the name of 
the Hurons. Ontontagan' s claim to speak for the Hurons in 1701 triggered an immediate 
retort from Cheanonvouzon and, eventually, to an armed conflict between those 
nations. 164 The Hurons's claim to speak for the Ottawas in 1763 was scarcely any more 
palatable for Pontiac and the Ottawas. 
The Ottawas resentment about the Hurons' new status probably encouraged them 
to oppose British rule. The Ottawas expected the British to recognize them as the senior 
nation at Detroit as the French had, just as they expected them to continue the French 
162 Newbigging, "The French-Ottawa Alliance," 1, 249; Dennis Delage, "L'alliance frano-amerindienne, 
1660-1701," Recherches Amerindiennes au Quebec 19 (1989), 13; "la nations central de !'alliance," 
Havard, Empire et mitissages, 223. 
163 
"George Croghan's Journal, 1760-1761," in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:118. 
164 
"quoique les hommes soient souvent de differens sentiments, les Hurons que voici, & nous Outaouaks, 
nous ne faisons cependant qu'un meme corps," Claude-Charles Bacqueville de La Potherie, Histoire de 
!'Amerique septentrionale, Tome IV, (Paris : Chez Jean-Luc Nion et Franc;ois Didot, 1722), 237, 256-59. 
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practices of distributing gifts and trading on advantageous terms. When the British not 
only failed to recognize Ottawa authority but actively supported the Hurons, the Ottawas 
reacted angrily. In order to restore their privileged place and to address the other 
grievances, the Ottawas sought to return the French to Detroit. Although they never 
explicitly registered their resentment of the Hurons' pretentious, the Ottawas behavior 
nonetheless demonstrated their frustration and unwillingness to concede authority to the 
Hurons. In response to this attack on Ottawa precedence at Detroit, the Ottawas feebly 
sought to reassert their old precedence at Detroit. At the August 1760 meeting with Gen. 
Monckton, the Delawares, and Six Nations, for example, the Ottawas sought to speak for 
themselves and the Potawatomis. The minutes first record that a Huron man, 
demonstrating the Huron's newfound ascendency, arose to speak "in Behalf of the rest" 
of the nations gathered. Yet after he had finished, the Ottawa headman Missinago 
claimed to speak "in Behalf of themselves and Pottowattimies."165 This claim, made just 
moments after the Hurons had purported to speak for the Ottawas, reads as a rebuttal to 
Huron claims of seniority. An Ottawa speaker again asserted Ottawa dominance in 1761 
when he claimed to "speak on the part of all our Confederacy here present," perhaps 
including the Hurons. 166 In 1763, the Ottawas also referred to the Delawares, who had 
once referred to the Ottawas as "Grandchildren" and "Cousens," as the Ottawas' 
"Nephews," thereby signaling their intent to reassert Ottawa authority in the Great 
Lakes. 167 These dueling claims to represent the Detroit nations constituted a determined 
165 
"At a Conference held by The Honourable Brigadier General Monckton with the Western Nation of 
Indians, at the Camp before Pittsburg, 12 day of August, 1760," in Pennsylvania Archives, 3:750. 
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167 
"Journal oflndian Congress," 15 Dec. 1763, WJP, 10:965. 
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argument about status at Detroit. The Ottawas' insistence that the Huron participate in 
the siege of Detroit, moreover, signals the extent to which the campaign against British 
excesses was also a campaign against Huron pretentious of authority. 
This inversion of authority, as had similar inversions in 1649, 1706, and other 
times, prompted a power struggle. The Ottawas, who were more invested in French rule 
than the Hurons, saw their struggle both as a campaign to revenge the disrespect which 
the British had shown them and an opportunity to reassert Ottawa authority. By using his 
Anishinaabe connections to force the Hurons to participate in the campaign, Pontiac 
would demonstrate who the true "Head of the Ottawa conspiracy" after all. More 
importantly, the movement, as Neolin had promised, was destined to return the French to 
the Great Lakes. When they did so, the Ottawas could expect to regain their old 
authority. For Pontiac, in other words, Huron participation in the siege became a symbol 
of Ottawa governance in the region, and continued Huron resistance became an 
undeniable and unacceptable challenge to his and his people's authority. For the Hurons, 
resisting the Ottawas' demands became not only proof of their continued autonomy and 
independence, but also a way to ingratiate themselves to their British friends. As a result, 
the two nations performed a delicate and highly ritualized dance. The Ottawas frequently 
demanded that the Hurons join their struggle against the British, relying on their superior 
numbers and connections with other Anishinaabeg to intimidate the Hurons. The Hurons 
responded by refusing these demands when they could, grudgingly participating when 
they were compelled to do so, quickly abandoning the siege, and finally working with the 
British to undermine Pontiac and the Ottawas. 
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The first indications of trouble came when Pontiac invited the Hurons to join his 
campaign in the late winter or spring of 1763. Although Navarre claimed that Pontiac 
demanded that the Hurons join his campaign because his force of Potawatomi and Ottawa 
warriors was still not "large enough" to accomplish ends, this explanation rings false. 168 
The Hurons in question only amounted to some sixty warriors and thus would have 
represented merely fraction of the total force. Rather Pontiac's insistence upon Huron 
compliance was a politically charged demonstration of Ottawa authority and a sustained 
attack on Huron aspirations to autonomy and influence at Detroit. Pontiac needed the 
Hurons to join the campaign less because he needed warriors and more because he sought 
to demonstrate the Ottawa political and diplomatic dominance of the region. By forcing 
the Hurons to participate, Pontiac reminded the Hurons of their place and, in the process, 
sought to alienate the Hurons from the British friends. 
Suffering under no illusion of Pontiac's intentions, the Huron leaders Theata and 
Babi scoffed at Pontiac's suggestion. Although some Huron warriors did accept the war 
belt, these two turtle elders, who had both played key roles during the crises of the 17 40s 
and 1750s, unceremoniously dismissed Pontiac's messengers without "caring to listen" to 
his propositions.169 If they had accepted the invitation, after all, the Hurons would have 
not only implicitly acknowledged the Ottawas' influence in the region, but would have 
removed the central prop to the Hurons' newfound ascendency: British tenure of the 
Great Lakes region. Pontiac's extension of an invitation to the Hurons, and the Hurons 
rejection of that invitation therefore signified something much more significant than 
168 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 6. 
169 Ibid. 
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whether the Hurons would participate in Pontiac's campaign. The exchange pitted two 
alternate visions of diplomatic and political relations at Detroit: one which reasserted the 
suzerainty of the Ottawa "elder brothers" over the Hurons, and another which defended 
Huron ascendance as the "head of the Ottawa Confederacy." 
The Hurons' casual rejection of Pontiac's invitation underlined the Hurons' 
newfound autonomy and hence clearly nettled Pontiac. Accordingly, the Ottawa leader 
once again tried to enlist the Hurons in his campaign. Meeting with the Hurons sometime 
in early May, Pontiac informed them that he would soon begin the attack and demanded 
the Hurons "give him an immediate answer." The Huron headmen, insisted that they 
must first consult with their people and deferred their response, and Pontiac grudgingly 
granted them two days to consider the proposal. As late as May 8, the day before 
hostilities began at the fort, Pontiac remained "occupied with the Hurons and 
Potawatomis who had remained in their villages."170 Yet after fully considering 
Pontiac's proposition, the Hurons once again elected to "remain neuter in the War," and 
therefore did not participate in Pontiac's abortive attempt to surprise the fort on May 9. 171 
Far from participating in the attack, the Hurons sought to undermine Pontiac's campaign. 
On May 10, the "Wiandotes [Hurons'] Chiefs," presumably Theata and Babi, visited 
Gladwin at the British fort on their way to a meeting with the Ottawas, where they 
promised "to endeavor to solicitate and perusuade the [Ot]Tawas from committing 
further Hostilities." Although Robert Roberts believed that Pontiac had "prevailed on 
[the Hurons] to sing the War Song" after "counceling a long while" later that day, the 
170 Ibid., 35. 
171 
"Journal oflndian Congress," 15 Dec. 1763, WJP, 10:965. 
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Hurons appeared determined to persist in their neutrality given Pontiac's demand for 
cooperation on the following day. 172 
If Pontiac was already annoyed, the Hurons' latest insolence enraged him. Not 
only had they failed to recognize Ottawa seniority at Detroit, but had even collaborated 
with the British against his plans. Pontiac therefore visited the Huron village in person 
on 11 May and issued an ultimatum. If they did not join the fight, Pontiac would order 
his followers to attack the Hurons themselves. The Potawatomis likewise visited their 
Huron allies either the same or following day and informed the Hurons that Pontiac had 
likewise threatened them that "they were to die the next Morning, unless they [the 
Potawatomis] Joined the Ottawas." The Potawatomis had finally decided to join Pontiac 
and encouraged the Hurons to do so as well. Pontiac's threats reminded the Hurons of 
their vulnerability and the long tradition of Ottawa dominance of Huron affairs. Still 
disinclined to join the campaign, the Huron warriors advocated "attacking the Ottawas" 
instead of the British. 173 
At length Theata and Babi accepted the hopelessness of refusing Pontiac's 
demands. Finding themselves "threatened and crowded so closely" by Pontiac's warriors 
and admitting that they "were weak," the Huron leaders eventually consented to join the 
Ottawas rather than risk the Ottawas' wrath. As Theata and Babi explained to their 
warriors, they had little choice in the matter. Pontiac's forces, already numbering some 
four hundred Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi warriors far outnumbered the Hurons' 
sixty warriors then present. And even if the Hurons abandoned Detroit to escape Pontiac, 
172 Robert Rogers, "Journal of the Siege of Detroit, taken from the Officers who were then in the Fort," in 
Hough, Diary of the Siege of Detroit, 128-29. 
173 
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they worried that the Ottawas and Potawatomis would "fall upon us and kill our wives 
and children. 174" As the Hurons later pointed out, the British lacked the strength to 
"assist [the Hurons] in case they shoulde be attack'd," and justifiably feared that the 
Ottawas "should declare War against them."175 Accordingly, the Hurons grudgingly 
accepted the futility of resisting Pontiac's demands. They agreed to join the siege on 
May 12 and joined the Potawatomi warriors, who had taken positions south of the British 
fort.I76 
The Ottawas and Hurons had therefore played out a familiar drama in early May 
1763. By demanding that the Hurons join the campaign, Pontiac had thus demanded that 
the Hurons recognize Ottawa seniority at Detroit. Pontiac, who had gathered an army of 
several hundred warriors, had little need for the paltry force of sixty Huron warriors. 
Rather Pontiac's insistence that the Hurons join the campaign had more to do with 
political and symbolic considerations. Pontiac sought to show everybody-his allies, the 
British, the Iroquois, and most of all the Hurons-that the Ottawas remained the elder 
brothers at Detroit and that the Hurons would accept their position or face the same fate 
as the hated British. To the Hurons, veterans of a long-running dispute with the Ottawas 
over status, the message was abundantly clear. The Ottawas had asserted their seniority 
and the Hurons must acknowledge it or suffer the consequences. By resisting Pontiac's 
pretentious, the Hurons had denied that seniority and had instead asserted their autonomy. 
Ultimately, however, Theata and Babi acknowledged an unpleasant truth that their 
174 [Navarre], "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," 62. 
175 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 44. The Hurons also sought to keep their negotiations with the 
British secret from the Ottawas by requesting for a "secret council" and entering the fort through a "false 
gate." [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 139, 186. 
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ancestors had often been forced to confront. Although they could often act autonomously 
and exert considerable influence, they remained a relative! y small community dwarfed by 
their Anishinaabe neighbors who "crowded [them] so closely." 177 As had so many of 
their ancestors, these Huron leaders acknowledged the Ottawas' might and acquiesced to 
their demands. As the Hurons bitterly complained to anyone who might listen in the 
following months, the Ottawas had "Compelled" them to fight. 178 But, as their ancestors 
had, the Hurons continued to plot against the Ottawas. 
Although Pontiac had forced the Hurons to join the campaign in the short term, he 
had not resolved the issue. The Hurons continued to resist Pontiac's assertions of Ottawa 
suzerainty at Detroit. Never enthusiastic supporters of the conflict, Huron warriors only 
fought perfunctorily and soon abandoned the siege altogether. The Hurons participated 
in the siege all day on May 12, but did not return on the following day. Instead they 
attacked a barge commanded by Chapman, seized Chapman's merchandise, including 
rum, and took several British survivors captive. Apart from participating in the capture 
of Presqu'lle in June, once again under duress from the Ottawas, the Hurons refused to 
participate in the hostilities. 
By May 16, only four days after they had grudgingly joined Pontiac's campaign, 
Theata and Babi sought to abandon it completely. On that day, Gladwin learned that the 
Hurons "had withdrawn from the plot," and had left their fort. 179 A week later, on May 
22, they therefore sent the long-time Huron interpreter, Jacques Baudry dit des Buttes dit 
177 Ibid., 62. 
178 
"Extract of a Court of Enquiry Held by Order of Major Gladwin to Enquire into the Manner of the 
Taking of Presqu'Isle, Detroit," 20 June 1763, MPHSCR, 27:638-39. 
179 Ibid., 81. 
305 
Saint-Martin, to speak to Gladwin in their name. 180 Admitting that they had participated 
in the siege and confiscated Chapman's goods, the Hurons wondered if Gladwin "wou' d 
make Peace with them" if they surrendered their prisoners and made restitution for the 
stolen merchandise. Yet the Hurons did not simply offer neutrality. They also offered to 
install themselves at a "small Island" near the mouth of the Detroit River where they 
could protect British vessels on their way to the fort. 181 Although Gladwin did not trust 
the Hurons enough to approve of their move to the mouth of the river, he did promise to 
"make Peace with them." He also asked them to "remain quiet, or use their Endeavors to 
separate Pontiac & his followers." The following day, the Hurons responded that they 
would "remain neuter" for five or six days and to try "by some Means" to alienate 
Pontiac from his supporters. After those five days, on 27 May, the Hurons once again 
sent Saint-Martin to speak to Gladwin. The interpreter reported that the Hurons were 
"still resolv' d to remain Neuter" and that they would abandon Detroit altogether if the 
Ottawas "oblig'd them to take up Arms."182 
At the same time, the Hurons also offered to "oblige Pontiac to come to their 
Terms" in conjunction with the Shawnees and Delawares. 183 By doing so, the Hurons 
sought once again to leverage their relationship with other nations into power over the 
Ottawas and other Anishinaabe peoples. As had Cheanonvouzon with the Iroquois and 
Miamis in the 1700s and Sastaretsy with the Iroquois and Flatheads in the 1730s, Theata 
180 Baudry, more often referred to as Saint-Martin, was married to Robert Navarre's daughter, Marie Anne. 
Navarre likely learned much of what he knew about the Hurons during the siege through his son-in-law 
(ibid., 82). 
181 The diarist did not specify the island, but it may well have been Bois Blanc Island, the site of the Huron 
mission from 1742 until 1749. 
182 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 12-14, 16. 
183 In the event the Hurons did not convince the Ottawas and Shawnees to abandon the siege, but the 
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and Babi sought to secure Huron autonomy from the Ottawas by appealing to powerful 
allies. The Hurons had, after all, enjoyed an especially familiar relationship with the 
Delawares and Shawnees, dating to their first forays into the Ohio Valley in the 1730s 
and they hoped to use that friendship to their advantage. Although the gambit had little 
hope for success since the Delawares and Shawnees proved just as hostile to the British 
as Pontiac and had in fact initiated the violence, the Hurons' promise speaks to their 
desire to use their diplomatic pull with Ohio Valley nations to assert Huron autonomy 
and undermine Ottawa power. 
While Navarre credited the French habitants, and especially Father Potier, for the 
Hurons' defection, the Hurons had their own reasons for distancing themselves from 
Pontiac. Navarre noted that Potier had held a council with the Hurons on May 14 in 
which he implored the Hurons to remain neutral and refused to grant the sacraments to 
any Huron who participated in the siege. 184 When the Hurons announced that they would 
no longer participate in the campaign on May 16, therefore, Navarre credited the "efforts 
of Father Potier" in securing their neutrality. 185 Yet Navarre almost certainly exaggerated 
Potier's role in the Huron decision to leave the siege in order to demonstrate the loyalty 
of the French habitants to the British Crown. Gladwin and the other British officers 
suspected that the habitants had colluded, or at least encouraged, Pontiac's plot. 186 
Therefore Navarre sought to demonstrate that Potier and the other French people at the 
post remained loyal to their new sovereign by emphasizing the role that Potier had played 
184 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 76-77. 
185 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 81. 
186 Jenkins to Amherst, 28 March 1763, CCOD, 401; Affidavit, 11 June 1763, ibid., 407-408; Jenkins to 
Amherst, 22 June 1763, 434; Gladwin to Amherst, 8 July 1763, ibid., 392. 
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in the Hurons' decision to abandon Pontiac. In reality, however, the Hurons had 
consistently resisted the Ottawas' invitations and had only participated perfunctorily 
when they did participate. The Hurons' decision to abandon Pontiac, then, owed more to 
their aversion to Pontiac and to Ottawas' pretention of authority over the Hurons. Their 
offer not only to remain neutral but to actively undermine the Ottawas' efforts likewise 
suggests that the Hurons had their own reasons, quite apart from being denied 
Communion, for opposing the Ottawas. The Hurons sought once again to gain the 
advantage in their age-old struggle with the Ottawas for dominance at Detroit. 
Although the bulk of the Hurons remained neutral through the rest of May and 
into June, Pontiac once again sought to force the Hurons into hostilities with the British. 
Around June 15, several war parties, including some Hurons, left Detroit for the British 
post at Presqu'Ile, at the site of current-day Erie, Pennsylvania. 187 The native warriors 
attacked the fort on May 20. During a cease-fire in the fighting, the Huron warriors told 
John Christie, the commanding officer of the garrison, that they had been "compelled to 
take up arms against Detroit by the Outawas."188 The Hurons also offered to let Christie 
and his garrison leave in peace if he surrendered the post. Although the Hurons reneged 
on their promise, took Christie and his soldiers captive, and may have killed some, they 
delivered Christie and some others to Gladwin soon after they returned to Detroit. 189 
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While some Hurons participated in the assault on Presqu'lle under duress, Theata 
and Babi sought to withdraw from the campaign altogether. Heretofore, the Hurons, 
fearing Ottawa retribution for their overtures to the British, had dealt with the British 
only through the mediation of their interpreter, Saint-Martin. As soon as the bulk of the 
Ottawa warriors left to attack Presqu'lle, the Hurons felt emboldened to visit the British 
fort in person and speak with Gladwin. 190 On June 16, the day after the warriors had 
departed, the Hurons entered Detroit by a "false gate" and held a council with Gladwin. 
The Hurons offered "many excuses" for their participation in the siege, most likely 
arguing, as they would do ceaselessly in the months to come, that they only joined the 
campaign when the Ottawas had forced them to. They noted, however, that they had not 
taken part in the fighting for a month and asked Gladwin to grant them peace. Although 
he made no firm peace with them, Gladwin presented the Huron leaders with a flag as a 
"sign of union" between the Hurons and British.191 This basic position-that they had 
been forced into fighting by the Ottawas, but had only fought briefly and under duress-
thereafter became the official Huron line, repeated every time they met with British 
representatives. 
Encouraged by this meeting and by the Potawatomis' apparent pending defection 
from the alliance, the Hurons resolved not only to make a separate peace with the British, 
but also actively to undermine Pontiac's coalition. On July 7, shortly after the Hurons 
who had participated in the attack on Presqu'lle returned to Detroit, the entire Huron 
190 The Hurons could not have relied on Saint-Martin if they had wanted, as the habitant had taken refuge 
from the Hurons inside the British fort on 1 July. [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 37; [Navarre], 
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village held a council and decided to meet with Gladwin the next day. 192 Arriving at the 
British fort the following day, the Hurons once again disclaimed any responsibility for 
the start of the hostilities. They claimed, somewhat disingenuously, that they had known 
"nothing of this Affair at the Commencement" because Pontiac had not revealed his plans 
until he had gathered a force sufficient to "overpower them." Even then, the Hurons had 
only fired at the British for "one day" before leaving the siege. Gladwin accepted the 
Hurons' explanation for their participation. 193 If the Hurons returned all the goods that 
they had looted and the prisoners they had taken, the commandant told them, their "errors 
would be pardoned and the past forgotten." The Huron delegates returned to their 
village, where they reported Gladwin's promises. 194 
True to their word, the Hurons returned to the fort the following day, 9 July, and 
brought seven British captains, including Christie from Presqu'Ile. They also pledged to 
bring in the merchandise they had looted from Chapman and others, down to the last 
"needle."195 Furthermore, the Hurons informed Gladwin that they planned to escape with 
the Potawatomis and "build a kind of Stockade" on the Huron River, near the mouth of 
the Detroit River, where they could defend themselves "against the Ottawas in case they 
should declare War against them."196 The plan, which the Hurons apparently tried to 
enact in early August, demonstrates the enmity between the Ottawas and Hurons and the 
always present possibility of violence between the Ottawas and the Hurons. Fully aware 
192 Ibid., 178. 
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that they could not oppose the Ottawas alone, the Hurons reached out to the Potawatomis 
for protection and for help implementing their plans for the region. 
The Hurons' proposal also underscores the extent to which they found their 
freedom to act circumscribed in 1763. The Hurons' protestations that they had 
participated in the conflict only under duress from Pontiac was much more than self-
serving spin. Pontiac, at the head of a large Anishinaabe army, vastly outnumbered the 
Hurons. The Ottawa leader had directly confronted the Hurons and threatened to attack 
them if they did not join the fight. Theata explained his reason for joining the siege by 
noting that, if they refused to participate, they would have to "abandon our lands and flee 
with our wives and children" and even then, they could not guarantee their own safety. 197 
In July they were still considering leaving Detroit until British reinforcements arrived 
who could "assist them in case they should be attack' d." They even suggested moving 
with the Potawatomis to the Huron River south of Detroit where they could erect a 
"Stockade ... to defend themselves against the Ottawa in case they should declare War 
against them."198 Moreover, as soon as threat of Ottawa reprisals dimmed, the Hurons 
sought to reassure the British of their loyalty. When many of the Anishinaabe warriors 
left in June, the Hurons contacted Gladwin. When the warriors left for good in 
September, Babi likewise visited the British to assure them of their good intentions, 
explaining that the Ottawas had theretofore blocked them from coming to visit the 
British. 
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The Hurons' determination to make peace with the British, which coincided with 
Potawatomi overtures of peace toward the British, once again outraged Pontiac. On July 
10, the day after the Hurons had turned their prisoners over to Gladwin, Pontiac came to 
the Huron village to reassert Ottawa authority, as he had on May 11. Pontiac reminded 
the Hurons of the Ottawas might and threatened them not to make peace with the British. 
To drive home his point, he brought "fifteen of his best Warriors completely arm' d." 
Unlike the meeting in May, however, Pontiac's show of force had "no effect" on the 
Hurons. 199 Buoyed by their talks with Gladwin, the return of some of their warriors, and 
the Potawatomis' wavering allegiance to Pontiac, the Hurons refused to acquiesce to the 
Ottawa's demand. Instead they returned to the British fort the July 11, where they 
surrendered the rest of their prisoners, as well as the goods they had pilfered from 
Chapman and other traders. The Huron leader Babi even surrendered a native slave who 
had been adopted into his family which, as Hay noted "was a very extraordinary thing, as 
they seldom give up a Prisoner that is adopted."200 As British lieutenant Edward Jenkins 
observed, the Hurons seemed "very anxious to get out of the scrape which the Ottawas 
and Chippewains [Ojibwas] have drawed them into." Satisfied that the Hurons had met 
the terms of peace, Gladwin extended a provisional peace to the Hurons and promised to 
recommend that General Amherst sign an official treaty with them.201 Satisfied with the 
Hurons defection, James MacDonald, noted that the British "had several Councils with 
the Waindotes [Hurons] ... during the Siege."202 
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Although Gladwin thought that the Hurons might rejoin Pontiac's confederacy 
again in late July, the majority of the Hurons honored their peace agreement with 
Gladwin.203 On July 26 the Hurons met with the Ottawa, Shawnee, and Delaware 
delegates at the Huron village. Some of the Hurons apparently agreed to resume the 
hostilities at the meeting?04 They even fired a few shots at a barge carrying British 
reinforcements to Detroit, and some may have participated in the Battle of Bloody Run a 
few days later.205 Yet on July 27 Andre, a Huron leader from the Lorette community, 
informed Gladwin that the Hurons "told the Ottawas that notwithstanding" their promise 
to resume hostilities, "they wou' d not fight" 206 Anticipating the Ottawas' anger at this 
latest refusal, the Hurons briefly moved to the relative safety of Grosse Ile in late July 
and invited the Potawatomis to join them. Although Navarre interpreted this move as a 
ploy to lure the British into a false sense of security, the Hurons likely moved in order to 
escape the Ottawas.207 Three weeks earlier, after all, the Hurons had told Gladwin that 
they intended to move to the Huron River-which empties into Lake Eriet near Grosse 
203 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 197, [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 48-49, 
MacDonald, "Journal of the Siege of Detroit," CCOD, 14-15; Gladwin to Amherst, 26 July 1763, ibid., 
442b, Jenkins to Amherst, 28 July 1763, in ibid., 445; 8 August 1763, Gladwin to Amherst, 8 Aug. 1763, in 
ibid., 455-57. 
204 [Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 195-98 
205 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 26, 53-54. 
206 Ibid., 52-53; Gladwin to Amherst, 26 July 1763, CCOD, 442b; Jenkins to Amherst, 28 July 1763, in 
ibid., 445. 
207 Navarre reported that the Hurons had only pretended to leave, but had really set up an ambush to 
surprise the British whom they expected to attack the village. Yet Navarre offered no proof for the claim, 
and Navarre or his informants might have mistaken the Hurons' efforts to flee the area as subterfuge. 
[Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," 203. 
313 
lie-and build a stockade with the Potawatomis to defend themselves from the 
Ottawas. 208 
During the spring and summer of 1763, Pontiac had consistently tried to force the 
Hurons to participate in his siege and, in doing so, acknowledge Ottawa suzerainty. The 
Hurons, who had more reason to support the British, had successfully resisted Ottawa 
attempts to force them to participate in the war. The Hurons were, as Gladwin admitted, 
"less culpable" than the others, and had been "led into the War, and have done but little 
Mischief. "209 
Having struggled over status the entire summer of 1763, the Ottawas and Hurons 
continued their fight even after the Ottawas left Detroit to establish hunting camps on the 
Maumee River in the fall of 1763. Although he expressed half-hearted regrets for his 
action, Pontiac remained defiant and intent upon resuming his campaign against the 
British, hopefully with French help, in the spring. Still determined to force the Hurons to 
acknowledge Ottawa supremacy, Pontiac warned the Hurons not to make peace with the 
British and actively patrolled the road to Detroit to keep them from visiting the fort. As 
the Mohawk man, Aaron, told Sir William Johnson in early October, the Ottawas had 
promised the Hurons "if they attempt to make Peace without their [the Ottawas'] Consent 
or Advice they will directly destroy them, and that if they attempt to come to the [British] 
Fort they will be considered by them [the Ottawas] as Englishmen." More explicitly, the 
208 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 44, 54, 56, 59; [Henri-Louis Boishebert], "Carte du Detroit et 
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209 Gladwin to Amherst, 8 July 1763, CCOD, 395; Gladwin to Johnson, 11 May 1764, WJP, 10:191. 
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Ottawas told the Hurons that, since they "liv' d near the English and lik' d them ... they 
should perish with them.'mo The Ottawa leader thereby sought to restore the age-old 
status quo at Detroit. He sought to remind the Hurons of their tutelage to the Ottawas by 
prohibiting them from acting without his "Consent." He alluded to the Ottawas' superior 
numbers by assuring them that he could "destroy them." 211 Pontiac maintained this 
position as late as July 1764, after the Hurons had concluded a formal peace with the 
British, when the Ottawa again "threaten[ ed] to extirpate the Hurons for making their 
Submission."212 Yet the Hurons did not submit to the Ottawas' threats. The Hurons had, 
as they had intermittently since their time at Michilimackinac, defied Ottawa attempts to 
dominate them and chartered an autonomous course. 
In contrast to, and in defiance of, the Ottawas, the Hurons not only maintained 
their loyalty to the British in the fall and winter but even fashioned themselves as 
ambassadors for the British to other nations in 1764. As soon as the Ottawas left the 
Detroit region in the fall, the Hurons regularly returned to assure Gladwin of their 
goodwill and loyalty. On Sept. 24, for example, Babi visited Gladwin at the fort and paid 
"him his Respects."213 The Huron leader explained that he would have come in sooner, 
but the Ottawas and Potawatomis, who had recently left, had been patrolling the road to 
the fort. In early December, the Mohawk man Aaron told Johnson that the "old Men of 
the Wiandots Nation" wanted to meet with him, and sent him wampum belts in order to 
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ask for peace.214 On 10 January 1764, Babi returned with Theata and wished Gladwin a 
happy new year. Four days later, the two chiefs returned once again along with another 
leader identified as "the Doctor's Son." The Hurons discussed the "Beginning of this 
Indian War" with Gladwin, almost certainly pointing out their innocence in the 
hostilities.215 Again in late April, Theata and several other Huron leaders met with 
Gladwin, and "repented of all the Ill we may have done." Promising to never 
contemplate "any bad Thing for the Future," Theata asked Gladwin to communicate their 
goodwill and loyalty to General Gage. 216 
Gladwin did indeed inform his superiors of the Hurons eagerness to reconcile 
with the British, and the Hurons began formal treaty negotiations with the British 
(Gladwin had lacked the authority to grant them anything more than a provisional peace). 
In early May, William Johnson, in his capacity as the superintendent, sent a Mohawk 
named Peter, to discuss the preliminaries of a British-Huron peace.217 Peter relayed Sir 
William's message that he had decided not to "extirpate" the Hurons, if "Sasterredsey"-
here apparently used as a metonym for the Huron community-"heartily repent[ed] of 
what he has done." Responding for the Hurons, Babi admitted that he and other Hurons 
had participated in the strike but he now hung his "Ax up in the Air" and refused to fight 
against the British any further. 218 These preliminary negotiations led to a formal treaty 
summit at Niagara in July. Blaming the Ottawas once again, the Hurons reminded 
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Johnson that they had been "Compelled to [fight the British] by your powerful Enemies 
the Ottawas" but had nonetheless tried to "Observe our Engagements" and had regularly 
communicated with Gladwin during the crisis.219 Apparently satisfied with their 
explanations and convinced of their goodwill, Johnson agreed to a "firm and absolute 
peace" with the Hurons and pledged that any "past offenses shall be forgotten."220 
Even before they concluded peace with Johnson in July 1764, the Hurons began 
serving as intermediaries for the British and their neighbors in the region. The pro-British 
Hurons, who had largely remained around Detroit in the fall and winter of 1763-1764, 
began an energetic campaign to reconcile with their fellow Hurons at Sandusky in the 
spring. After the pro-British Hurons met with Johnson's representatives in May, Theata 
visited Sandusky and told the Hurons there that he had made a preliminary agreement 
with the British.Z21 Although the meeting went poorly and the other pro-French Hurons 
mocked Theata's faith in the British, a delegation of pro-French Hurons from Sandusky 
did arrive at Detroit at the beginning of the following month. They met with Gladwin on 
July 4 and surrendered five prisoners and asked for peace with the British. The following 
day, these pro-French leaders came to Gladwin again, this time accompanied by "some of 
the Hurons of this Village." According to Gladwin, these Hurons had decided to "join 
their own Village" once more and hence to abandon their hostility toward the British. By 
doing so, the erstwhile rebellious Hurons reported that they hoped to encourage "those of 
Sandusky" to do the same. 222 As late as 1766 Theata acknowledged that "there are some 
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"An Indian Congress," 17 July 1764, WJP, 11:281-83. 
220 
"Articles of Peace between Sir William Johnson and the Huron Indians," 1764, in NYCD, 7:650-51. 
221 
"Indian Intelligence," June 1764, WJP, 11:227-29. 
222 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 101. 
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whose Hearts are not well inclined" and promised to do "every thing in our power to 
unite all our nation as far as to Sandusky."223 
In a particularly ironic twist, the Hurons even worked to help some of the Ottawas 
reach an accommodation with the British. In May 1764 a portion of the Ottawa village, 
presumably the peace faction led by a leader named Manitou, requested "the intercession 
of the Hurons" to help them finalize a peace deal with the British?24 Later that month 
Manitou and other Ottawa leaders asked the British to send representatives to their 
villages on the Maumee River and to "get one or two of the Huron Chiefs to go with 
them." This request suggests that they recognized the Hurons' favored status with the 
British and hoped to convince their erstwhile allies to mediate a peace between them and 
the British. 225 When British officers met with the Ottawas at Detroit the following 
September, the Hurons, who had already made peace in July, heralded the move and gave 
their consent to the proceedings.226 By officially condoning the proceedings and daring 
to give the Ottawas advice, the Hurons demonstrated their role in the new order. 
They played this role again in 1765, when they sought to proctor a peace between 
the Shawnees and Delawares, the Hurons' longtime allies, and the British. The Hurons 
launched raids against the still defiant Shawnees and Delawares in the winter of 1764 and 
1765, but stopped when they learned that those nations had accepted a provisional 
truce. 227 The following August, the Hurons met with the Shawnees and others in the 
223 
"Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pontiac and other Indians," July 1766, in NYCD, 7:862. 
224 The letter has unfortunately not survived and all we have is a brief description in Johnson's calendar of 
papers. Du Couagne to Johnson, 12 May 1764, WJP, 4:422; Parmenter, "Pontiac's War," 631. 
225 [Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," 71, 104, 116 (quotation). 
226 
"Congress with the Western Nations," 7-10 Sept. 1764, WJP, 4:530. 
227 Johnson to Gage, 21 Sept. 1764, WJP, 4:544; "Statement of General Bradstreet," in Hough, The Siege 
of Detroit in 1763, 157; Alexander McKee to Johnson, 14 Jan. 1765, WJP, 11:531; John Campbell to 
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company of George Croghan and other officials. The Hurons "exhorted the several 
Nations to behave themselves" and to make peace with the British.228 Again in 1767 the 
Hurons chided some Saginaw Ottawas for killing Englishmen. They "Spoke to them & 
Gave them a Belt to extort them to behave well for the future." 229 
The Hurons' newfound authority and precedence was on display at July 1766 
meeting between Johnson and those Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis who had yet to 
make peace with the British, including Pontiac himself. After Pontiac and the others had 
begged for forgiveness and Johnson had agreed to grant them peace, Theata addressed the 
assembly. Noting that he and his people had long-since made peace with the British and 
had since acted faithfully, he exhorted the Ottawas and others to "behave in the same way 
we do." In case Pontiac failed to catch the first warning, Theata repeated that he advised 
"all the rest of our Brethn" to follow the Hurons' lead and obey the British. Theata 
concluded by noting that he spoke "in the name of all the Nations about Detroit." In a 
none-too-subtle way, Theata had reminded Pontiac of the new order of things at Detroit. 
Now the Hurons, allied to the British, acted as the elder brothers who advised the junior 
Ottawas. Moreover, the Hurons freely spoke for all their neighbors at the post. The 
Hurons seemed to be serving at this conference, as they had before, as the trusted allies of 
the British. 
Their loyalty during the conflict and assistance afterwards garnered the Hurons 
what they had always wanted, a place of prestige at Detroit and autonomy from the 
Johnson, 20 Feb. 1765, ibid., 11:587-88; "Croghan's Journal," 1765, in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 
155. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Jehu Hay to George Croghan, WJP, 5:729. 
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Ottawas. That process had begun with the fall of New France and had been consolidated 
by the summer of 1764 when the Hurons became the first of the combatants to conclude a 
formal peace with Sir William. In 17 67, George Croghan spoke to the Hurons in the 
presence of their neighbors and thanked them for their "Steady and good behavior since 
the Peace," as well as the good conduct of their "Young Men."230 The Ottawas at the 
assembly certainly appreciated and likely resented the tremendous inversion that had 
taken place since 1760. In what must have been a poignant inversion, Theata and Babi 
served as spokesmen and intermediaries for the British, just as the Ottawas Mikinic and 
Kinosaki had done for the French in the 1730s into the 1750s. Cheanonvouzon's plans 
had been accomplished. 
Conclusion 
Ironically Pontiac, one of the most acclaimed pan-Indian leaders in history, could 
not convince his nearest neighbors, the Hurons, to join his campaign in 1763. This 
paradox speaks volumes about what sort of place Detroit was not only in 1763 but also 
for decades before then. This story reinforces the interrelated contentions that have run 
throughout this study: that the peoples of Detroit remained distinct and autonomous, and 
that the interactions among them shaped the region and created the context in which 
colonialism operated. 
230 George Croghan, George Croghan's journal of his trip to Detroit in 1767, with his correspondence 
relating thereto: now published for the first time from the papers of General Thomas Gage in the William 
L. Clements Library, ed. by Howard H. Peckham (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1939), 43. 
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In 1763, as they had in 1706 and 1738 and other times, the Hurons and Ottawas 
demonstrated that neither they nor their neighbors in the region had abandoned their 
individual corporate identities. Even though they had been "inseparable companions" 
since the fall of Huronia over a century before, had lived at the same place, and had 
struggled against the Iroquois, Foxes, English, British, and Flatheads together, they still 
remained distinct peoples who prioritized the needs of their peculiar communities over 
the needs of their regional allies. When the Hurons saw an opportunity to gain the upper 
hand over their neighbors in 1763, many did so, risking their own safety in the process. 
The Michilimackinac Ottawas likewise refused to participate in the conflict, and the 
Potawatomis and Ojibwas did so only conditionally, willing to defect from Pontiac and 
the Detroit Ottawas if it suited their interests. That these peoples not only remained 
separate, but carried on a tradition of competition suggests that Detroit and the Great 
Lakes Region more generally was inhabited not by orphaned refugees clinging to each 
other and to their European foster parents, but by robust and proud peoples. Detroit, and 
the surrounding region, was peopled by culturally and ethnically distinct communities 
that vied or cooperated with one another to achieve their goals. 
The interactions between these peoples in tum shaped Pontiac's War. Although 
historians of Pontiac's War have paid close attention to the dynamics of inter-native 
relations, they have tended to focus more on those things which united the peoples of the 
Great Lakes Region with natives elsewhere, particularly in the Ohio River Valley. 231 As 
231 Richard White sees the action as an attempt of Onontio's children either to secure their purported 
"father's" return, or to force the British to take his place (White, The Middle Ground). Gregory Dowd 
argues that the conflict was a pan-Indian conflict about status within the empire, and that the Delawares, 
Ottawas, and others found unity in Neolin's promise of renewal (Dowd, War under Heaven). Michael 
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a result, these accounts have replicated a very traditional colonial narrative of Pontiac's 
War: a pan-Indian coalition, united by their distaste for British conduct and by a shared 
religious narrative articulated by Neolin, fought against the British in order to forestall 
territorial expansion and to maintain their autonomy. 
Yet, as we have seen, Pontiac's War was shaped by a larger set of dynamics 
whose roots extended farther back in time than the advent of British rule or N eo lin's 
vision quest. Without the geo-strategic cooperation and social connections between the 
Anishinaabe communities, Pontiac would have scarcely been able to field an army large 
enough to threaten the British (or the Hurons). If the Hurons had not maintained a long 
relationship with the Iroquois, moreover, the Hurons would not have enjoyed their 
newfound status at Detroit and would have been more inclined to join Pontiac's 
movement. Had the Hurons and Ottawas not fought for status since at least the 1670s, 
they might have acted in concert against the British instead of working at cross-purposes. 
The Anglo-Indian conflict, in short, was entangled within and circumscribed by a whole 
set of relationships that were only partly related to the larger imperial struggle. Had these 
interactions not been present, or had the people of the Great Lakes Region acted as a 
single, collective entity, the outcome of the conflict might have different. As it was, they 
shaped the contours and limits ofthat movement in consequential ways. Pontiac's War 
was much more than an Anglo-Indian struggle over the nature of empire or the place of 
Indians in the new regime, it was also a story of Anishinaabe cooperation, Huron-
Iroquois diplomacy, and Huron-Ottawa rivalry, as well as intra-Huron conflict. The war 
McConnell presents a more nuanced understanding of the event, finding "a complexity that belies the 
notion of a pan-Indian movement to forestall the English at any price." He likewise suggests that those 
who did participate did so for quite different reasons (McConnell, "The Search for Security," vii). 
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was indeed a "fight over status" as Gregory Dowd maintains, but that fight was more 
complicated than Dowd allows?32 The conflict was simultaneously a war about natives' 
abstract status in the empire and a very local conflict about status between the Hurons 
and the Ottawas. Those two fights cannot be disentangled. 
The fact that Pontiac's War, a paradigm of the struggle between invading 
colonizers and resistant natives, was situated in a set of relationships among native 
peoples demonstrates the extent to which the colonial relationship in general was 
embedded in a whole set of relationships. The pattern in which French and British people 
interacted with native peoples was constituted by the ways in which native peoples 
interacted with one another. Any time the French interacted with the Hurons, for 
example, they did so in the context of the complicated lines which connected the Hurons 
to their Iroquois and Miamis allies, their Ottawas rivals, and even rival Huron factions. 
Indeed, much of the care the French took to keep the Hurons satisfied owed to the 
omnipresent possibility that the Hurons would defect from the French alliance and join 
the Covenant Chain. In the first years of his administration as governor, the Marquis de 
Beauharnois removed Alphone de Tonty from his post at Detroit because the Hurons 
demanded it. When the Hurons petitioned for his removal, they ominously threatened to 
take their "fire"-meaning their village-"elsewhere," presumably to Seneca territory.233 
Conversely, Onontio could only claim the influence he did in the Detroit region because 
of the cultural and kinship connections between the Anishinaabe peoples. As 
Beauharnois observed in 1738, New France could not afford a conflict between the 
232 Dowd, War under Heaven, 2. 
233 Beauharnois au rninistre, 27 Sept. 1727, COAM, CllA, vol. 49, fols. 109-112v. 
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Hurons and Ottawas because the "hurons are allied with the 5 Iroquois Nations, and the 
Outaoi.iais with all those of the pa"is d' en haut. "234 
Conversely their relationship with the French reshaped the patterns of interactions 
among native people. Conflict for access to French and British merchandise and 
technology intensified rivalry between the Hurons and Ottawas. When Gov. Callieres 
ordered that a house be built for Cheanonvouzon the Ottawas demanded the same mark 
of French regard.235 The French decision to anoint the Ottawas as the "elder sons" of the 
region both recognized the Ottawas' status among their neighbors and enhanced that 
status. 
"Euro-Indian" relations therefore cannot be abstracted from a whole set of 
relationships which fundamentally shaped and continued to reshape the terms on which 
native and European encountered one another. Relationships between native peoples 
constrained the ways in which French and British officials could act and defined the 
limits of the possible in the region, just as the presence of European technologies, 
peoples, and alliances in the region constrained native autonomy and created new 
opportunities. Rather than resorting to metaphors about a cultural "middle ground" or an 
impenetrable "American woods," we should view intercultural interactions in the Great 
Lakes Region in the same way an ecologist views an ecosystem: as a complicated and 
integrated system of interlocking processes and mutually constituting relationships. 236 
An ecologist knows that no two organisms in an ecosystem interact in a closed system. 
234 
"les hurons etant alliez avec les 5 Nations Iroquois, et les Outaoi.iais avec tous celles des pals d'en haut," 
Resume de lettres de Beauharnois, Jan. 1739, in ibid., vol. 72, fol. 393v. 
235 Cadillac to the Minister, 31 Aug. 1703, MPHSCR, 33:166. 
236 White, The Middle Ground; James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999) 37-38. 
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Rather each relationship is connected to, and inseparable from, a whole host of others, 
and each process is contingent upon a score of other processes. While I do not intend to 
equate the native and European peoples of Detroit with non-human organisms, or to 
suggest that power relations between groups functioned like a food chain, I nonetheless 
believe that the analogy is productive. Only by understanding the totality of these 
relationships can we understand how colonial relationships worked. 
Yet this story is not only about Detroit, or about the Great Lakes region. It also 
has significance for the whole New World and other colonial contexts. Researchers have 
shown that events that we have typically seen as the paradigms of colonialism were 
actually profoundly shaped by and enmeshed in interactions among native American 
peoples. Take, for example, Hernan Cortes's conquest ofTenochtitlan in Mexico in the 
1520s. Traditional accounts of the Conquest have ascribed that victory to the superiority 
of Spanish arms and technology, as well as to epidemic diseases. But analysis has 
suggested that Cortes could never have conquered the city without the aid of the Aztecs' 
traditional enemies, particularly the Tlaxcalans and tribute city-states, who provided 
support to Cortes and whose warriors outnumbered the Castilian conquistadores by a 
factor of ninty-nine to one. As in the Great Lakes, the relationship between the 
"colonized" and the "colonizers" was embedded in and inextricable from a whole host of 
h 1 . h' b . 1 237 ot er re atwns 1ps etween native peop es. 
237 Camilla Townsend, "Burying the White Gods: New Perspectives on the Conquest of Mexico," Journal 
of American History (June 2003): 659-87; Ross Hassig, Mexico and the Spanish Conquest, 2nd. Ed. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006). 
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EPILOGUE 
Exploring the Detroit River with Tocqueville, 1831 
In 1831, a little more than a century after Charlevoix visited Detroit, another 
celebrated French traveler, Alexis de Tocqueville, visited the region. Tocqueville 
encountered a dramaically changed place. Where Charlevoix had found the palisades of 
the native villages surrounded by native fields, Tocqueville saw the houses and barns of 
Euro-American inhabitants, which had, he judged, a "French appearance."1 Referring to 
the French practice of building their houses and buildings on the river's edge in 1781, the 
Moravian missionary David Zeisberger noted that the riverbank was "thickly settled, and 
is built like a village along the river."2 Where Charlevoix had seen Fort Pontchartrain 
proudly flying the white Bourbon banner, Tocqueville arrived at the post just a few years 
after the last fortress at Detroit had been dismantled, and the French flag replaced by Old 
Glory. 3 Where Charlevoix had encountered a social space connected by the rivers and 
lakes, Tocqueville found a river that served as a political divider between the United 
States and the British province of Upper Canada. Detroit had, in short, ceased to be a 
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1959), 134-135. 
2 Diary of David Zeisberger, A Moravian Missionary among the Indians of Ohio, trans. and ed. Eugene F. 
Bliss, (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co, 1885). As was the custom throughout the French riverine world, 
the plots at Detroit were laid out in long rectangular lots, with the short end abutting the river. This ensured 
that all habitants had access to the river for transportation purposes. See Carl Ekberg, The French Roots in 
the Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1998), 36. 
3 Brian Dunnigan, "Fortress Detroit, 1701-1826," in David Skaggs, and Larry Nelson, eds., The Sixty 
Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 183. 
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Figure 15: [Henri-Louis 
BoishebertJ, [Plans des terreins 
appurtenant aux franc;ais autor de 
Fort de PontchartrainJ, 1731. 
Centre des archives d'outre mer, 
Aix-en-Province, France. 
Tills 1731 map illustrates the 
characteristic longlots willch 
immigrants from the St. Lawrence 
Valley established at Detroit. Tills 
native place and had become the province of Euro-Americans and enslaved African 
Americans.4 
The transformations that Tocqueville encountered in 1831 had their roots in the 
French period. Although Cadillac had envisioned the post as a thriving agricultural space 
and a feudal fiefdom, Detroit had fallen far short of his aspirations.5 In 1708, Aigremont 
had noted that few inhabitants of the area bothered to farm in the region and there were 
only a few lonely horses and cattle to pull plows.6 Conditions scarcely improved over the 
next thirty years. Vaudreuil, who had always opposed the establishment of Detroit, had 
tried to undermine the post through neglect, and his client, Alphonse de Tonty, did very 
little to encourage French settlement there. During that period the French population at 
Detroit had stagnated and even declined on occasion.7 As a result, by 1755 Charles 
4 Norman MacRae, "Blacks in Detroit, 1736-1833: The Search for Freedom and Community and Its 
Implications for Educators" (Ph.D. diss., University of Micillgan, 1982). 
5 Lina Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit, 1701-1765," (PhD. diss., Dept. of History, 
Universite Laval, 2002), 53, 87-93 ; Guillaume Teasdale, "The French of Orchard Country: Territory, 
Landscape, and Ethnicity in the Detroit River Region, 1680s-1810s," (PhD. diss., Dept. of History, York 
University, 2011). 
6 
"Letter from Sr. d' Aigremont Denouncing Cadillac Methods," 14 Nov. 1708, in MPHSCR, 33:425-26. 
7 Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit," 86-90. 
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Stuart counted "But 360 Familys" at the post, while George Croghan dismissed the 
habitants as "a lazy, idle" people, "depending chiefly on the savages for their 
subsistence." A British officer, Dedrick Brehm, put it bluntly in 1760: "The Settlement 
seems very little improved in 60 years."8 
Although Stuart and Croghan may not have been aware of it, the French 
population at Detroit had been growing since the mid-1730s. Finally securing 
encouragement from the crown, Louis Henry Deschamps, sieur de Boishebert began to 
grant more land outside the fort in the mid-1730s. With the Fox threat abated, habitants 
could finally start living on their lands, rather than in the safety of Fort Pontchartrain.9 
The French further encouraged this movement in the 1750s, when, after Orontony's 
failed coup demonstrated their vulnerability, colonial officials began actively 
encouraging migration to the fort. Supplying any volunteers with goods and livestock, 
the officials convinced a large convoy of settlers to move to Detroit in 1749.10 By 1754, 
those inhabitants had begun to sell their surplus grain; and a year later the governor could 
boast that the post "is a considerable one and well populated." 11 This growth continued 
after the British assumed control of the post. Between Boishebert' s tenure in the mid-
8 Likening Detroit to "Siberia," Brehm requested a transfer from the settlement. Brehm to Amherst, 23 
Deb. 1761, in CCCOD, 44; Brehm to Bouquet, 30 Nov. 1763, in Stevens and Kent, The Papers of Col. 
Henry Bouquet, 21: 1. 
9 Brian Dunnigan, Frontier Metropolis: Picturing Early Detroit, 1701-1838 (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2001), 21. 
10 Ibid., 35-37 ; Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit," 93-117 ; Gouger, Lina. "Les convois de 
colons de 1749-1750: Impulsion gouvernementale decisive pour le developpement de la region de 
Windsor." in Marcel Beneteau, ed., Passage du Detroit. (Windsor, Ont.: Humanities Research Group, 
University of Windsor, 2003):47-57. 
11 Fran<;ois Bigot au ministre, 10 Oct. 1759, in CAOM, CllA, vol. 104, fol. 136; Vaudreuil de Cavagnal au 
ministre, 30 Oct. 1755, in WHC, 18 :157; Memoir de Bourgainville, in Ibid., 170-73. 
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1730s and 1765, the population had grown from around 200 to nearly 900. 12 An English 
observer encountered three Canadian families moving from Montreal to Detroit in 1760, 
and Lt. Col. John Bradstreet observed in 1764 that the "Colony of Detroit grows fast." 13 
Cadillac's vision had finally been realized. 
Although the habitants and natives developed close ties, the growth of the 
European population had strained that relationship. Cheanonvouzon had long ago 
resisted the idea of moving to Detroit because he feared that his young men might kill 
French livestock. 14 While that fear might have been unfounded in 1702, it was not by 
1760. The Hurons complained to Johnson in 1762 that the "French Inhabitants commit 
great Trespass on their. . .lands" and cut wood on their lands while the Hurons were away 
hunting. Johnson predicted that such activity "must create uneasiness in i minds of i 
Indians and produce misunderstandings."15 In late April 1764, Theata met with Gladwin 
and told him that "Wood & Bark is very unhandy to us at our old Village" and asked for 
permission to move elsewhere. 16 In the face ofthis immigration, manyofDetroit's 
native peoples began moving to literally greener pastures, such as Sandusky and the 
southern reaches of the Detroit River. By 1777 the Hurons had four different settlements 
in the Detroit region, and the Potawatomis had moved to the Huron River. 17 Finally, in 
12 Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit," 53. 
13 
"The Detroit Journal," 1760, in WJP, 13:230-31; Colonel Bradstreet's Thoughts on Indian Affairs," in 
DRCHY, 7:693. Catherine Cangany argues that Detroit became a fully articulated part of the Atlantic 
World during the British period. "Frontier Seaport: Detroit's Transformation into an Atlantic Entrep6t, 
1701-1837, (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, The University of Michigan, 2009), 39. 
14 Mermet a Cadillac, 19 April1702, MDE, 5:220. 
15 Johnson to Croghan, 24 Oct. 1762, in WJP, 10:560-61. 
16 Despite this request, it is not clear whether the Hurons moved away at this time, and indeed they 
maintained their village at Detroit. [Jehu Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," in Franklin Hough, ed., 
Diary of the Siege of Detroit, Albany, NY: J. Munsell, 1865), 89. 
17 Dunnigan, Frontier Metropolis, 71. 
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1790 the Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and Hurons ceded much of their holdings 
around Detroit to the British crown and retained only two small reserves in the area. 18 
Yet if Detroit was no longer a predominantly native place in 1831, the natives had 
not disappeared. On his way up the Detroit River, Tocqueville saw "two stark naked 
savages in a canoe" adorned with "Rings hanging on the nose." He also saw an Indian 
village-perhaps the Huron Reserve halfway between Lake Erie and Detroit. 
Tocqueville juxtaposed the Hurons' bark houses and naked children with the British fort 
on the Windsor shore, marveling at the contrast between "extreme civilisation" and "the 
Figure 16: E.H., "A View of Detroit," July 25, 1794. From Burton Historical Collection, 
Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan. 
This view of Detroit in 1794 portrays the trappings of an expanding Euro-American presence at 
Detroit, such as buildings, sailed sloops, as well as evidence of continued native presence in the 
canoe filled with native people in the lower left-hand corner. 
18 R. Allen Douglas, Uppermost Canada: The Western District and the Detroit Frontier, 1800-1850 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2001), 5; Teasdale, "The French of Orchard Country." 
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extreme opposite." 19 Contrary to Anglo-American fantasies about the vanishing Indian 
that had inspired the policy of removal, the peoples of Detroit had not vanished, and had 
not really gone very far. Nor had these people renounced their identities as separate and 
distinct communities. Just two years before Tocqueville's arrival, the Ottawas, 
Potawatomis, and Ojibwas laid claim to the Huron Reserve, launching a bitter struggle 
between the Hurons and the Anishinaabe claimants, which, in turn launched an internal 
debate among the Hurons. 20 Such quarrels had a long lineage. That the Hurons and the 
Ottawas, who now only represented small communities in a large sea of Euro-Americans, 
continued to squabble over territory in the 1830s tells us much about the nature of that 
relationship. Despite the wholesale changes that had transformed Detroit from a native 
place to a Euro-American one, despite their movement from the heart of Detroit to its 
peripheries, despite the changes in colonial administrations, declarations of 
independence, and wars, the Hurons and Ottawas remained separate and sought 
advantage over their neighbors, and the Hurons responded to challenges through factional 
politics. Much had changed at Detroit. This, at least, had remained the same. 
19 Tocqueville, Journey to America, 135-36. 
20 Douglas, Uppermost Canada, 126-30; R. Cory, "A 19th c. Wyandot Site on the Detroit River," Kewa: 
Newsletter of the London Chapter, Ontario Archaeological Society, 87:1 (1977): 11-19. 
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